



MANITOBA PUBLIC UTILITIES BOARD

Re:

MANITOBA HYDRO
NEEDS FOR AND ALTERNATIVES TO
REVIEW OF MANITOBA HYDRO'S
PREFERRED DEVELOPMENT PLAN

Regis Gosselin	- Chairperson
Marilyn Kapitany	- Board Member
Larry Soldier	- Board Member
Richard Bel	- Board Member
Hugh Grant	- Board Member

HELD AT:

Public Utilities Board
400, 330 Portage Avenue
Winnipeg, Manitoba
March 31, 2014
Pages 4343 to 4600

1 APPEARANCES

2 Bob Peters) Board Counsel

3 Sven Hombach (np)

4

5 Patti Ramage) Manitoba Hydro

6 Marla Boyd)

7 Douglas Bedford (np))

8

9 Byron Williams) CAC

10

11 William Gange) GAC

12 Peter Miller (np))

13

14 Antoine Hacault) MIPUG

15

16 George Orle) MKO

17 Michael Anderson (np))

18

19 Jessica Saunders) MMF

20 Corey Shefman (np))

21

22 Christian Monnin) IEC

23 Michael Weinstein (np))

24

25

1	TABLE OF CONTENTS	
2		Page No.
3	List Exhibits	4346
4		
5	IEC POTOMAC ECONOMICS PANEL:	
6	ROBERT SINCLAIR, Affirmed (Qual.)	
7	Qualification of Witness	4356
8	Examination-in-chief by Mr. Christian Monnin	4369
9	Cross-examination by Mr. Byron Williams	4434
10	DAVID PATTON, Sworn (Qual.)	
11	Qualification of Witness	4475
12	Continued Cross-examination by Mr. Byron Williams	4479
13	Cross-examination by Mr. Antoine Hacault	4486
14	Cross-examination by Ms. Jessica Saunders	4546
15	Cross-examination by Ms. Patti Ramage	4555
16		
17	Certificate of Transcript	4600
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		

1	LIST OF EXHIBITS	
2	EXHIBIT NO.	PAGE NO.
3	POT-2-1	Potomac Economics Report on Export
4		Prices and Revenue 4366
5	POT-2-2	Potomac Economics Report Errata 4366
6	POT-3	Scope of Work for Potomac Economics 4367
7	POT-4	Potomac Economics Presentation 4367
8	MH-138	Table plotting Manitoba Hydro
9		firm energy based on DSM Level 2 4550
10	MH-139	Response to Undertakings 26 and
11		42 4550
12	MH-140	Response to Undertaking 36 4551
13	MH-141	Response to Undertaking 63 4551
14	MH-142	Response to Undertaking 64 4551
15	MH-143	Response to Undertaking 65 4552
16	MH-144	Response to Undertaking 66 4552
17	MH-145	Response to Undertaking 68 4552
18	MH-146	Response to Undertaking 72 4553
19	MH-147	Response to Undertaking 44 4553
20	MH-148	Response to Undertaking 69 4554
21	MH-149	Response to Undertaking 48 4554
22	MH-150	Response to Undertaking 54 4555
23	MH-151	Book of documents 4555
24		
25		

1 --- Upon commencing at 10:00 a.m.

2

3 THE CHAIRPERSON: Good morning. I
4 believe that we're ready to resume the proceedings of
5 the hearing. I hope everyone had a good weekend, and
6 I hope that you're refreshed for this week's events.
7 So I'll turn over the microphone to Mr. Peters,
8 please.

9 MR. BOB PETERS: Thank you. Good
10 morning, Mr. Chairman, Board members, ladies and
11 gentlemen. I would just like to speak to a few of the
12 timetabling changes that were communicated by email
13 to, I believe, most everybody this weekend, and for
14 the benefit I suppose of the transcript, to make sure
15 that we're all keeping current.

16 Certainly today's start at 10:00 a.m.
17 is partly as a result of, I'm sure, Dr. Sinclair's
18 travel adventures yesterday. But we're glad he's here
19 today and will understand his colleague will be
20 joining him this afternoon.

21 What also happened last Friday is
22 Manitoba Hydro had indicated that additional time was
23 required to deal with some financial analysis
24 information. And as a result of that, the schedule
25 had been revised to hopefully use Friday, April the

1 4th, to ask additional questions of Manitoba Hydro's
2 witnesses. That now does not appear to be a viable
3 option.

4 And so instead of Manitoba Hydro
5 appearing on April the 4th, we want to thank Mr.
6 Monnin, Mr. Weinstein, and their client MNP, who has
7 on short notice agreed to come in for this coming
8 Friday on macro-environmental issues. And, so Friday,
9 April the 4th, will be the day set aside for MNP.
10 They were previously scheduled to testify on Tuesday,
11 April 22.

12 Before I leave April the 4th, the
13 parties should be aware that at 12:45 p.m. that day
14 there is a presenter that has been scheduled and is to
15 appear for a brief presentation. And that again is
16 12:45 on Friday, April the 4th.

17 Speaking of presenters, on Monday,
18 April the 7th, there is yet another presenter who has
19 asked for a short time before the panel to present.
20 And he will present at 12:45 on Monday, April the 7th,
21 according to our current schedule.

22 If we turn ahead in the schedule till
23 Easter Monday, as it's known, or April 21, that is a
24 date that the panel had indicated they were
25 considering using that day for the hearing of

1 evidence. And in Manitoba Hydro's letter of Friday
2 afternoon, they had suggested that that Easter Monday
3 would be a better day to have Interveners cross-
4 examine Manitoba Hydro's finance and other witnesses
5 on the updated filings that are expected to be made.

6 The expectation is Manitoba Hydro's
7 filings will now be completed by April 11, and
8 therefore Manitoba Hydro put forward April 21. I will
9 indicate that while April 21 hasn't been -- is just
10 being presented to the panel this morning for
11 consideration, you've also heard that MNP has given up
12 April 22. So we -- we now have a potential of two (2)
13 days available, April 21 and April 22, in which
14 Manitoba Hydro's witness panels would be recalled to
15 deal with their updated financial and economic
16 analysis, as well as undertakings.

17 I have asked counsel for the
18 Intervenor to let me know when they're in a position
19 to know what their time requirements are likely to be.
20 And, Mr. Chairman and panel members, depending on that
21 information, I will be in a better position to report
22 to the Board if we need one (1) full day for the
23 recall of Manitoba Hydro's panel or more than one (1)
24 full day.

25 And if we need more than one (1) full

1 day, I expect we're encroaching on Easter Monday. And
2 if we don't, then the panel may just want to sit on
3 Tuesday, the 22nd of April.

4 I then have sheepishly, as I look
5 across to Mr. Hacault, one other item that I have
6 added to the timetable. And I -- I did take a bit of
7 poetic licence. I will indicate that clearly, that
8 Mr. Hacault and I had been discussing the relocation
9 of the testimony of his witness, Mr. Patrick Bowman on
10 behalf of MIPUG. MIPUG is presently scheduled on May
11 the 5th. That is a Monday. It also happens to be the
12 Monday of the national conference for the Canadian
13 Association of Members of Public Utility Tribunals,
14 and there was an effort to try to preserve a few days
15 that week to allow attendance at that conference.

16 And I was in discussion with Mr.
17 Hacault about moving it up to the Saturday, May the
18 3rd, and as I looked at the schedule, I -- I think --
19 and Mr. Hacault will certainly speak for himself, that
20 it was a -- an option that was being considered on a
21 best efforts basis, but I also look and I see Mr.
22 Orle's client MKO has witnesses planned for Friday,
23 May the 2nd, and we're just not certain as to the
24 duration of time we will need on Friday, May the 2nd
25 with MKO witnesses.

1 And because that hasn't been finalized,
2 there is, dare I say, a window of opportunity for Mr.
3 Bowman to perhaps begin his testimony on the Friday,
4 May the 2nd. That's, Mr. Chairman and panel members,
5 still in flux, and I'll communicate with my colleague
6 opposite to -- to see if we can firm that up, but
7 indicating that May 2nd and May 3rd are now the target
8 dates for MIPUG evidence.

9 The last item, Mr. Chairman and panel
10 members, to just add to the schedule is that on
11 Wednesday, May the 14th, the panel is travelling to
12 Thompson, Manitoba, and will be sitting on a -- to
13 hear presentations both in the afternoon and the early
14 evening in Thompson, and so that's a matter that
15 should also be added to peoples' schedule.

16 I have a few paper copies that I'll
17 leave at the back table for those who didn't want to
18 print out their own or want a copy this morning, but
19 subject to any questions you have of me, Mr. Chairman
20 or panel members, those complete my comments of this
21 morning.

22 THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr.
23 Peters. The panel has no questions to ask you at the
24 present time.

25 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: Oh, Mr. Chair, just

1 before we move on from this, I think the parties in
2 the room should be aware that Manitoba Hydro had
3 proposed its financial panel for the April 21st date,
4 or April 22nd, and I just -- in terms of planning, we
5 had thought the economics were going to go April 4th,
6 and I see what's gone on in -- in terms of moving off
7 that date, but parties should be aware Mr. Cormie will
8 not be available on April 21st.

9 So in terms of the economics piece, we
10 are going to have one (1) person -- we haven't been
11 able to consult with our panel members, but we know
12 for sure today that Mr. Cormie won't be available that
13 day, so perhaps people can take that into
14 consideration in terms of the areas they wish to
15 follow-up on.

16 THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Ms.
17 Ramage. With that, I'll turn the microphone over to
18 Me. Monnin. Bonjour, Me. Monnin.

19 MR. CHRISTIAN MONNIN: Bonjour, Mr.
20 President. It's my pleasure to be here this morning
21 with Dr. Robert Sinclair --

22 THE CHAIRPERSON: Just a second,
23 please. I -- I'm -- I will turn the microphone over
24 to Mr. Williams. I'm sorry about that.

25 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: I -- I'm the one

1 who should be apologizing for interrupting. Mr.
2 Chair, just a -- a -- I guess three (3) points. If
3 Mr. Peters, in terms of the schedule -- I understand
4 the panel is going to be up in -- in Thompson the week
5 of -- and Wednesday, May 14th.

6 Are we still assuming that -- that
7 closing arguments will proceed on the 14th? I see Mr.
8 Peters's head nodding.

9 MR. BOB PETERS: I -- I think Mr.
10 Williams misspoke. Thompson, Manitoba, is Wednesday,
11 May the 14th, and closing submissions will be
12 Thursday, May 15th from the PUB, from Consumers'
13 Association, and from Green Action Centre, whose
14 witnesses will have finished a -- a couple of weeks
15 earlier than that, so that is still the plan.

16 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Okay. And -- and
17 certainly from our client's perspective, I'll offer
18 this input now in terms of schedule, because for the
19 financial and economic panel of Manitoba Hydro, our
20 client's preference would be that it be on -- begin on
21 the 21st, rather than the -- the Tuesday. And I would
22 note that we have witnesses coming up towards the end
23 of that week who will be probably incorporating
24 material from the cross-examination into their --
25 their evidence.

1 So we're -- we're mindful of the many
2 time pressures on the panel. But from the selfish
3 perspective of CAC (Manitoba), they would prefer to
4 start on the -- the 21st, for -- for what it's worth,
5 sir.

6 And finally -- and certainly our client
7 just wants to go on the record as -- as noting that in
8 terms of the very valuable evidence of Potomac, there
9 is still an ongoing dialogue between the Public
10 Utilities Board and Manitoba Hydro, as we understand
11 it in terms of material, that it continues to be
12 blacklined, and that issue is not resolved.

13 And from our client's perspective, it
14 leaves them in some prejudice today, in the sense that
15 there is material that they would have liked and
16 expected access to in preparing their cross-
17 examination that is -- is not currently available to
18 them.

19 So with the greatest of respect, our
20 client would object to commencing the -- the
21 presentation at this point in time. We certainly
22 expect that objection to be overruled, and -- and we
23 are prepared to continue with our examination. But I
24 just want to go on the record as noting our client's
25 concerns and observing that it does, in our view,

1 prejudice our preparation today.

2 THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr.
3 Williams. Your objection is noted. The information
4 that is available on the public record so far is
5 available -- that, in our opinion, is one that -- or
6 is information than can -- can be put on the public
7 record. We will be examining this issue further
8 tomorrow in the CSI section. And the outcome of those
9 discussions will perhaps reflect in a broader public
10 record, but time will tell. So thank you very much
11 for those comments.

12 Back to you, Me. Monnin.

13 MR. CHRISTIAN MONNIN: Merci, Mr.
14 President. It's my pleasure to be here this morning
15 with Dr. Robert Sinclair, Potomac Economics. Just a
16 couple of administrative matters before I move to
17 housekeeping questions.

18 Dr. Patton is in transit as we speak.
19 He anticipates to be here approximately one o'clock.
20 At that point in time, he would like to -- to meet his
21 counsel and -- and just have a brief -- a brief
22 meeting. We will then propose to have him sworn in --
23 or, rather, qualified as an expert, sworn in, if all
24 goes according to planned, and he can sit in with the
25 -- the balance of the cross-examination in the CSI.

1 The -- the last caveat with Dr. Key --
2 Dr. Patton is that for tomorrow morning he is present
3 in Winnipeg, but he has a prior conference call that
4 he must attend to. And once he's done that, he will
5 return for continued cross-examination.

6 That being said, I propose to commence
7 the questions to have Dr. Sinclair qualified. Well,
8 that's of two (2) minds. Do we swear him in before or
9 should we get him qualified prior to? Very well. Mr.
10 Simonsen...?

11

12 IEC POTOMAC ECONOMICS PANEL:

13 ROBERT SINCLAIR, Affirmed (Qual.)

14

15 QUALIFICATION OF WITNESS:

16 MR. CHRISTIAN MONNIN: Third -- third
17 time's a charm, as they say. Dr. Sinclair, you are
18 here on behalf of Potomac Economics, which has been
19 retained by the Manitoba Public Utilities Board, the
20 PUB in order to assist the PUB to conduct a Needs For
21 and Alternatives to review of Manitoba Hydro's
22 Preferred Development Plan and in accordance with the
23 terms of reference and Potomac Economic's scope of
24 work dated September 20th, 2013, to critically review
25 certain aspects of Manitoba Hydro's Preferred Devel --

1 Development Plan and filing some support thereof.

2 Is that correct?

3 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

4 MR. CHRISTIAN MONNIN: Potomac

5 Economics prepared a report in accordance with the
6 terms of the reference and the scope of work, correct?

7 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

8 MR. CHRISTIAN MONNIN: Was the report
9 prepared by you or under your supervision and control?

10 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes, with -- by
11 me and also by David Patton.

12 MR. CHRISTIAN MONNIN: And there's
13 also a slide presentation which you'd be relying upon
14 today for -- to go over the -- your report.

15 Was that prepared by you or under your
16 supervision and control?

17 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes, prepared by
18 me with also -- reviewed and with the assistance of
19 Dr. Patton.

20 MR. CHRISTIAN MONNIN: Dr. Sinclair,
21 your curriculum vitae has been filed with the PUB as
22 part of Exhibit Hill Co. Number 8, Tab 1(a), in --
23 specifically.

24 Can you describe your qualifications
25 and experience related to the work undertaking by

1 Potomac with respect to these proceedings?

2 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes. I have a
3 PhD in economics from the University of Pittsburgh,
4 where I studied microeconomics and reg -- regulation
5 and antitrust. I also have been an energy consultant
6 for twenty (20) years -- more than twenty (20) years.
7 And in that role I have testified a number of times on
8 matters relating to electric utility regulation and
9 competition

10 I've worked for over ten (10) years in
11 market monitoring, where we are in the -- the
12 responsibility to monitor markets, including assessing
13 market outcomes, participant behaviour in those
14 markets, and also the -- the structure of those
15 markets and the -- the effect of operations on the
16 market outcomes.

17 In those rules, we've worked closely
18 with prices. We've worked closely with the market
19 clearing mechanisms, designing them, monitoring them.
20 And based on that experience, we're able to make
21 assessments about future conditions in the markets and
22 prices and output.

23 MR. CHRISTIAN MONNIN: Thank you, Dr.
24 Sinclair. Can you general -- generally describe the
25 type of clientele that you work for?

1 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: As market
2 monitors, we generally work with RTOs, large
3 transmission operators that also operate centralized
4 markets, energy markets, capacity markets. Typically,
5 for those clients we will conduct reports, do studies
6 on market efficiency, market outcomes, as I said,
7 behaviour of market participants.

8 We also have cases where we monitor
9 transmission networks, their operations, and their
10 effect on markets. And we have also, over time,
11 worked with the individual clients involved in matters
12 relating to competition in electricity markets.

13 MR. CHRISTIAN MONNIN: Thank you, Dr.
14 Sinclair. With that, Mr. President, we'd ask that Dr.
15 Sinclair be accepted by the Board as an expert for the
16 purposes of giving evidence on the report of Potomac
17 Economics.

18 THE CHAIRPERSON: I just have one (1)
19 question, Dr. Sinclair. With respect to capacity
20 markets, you monitor them for which regional
21 organizations?

22 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: We monitor the
23 capacity markets in MISO. There's also capacity
24 markets in ISO New England and the NYISO. And we
25 sometimes get involved ancil -- in a related context

1 with capacity markets in PJM, although we're not the
2 market monitor for PJM.

3 THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you for that.
4 I'd like to hear from the Intervenors, please. Mr.
5 Williams, would you like to start?

6 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Certainly, from
7 our client's perspective, we -- within the area of
8 evidence presented by Potomac, we wholeheartedly
9 endorse their expertise in -- in offering the opinions
10 that they have presented here.

11 THE CHAIRPERSON: Me. Hacaault...?

12 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: Likewise on
13 behalf of MIPUG, Manitoba Industrial Power Users
14 Group, we have no objections to the expertise of Dr.
15 Sinclair as presented.

16 THE CHAIRPERSON: I don't see Mr. --
17 Mr. Gange, so I'll assume that he's -- he's -- you
18 wish to comment?

19 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: I do not believe
20 he will be here for the next two (2) days.

21 THE CHAIRPERSON: Mr. Orle, please?

22 MR. GEORGE ORLE: No objection to the
23 qualifications as an expert. Thank you.

24 THE CHAIRPERSON: And on behalf of
25 MMF, Mlle. Saunders?

1 MS. JESSICA SAUNDERS: Yes, MMF has no
2 objections to the qualifications. Thank you.

3 THE CHAIRPERSON: And Ms. Ramage...?

4 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: Manitoba Hydro --
5 we -- we have a few brief questions before proceeding.

6 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: One of the -- of
7 the topics you -- I just heard you mention was that
8 you were looking at competition in electricity
9 markets.

10 Just to confirm, would that mean market
11 manipulation?

12 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes, among other
13 things, it would include that.

14 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: What else would it
15 include?

16 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: It would include
17 market dominance, as far as being a large player
18 unilateral market power. It would include -- it would
19 include operations by the RTO, the transmission
20 operator, in undertaking certain operations that may
21 affect competition, and it may also affect -- be
22 affected by participants that are buyers in the market
23 attempting to depress prices, as well as sellers
24 attempting to raise prices.

25 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: Thank you. In

1 reviewing the various CVs that were filed by Potomac,
2 I noted that Potomac's -- has invested in developing
3 and updating real time and day ahead automated
4 mitigation procedure software for the MISO ancillary
5 services market.

6 Can you just explain what that is?

7 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Okay. Automated
8 mitigation is a -- like -- like the term says, an
9 automated process whereby offers and bids in the
10 market are analyzed by a computer program in order to
11 detect whether they are outside certain ranges, and
12 whether -- if they're outside certain ranges, they
13 have an adverse market impact, such as raising prices,
14 or in the case of a -- a buyer, lowering prices.

15 And this process is -- is automated in
16 accordance with terms of the tariff, so it's -- it's
17 no discretion allowed, but it's an attempt to mitigate
18 market power in advance of the market actually being
19 cleared.

20 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: Thank you. Another
21 model I saw reference to was reference price
22 calculation software that supports the conduct and
23 impact -- and impact market power mitigation framework
24 of MISO.

25 What would that model deal with?

1 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Okay. So the
2 automated mitigation, going back to the last question,
3 is a conduct in impact process whereby first of all,
4 conduct of the participants is measured so that a --
5 an offer or a bid is within a certain range. We have
6 threshold ranges, and if it is outside that range, the
7 impact of that conduct is tested in a simulation of
8 the market, basically.

9 In order to apply that conduct impact
10 framework, the -- the offers and the bids must be
11 judged against some threshold, and we call these
12 reference values. And basically, for instance, for a
13 generator, a reference value would be some estimate of
14 its marginal cost. And if that offer is outside some
15 range of that marginal cost, then it fails the conduct
16 test, and then is measured in the second part of the
17 test for impact on the market, so the reference value
18 is the -- is -- is the basis of the threshold for the
19 conduct in the market.

20 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: So would I be --
21 would it be accurate to say that you're looking at
22 past performance of markets, or how the market
23 participants behave on a day-to-day basis?

24 Is that what those models do?

25 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: We do look at

1 past performance, but the -- the automatic -- the
2 automated mitigation process, the conduct impact test
3 is a prospective test looking at the current offers
4 and bids, and mitigating them before the market
5 actually clears.

6 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: So in terms of
7 perspective, is that near-term perspective, or what?

8 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: That's near --
9 that's day ahead, yes.

10 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: So would you agree,
11 then, that the focus of your business is -- tends to
12 be looking at what happened in the past, and the near-
13 term future to identify and remedy market design
14 flaws?

15 That's what the -- the role of the
16 market monitor is, and that's the business focus?

17 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Certainly we do
18 a lot of work looking at past conduct, and we
19 certainly, on a day-to-day basis, look at the
20 immediate run perspective, but we also do a lot of
21 work in looking forward, especially in the capacity
22 markets. We look forward on profitability, future
23 profitability based on prices.

24 We have also done a great deal of work
25 in forecasting future revenues in -- in the context of

1 supply procurement monitoring. I didn't mention that
2 as much when I -- in the introduction, but we also do
3 work where -- similar to this proceeding, where we are
4 asked to assess the reasonableness of a capacity
5 procurement by a utility where we will examine future
6 prices to see -- to determine the reasonableness,
7 determine whether the revenue is sufficient to justify
8 the cost. So in addition to the everyday market
9 monitoring, we also are involved in more longer term,
10 more forward looking types of analysis.

11 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: Is that longer term
12 five (5) years out or twenty (20) years out? What
13 would...

14 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: The -- I have to
15 think of the various cases we do, but they typically
16 go out the life of a plant which would be closer to
17 twenty (20) or thirty (30) years.

18 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: So would it be
19 fair, then, to say that your work as MISO monit -- or
20 as MISO market monitor and your other work, they blend
21 and give you the tools and insight that makes you
22 attractive to parties looking for insights where -- in
23 terms of where the market is headed?

24 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

25 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: That's Manitoba

1 Hydro's questions, and Manitoba Hydro has no objection
2 to Potomac being qualified.

3 THE CHAIRPERSON: Yes, the panel will
4 accept Dr. Sinclair as an expert witness for the
5 purposes of this hearing. So well -- welcome back to
6 Winnipeg, Dr. Sinclair.

7 MR. CHRISTIAN MONNIN: Mr. President,
8 if I may. Just one (1) last housekeeping item for --
9 for exhibits for Dr. Sinclair and Dr. Patton's
10 presentation. There is the Potomac report, which is
11 the March 2004, redacted. And in discussion with Mr.
12 Simonsen earlier, that would be Exhibit 2.1 of
13 Potomac.

14

15 --- EXHIBIT NO. POT-2-1: Potomac Economics Report on
16 Export Prices and Revenue

17

18 MR. CHRISTIAN MONNIN: There's also an
19 errata which has been CSI scrubbed, as we say. And
20 that should be 2.2 of Potomac.

21

22 --- EXHIBIT NO. POT-2-2: Potomac Economics Report
23 Errata

24

25 MR. CHRISTIAN MONNIN: The scope of

1 work is -- it's although on the website it's not part
2 of the exhibit. We will be introducing the scope of
3 work for Potomac dated September 20th, 2013, as -- as
4 Exhibit number 3.

5

6 --- EXHIBIT NO. POT-3: Scope of Work for Potomac
7 Economics

8

9 MR. CHRISTIAN MONNIN: And, finally,
10 the slide deck which is part of the presentation today
11 will be incorporated as Exhibit number 4.

12

13 --- EXHIBIT NO. POT-4: Potomac Economics
14 Presentation

15

16 THE CHAIRPERSON: Now, doc -- Dr.
17 Sinclair, you've been spared the -- you've been spared
18 the usual proviso that Mr. Peters provides to
19 witnesses, and I'll -- I -- I don't wish to spare you
20 of that. So I think I will ask him to repeat it,
21 please.

22 MR. BOB PETERS: Yes. Thank you, Mr.
23 Chairman. And, Dr. Sinclair, as I'm sure your counsel
24 has indicated, the terms of reference to the Public
25 Utilities Board allow for evidence to be heard on --

1 in public with respect to as much evidence that is not
2 commercially sensitive information. And that
3 commercially sensitive information is only to be heard
4 in camera.

5 This morning is the public session, and
6 so we are asking you to guard against putting on the
7 public record any information that has been noted by
8 Manitoba Hydro and the Public Utilities Board as -- as
9 commercially sensitive information. I would suggest
10 that if you are in doubt, you take a -- take the time
11 to consult with your counsel, who may also take the
12 time to consult with other counsel, just to make sure
13 we're walking that clear line. Thank you, sir.

14 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: Mr. Chair, before
15 going forward, I just have a question of clarification
16 on the exhibits. The Potomac report is -- that's
17 identified as Exhibit 1. Is -- says, "March 2014,
18 redacted." And it's the January 15th, but there have
19 been a couple of versions of different redactions.

20 And I'm wondering if they are going to
21 be in any way identified, should that be necessary, or
22 -- or how we're going to deal with the versions of the
23 report. That may be something we don't need to deal
24 with right now and can be a housekeeping matter, but I
25 know I have trouble keeping track of versions.

1 MR. BOB PETERS: Well, just to be
2 clear, Mr. Chairman, there are two (2) public
3 versions. Both of them are on the PUB website. And
4 one (1) had been filed previously, and I think it was
5 from mid-January. And then more recently there's been
6 a -- a version that has been refiled that contains
7 some errata that had been noted by Potomac Economics.
8 So I believe it's Potomac Exhibit 2.1 is the version
9 that is most current and the one that we'll be dealing
10 with this morning, unless counsel has a different
11 suggestion. Thank you.

12 MR. CHRISTIAN MONNIN: For the record,
13 that's -- that's my understanding, what is accurate.

14 THE CHAIRPERSON: Ms. Ramage, did that
15 address your concerns?

16 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: If we have any,
17 we'll -- we'll discuss it with counsel. But I -- I
18 think we're covered off.

19 THE CHAIRPERSON: I think the
20 preliminaries are over. Me. Monnin...?

21

22 EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR. CHRISTIAN MONNIN:

23 MR. CHRISTIAN MONNIN: If nothing
24 further from you, Mr. President, we're ready to have
25 Dr. Sinclair proceed with his presentation.

1 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Good morning,
2 Mr. Chairman. It's good to see you again. Good
3 morning to the rest of the panel. Good to see those
4 of you whom I've met. Mr. Bel, nice to meet you. Dr.
5 Grant, nice to meet you. I don't think we've met
6 before. Good morning to the Board counsel and the --
7 and the staff and other Intervenors, and good morning
8 to Manitoba Hydro.

9 As I said, my name is Robert Sinclair,
10 and this is my presentation to summarize the points of
11 our expert report. I'll will go over my credentials
12 briefly. I've already talked about them a little bit.

13 I have a PhD in economics from the
14 University of Pittsburgh, and I've studied areas of
15 industrial organization, antitrust-related issues.
16 I've been a consultant since 1993 and providing expert
17 testimony on a number of issues, as -- as I had noted
18 earlier.

19 I also want to introduce Dr. David
20 Patton, who will be here this afternoon and part of
21 tomorrow. And we apologize for Dr. Patton's lack of
22 availability. The scheduling was just starting to
23 take place very recently, and he had some hard
24 commitments that were difficult to overcome, but he --
25 he'll be happy to be here.

1 He also had a PhD in economics in
2 related areas of industrial organization, antitrust.
3 He's been an energy expert since 1990, including
4 serving on the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,
5 and he's the president of Potomac Economics.

6 As I mentioned a little bit about what
7 our firm does, we are the leader in the field of
8 market monitoring. We monitor most of the large RTOs,
9 including the Midcontinent ISO, what we refer to as
10 MISO, also NYISO, ISO New England, and ERCOT. And we
11 do some work also for the CALISO, calculating
12 reference prices.

13 In addition to this, we have a number
14 of other cases that we tend to work on, monitoring
15 work, monitoring transmission operations so that these
16 operations do not have an adverse effect on market
17 outcomes. We have some work over in Europe where we
18 also advise on market monitoring issues. Generally,
19 again, our work is involved with ensuring competitive
20 outcomes and competitive behaviour in the electricity
21 markets.

22 I'm going to summarize the scope of our
23 -- our work. We were asked by the PUB to examine
24 expectations in export markets, primarily MISO, since
25 MISO is the primary market where Manitoba Hydro

1 expects to make most of their additional sales under
2 the Preferred Development Plan.

3 So our focus primarily involves the
4 forecast of MISO prices, again, because this is the --
5 the main market where Manitoba Hydro expects to be
6 involved.

7 We address three (3) main issues in our
8 presentation. The first is we discuss our forecast of
9 MISO prices. We also address related market issues,
10 export issues, especially how they may affect
11 quantities of exports to the MISO market. And
12 finally, we address certain points raised by Manitoba
13 Hydro on rebuttal.

14 So let's move to the first of these,
15 which is the forecast to MISO prices. Well, before
16 that, let's, just for everybody's benefit -- of
17 course, everybody understands this project quite well,
18 but I think it's useful to look at it again.

19 So Manitoba Hydro is proposing to spend
20 some money on constructing generation capacity to
21 serve their load, but they're proposing to -- to build
22 more than is necessary for their load in order to, in
23 addition to serving load, create export market
24 capacity.

25 And so we have the development cost

1 plus what we might call extra development cost to
2 build the extra capacity. And if you deduct from that
3 the market revenue, the additional market revenues
4 from the extra capacity, we have the total cost to
5 Manitoba. This is a fairly simplistic review of the
6 relationship here, but I think it makes the point.

7 So the -- the question is: What's the
8 purpose of our presentation? And really, what -- we
9 were focussed on whether these extra development costs
10 are going to be off -- offset by the export revenues.
11 That's basically what the -- what the -- the main
12 question that our report addresses.

13 And -- and our own report is focussed
14 more on the market revenues. So we're really
15 interested in what are the quantities of sales that
16 Manitoba Hydro will make in accordance with the plan,
17 and also the export prices.

18

19 (BRIEF PAUSE)

20

21 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: So really we --
22 we were asked to address export quantities and export
23 prices. Generally speaking, the quantities that
24 Manitoba Hydro is putting forth in this proceeding are
25 based on excess capacity that they plan to build and

1 have available for some portion of the -- the project
2 horizon, and also some water optimization which
3 determines how much they can sell off peak or on peak.

4 We found some minor issues associated
5 with these -- these quantities, and we'll talk about
6 those, but generally we find that the quantity
7 forecast is -- is reasonable. We don't have a lot of
8 issues with that.

9 With respect to export prices, most of
10 our energy and our analysis went into developing
11 export prices because they have a greater deal of
12 uncertainty. And for reasons described below, we
13 developed our own forecast to assess the Company's
14 forecast. In part, we did this because we were
15 limited in our ability to examine the underlying logic
16 and the underlying data that supported the price
17 forecast, and we'll talk about that.

18 So I just want to mention very
19 generally the -- the Manitoba Hydro price forecast.
20 Manitoba Hydro uses six (6) consultants to establish
21 their export prices. And these forecasts include
22 three (3) products. And I agree these are the
23 important products that you want to look at in -- in a
24 forecast. And these were the on-peak energy prices,
25 the off-peak energy prices, and also the capacity

1 prices. And these three (3) prices will make up just
2 about all of the revenue that Manitoba Hydro will be
3 earning -- is proposed to earn over the horizon of the
4 project.

5 As I said, the availability of the
6 underlying data for the forecast was restricted. So
7 as a result, we developed our own forecast that would
8 enable us to assess the Company's forecast. So
9 basically we examined the Company's forecast and we
10 found that at some point we could no longer -- we
11 could no farther go into the details.

12 And so we felt that the best way to do
13 this was to develop our own detailed forecast and
14 compare that to what the Company's have -- had
15 developed. And part of our intention was to develop a
16 forecast that is highly transparent, easily
17 understood, but also has rigorous and detailed
18 elements to it that can be relied on for these
19 purposes -- of this hearing.

20 So now I want to go ahead and talk
21 about our energy price forecast, and there's both an
22 on-peak and off-peak energy price forecast. We do the
23 on-peak and off-peak energy price forecast basically
24 the same. We -- we estimate the energy price in each
25 hour, and then simply separate the hours by on peak

1 and off peak. So anything I say going forward with
2 respect to estimating these prices, that applies to
3 both the on peak and off peak.

4 So our forecast is a twenty (20) year
5 forecast, the same as the Manitoba Hydro consultants.
6 We use the day-ahead market as the basis for the
7 forecast. Just about all of the energy in the Midwest
8 markets are clearer than day-ahead markets. It's the
9 important market in the Midwest, and it's also the
10 market that the consultants focussed on.

11 Our forecast are based on actual MISO
12 supply curves from the two (2) most recent years
13 available, 2011 to 2012. So what we do is we look at
14 the supply relationships that existed for every hour
15 in 2011 and 2012, and -- and every hour we make
16 adjustments to the supply curves to try to project
17 what the conditions in those hours will be like in
18 future periods. And I'll explain how that works.

19 But we use historical -- the historical
20 supply curves, adjust them based on the projected key
21 inputs, fuel prices, retirements in order to determine
22 what the price would be in some future hour. And we
23 do it for every hour of the year.

24 So for each hour what we observe is the
25 offer -- as-offered marginal cost of MISO units that

1 are committed in that hour. And this is all public
2 data that you can get from the MISO site. And we also
3 have MISO demand, system-wide demand, and we can also
4 observe the actual clearing price. And I'll show you
5 an illustration of what exactly that would look like
6 if you were analyzing it.

7 Again, this is all public data. It's
8 all -- it's all available. There's no mystery on how
9 this is done. I mean, there -- well, we have a
10 computer program doing some of it, so it's -- it's
11 available, but we -- here's basically how it works.

12 So this is going to be some
13 representative hour in MISO. And what we as -- what
14 we're able to observe in each hour is this supply
15 curve. And this tells us what the marginal cost is of
16 all the MISO units that are committed during that
17 hour, I don't know, say 3:00 p.m. on July 15th.

18 And what we do is we -- we are able to,
19 of course, just simply sort the MISO units and stack
20 them from low cost to high cost, and you get this
21 supply curve. This is familiar to a lot of people in
22 the industry. So this is actually what happened on
23 this hour in -- in, say, 2011 or 2012. We're also
24 able to observe the level of demand and if you have
25 some level of demand, say 82,000 megawatts, then we're

1 also able to observe the price. And we're able to
2 construct the supply and demand relationship for that
3 hour.

4 Now, what we do is -- go ahead and put
5 that box up -- is we get this price, it's roughly
6 fifty-five dollars (\$55). This is what we call the
7 system marginal price. It's the -- it's the so-called
8 MISO-wide price. It would represent what it cost MISO
9 to meet the next increment of load if you would ignore
10 congestion and losses. So it -- it's simply the --
11 the summing together of all of the MISO units that are
12 online in that hour, and determining what it would
13 cost MISO if it was to meet another incremental load.
14 It's the marginal -- marginal cost to meeting load in
15 MISO.

16 Now, as I'll explain below, in order to
17 get the appropriate price, for the purposes of this
18 case, we'll need to add the congestion and losses in.
19 But the system marginal price is the basic price that
20 MISO uses to establish the locational prices. And so
21 we calculate this system marginal price for every hour
22 of each year for the twenty (20) years, based on the
23 historic supply curve that we see in 2011/2012.

24 And I'll show you exactly how -- how we
25 go ahead and forecast the future hours. So I'm going

1 to move to the next slide, where we take the supply
2 curve and look at what happens if we change some of
3 the market fundamentals. So let's see what happens to
4 the same supply curve if we -- if -- inst -- if the
5 demand changes.

6 So we use this supply curve for a
7 future hour where everything's the same except demand
8 goes up. So we have a shift out in demand and then we
9 just simply have a higher price. So if we're
10 forecasting a price for 2015, we take the 2012 supply
11 curve and we adjust it to the 2015 demand. We also do
12 it for other factors, but just to keep it simple for
13 now we just look at the one factor that might change.
14 And then we get a higher -- this will be our forecast
15 for 2015.

16 But more than that changes. More than
17 demand changes. So now let's suppose we have some
18 retirements in the meantime. So let's suppose that in
19 2015, everything's the same. Fuel costs are the same,
20 demand's the same, but we have some units retiring,
21 net retirements.

22 So we have a net retirements. What
23 happens is the supply curve moved back -- moves back
24 something like this, because basically you're removing
25 basic coal units. You're removing them from the

1 bottom of the stack, so everything else on top of the
2 stack has to shift to the left. So you have this
3 supply curve like that, and then the price is going to
4 clear right here. And so you -- you remove some coal
5 units from the market, and you get a higher price.

6 So this is the system marginal price in
7 the future -- in some future hour with retirements.
8 Again, everything else is the same. You see that the
9 demand stays the same. The shape stays the same, the
10 shape of the supply curve stays the same.

11 Now the third determinate we want to
12 look at is the -- what happens when fuel costs change.
13 When you have higher fuel cost, the supply curve will
14 shift up something like this. We can think of it -- I
15 don't know how to do this, but I'm -- I don't have a
16 pointer, but someone is -- just go into this mode here
17 -- can you still see? Can you see my pointer? This
18 is just regular mode.

19 So if you have a unit here, say 50,000
20 megawatts, and before it -- its marginal cost was
21 here, it has -- experiences higher fuel costs, this
22 marginal cost goes up here. So that's why the supply
23 curve shifts straight up when you have -- when you
24 have the higher fuel cost.

25

1 (BRIEF PAUSE)

2

3 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: We're back to
4 slide number 16, where we shifted the supply curve up,
5 because fuel -- fuel cost increased. And then is --
6 you -- at the same level of demand, you get a higher
7 price, something like sixty-five dollars (\$65). So if
8 we were forecasting some hour in 2015, and all we had
9 changing between 2015 and 2012 was fuel cost, then we
10 would simply just get a higher price, as shown in this
11 -- in this figure.

12 Now, when we move to slide 17, we're
13 going to try to put all the effects together, so you
14 can see that in some future hour, we're not just going
15 to have fuel price changes. We're going to have a
16 number of things changes -- changing.

17 So again, this is the original price
18 here where you see the arrow. Now, if we have higher
19 fuel costs, the price will go up to the second arrow,
20 something like fifty-five dollars (\$55). If we, in
21 addition to that, we have retirements, we shift the
22 curve out from that point and we get a price, say
23 fifty-eight dollars (\$58), and finally, if we were to
24 increase demand, then we get a price something like
25 seventy dollars (\$70). It's just an example.

1 So on -- on slide 17, what we're seeing
2 is the -- what we do in our model, and that is include
3 all these effects in the supply curve, and you have
4 these three (3) major determinants of the supply
5 curve. Actually, of the market, really, because
6 demand is part of the market, and all three (3) of
7 them tend to move higher over time. So you'll see
8 that the tendency is for prices to move higher over
9 time. The question is how high they move.

10 Now, there's a couple of things that I
11 don't show on these slides, and that is, although we
12 have a constant supply curve that we use from a
13 historical period, when we do have changes in
14 retirements and changes in demand, we also will sort
15 of what we call recommit for that hour. And that is,
16 we may -- MISO, if it experiences changes in demand,
17 it will -- it will not commit the system in the same
18 way that they -- that it committed it in 2012. It
19 will commit additional units or less units.

20 So we also keep the supply curve
21 adequately -- adequately committed by adding more
22 units from the existing units into the supply curve so
23 that we don't have an under-committed system or an
24 over-committed system. I don't show that on here,
25 because I think it would unnecessarily complicate it,

1 but we do recommit it in future periods on a daily
2 basis so that we have enough capacity online in the
3 supply curve to clear the market.

4 Are there any questions so far from the
5 panel about how that's done? Dr. Grant...?

6 DR. HUGH GRANT: I'm on my hands and
7 knees here. Can I ask a few things? First of all,
8 how do you observe the marginal cost? Is this just
9 the offer price of different utilities?

10 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: It's -- it's the
11 as-offered marginal cost.

12 DR. HUGH GRANT: The second question I
13 had, you talked about net replacements or net
14 retirements. And so if you're taking a -- a coal-fire
15 unit out of service and replacing it with an up-to-
16 date natural gas unit, what would be the effect on the
17 supply curve, particularly the -- these would be lower
18 cost, more efficient users of energy, right?

19 So marginal cost should come down?

20 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: That's a good
21 question, I -- and later on, I have a table that --

22 DR. HUGH GRANT: Okay.

23 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: -- looks
24 specifically at that, but your -- your sense is right
25 that when you start to retire the least-efficient coal

1 plants that were high heat, right, and you start to
2 replace them with the modern CCGTs, and you have a
3 certain gas price relationship. You can get CCGTs
4 that are lower in cost than the retiring coal unit, so
5 you could get a decline -- actually a decline in the
6 off-peak price.

7 DR. HUGH GRANT: And just one last
8 point on slide 16. This is a very minor point, I
9 think. This should be a -- would this be linear
10 transformation of the line? Is it just -- is it --
11 did you just get a little too lusty drawing that upper
12 sloping portion, because you get a very large price
13 increase from what's a fairly modest change in fuel
14 cost.

15 Is that -- or is it something about the
16 nature of these marginal units that are coming online?

17 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: It should be a
18 straight shift up so -- actually, where the curve
19 bends, it should be lined up horizontally, you're
20 right -- vertically.

21 DR. HUGH GRANT: So the -- the price
22 increase should be roughly proportional to the -- you
23 know, down at the vertical distance that these two (2)
24 lines are moving at the other end?

25 I'm just -- I was just curious --

1 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: I think that's
2 right, yeah.

3 DR. HUGH GRANT: -- I was just
4 curious, is it something unique coming on with these
5 sort of marginal units in that their fuel costs may go
6 up. Anyway...

7 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: No, I think
8 you're right. This should be -- the vertical distance
9 should be equal bet -- between all those points,
10 you're right. And you're right, it doesn't look like
11 it is. That's a good point.

12 DR. HUGH GRANT: Thank you.

13

14 (BRIEF PAUSE)

15

16 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: So I'm going to
17 move now on to slide 18. So from slide 17 you'll see
18 that we did three (3) things: we affected capacity, we
19 affected fuel costs, we affected demand. And I'm
20 going to carry those over to the next slide, because
21 these are our main determinants of -- of how we make
22 our forecast.

23 So if I circled net retirements there,
24 one of our main determinants in our future prices is
25 the capacity additions and retirements. The higher

1 fuel costs are fuel costs: coal and natural gas, other
2 fossil fuels. And I'm also combining carbon in here.
3 Some people might consider carbon to be a fourth
4 determinant. I'm going to just lump it in fuel costs,
5 because it acts like a fuel cost. And for demand, we
6 also track load growth over time.

7 So these are the three (3) main
8 determinants that are going to tell use how we take
9 that historical supply curve and change it into a
10 historical -- into a forecast supply curve and,
11 therefore, a historic price.

12 We make a range of assumptions about
13 capacity additions, fuel costs, and load growth. And
14 these result in four (4) alternative forecasts that we
15 come up with. We have two (2) reference cases: one
16 (1) with and one (1) without carbon costs. We have a
17 high-growth case, which represents more robust
18 macroeconomic activity. And we have a low fuel price
19 case, which reflects lower fuel costs and also lower
20 demand for electricity.

21 Now what I want to do is take each of
22 these three (3) categories of main determinants and
23 explain a little bit about what -- how we got to
24 those. So we'll start with the capacity additions and
25 retirements. Our capacity additions and retirements

1 over the twenty (20) year forecast period is based on
2 the projections of the US Energy Information Agency.
3 And we used their reference case.

4 The EIA, I think, has about sixty (60)
5 some cases. I can't remember exactly, but it's dozens
6 and dozens of cases. And they have a reference case.
7 And the other alternative cases are from the reference
8 case, but testing different outcome -- different
9 possible fore -- future outcomes. We start with the
10 reference case. We believe that is the case that the
11 EIA thinks is most likely to occur. And after
12 reviewing their reference case, we believe it -- it's
13 a reas -- it's reasonable projections.

14 They project 7,700 megawatts of
15 retirements over the twenty (20) year period. Six-
16 thousand (6,000) megawatts are coal retirements. They
17 forecast over 9,000 megawatts of additional capacity
18 coming online. And again, this is in MISO. I should
19 mention it's MISO north and central. It's not -- it
20 doesn't include MISO south's region -- MISO's south
21 region.

22 A lot of that, the additions are wind,
23 4,000 megawatts, but most of that is derated so that
24 when you actually have it into market, you only have a
25 few megawatts. I think something like 20 percent of

1 those megawatts actually are producing -- able to
2 produce in the market when they're committed.

3 And we also balance the system in any
4 given year when there's a deficit. And we do that by
5 adding natural gas capacity. So that's not an EIA
6 assumption. That's what we do when we have a year
7 where the demand either has exceeded the existing
8 capacity because the EIA assumptions don't always add
9 up to the MISO demand, and so we commit to -- we add
10 capacity in our own process. In our reference case,
11 we added about 4,000 megawatts over the twenty (20)
12 year period.

13 Any questions about the capacity? I'll
14 move on to the fuel prices.

15 THE CHAIRPERSON: The reference to
16 derated, could you explain that for me, please?

17 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Oh, yeah, so --
18 so when you look at this you'll see that there's an
19 addition of 7,000 megawatts. And I mean, retirements
20 is 7,000 megawatts and additions of 9,000. And it
21 looks like an addition of 2,000 megawatts altogether.
22 But the wind is derated in a sense that it doesn't
23 show up on the market at 4,000 megawatts. It
24 typically is derated by -- by 80 percent. So you
25 wouldn't count that as capacity, for instance. You'd

1 kind of derate that for capacity.

2 So I'll move on to fuel -- our fuel
3 projections. So our fuel costs again are taken from
4 the Energy Information Agency, the reference case.
5 Natural gas cost increase, they just about double in
6 the twenty (20) year period. Coal costs increase 50
7 percent.

8 Now, our carbon prices do not come from
9 EIA. In our carbon case, they start at thirteen
10 dollars (\$13) in 2021, and then increase to about
11 twenty-five dollars (\$25) in 2034. This assumption
12 was based on Mr. Sabine, of MNP -- MNP. He's -- he's
13 the expert consultant on this -- on this issue. And
14 he advised us that this was his most likely case,
15 although he did say there's a 50 percent change that
16 this will not be the price and that the price will be
17 zero. So it is 50/50 that we get to thirteen (13) or
18 zero. And I'll -- I'll explain that a little bit more
19 later, but that does not come from EIA. That comes
20 from Mr. Sabine.

21 Any questions on fuel cost to the
22 panel? So we talk about load growth. You remember on
23 our -- on our schemes, on our illustrations before
24 that can affect the prices, so we want to know how --
25 how much demand grows, again based on EIA reference

1 case, although we do adjust it for carbon. As I'll
2 explain, in our reference carbon case, our load growth
3 projections result in a cumulative 10 percent growth
4 over twenty (20) -- a twenty (20) year period, rather
5 slow.

6 We use the EIA reference up to 2012,
7 but after that, because of the carbon in our carbon
8 case, that is, because of carbon, we reduce the load
9 growth under the assumption that load will grow
10 slightly slower when you put a tax on the inputs.

11 So we -- after that point, we pick up
12 the load growth that EIA identified in their own
13 sensitivity. They did a ten dollar (\$10) carbon price
14 sensitivity, which indicates slightly lower growth,
15 and we used that for those years after 2022 -- after
16 2021.

17 Any question about how we get the load
18 growth?

19 MS. MARILYN KAPITANY: Not on load
20 growth, but could we just go back to fuel cost for one
21 second? And -- and I'm particularly interested in the
22 natural -- the natural gas cost increase from three
23 twenty-six (326) to six thirty-one (631).

24 I'm hearing so much about the huge
25 supply of shale gas in Bakken. And I'm just wondering

1 what is it that you think is going to drive the gas
2 price to that extent?

3 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: That's a good
4 question. I think, you know, the marginal cost of --
5 of gas is going to depend on the cost of extracting
6 it, basically. And in the long run there's -- and
7 this is the -- this is the reference case. We do have
8 a -- another case that assumes that gas production is
9 higher as a result of what you just mentioned. But in
10 the reference case, the underlying drivers of the gas
11 cost would be the labour and materials required to get
12 out to the field to extract it.

13 And we do believe there is a reasonable
14 case to be made that we will be in a low gas price
15 scenario, where the extraction costs sort of collapse
16 in a way, so to speak, because of all the -- the so-
17 called fracking. And in that case we do have
18 significantly lower prices. So we believe that's a
19 very plausible scenario, and we do estimate that case,
20 too.

21 MS. MARILYN KAPITANY: Thank you.

22 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: But the short
23 answer is from three (3) to six dollars (\$6) is
24 basically the underlying cost of extraction.

25

1 (BRIEF PAUSE)

2

3 MR. CHRISTIAN MONNIN: If -- if I may,
4 just for the benefit of the record, that particular
5 question from panel member Kapitany referred to slide
6 21. The -- the number wasn't on that slide, but...

7 DR. HUGH GRANT: Can I just get one
8 other thing in? On slide 22 I'm just curious about
9 the impact of the carbon tax on -- on load. We had a
10 fascinating discussion about price elasticities with
11 electricity.

12 A pretty marginal effect, I mean, small
13 impact over the ten (10) years?

14 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: It -- it was --
15 you know, it was very detectable. You can see how I
16 have a -- if you have my report, I can show you the
17 exhibit. But it's -- it's in the appendix. Very easy
18 to see on page 47.

19

20 (BRIEF PAUSE)

21

22 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: I'm sorry, not
23 on page 47. But I think page 48, the -- the load
24 growth.

25

1 (BRIEF PAUSE)

2

3 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: And so if you
4 look at the -- the blue line in the middle that's
5 associated also with the dotted line. So the dotted
6 line is what happens if you do not have a carbon price
7 -- a carbon price of zero. And the solid blue line
8 indicates how the load changes under our scenario of a
9 carbon price. So if you didn't have a carbon price,
10 load will continue to grow up to one point one-two
11 (1.12). With a carbon price, it only gets up to one
12 point one (1.1). And that -- and that's derived from
13 projections -- projections from the EIA.

14

15 (BRIEF PAUSE)

16

17 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: So moving to
18 slide 23, we just mention again our alternative
19 forecasts. We had a -- a reference case with carbon
20 which -- and we also have an alternative reference
21 case with no carbon. And we think those cases are
22 equally likely, 50 percent each. And -- but we think
23 there's some probability that we could be in a high
24 resource production case that panel member Kapitany
25 had mentioned, where -- where the fracking is -- is --

1 continues to produce its beneficial results to the gas
2 supply.

3 And that results in a lower fuel price
4 not just for gas, but also for coal, and also results
5 in lower electricity demand, partly because of the use
6 of natural gas instead of electricity for lots of
7 processes. The -- then we have a high-growth case,
8 which is a macroeconomic thing, where it is just a
9 more robust macroeconomic scenario. And we think
10 that's a plausible -- a plausible case as well.

11 And we -- we place some probabilities
12 on these, but it is very difficult to determine what
13 the probabilities are. But we do come down that the -
14 - we think that the reference cases are equally likely
15 at around 30 percent, and the other two (2) cases
16 roughly 20 percent. I think that rounds out to 100
17 percent. It's in the report. We were hesitant to put
18 probabilities on them, but it was useful, I think, for
19 the process.

20

21 (BRIEF PAUSE)

22

23 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Now, we can go
24 on to slide 24. Now, as -- as I mentioned before, the
25 process where we take the historical supply curves and

1 change them to reflect these major determinants, these
2 major inputs, really produces the system marginal
3 price, which is the -- the price that MISO starts with
4 when it is -- is determining the locational marginal
5 price.

6 The system marginal prices is -- you
7 can think of it as a great big pool, and you're --
8 you're trying to pull units together to see which ones
9 are cheapest and -- to meet demand. But then you
10 realize you've got to honour these transmission
11 constraints and losses, so you have to re-dispatch in
12 a way.

13 So as I said, we're interested in the
14 locational marginal price at the Manitoba border.
15 This is the price where, when Manitoba Hydro makes an
16 export, it'll be receiving the locational marginal
17 price at the Manitoba border.

18 And to get that, we need to take the
19 system marginal price, which we estimated in that
20 process I showed you, take out losses, because to get
21 from the system marginal price to the border the
22 system incurs transmission losses, and also
23 experiences congestion. The system operator will have
24 to re-dispatch and incur costs in order to make sure
25 that the -- the power can be accepted at that

1 location.

2 So really next up in our forecast, once
3 we have all these prices for every hour going out
4 twenty (20) years, we have really seventeen thousand
5 (17,000) prices per year. But they're just the system
6 marginal price, so we have to add losses and
7 congestion to those.

8 We have seventeen thousand (17,000)
9 prices because we -- our historical prices are based
10 on two (2) years, so to even out any kind of
11 anomalies. And we take the average of -- really we
12 take a forecast based on both years, and then we take
13 the average.

14 Okay. So next we want to discuss how
15 we integrate the congestion losses into our system
16 marginal price to get to the border. So for losses,
17 we simply take the average over those two (2) years,
18 2011/2012. This was about 9 percent. A simple
19 average. We didn't expect that to vary a lot, so we
20 didn't -- we thought that the average was adequate,
21 Manito -- Manitoba's consultants. Or the ultimate
22 price that Manitoba uses also has sort of an average
23 for losses. Actually, losses and congestion.

24 Now, the congestion costs, we thought,
25 needed more careful treatment because it -- it can

1 fluctuate more based on system conditions. So
2 basically we took the historical congestion costs and
3 used a linear regression to estimate what it might be
4 in each future hour. We did a linear -- we did a
5 forecast model using linear regression techniques.

6 So to -- to do the linear regression
7 techniques, we look at the historical congestion for
8 each hour, and then look at the characteristics in
9 each hour and try to estimate a relationship between
10 what the congestion was in that hour and how those
11 various factors that -- that are prevailing in those
12 hours are related statistically.

13 I actually don't have the presentation
14 of the model here, the linear regression model. It's
15 rather technical, but cer -- certainly spelled out
16 pretty clearly in the report, I believe.

17 But our estimates indicate that on-peak
18 hours, congestion was about 12 percent, and then in
19 off-peak hours, about 16 percent. And the -- the
20 higher off-peak congestion was the result of basically
21 lots of wind -- having to manage a lot of wind in the
22 off-peak hours. And also in off-peak hours the demand
23 in the West is lower, so in order to get out of the
24 West you -- you will experience more congestion.

25 I'm happy to answer questions about the

1 regression model.

2 DR. HUGH GRANT: Can I just ask, how
3 do you get from congest -- how does congestion
4 translate into a price or cost effect?

5 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Okay, so if you
6 go back to slide number 24. We're looking at the LMP,
7 so we -- we had the system marginal price which we
8 estimated with all those supply curves, the historical
9 supply curves, and so we simply take -- we simply take
10 the SMP and subtract that losses, which was something
11 like 9 percent, and then we subtract out the
12 congestion, which is estimated -- really is -- is
13 almost like a historical average, except it's a little
14 more complicated because we did the regression.

15 We take the historical congestion to
16 see how much it is. For instance, we estimated that
17 if you increase wind capacity by 1 percent, the
18 congestion component of the LMP increases something
19 like forty-five (45) cents, so the congestion is going
20 to be something like five dollars (\$5) or something.

21

22 And we have all the observations of the
23 congestion over time, and we have all the observations
24 of load generation, other types of variables that we
25 think might impact the congestion, and we come up with

1 some relationship between those variables.

2 And so every hour in the future, using
3 the regression estimates, the -- the estimated
4 coefficients, we can take the projected values of load
5 generation, SMP, for instance, is an explanatory
6 variable, and plugged them into the regression
7 coefficients, and we get what the future congestion
8 component will be in that hour.

9 DR. HUGH GRANT: I'm just not clear
10 how it translates into a monetary cost. So my
11 electron gets to the border, but there's congestion in
12 the system, so how does that end up --

13 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Oh, I see.

14 DR. HUGH GRANT: -- affecting the
15 price --

16 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Okay, so the
17 problem is that if Manitoba Hydro wants to send a lot
18 of power into -- into the west -- into -- at the
19 border there, you may have other generators in the
20 west already running, so in order to allow more
21 production to be absorbed at -- at the border, you may
22 have to turn down a unit in, say, Minnesota, and so
23 you calculate the cost of basically turning that unit
24 down and allowing the Manitoba unit to produce.

25 And that, essentially, is what the loss

1 will be, is how -- how you have to re-dispatch the
2 system, basically, in order to facilitate additional
3 transfers between points, basically, how you have to
4 manage the system to keep it in balance in order to
5 allow a generator to produce more at some point, or a
6 -- a load to withdraw more at some point.

7 It's basically mostly re-dispatch
8 costs, so we had all the observations of that, and we
9 had all the prevailing factors for those hours, and we
10 simply estimated the relationship between congestion
11 and these historical conditions. And we knew what the
12 future conditions were based on our forecast, and we
13 were able to project the future congestion. It's
14 rather -- it's rather constant, but we thought we --
15 it was important to recognize that there's lots of
16 factors that can affect congestion.

17 So based on those estimates, basically
18 averages, the following chart shows our reference
19 forecast. This is our forecast for our reference case
20 with carbon, and on the left-hand panel, there's the
21 peak hours, one (1) price per year. And in the off-
22 peak, there are -- I'm sorry. On -- on the right-hand
23 panel, there is the off-peak prices, again, one (1)
24 price per year, so they -- it's sort of an average.

25 So the red line on top is the MISO

1 SMP. That's where most of our effort went, is to try
2 to determine what the marginal price is going to be in
3 MISO based on projections of load, retirements, and
4 fuel costs.

5 And then we reduce that price by the
6 marginal congestion, which we just discussed, which is
7 what it costs to get from MISO to the border, and then
8 the marginal losses. Then the -- the lower blue line
9 -- or it's kind of greenish, is -- is the LMP -- our
10 forecast LMP for our reference case, so -- okay.

11 MS. MARILYN KAPITANY: So the -- the
12 marginal losses are only transmission losses. There's
13 nothing else in there?

14 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: I think that's
15 basically it, yeah. It's -- it's the total -- there
16 may be some small losses associated with some capacity
17 there, but mostly it's transmission losses, line
18 losses.

19 So you'll notice a big jump up in 2020.
20 That's the introduction of the carbon price. So you
21 see that the carbon price has a huge impact on the
22 forecast, and in the next slide I'll show you --
23 illustrate more clearly what that impact is.

24 The impact of carbon in the off peak is
25 also significant. It's also larger, because the

1 carbon price went will impact off-peak prices more,
2 because it's likely to impact coal resources much more
3 significantly. So any changes in carbon price are
4 going to be -- it's -- it's going to be showed up --
5 it's going to show up more significantly in the off
6 peak, but you see it's -- it's very significant in on-
7 peak hours.

8 So then if you recall, we did four (4)
9 cases. We -- we did a reference case with and without
10 carbon, and we did a -- a high growth and low energy
11 price case. So this is a four (4) -- all four (4) of
12 our cases for the LMPs, we have again, peak and off
13 peak. We have, of course the high growth case is the
14 highest, because that includes more load growth and
15 also the carbon, whereas the two (2) lowest cases is
16 our reference case without CO2. So you don't get that
17 jump up in 2020. As you see they track each other
18 perfectly until 2020, then they depart.

19 So the difference between the blue and
20 the green shows you the impact of carbon, which also
21 reflects changes in load. And then finally, our low
22 case is the -- is the so-called fracking case, where
23 the extraction of natural gas continues to develop
24 technologically, and prices are very low, which also
25 affects the coal prices, and we also assume no carbon

1 in that case. But you can see from the cases if you
2 want to put carbon in any of those, you'd sort of just
3 jump it up at 2020 and then continue it on.

4 So those are our price forecasts for
5 energy. Any questions about -- about that? So that
6 means we move to a capacity price forecast.

7 Now, the capacity price -- so the
8 energy price is what Manitoba Hydro received for
9 supplying energy to their customers. The capacity
10 price is an additional price above the energy price,
11 which they will receive for committing to provide
12 capacity, which is basically a firm -- a firm
13 commitment to supply energy, usually sixteen (16)
14 hours a day, but sometimes twenty-four (24), but
15 basically, it says we have enough capacity of above
16 our own requirements and above our other firm sales to
17 guarantee you that we can deliver this energy at all
18 hours during the year for the next whatever the
19 horizon of the contract is.

20 So here's our -- the overview of our
21 capacity price forecast. We use the so-called net-
22 CONE, or net cost of new entry, and basically, what
23 we're saying is that the capacity price should reflect
24 what it costs -- or should reflect a value that
25 compensates a new entrant for supplying capacity to

1 the MISO market, and that will be -- depend on the
2 cost of putting a new unit in, which is, in our case,
3 a combustion turbine, because that's the lowest type
4 of -- lowest-cost capacity that you can build.

5 And -- but you don't pay them the
6 entire cost of entry, because they're going to earn
7 some money in the -- in the energy market. So you
8 estimate the energy revenues, and you subtract that
9 from the cost of new entry.

10 And that's how much money they need to
11 remain viable in the market, so that's what we
12 consider to be the capacity price. And this is the --
13 the approach that the Manitoba Hydro consultants also
14 took, the so-called net-CONE.

15 And it makes sure that you get entry,
16 and that entry does not depend tot -- totally on your
17 ability to earn money in the energy market, because
18 such a system has serious problems. So there's --
19 regulators require that capacity be bought, and it's
20 going to be related to how much it costs for a new
21 entrant to be viable. Any questions about that?

22 MS. MARILYN KAPITANY: Can you just
23 say a bit more about what the ancillary services
24 market is?

25 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Okay, yeah. So

1 for the ancillary services market provides basically
2 reserves to the system. So you can provide energy to
3 the system on a -- on a -- in the operating horizon.
4 Day ahead, you provide energy a day ahead, but you can
5 also provide reserves and -- and regulation.

6 And so CTs can also earn money, not
7 just producing, but also because they're on stand-by
8 very often, they can bid into the ancillary services
9 market. Even though they don't run, they may get paid
10 just to stand by on -- for reserves, because they can
11 start in thirty (30) -- thirty (30) minutes. Some
12 faster.

13 We assume they earn a dollar an hour in
14 peak hours. We -- I'm sorry, we assume they earn a
15 dollar an hour when they are not operating, which is
16 something like seventy-five hundred (7,500) hours a
17 year. They barely oper -- they hardly operate, but
18 they do operate in peak times. Other times, they're
19 standing by.

20

21 (BRIEF PAUSE)

22

23 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: So again, this
24 is just a few more comments on the logic of the net-
25 CONE. It recognizes that's -- recognizes that

1 suppliers need a capacity price high enough to make
2 entry profitable, but it has to be set right so that
3 you don't have excess entry, excess planning reserves,
4 and you don't have insufficient planning reserves.

5 If you set it at net-CONE, then you
6 will get entry to occur at just the right level. If
7 you set it higher, then you'll get too much capacity
8 to enter. Planning reserves would be excessive. If
9 you set it too low, entrants won't enter until the
10 capacity is short and prices start to rise, and you
11 won't get sufficient planning reserves. So in a way,
12 it's administrative, because it's set to hit a certain
13 planning reserve margin.

14 THE CHAIRPERSON: Dr. Sinclair, your
15 report indicated that there was a surplus capacity in
16 the -- in the MISO market, and how -- how did the
17 market get in that position?

18 Can you -- could you...

19 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yeah. It was
20 primarily the result of the 2009 financial crisis.
21 Lost -- a loss of -- loss of demand. There was also a
22 build-up of -- of gas capacity during the -- right
23 before that, in the '90s and early 2000s, but mainly
24 it was as a drop in demand.

25 THE CHAIRPERSON: And -- and the --

1 the fact that a non-functioning capacity market in --
2 in MISO is totally attributable to this excess surpl -
3 - production and capacity?

4 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: No. It's
5 attributable to the market design, and I'll say a
6 couple words, but I think Dr. Patton -- this is one of
7 his favourite topics. So if you don't mind asking him
8 that question tomorrow, or this afternoon.

9 The problem with the MISO capacity
10 market is that it has a -- a vertical -- what we call
11 vertical demand curve, so that basically, when you get
12 into excess -- just a couple megawatts in excess of
13 the planning reserves, the capacity price collapses to
14 zero, and also if you are -- have adequate capacity,
15 the price collapses to zero. So you're often -- very
16 often seeing prices of zero.

17 So that's -- it's -- it's not so much
18 that there's a surplus, but there is a -- a market
19 design flaw, but even with that -- that flaw, you
20 might see pretty low prices, given that there is a
21 surplus. We're seeing low prices in PJM, for
22 instance.

23

24 (BRIEF PAUSE)

25

1 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: So just some
2 details of our calculation. We assume an -- we
3 estimate the net-CONE to be ninety (90) -- about
4 ninety dollars (\$90). So I got -- I discussed this.
5 Basically, you take that eight-nine dollars (\$89), and
6 you calculate the revenues per kilowatt, and those are
7 based on our own forecast that we talked about
8 earlier, our energy forecast. We know what the energy
9 forecasts are. We know how often the CT would run
10 based on its own marginal cost, so we can calculate
11 how much it would make every year.

12 There is a surplus in MISO until 2018.
13 So when you do have a surplus, you will tend to have
14 lower prices below the net-CONE because people need --
15 the demand will fall off for capacity. There's no --
16 there's no need for utilities to buy capacity, so
17 they're not buying capacity, so the price will go
18 down.

19 So here's our price forecast.

20 THE CHAIRPERSON: Dr. Sinclair, the
21 previous slide indicated 2018 as the year when new
22 resources were required. And I'm trying to reconcile
23 that with the ongoing debate within MISO and OMS
24 regarding the 2015/2016 year and the surveys they are
25 doing with respect to the -- you know, determining the

1 capacity.

2 What's different between that and
3 what's -- what's here in your slide?

4 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Okay. So our --
5 our retirements, it -- it really boils down to
6 retirements, the assumptions on retirements. And we -
7 - we see that -- based on our retirements, that in
8 2017 we'll see that the retirements will have
9 eliminated the surplus. But there are some capacity
10 contracts in MISO that go outside the market, PJM, for
11 instance. Those will probably be drawn back into the
12 market in 2017. So really it won't be until 2018 that
13 we see the -- the surplus -- that -- that we see that
14 the capacity of market will reach its equilibrium.

15 So we're -- our -- our data shows that
16 by 2017 we'll have -- the surplus will have dissipated
17 based -- really based on retirements because we're --
18 we're seeing 6,000 megawatts of coal come in, in 2017.

19 I think MISO might look at that and say
20 that they expect slightly more retirements. Well,
21 they expect -- I think they're assuming 12 megawatts
22 by 2016, so one (1) year sooner and slightly more
23 megawatts; not slightly more, twice as much.

24 And so MISO -- MISO did -- did a survey
25 to determine what the level of retirements were --

1 were expected to be. And I think that they did one
2 that's rather conservative in the sense of -- in a
3 planning sense, because they're more of a planning
4 organization, we need to plan for 12 gigawatts of
5 retirements.

6 But I think if you look at some of the
7 presentations in that regard, you'll see that between
8 6 and 12 megawatts, they're in categories what they're
9 not quite sure of. So we weren't quite sure that you
10 would get above 6 gigawatts as fast as MISO is
11 planning. They need to plan conservatively, so we
12 don't blame them.

13 But I think in forecasting prices you
14 should look at what you really expect to happen, not
15 what you need to plan for. And we thought the -- we
16 thought the EIA assumptions looking at 6 gigawatts was
17 something that we -- we feel more comfortable with in
18 -- in our forecast.

19 So here's our capacity price forecast.
20 Again, until 2018, we're really picking up capacity
21 prices from PJM, because the MISO capacity market is
22 really establishing zero prices, which we don't think
23 -- we think that's because of the market design flaw.

24 So we just pick up the PJM prices until
25 2018, when -- at which point we see -- we project the

1 system to be an equilibrium. And after that point,
2 the capacity price is basically set at net count on a
3 real term going forward that is a few -- few points.
4 I put the points inside the chart because there was
5 that big white space.

6 But once we get an equilibrium, you see
7 that the capacity price stays rather constant, just
8 under seventy dollars (\$70). That's because the cost
9 of entry -- cost of new entry is based on the most
10 efficient CT. And there's no reason to believe that
11 that cost will go up or down significantly over time,
12 so -- and this is in real dollars, so, basically, the
13 cost of entry stays constant over all those years, and
14 also the net revenue.

15 So the -- the capacity price is the
16 cost of entry minus what you earn -- what a CT would
17 earn in the market. And that also stays constant
18 because the factors that change over time really cause
19 the margin that a CT earns to stay relatively
20 constant. For instance, fuel prices, if the fuel
21 price goes up because a CT is on the margin and if it
22 be this marginal cost, then the marginal cost and the
23 price will go up at the -- at -- by the same
24 increment. Likewise, with -- if load changes or
25 retirements change, it doesn't affect the CT on the

1 margin.

2 So we project, in our equilibrium
3 analysis here, that what a CT will earn over time is
4 going to stay constant, what it costs to enter over
5 time stays constant; so that's why you have a flat
6 capacity supply curve -- capacity price curve, sorry.
7 Tomorrow in the -- the CSI session, we'll show you
8 this compared to the other consultants. So I think
9 you'll find that interesting, too.

10 Any questions about the capacity price
11 forecast?

12 Oh, so we -- in our report we talk
13 about three (3) caveats. And the one is we recognize
14 that Manitoba Hydro will have to rely on bilateral
15 contracts, bilateral capacity contracts, because the
16 MISO capacity market needs to be reformed and it's not
17 clear when that will be reformed. And there's a
18 possibility that utilities may prefer to build
19 themselves, rather than buying long-term capacity from
20 others. It's -- it's -- we haven't quantified that,
21 but we think it's something to keep in mind.

22 Over the long time -- time frame of the
23 forecast, generation technology may become cheaper.
24 We've seen it over the last twenty (20) years or so
25 that adding capacity has become cheaper. We think the

1 risk is that -- we're not projecting it will get
2 cheaper, but we think the risk is that it will get
3 cheaper before it gets more expensive. Again, it's
4 just sort of a qualitative statement here.

5 Also the net revenues that we use to
6 estimate the capacity price, it was based on the MISO
7 system marginal price. But if you have a -- an area
8 that's highly congested, those -- those generators may
9 earn more revenues and -- which will cause the
10 capacity price to go down in the whole footprint. So
11 there's some chance that the -- the net-CONE will
12 overstate the capacity price.

13 Again, we didn't quantify these. We
14 just think these are risks that you should keep in
15 mind when interpreting capacity price.

16 THE CHAIRPERSON: Could we dissect a
17 lot of those statements? At -- at least two (2) of
18 those statements. I am -- I am interested
19 particularly in -- in number 1, specifically, Manitoba
20 Hydro relying on bilateral contracts and face possible
21 preference for self-building. Okay.

22 I understand that point, but I'm guess
23 -- I guess what I'm wondering is, given that
24 statement, why would somebody sign a long-term
25 contract with Manitoba Hydro?

1 You know, if -- if you are dealing with
2 the self-interest embodied in this from the -- from
3 the buyer's perspective in the US, why would you be
4 interested in -- in buying from Manitoba Hydro over
5 such an extended period of time in some cases?

6 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yeah. I -- I
7 don't think the -- the preference for self-building is
8 all encompassing. But it's just I think there's a
9 tendency for a utility, when they go out to procure
10 capacity. And we've done some procurement monitoring,
11 and you -- you can just see that there is some
12 preference for keeping the capa -- capital
13 accumulation within the company as opposed to buying a
14 -- a PPA.

15 There's just a -- a long-term -- the
16 return on investment is slightly higher because you
17 have your own steel in the ground and you earn a
18 return on that. And actually a PPA can actually
19 result in higher taxes since -- in some ways. But for
20 the most part, we -- we think this is just a
21 preference.

22 We don't think the regulators will
23 necessarily allow just a utility to build anything
24 they want. They have to go out and sort of market
25 test it. So there's very good reason to think that

1 Manitoba Hydro can come in with a capacity contract
2 that's better than a self-build option. And the
3 regulators will require that the PPA be taken instead.

4 THE CHAIRPERSON: 'PPA' meaning a
5 power purchase agreement?

6 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Power purchase
7 from -- from Manitoba -- Manitoba Hydro.

8 THE CHAIRPERSON: So -- so you said
9 taxes. You associated taxes with a PPA.

10 What -- what do you mean by that?

11 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yeah, there's a
12 -- so let's see. So when you -- when you buy a PPA --
13 I'm -- not taxes, credit -- a credit rating. So when
14 you buy a PPA, the credit agencies treat it as a --
15 like a debt. So not -- not fully as a debt, and it
16 changes sometimes. But part of it is treated as a
17 debt because you have this long-term obligation on
18 your balance sheet.

19 And so, you know, to keep your credit
20 quality up, you may have to issue some more stock or
21 something like that. So it's -- it's something that
22 utilities look at and say: Well, okay, PPA or a self-
23 build. Build our own unit here in our backyard. We
24 get our jobs in -- in our service territory. And we
25 also earn a return on the investment.

1 So there's some thinking that --
2 there's a preference for that kind of transaction.
3 Like I said, it's not overwhelming that in every case
4 that you get that, but I think the incentives were
5 there for trying to get a self-build as opposed to a
6 PPA. Of course, many utilities have PPA. So it,
7 obviously, doesn't -- isn't the case everywhere. It's
8 sort of on the margin, perhaps.

9 THE CHAIRPERSON: "On the margin,
10 perhaps," could you explain that please?

11 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: So if you have a
12 -- a self-build that's very economic and you have a
13 PPA that's comparable, you may go with the self-build;
14 as opposed to if you have a PPA that comes in that
15 looks very good compared to self-build, you may not be
16 able to push that through the regulatory process.

17 THE CHAIRPERSON: Now, it -- item
18 number 2 talks about generation technology. So you
19 know, wind is ob -- an obvious example of something
20 that might become cheaper. But what about other
21 technologies, solar and so on? You know, you didn't
22 encompass that as part of your work.

23 Is there a reason for that, that you
24 didn't attribute more importance to technological
25 development in your assessment?

1 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yeah, the reason
2 is it's very hard to foresee. But we do think, based
3 on recent experience, that the technological advances
4 are significant. The efficiency of gas plants, for
5 instance, are significant and may continue; we don't
6 know.

7 So we thought the best was to use the
8 CT, which we know is -- is the most efficient form of
9 capacity to add to a system. And then just mention
10 that, that may not be -- there may be something
11 cheaper in the future. So it's -- there's a risk.
12 And, you know, Man -- in Manitoba Hydro capacity sale
13 would have to compete not just -- not always with the
14 CT, but also the most efficient new capacity.

15 But we -- we really had no way to
16 incorporate something like that into the analysis.

17

18 (BRIEF PAUSE)

19

20 DR. HUGH GRANT: I was going to save
21 this for later, but I was just curious about this
22 preference for self-building. And is there any
23 genuine preference in this sense, or is it a relative
24 price issue where, if in the past there's been large
25 transaction cost to transmitting energy over long

1 distances.

2 Is that, perhaps, why energy isn't --
3 electricity isn't as traded an item? And -- and if
4 that's the case, would it decline over time? I mean,
5 presumably, now the cost of transmission have fallen
6 and makes it more desirable to trade?

7 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: I think over
8 time we have seen the markets open up. So the open-
9 access transmission has, I think, made it more -- made
10 -- has made it easier for utilities to engage in long-
11 term PPA contracts, and not less.

12 But the self-building is more of a
13 corporate, sort of, incentive within a company to
14 prefer to have more of a -- a rate base. But again,
15 if you have a good PPA and you have, you know, looking
16 at a development plan of a -- of a new fossil unit or
17 something, sometimes they just don't compete, so you
18 will have the PPA being selected.

19 THE CHAIRPERSON: Bullet number 3
20 talks about lower net-CONE values. If your variable
21 profits are decreasing, would your net-CONE value
22 increase?

23 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: If you have a --
24 if you -- if you're a generator -- a developer located
25 in an area where the energy prices are high because of

1 congestion, so if you were to locate your generator
2 there, you would earn these high -- high prices
3 because it -- because of the locational price is high.

4 Y

5 So the net-CONE would go down, because
6 the net-CONE -- additional revenues reduce the
7 capacity price, because net-CONE is the cost of the
8 unit, which basically should be comparable everywhere.
9 Although, you could argue in congested areas might be
10 a slightly more expensive, but when you earn more
11 revenues, your net-CONE will go down.

12 THE CHAIRPERSON: But if your costs
13 increase because of congestion, wouldn't your net
14 revenue go up?

15 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Well --

16 THE CHAIRPERSON: Net-CONE go up,
17 rather?

18 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yeah, so but
19 you're a generator, so if cost -- if costs are going
20 up, you're earning the extra cost. They're not costs;
21 they're congestion costs. So if you're located in
22 area where there's congestion costs, as a generator
23 you actually earn the extra money because you're
24 relieving congestion. Think of it as -- instead of
25 congestion costs, think of it as a place where there's

1 high -- high locational prices. So you set yourself
2 down there, and you're -- you're earning high --
3 higher prices than everywhere else.

4 Okay. So we can move on to -- okay.
5 So next is -- are the export market issues. So if
6 there's any questions about the energy prices or -- we
7 can certainly go back to them anytime, but I'm happy
8 to take questions about the capacity prices or energy
9 prices.

10

11 (BRIEF PAUSE)

12

13 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: So I think I
14 really only have two (2) export market issues. I -- I
15 did state earlier that we thought, given the scale of
16 the exports projected, that we think MISO could easily
17 absorb those kind of quantities. So I don't think we
18 have any problem with the projections of the
19 quantities.

20 There were some -- we had some
21 qualifications with some issues, but I think -- I -- I
22 think I can't talk about it till tomorrow, so. But
23 basically it -- it depends on various pricing, so I
24 think we'll save it for tomorrow.

25 So that just takes us to some of the

1 issues that Manitoba Hydro raised in their rebuttal
2 that would --that we thought we needed to address.
3 Keep going.

4

5 (BRIEF PAUSE)

6

7 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: So let's see,
8 I'm on slide 37 now. And I think I have about forty-
9 one (41) slides or so, so we -- I think we can get --
10 keep going. So I'm referring to Manitoba Hydro
11 rebuttal, I think it's...

12

13 (BRIEF PAUSE)

14

15 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: I think it's
16 Exhibit 85, Manitoba Hydro-85. And these pages that I
17 reference are the ones that were listed on the top of
18 the original document, so like let's say something
19 like ninety-five (95) out of a hundred and forty-five
20 (145). I understand there might be another page
21 number put in there. But anyway.

22 Let's see. So one of the points that's
23 raised in the rebuttal is that our forecast is within
24 the general range of the experts. We'll see tomorrow
25 when we look at these all together, and you can

1 certainly judge for yourself.

2 But it's really a point that we don't
3 care that much about because really we weren't really
4 aiming to get higher or lower. We just wanted to --
5 to get -- have a forecast that was transparent, that
6 everybody could understand, that could be evaluated
7 rather easily but still have the sophistication
8 necessary to capture all the important changes and the
9 inputs.

10 And -- but anyway, our forecast is
11 lower than -- okay.

12 MR. CHRISTIAN MONNIN: Mr. Chair,
13 we're in -- possibly into a grey area here, so we're
14 just coming to a landing on that with regards to CSI.

15

16 (BRIEF PAUSE)

17

18 MR. CHRISTIAN MONNIN: Mr. Chair, with
19 respect to slide 37, the first bullet referring to
20 Manitoba Hydro rebuttal 95-97, there may be some
21 assertions in the two (2) checklists -- or the
22 checkmark bullets beneath that that stray into the
23 area of CSI. I'm not going to advise which -- which
24 of the two (2) that is, but it's something that we
25 will be addressing during the break.

1 My friends from Hydro advise me that
2 the balance of slide 37, the bullet with regards to
3 rebuttal at page 98, is -- is fine for Dr. Sinclair to
4 -- to proceed. So he will -- he will do so.

5

6 (BRIEF PAUSE)

7

8 THE CHAIRPERSON: Mr. Williams, did
9 you -- I see you've got your finger on the button.

10 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: If there are
11 going to be objections, it would be helpful to have
12 them put on the record. And clearly, one just has to
13 look at page 5 of the Potomac evidence to -- to see
14 that the -- this checkmark is consistent with --
15 certainly in our -- our client's evidence. So it
16 would be helpful for our client to understand the
17 basis of the allegation. Maybe that can be put on the
18 record afterwards.

19 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: Mr. Williams, we're
20 working in real time, and we don't have a basis for an
21 allegation. We're being careful right now, so we're
22 trying to look it up as we are proceeding.

23 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Isn't the
24 statement on page 5, under 'B', second paragraph:

25 "Our results generally forecast lower

1 prices than Manitoba Hydro's
2 consultants due to assumptions on key
3 inputs."

4 Isn't that the key statement?

5

6 (BRIEF PAUSE)

7

8 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: Where are you
9 reading from, Mr. Williams?

10 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: If you look at
11 the first two (2) paragraphs under 'B', "Summary of
12 Results," and in particular the second line -- excuse
13 me, the first sentence of the second paragraph.

14

15 (BRIEF PAUSE)

16

17 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: Mr. Williams,
18 that's helpful. I think we're okay on this, but
19 you'll -- you have to understand, we're -- we're
20 seeing the deck for the first time, so we're -- we're
21 trying to make sure that nothing gets out. And so we
22 have to stop and then look, not -- not have
23 information go out and then think about it after.

24 MR. CHRISTIAN MONNIN: So just so I
25 understand clearly then, Dr. Sinclair can proceed with

1 that slide?

2 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: Well, he can -- Dr.
3 Sinclair can proceed with the slide. The CSI would be
4 in the explanation of why that is the case. So the
5 expectation would be the -- the statement is already
6 out there, but the actual details behind it are the
7 CSI.

8 MR. CHRISTIAN MONNIN: That's
9 acceptable. Thank you.

10 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Okay. So we
11 were at page 98, the rebuttal. Potomac Economics has
12 improperly dismissed Manitoba Hydro forecast. And the
13 -- one of the reasons that we develop our own forecast
14 was that we were not able to get access to a lot of
15 the details of the underlying data. Now, there were
16 some PowerPoint presentations associated with each
17 consultant, and we were able to get some idea of the -
18 - the main inputs.

19 But we really felt that in order to
20 assess -- make an assessment of the reasonableness of
21 the forecast, we needed to see more -- more of the
22 inner workings of the models. And -- and so I don't
23 know if we'd say we dismissed them, but we said -- we
24 recommended that a more transparent model be the basis
25 of your decision.

1 And we tried to develop a transparent
2 model where you can see everything that we did, and
3 everything's available. And so, really, our -- our
4 point here is that we -- we could only work with those
5 models so far and then we needed to get some more
6 information and provide you with some more details.
7 And so we developed our own model.

8

9 CONTINUED BY MR. CHRISTIAN MONNIN:

10 MR. CHRISTIAN MONNIN: If I may just,
11 again, for the benefit of the record, I -- I believe
12 it's on the record. However, the debate on -- on --
13 with respect to CSI content pertained to slide 37 of
14 the presentation.

15 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: So on to slide
16 38, where a similar comment was made in the rebuttal
17 at page 98 of the rebuttal:

18 "Potomac Economics improperly
19 interpreted consultants' capacity
20 analysis."

21 Again, we had difficulty fully
22 comprehending what was going on in the analyses. So
23 we weren't really able to make conclusive statements.
24 And we had to infer a lot from what we saw in the
25 data. So if it was improperly interpreted, it was a

1 result of not having enough data.

2 The Manitoba Hydro rebuttal at page
3 101:

4 "Potomac Economics misunderstood the
5 Brattle capacity analysis inputs."

6 So we read the Brattle report to be
7 using a twelve hundred dollar (\$1,200) a kilowatt
8 combustion turbine price. So it wasn't that we
9 misunderstood, but we -- it was actually reported to
10 us that was the price. And the rebuttal notes that
11 Brattle corrected that value in some form. I -- I
12 suppose it was maybe a confirmation to the Company.
13 But, anyway, it wasn't that we misunderstood. It was
14 just we were not informed properly of the -- of the
15 prices used.

16 All right. Just a couple -- a couple
17 more slides. So at page 105 -- and I talked about
18 this earlier. The panel Chairman asked a question
19 about it, and we'll talk about it a little bit more
20 now:

21 "Potomac Economic's coal retirements
22 assumption is outside the
23 mainstream."

24 As I said before we -- our assumption
25 is based on EIA projections, which we do not believe

1 are outside the mainstream. EIA does very careful
2 work. Their evaluation involves many experts, many --
3 a great amount of effort. and has been ongoing for
4 many years. The -- their model has been vetted over
5 many years. I -- I think they do very careful work,
6 important work.

7 And as I discussed before, I think part
8 of this assertion that our coal retirement assumption
9 is outside the mainstream is because it doesn't match
10 up with MISO's 12 gigawatts. And I explained that
11 part of that is because MISO is a planning
12 organization. They plan more conservatively. And
13 they are counting capacity that looks -- that was in a
14 category of indeterminate whether it would retire or
15 not.

16 And so the difference between what we
17 say at 6 gigawatts and what MISO says at 12 gigawatts
18 is really a category where MISO is assuming these
19 retirements, even though these units have not
20 indicated that they're retiring. And besides that, we
21 do think that the EIA has good estimates.

22 And finally, it's made out to indicate
23 -- it's made out that this will have a big impact on
24 prices, whereas, actually, when carbon costs are
25 included, the marginal retiring coal plant is actually

1 comparable to a new CCGT. So if you were to retire
2 more coal units in our model, or really any model, and
3 you have a carbon price, you really are going to get
4 the coal plants that are retiring to be comparable to
5 the new CCGTs.

6 And if you look at the following slide,
7 on slide 40, we wanted to illustrate this. And I've
8 brought it up before in response to a question. We
9 have three (3) types of units here -- a CCGT, a CT,
10 and an old coal plant -- because what -- what do you
11 have on the margin is that you have coal retiring
12 inefficient coal plants, and you have these new CCGTs
13 coming in. And the important numbers are on the far
14 right.

15 So this is the marginal cost of an old
16 coal unit when you have a carbon price; carbon price
17 being twenty dollars (\$20) there. You see the carbon
18 price. And so if that's on the margin, you have a
19 fifty dollar (\$50) price. Now, the marginal cost of a
20 new CCGT in that time frame is -- is slightly higher,
21 but it's basically comparable.

22 So all -- all the issues that are
23 raised about coal retirements giving the impression
24 that this may have a drastic impact on prices, I think
25 it's not true in that our model could sustain more

1 coal retirements and the prices would be very stable.
2 It's at stable levels. And I believe that would be
3 the case with most models, and it is driven by these
4 converging costs.

5 Okay, so Manitoba -- in slide 41,
6 Manitoba also takes exception with our use of emission
7 rates. So we use a cons -- we use a constant rate for
8 all gas plants, and we use a constant rate for all
9 coal plants. And Manitoba Hydro's suggesting that
10 perhaps this should change. This should be -- it
11 should change with the efficiency of the plant.

12 And that's logical that if -- if a
13 plant's less efficient, it's going to emit more CO2;
14 and I agree with that point. However, this is
15 something that will have very little impact on -- on
16 the -- really, what the marginal price in any hour,
17 because you're really moving between heat rates and
18 you're -- and you are -- the carbon price moves
19 through the cost of the plant and the -- the variance
20 in the carbon. And the heat rate will not have a big
21 impact on the -- on the marginal costs of the plant if
22 you were to make that adjustment.

23 In fact, you may get lower -- actually,
24 lower off-peak prices because you'd be pushing coal
25 units off the margin and bring a cheaper gas onto the

1 margin, and you may actually lower the off-peak price.

2 But we -- we think that the -- the effect is -- is

3 minimal.

4 In a similar way, Potomac Eco --

5 Manitoba Hydro -- this is on slide -- my slide 42.

6 Manitoba Hydro says that our capacity expansion is too

7 simplistic. If you remember, we used the EIA capacity

8 expansion. But we have to supplement that to a degree

9 because in some years there's not enough capacity to

10 meet the demand. So we add natural gas plants, half

11 of it combustion -- combined-cycle gas turbines, and

12 half of it combustion turbines.

13 And again, there's a suggestion that

14 this will have a big impact on -- on the prices, but

15 we're really adding very little in this -- in this

16 system because most of the additions are from the EIA

17 capacity expansion. And, for instance, in a reference

18 case, we add about 4,000 megawatts of natural gas over

19 the twenty (20) year period, which is about 11 percent

20 of the CCGT and CT capacity in the region by 2034.

21 So, again, this -- this impact is likely to be very

22 small if we were to make it more flexible like that.

23 So that's -- that's it for my public

24 presentation, and the CSI will be presented, I

25 believe, tomorrow. So thank you. Certainly if you

1 have questions, I'd be happy to answer them now.

2 THE CHAIRPERSON: Dr. Sinclair, the
3 consultants that were used by Manitoba Hydro to
4 forecast prices would have access -- have had access
5 to the same historical data that you had access to?

6 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yeah -- yes.

7 THE CHAIRPERSON: So the difference
8 would be assumptions that they used and perhaps the
9 formulas they used to generate the price forecast.

10 I mean, that would -- in essence is
11 that the difference between -- without knowing the
12 details, would -- would -- is that what you assume
13 would be the difference between your results versus
14 their results?

15 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: It -- it's hard
16 to say. They -- they certain had the same access to
17 the key inputs, such as gas prices. They provided
18 some of that, actually. But what was different
19 between our model and their model was that their model
20 tends to be -- it's a commitment model, commitment of
21 dispatch model basically.

22 So it -- it goes through each hour
23 trying to find -- re-dispatches the system --
24 recommits the system, re-dispatches the system, where
25 we actually take what actually happened in MISO and

1 adjust it from there. So they -- conceivably they
2 could have taken a -- taken the MISO curves like we
3 did, and adjusted them.

4 But what they do, I think they -- they
5 produce -- and again it's a little sketchy, because
6 the transparency wasn't that great. But I believe
7 what they do is they have more of a linear programming
8 model that will take the -- the units that are
9 available, sort of select them out of certain groups,
10 and create their own supply curves for each hour, not
11 related to the historical necessarily.

12 They may use the historical, but I -- I
13 don't know, to sort of gauge their own estimates. But
14 they -- they tend to build up from worth -- up from
15 scratch a little bit more, from what I understand.

16 THE CHAIRPERSON: Mr. Williams, are
17 you in a position to -- to ask some questions of this
18 witness?

19 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: I am ready when
20 the --the panel is ready.

21 THE CHAIRPERSON: I just want to
22 confirm that I -- I heard Mr. Monnin say that, you
23 know, his client is arriving at one o'clock. He'd
24 like some time with the. I wonder if we couldn't
25 combine both things, and have lunch around that time

1 so that he's able to consult at the same time as -- as
2 we're having lunch.

3 And for the sake of efficiency, I'm
4 assuming we can go till, say, quarter to 1, and then
5 break and then resume after -- after lunch. Is that
6 workable for all of the Intervenors? If it is, I'm
7 just going to look around to see if any -- anybody
8 needs a break. It doesn't look -- yeah, we do need to
9 -- let's take five (5), and then we'll come back and -
10 - and work till about quarter to 1:00.

11

12 --- Upon recessing at 12:02 p.m.

13 --- Upon resuming at 12:11 p.m.

14

15 THE CHAIRPERSON: I believe that we're
16 in a position to resume the questioning of the
17 witness. So, Mr. Williams, please.

18

19 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. BYRON WILLIAMS:

20 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Thank you. And
21 good afternoon, members of the panel. And Mr. -- Dr.
22 Sinclair, good afternoon to you, as well.

23 I wonder if we could pull up the terms
24 of reference of the Public Utilities Board in this
25 proceeding, so the ones issued to the Public Utilities

1 Board. Thank you. And perhaps if we could scroll
2 down to the -- page 2, 1(d). That's perfect there,
3 thank you.

4 Dr. -- Dr. Sinclair, your team, in
5 preparing for your work on this assignment, I take it
6 you would have reviewed the terms of reference of the
7 Public Utilities Board?

8 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

9 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And you're aware
10 that one of the issues for the Public Utilities Board
11 to advise the province on is the reasonableness,
12 thoroughness, and soundness of all critical inputs,
13 including export expectations and commitments?

14 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

15 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And if we could
16 scroll down to 2(d), which I believe is on page 3 of 8
17 of the terms of reference. Thank you.

18 And as well, Dr. Sinclair, you're aware
19 that the Public Utilities Board is called upon to
20 advise the province, in terms of the reasonableness of
21 forecasted critical inputs, including electricity
22 market price forecasts?

23 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

24 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And scrolling
25 down to sub (e), and again, Dr. Sinclair, you're aware

1 that the Public Utilities Board is called upon to
2 advise the province, in terms of the reasonableness of
3 the scope and/or evaluation of risks and benefits
4 related to the reliability of Hydro's interpretation
5 of the most likely future -- future outcomes,
6 including export market prices and carbon pricing?

7 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

8 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And just down to
9 sub (g). Thank you. You also are aware, Dr.
10 Sinclair, that the Public Utilities Board is called
11 upon to advise the province, in terms of the financial
12 and economic risks of the plan as compared to
13 alternative development strategies with regard to
14 export, carbon contracts, and opportunity revenues?

15 Would that be fair, sir?

16 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

17 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: If we could pull
18 up Potomac Exhibit 3, which is the scope of work for
19 Potomac Economics. And in terms of -- if we could go
20 to item number 11 on that list.

21

22 (BRIEF PAUSE)

23

24 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Dr. Sinclair, one
25 of the tasks assigned to Potomac was a review of

1 Manitoba Hydro's export revenue forecasting, including
2 the ICF forecasts.

3 Am I correct, sir?

4 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

5 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And is it fair to
6 say that in undertaking that work, Potomac exhibited -
7 - or experienced some challenges in terms of some of
8 the underlying data relating to the ICF forecasts?

9 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: Kelly. Sorry,
10 objection. The question presumes which of the
11 forecasters are included in Manitoba Hydro's forecast.

12 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Let me -- let me
13 ask that question a little -- a different way, and I
14 apologize for the...

15 In terms of assessing the -- Manitoba
16 Hydro's export revenue forecasting process, did
17 Potomac experience challenges in assessing the
18 underlying forecast provided by any of the six (6)
19 external -- external consultants to Manitoba Hydro?

20 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yeah. I think I
21 explained before that one of the reasons we conducted
22 our own detailed analysis was that there was a lack of
23 transparency in -- in most of the forecasts, that we
24 were not able to determine the underlying mechanisms
25 which produced them.

1 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Under task 1 of
2 the -- of the terms of reference for Potomac -- or
3 scope of work, excuse me, you were called upon to
4 review the factors considered to arrive at Manitoba
5 Hydro's export market expectations and to comment on
6 whether they are complete, reasonable, and accurate.

7 Would that be fair, sir?

8 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

9 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And again, you
10 would -- it would be fair to suggest that you experien
11 -- in -- in performing this ins -- assignment, you
12 experienced some transparency constraints, sir?

13 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

14 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: If we can scroll -
15 - scroll down to number 6 on this page, Dr. Sinclair,
16 you were asked to review Hydro's IFF dating back to
17 IFF09, and assess the reasonableness of Hydro's
18 derived average export prices projected at that time?

19 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

20 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And -- and, sir,
21 I have certainly, I -- I think, exhaustively read your
22 -- your evidence as -- as presented in Potomac Exhibit
23 2-1, and would I be -- would it be fair to say that I
24 -- I don't see much commentary in terms of the IFF09
25 projections in that document, sir?

1 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yeah, we
2 reviewed those forecasts, and we did not include them
3 in the report. You're right. It's just that our
4 review of those did not seem to contribute much to our
5 effort at producing a forecast, so we did -- we didn't
6 spend a lot of time developing any points in that
7 regard.

8 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And -- and I
9 accept that. Sir, do -- do you have any observations
10 in terms of the reasonableness of IFF09 as compared to
11 actual export market data for the year -- you know,
12 years 2010 through 2013?

13 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: No, we did not
14 do a quan -- quantitative analysis of that.

15

16 (BRIEF PAUSE)

17

18 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Sir, in terms of
19 Potomac's efforts as presented in Exhibit 2-1 of
20 Potomac, the redacted evidence of March 2014, it would
21 be fair to say that the intent of Potomac was to
22 present a forecast that was highly transparent and
23 easily understood?

24 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: That's correct.

25 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And to assist the

1 Public Utilities Board, you provided a forecast over
2 the next twenty (20) years of energy and capacity
3 prices in the MISO marketplace?

4 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: That's correct.

5 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And would it be
6 fair to characterize your report -- we can turn the --
7 if -- if you'd wish to, Diana, to Exhibit 2-1 of
8 Potomac?

9 Would it be fair to characterize that
10 report as presenting a relatively detailed explanation
11 of your modelling and assumptions?

12 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

13 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: For example, sir,
14 you have provided a transparent explanation of the
15 sources of your data, including the EIA annual energy
16 outlook assumptions and the EIA updated capital
17 estimates?

18 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

19 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And to your
20 knowledge, sir, is there any other forecast of MISO
21 export prices on the public record of the NFAT
22 proceeding which transparently lays out its data
23 assumptions and methodology to the -- to the degree of
24 Potomac?

25 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: No, not -- not

1 to the degree that we do. You should be able to
2 replicate our study based on public available data.
3 Now, I do say that the Brattle study that was done for
4 the NFAT, that -- that had a little more transparency
5 than -- than the others, so -- but it was -- we could
6 not take their study and replicate it, no, wouldn't be
7 able to.

8 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Okay. And I
9 asked on the public record, and I do not believe that
10 I'm seeking CSI with this question, but Ms. Ramage and
11 -- and Me. Monnin will be on the alert if I am.

12 To your knowledge, is there any other
13 forecast of MISO export prices on the CSI record of
14 the NFAT proceeding, which transparency lays out its
15 data assumptions and methodology to the degree that
16 Potomac does?

17 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: No.

18

19 (BRIEF PAUSE)

20

21 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: If we could turn
22 to -- if we could turn to Potomac Exhibit 2-1, to page
23 41, please?

24

25 (BRIEF PAUSE)

1 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And if you could
2 scroll down to the bottom of this page? Try to ignore
3 the black lining, Dr. Sinclair. Again, I'm not
4 seeking CSI in this particular question, but you see,
5 sir, the first sentence of the second paragraph, a
6 suggestion by Potomac that you were unable to obtain
7 detailed information on the models and inputs used by
8 Manitoba Hydro's consultants to forecast capacity
9 prices.

10 Do you see that, sir?

11 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

12 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And with regard
13 to the inability of Potomac to access this detailed
14 information on models and inputs related to capacity
15 price forecasts, to your understanding, sir, was it
16 that Manitoba Hydro refused to provide the material,
17 or that Manitoba Hydro did not have the material?

18 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: My understanding
19 was that Manitoba Hydro agreed with their consultants
20 that they would not release the detailed material. I
21 believe they did not have it.

22 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Okay. Did you --
23 and I guess just on that point, did you explore with
24 Manitoba Hydro whether it had the detailed
25 information on the models and inputs of its

1 consultants with regard to capacity prices?

2 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes, we had
3 conversations about it.

4 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And your sense
5 was they did not have it?

6 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yeah. My sense
7 -- we were told that the data was proprietary, that
8 they had agreed not to release it. I think there was
9 some effort to go back to the consultants that was
10 unsuccessful, except in the case of Brattle. But
11 generally, yeah, the -- the message was, We don't have
12 it and we can't get it.

13 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Did you explore,
14 Sir, with Manitoba Hydro whether it had sought to
15 independently verify the information related to the
16 model and the inputs of its consultants with regard to
17 capacity prices?

18 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: No, I did not.
19 I didn't ask them that.

20

21 (BRIEF PAUSE)

22

23 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: So -- so you're
24 not in a position to offer us any comfort that
25 Manitoba Hydro had sought to indiv -- independently

1 verify the indep -- the information, models, and
2 inputs of his consultants with regard to capacity
3 prices?

4 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: That's correct.

5 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: I wonder if you
6 can turn -- still staying with this document, being
7 Manitoba -- or Potomac Exhibit 2-1, to page 19 of
8 Potomac's March 2014 redacted report.

9

10 (BRIEF PAUSE)

11

12 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And, Sir, we were
13 talking about capacity prices previously.

14 You'll see here that in this section of
15 your report, you're referring to energy prices?

16 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Correct.

17 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And would it be
18 fair to say as well, Sir, that when it came to
19 examining the underpinnings of Manitoba Hydro's energy
20 price forecast, that you were unable to obtain
21 detailed information regarding the consultants'
22 models, input data, and results?

23 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: We were not able
24 to obtain sufficient details.

25 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And, Sir, we --

1 we went over this with capacity prices.

2 Would it be fair to summarize it --
3 your understanding that, with the exception of
4 Brattle, Manitoba Hydro was unable to -- to obtain
5 that additional information from its consultants?

6 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: It's the same,
7 correct.

8 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: If we can turn to
9 page 10 of this document, which is the report of March
10 2014, redacted.

11

12 (BRIEF PAUSE)

13

14 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Sir, under the
15 Brattle Group heading, the third sentence, you see
16 again a reference to limited information regarding the
17 model and assumptions, agreed?

18 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

19 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And apart from
20 what we've already discussed, with regard to the
21 capacity forecast and the energy price forecast, are
22 there any additional details in terms of the
23 limitations relating to the -- the information from
24 Brattle that you wish to -- to identify?

25 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: I don't think

1 so, except maybe to say that it wasn't just data, but
2 also the underlying mechanisms that -- what were used
3 to -- to model the data, that were also unavailable.

4 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Okay. And
5 perhaps if we could turn quickly to the top of page
6 12, and maybe we can elaborate on that just a little
7 bit.

8 And, Sir, in terms of your reference to
9 the lack of insight into the -- the mech -- mechanism
10 of Brattle, would it be fair to say that, in terms of
11 energy prices and capacity prices, Potomac was unable
12 to disentangle countervailing effects, and that caused
13 you some concerns, in terms of the Brattle estimates?

14 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: That's correct.

15 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Sir, going back
16 to the -- our very early discussion of the Public
17 Utilities Board's mandate to report on the
18 reasonableness, thoroughness, and soundness of all
19 critical inputs, including export expectations, would
20 it be fair to say that -- that Potomac's efforts to --
21 to report on these inputs were, in essence, frustrated
22 by limited access to consultants' models, outputs, and
23 assumptions?

24 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes, I think
25 that's the -- the point we make, is that because we

1 couldn't get to the bottom of some of the
2 calculations, that we couldn't make further -- we
3 couldn't make definitive conclusions.

4 I don't want to give the impression,
5 there, that -- it's true there was limitations on the
6 data from the consultants, but otherwise, we had a
7 fairly high level of cooperation on other matters from
8 Manitoba Hydro, and -- we would call, and they were
9 fairly responsive, and -- and straightforward.

10 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And I thank you
11 for that.

12 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Just -- yeah.

13 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Oh, sorry, I
14 didn't mean to interrupt.

15 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: It was really
16 just getting to the bottom of the consultants.

17 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Sir, if you need
18 a reference, it's page 9 of your report, but is it
19 your understa -- page 9 of this report. And by that,
20 I mean --

21 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Oh, slides.

22 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Not the slides,
23 excuse me, Hydro Exhibit 2-1, and I apologize. In --

24 MR. CHRISTIAN MONNIN: I'm sorry,
25 that's Potomac Exhibit 2-1, just for the record.

1 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Thank you, Me.

2 Monnin.

3

4 CONTINUED BY MR. BYRON WILLIAMS:

5 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Sir, and -- and
6 if I'm speaking too simplistic -- simplistically, Dr.
7 Sinclair, you'll correct me, but would it be fair to
8 say that, for purposes of the financial model, Hydro,
9 to your knowledge, essentially lumped all six (6)
10 external consultants together on an equal ways --
11 equal-weight basis to establish a single consolidated
12 forecast?

13 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: That -- that's
14 correct.

15 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And My Friend Ms.
16 Ramage and -- will want to keep her finger on -- on
17 the button just for this question. Perhaps, you as
18 well, Me. Monnin.

19 But are you in a position on the public
20 record, sir, to indicate whether all six (6)
21 forecasters for -- modelled both a no-CO2 cost
22 scenario and a CO2 cost scenario?

23 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: That material, Mr.
24 Chair, has been redacted at -- at this point, so
25 Manitoba Hydro would object to a response to that

1 question.

2 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And CAC
3 (Manitoba) would reserve the right to re-put that
4 question if there's a -- a determination that -- that
5 that should be put on the public record.

6 MR. CHRISTIAN MONNIN: For the
7 purposes of the IECs, we will abide by whatever --
8 whatever direction the Board gives us on that.

9

10 CONTINUED BY MR. BYRON WILLIAMS:

11 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Dr. Sinclair,
12 again, this was a -- a thrust of your evidence this
13 morning, but in the absence of the -- an ability to
14 validi -- validate the external consultants employed
15 by Hydro, Potomac developed its own forecast, agreed?

16 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: That's correct.

17 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: So I'm going to
18 play devil's advocate with you for just a moment or
19 two (2). Recognizing that we have six (6) forecasts
20 on the Hydro side that neither you or, apparently,
21 Hydro have been able to verify, isn't there somehow
22 some strength in numbers, no matter the potential
23 flaws or biasses within any one (1) of those
24 individual six (6) forecasts, that we can somehow hope
25 that the sum of that forecast will be greater than

1 their individual parts?

2 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: I -- I don't
3 think I can really conclusively say so. No, I don't -
4 - I don't really know.

5 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Okay. I'll try
6 it one (1) more time, just because I'm feeling a
7 little provocative this morning, sir. In other words,
8 shouldn't we trust the cumulative wis -- wisdom of six
9 (6) forecasters, however lacking in validation and
10 transparency, as compared to one (1) transparent
11 forecast?

12 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: I -- yeah, I
13 think the -- the point we make with some of the
14 statements in our -- in our report about recommending
15 not relying on the consultants is -- is that a -- a
16 transparent forecast is very useful because you know
17 what's going on, the inner workings.

18 And even though the consultants may or
19 may not be -- have a good forecast, without knowing
20 how they actually -- how they actually work, it's hard
21 to make a conclusion how accurate they are. So you
22 may conclude that a transparent one, yes, is more
23 valuable than a -- a non-transparent one.

24 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Sir, you've
25 talked about this a bit before, and I believe it's a -

1 - rather than point you to your pre-filed evidence,
2 I'll refer you to your PowerPoint of today, Potomac
3 Exhibit 4, slide 23.

4

5 (BRIEF PAUSE)

6

7 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Sir, at a high
8 level here, Potomac sets out the four (4) alternatives
9 that it examined, the reference case with carbon
10 costs, the reference case with no carbon costs, the
11 high resource production case, and the high growth
12 case.

13 Would that be fair?

14 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yeah. Yes.

15 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And the two (2)
16 most likely scenarios, sir, were the reference no
17 carbon case and the reference case.

18 Would that be fair as well?

19 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: That's correct.

20 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And you assigned
21 an equal probability based on judgment to those two
22 (2) scenarios, sir?

23 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

24 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Just for the
25 clarification of my client, moving to the high

1 reference case, which you discussed earlier with Board
2 member Kapitan, would I be correct in suggesting to
3 you that it includes both no carbon costs as well as
4 an expectation that will -- there will be limit --
5 little growth in the price of natural gas due to
6 increased supply?

7 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: That's correct.

8 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And you assigned
9 a -- a -- judgmentally, a -- a probability to that
10 scenario of 20 percent?

11 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: That's correct.

12 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Thank you, and
13 we're going to turn to slide 27. And Dr. Sinclair,
14 I'm doing this on the -- on the fly, because I had
15 actually been working off of your pre-filed evidence,
16 so you'll correct me if I -- I misstate this.

17

18 (BRIEF PAUSE)

19

20 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: But on the left-
21 hand side, we see the presentation of the four (4)
22 Potomac scenarios at the peak time.

23 Would that be fair, sir?

24 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

25 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And I -- I want

1 to start with the reference case with carbon costs,
2 which I understand to be the green line.

3 Am I correct in that understanding,
4 sir?

5 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes, that's
6 green.

7 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And you might
8 have to refer, members of the panel, to the paper
9 presentation to -- to see the green line.

10 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Okay. It's the
11 second one (1) from the top on -- in the left panel.

12 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And just to walk
13 through the -- that -- the reference case, sir, do I
14 see you starting on the left-hand side of this
15 presentation at about thirty dollars (\$30) per
16 megawatt hour in 2015?

17 Would that be fair?

18 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

19 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And on or about
20 2021, we -- we see the -- as the forecast for the
21 green line passing the -- the forty dollars (\$40) per
22 megawatt line.

23 Would that be fair?

24 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Correct.

25 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And it tops out

1 at -- at or around 2033/'34, at fifty-eight (58) or
2 fifty-nine dollars (\$59) per megawatt hour.

3 Would that be fair?

4 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Correct.

5 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And just above
6 it, which, on the paper cop -- copy is the light blue
7 line, or the top line, we see the reference hydro
8 figure.

9 Would that be fair, sir?

10 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

11 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And would it be
12 fair to -- to characterize the -- that pattern as
13 fairly similar to the reference CO2 cost line, with
14 the exception that the price is somewhat higher,
15 ending at above sixty dollars (\$60) per megawatt hour
16 towards the end of the twenty (20) year forecast?

17 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes. It's --
18 basically has the same shape, if that's what you mean.

19 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: The same shape,
20 sir, and -- and I'm -- I'm going to suggest to you
21 that as compared to the no CO2 cost scenario, or the
22 low energy price scenario, it's also relatively closer
23 in terms of its price experience to the reference CO2
24 model.

25 Would that be fair?

1 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

2 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Now, on the paper
3 copy, we see the reference case no carbon as being on
4 the dark blue, the third line from the top.

5 Is that fair, sir?

6 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

7 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And again, that
8 starts around thirty dollars (\$30) per megawatt hour
9 in 2015, sir?

10 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

11 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And in this case,
12 it does not get to the forty dollars (\$40) per
13 megawatt hour till on or about 2029 in your forecast?

14 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

15 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: So about eight
16 (8) years later than the other reference case?

17 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

18 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And it finishes
19 out towards the end of the forecast in the low- to
20 mid-forties (40s) on or about 2033/2034, sir?

21 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

22 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Would it be fair
23 to say roughly fifteen dollars (\$15) per megawatt less
24 than the reference case at 2033?

25 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

1 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Now, in -- in
2 your discussion with Board member Kapitany, you
3 indicated with regard to the low energy price scenario
4 that you believed a reasonable case could be -- could
5 be made for that scenario, sir?

6 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Plausible, yes.

7 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: I believe the
8 word you used in the -- the discussion with her was
9 'very plausible'.

10 Would you accept that, subject to
11 check?

12 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Sure. Twenty
13 (20) -- 20 percent chance.

14 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And again, on the
15 paper copy, this appears with the red line?

16 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

17 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And it starts at
18 a bit less than thirty dollars (\$30) per megawatt in
19 2015, sir, agreed?

20 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

21 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And it finishes
22 at around thirty-five dollars (\$35) per megawatt hour
23 towards the end of your forecast, correct?

24 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

25 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: So it never gets

1 to that forty dollars (\$40) per megawatt figure that -
2 - that we eventually cross in the other three (3)
3 scenarios?

4 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: That's correct.

5 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Subject to check,
6 would you agree that towards the end of the forecast,
7 it is roughly twenty-three dollars (\$23) per megawatt
8 hour less than the reference at 2033?

9 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

10 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And roughly eight
11 dollars (\$8) per megawatt less than the no carbon at
12 2033?

13 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

14 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Sir, looking at
15 these four (4) scenarios, would I be correct in
16 suggesting to you that in terms of downside risk for
17 these scenarios, that the greatest risk in terms of
18 magnitude flows from a low-CO2 scenario?

19 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes. I -- I'm
20 sorry, magnitude?

21 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Sorry, let me try
22 this again. Sir, in terms of the -- as compared to
23 the reference CO2 case, the biggest -- let me try it
24 again. If one were to rank the downside risk to the
25 reference with CO2 cost case, would it be fair to say

1 that the -- the biggest risk is no-CO2 prices,
2 followed by an -- an accumulative additional risk
3 related to low natural gas prices?

4 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Okay. So the --
5 the prices will be impacted more if carbon does not
6 materialize -- carbon prices are zero, than if low
7 energy prices were to materialize, right.

8 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And a -- a much
9 better answered question than asked, and I thank you -
10 - thank you for that.

11 Mr. Chair, just in terms of the time, I
12 -- that's a -- a nice breaking point. I can keep
13 going if you wish. I can just indicate that My Friend
14 Mr. Gange, I believe, has no cross-examination, and
15 nor does My Friend Mr. Orle.

16 THE CHAIRPERSON: You know, I think
17 that -- Me. Monnin, I'm looking at the clock here. Do
18 -- do you know if your witness will -- will be
19 arriving shortly, or...?

20 MR. CHRISTIAN MONNIN: Mr. President,
21 I -- I believe that his -- his plane is arriving at
22 one o'clock --

23 THE CHAIRPERSON: Okay.

24 MR. CHRISTIAN MONNIN: -- and then
25 he'll make his way directly from the airport, here.

1 So subject to check, as we say, I suspect he'll be
2 here in about half an hour, forty-five (45) minutes
3 after that time.

4 THE CHAIRPERSON: Okay. So we could
5 then potentially go for another few minutes then.

6

7 (BRIEF PAUSE)

8

9 CONTINUED BY MR. BYRON WILLIAMS:

10 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Sir, if I
11 understood your -- again, your better answer than my
12 poor question, the biggest risk in terms of price is
13 the no -- no carbon cost scenario?

14 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

15 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And am -- am I
16 correct in suggesting to you that when your -- your
17 fellow independent consultant, a Mr. Sabine from MNP
18 or Meyers -- well, I'll just say MNP. We'll use that
19 acronym.

20 When he looked at the no carbon cost
21 scenario versus the carbon cost scenario, he concerted
22 -- concluded that it was roughly 50/50 in terms of
23 those two (2) potential futures?

24 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

25 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And sir, would

1 that be consistent with the analysis of Potomac in
2 terms of the -- those two (2) potential futures being
3 roughly 50/50 in terms of a carbon cost future or a no
4 carbon cost future?

5 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

6 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And it would be
7 fair to conclude that there is a significant
8 uncertainty relating to the introduction of CO2 costs?

9 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

10 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: I wonder, sir, if
11 you can outline at a national and regional level the
12 factors that led Potomac to conclude that there was
13 significant uncertainty regarding the introduction of
14 carbon costs?

15 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yeah, I -- I
16 don't think we were really -- I -- I think it was
17 mostly our assessment of the political timing that
18 there was a push for car -- more carbon action by the
19 federal government, say five (5) years ago, and the
20 momentum for that probably won't materialize soon. So
21 that was basically how we saw it.

22 And, of course, you know, we -- we work
23 with participants in the energy markets every day, and
24 our -- our opinion is formed by opinions that we pick
25 up also from other participants.

1 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Thank you for
2 that. And -- and just, if we were to go back in time,
3 perhaps five (5) -- five (5) years, it would be fair
4 to say that at that point in time, observers were more
5 optimistic about the likelihood of carbon cost being
6 implemented in the relatively near future?

7 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

8 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And it would also
9 be fair to say, again, looking back in time to about
10 five (5) years ago, they would be more confident in
11 terms of the magnitude, a -- a higher magnitude of
12 carbon costs being, you know -- at that point in time.

13

14 Would that be fair?

15 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: That -- that's
16 logical, but I can't remember.

17 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Fair enough. I
18 want to just stay on the path of uncertainty for a --
19 a few more moments, and I wonder if we could turn to
20 page 45 of Exhibit Potomac-2-1, your redacted evidence
21 from March of 2014?

22

23 (BRIEF PAUSE)

24

25 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Now, I have to

1 say that the Chair scooped -- the Chairperson of the
2 panel scooped a few of my good questions on this, so
3 I'll see if I can -- can, with no bitterness, try and
4 work out a couple. But, sir, in terms of the longer
5 term price forecasts, we -- we have both the six (6)
6 expert consultants of Hydro and the Potomac forecast
7 going out to 2034.

8 Would that be fair, sir?

9 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

10 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And then we have
11 really, in terms of forecasts, a big black hole for
12 the period between 2034 and -- and 2080, would that be
13 fair, sir, in that there are no forecasts going out
14 that long?

15 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: That's right.
16 There is no forecast by ourselves or the consultants.

17 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And what -- what
18 Hydro essentially does is, for the period, at least,
19 between 2035 and through 2049, is literally
20 interpolate a value equal to the compound annual
21 growth rate, or CAGR, for 2030 through '34, and zero
22 value for 2049. Is that what it does?

23 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: That's correct.
24 After 2049, it's zero.

25 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Okay. And as

1 Potomac looks to the future in terms of capacity
2 prices, it would be fair to say that you find no basis
3 for assuming that real prices will increase after
4 2034.

5 Would that be fair?

6

7 (BRIEF PAUSE)

8

9 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: I think we -- we
10 found it difficult -- I guess we've -- we would find
11 it difficult to find a basis for that, although I have
12 to say that -- that it's not a -- a very large rate
13 between -- and it declines very quickly, and it's zero
14 after that.

15 I think what we recommend is that the
16 Company's provided sensitivity, what would happen if
17 there were zero instead of that -- that other
18 alternative growth rate.

19 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And that's
20 helpful, and -- and to your knowledge, has that
21 sensitivity been done?

22 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Not -- not to my
23 knowledge.

24 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Okay.

25 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: But we really

1 haven't been in the business of following up on that.

2 We -- we put a recommendation in.

3 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Now, sir,
4 referring you to page 43 of your evidence, near the
5 top.

6

7 (BRIEF PAUSE)

8

9 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Actually, I
10 misspoke, page 45 of your evidence, near the top, and
11 Ms. Ramage and Me. Monnin may want to -- I don't think
12 I'm going to sneak into CSI, but they'll want to keep
13 their fingers near their pen -- or near their buttons.

14 We see you recommending that the
15 Company provide additional analysis supporting its
16 assumptions relating to its ability to make on-peak
17 opportunity sales at a premium as compared to the MISO
18 day-ahead price.

19 Would that be fair?

20 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Correct.

21 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And you're
22 recommending additional analysis be undertaken in
23 support of that premium. Is that correct, sir?

24 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Correct.

25 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And one (1) of

1 the reasons you recommend that, is when you looked at
2 the 2011 material, that informa -- information in
3 terms of a premium was not supported.

4 Would that be fair?

5 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: That -- that's
6 correct. The -- the two (2) years I looked at would
7 not support that. That's why I recommend perhaps
8 going back -- either going back some more years, or
9 developing a -- a model that might illustrate it
10 better.

11 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Yeah. And -- and
12 in fairness, in 2011, the -- the on-peak price was
13 higher than the average on-peak sales of Hydro, but in
14 2012, Hydro did earn a premium.

15 Would that be fair?

16 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Correct.

17 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And to your
18 knowledge, sir, has that analysis been undertaken,
19 that additional sensitivity analysis?

20 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: No. Again, we
21 hadn't really followed up.

22 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Turning, sir, to
23 page 42 of your report, scrolling down, and again, I
24 see my pagination is slightly off. I want to turn you
25 to page 44, and I apologize for that, and if anyone's

1 suffering carpal tunnel from extra flipping, I
2 apologize as -- as well.

3 Sir, directing your attention to the
4 second last paragraph, you -- you note that Hydro
5 assumes in its forecast that all dependable capacity
6 is sold under long-term firm contracts.

7 Would that be fair?

8 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

9 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And a minor
10 concern that you articulate in this reference, sir, is
11 that that assumption would -- would appear
12 inconsistent with the historical record?

13 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

14 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And so, sir, you
15 recommend that 9 percent of Hydro's projected long-
16 term dependable energy be repriced at peak opportunity
17 sales levels.

18 Would that be fair?

19 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Correct.

20 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: I note your
21 comment about La Capra, but to your -- to -- to your
22 knowledge, or have you seen anything from Hydro
23 working on that -- that assessment of a repricing at a
24 -- for -- for 9 percent?

25 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: No.

1 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: I'm pretty
2 confident I have this pagination correct. If we could
3 turn to page 16 of the -- yes. And Dr. Sinclair, just
4 in terms of the last paragraph, you reference the low
5 and high case alternatives produced by the Hydro
6 consultants in response to a request by Manitoba Hydro
7 to pre -- provide plausible scenarios.

8 Is that fair, sir?

9 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

10 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And, sir, and
11 maybe I'm reading too much into this paragraph, but
12 would it be fair to say that in terms of the range
13 produced by the Hydro con -- consultants, you
14 distinguish your analysis in that rather than
15 presenting plausible scenarios, you are producing
16 alternatives based upon likely alternatives, which
17 together, present a -- a large range of probable
18 outcomes?

19 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: That was -- our
20 intention was to select alternatives that would, we
21 think, capture the broad range of alternatives. So
22 capture just about every possibility, or 80 percent,
23 or whatever. We -- we didn't put a number on it, but
24 we sort of -- we didn't want to identify a low case
25 which only had a 1 percent chance of occurring, but we

1 wanted to perhap -- present something, maybe it came
2 out a little bit higher, but had a 20 percent change
3 of occurring.

4 So we didn't want -- we weren't
5 searching for the highest and lowest, but only where
6 we thought it's plausible -- based on our knowledge,
7 what we might -- could expect, plausibly, to occur.
8 Now, I -- I don't really know whether that same
9 thought process occurred with the consultants or not.

10 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Okay. And -- and
11 just, sir, so I understand it, in terms of your
12 analysis, you were looking for a -- a tighter range?

13 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Tighter than
14 just the upper and lower bounds, yeah.

15 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And if you're
16 able to offer any reflection upon what are the
17 different insights we might get from the tighter range
18 as -- as compared to the other -- the other approach?

19 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: The other --
20 meaning just an absolute upper or lower bound?

21 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Fair enough.

22 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yeah. So we
23 would be sort of in the -- the mass -- the great mass
24 of probabilities that we would expect to occur. We
25 thought of it more like a -- maybe three (3) standard

1 deviations from the mean, where you pick up 75 percent
2 of all likelihoods.

3 So we were trying to stick close to the
4 -- to the likelihoods without going out to the
5 extremes. So, I don't know, we could say that we
6 tried to pick up the great mass of outcomes.

7 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Thank you. And
8 if we can turn to pages 12 through 14 of your redacted
9 report? And that's fine for right now. And, again,
10 My Friend Ms. Ramage and -- and Me. Monnin may be more
11 inclined to press the button when we come to this
12 discussion. We shall see.

13 Sir, in looking -- if -- if we flip
14 through the pages 12 through 14 just visually for a
15 second, am -- am I correct, sir, in guessing that you
16 were presenting some discussion of your analysis of
17 the Hydro export price consultants other than the
18 Brattle Group?

19 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: That's correct.

20 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And if we can
21 turn first of all to page 14? Sir, you reach -- you
22 see a -- a reference to a consultant report 6.

23 Do you see that, sir?

24 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

25 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Without in any

1 way seeking CSI, sir, in terms of that particular
2 report -- to back up, sir, you -- you'll agree with me
3 that there's no discussion presented in terms of this
4 report? That it's all blacked out?

5 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

6 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Without seeking
7 CSI, sir, can you advise my client as to any advice or
8 opinion you formed in terms of the advisability of
9 relying upon this forecast, being number 6, as a basis
10 for projecting export revenues?

11 What were your conclusions?

12

13 (BRIEF PAUSE)

14

15 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And while you're
16 chatting with Me. Monnin, I want to be clear. I'm
17 seeking only your conclusions at this point in time.

18 MR. CHRISTIAN MONNIN: And just to
19 give you some context, Mr. Williams, I'm just speaking
20 with Dr. Sinclair to make sure that he's comfortable
21 to be able to provide an answer without disclosing
22 CSI.

23

24 (BRIEF PAUSE)

25

1 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: So a -- a couple
2 of things. First, I think what we would say for that
3 one is similar to what we'd -- we had said about the
4 other ones that were not redacted. For instance --
5 yeah, for number 6. For -- for instance, at the end
6 of number 5, which is the top of the page:

7 "We do not recommend this forecast as
8 a basis for projecting export
9 revenues."

10 That same statement would apply to six
11 (6), we just didn't put it in.

12 Now, the second thing is, I think in
13 retrospect, we could have dispensed with a lot of -- a
14 lot of the -- the redacted material here. I -- I
15 don't think it was necessary to put it all in it. It
16 was sort of the fact that the transparency issue was
17 really afflicting all of the consultants.

18 We could have maybe made a general
19 statement saying, Consul -- you know, applicable to
20 all five (5) consultants about this transparency
21 issue. So it wasn't really necessary to put all this
22 in. So -- but -- six (6) is sim -- would be similar
23 to five (5), as far as conclusions go.

24 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And I'll ask you
25 by way of undertaking, and certainly you can discuss

1 this with -- with Me. Monnin and Manitoba Hydro, but
2 would it be possible to put in a -- a narrative
3 relating to these consultants 2 through 6, which
4 highlights or summarizes, kind of, the basis for not
5 concluding that you -- for -- for recommending that it
6 not be relied upon.

7 And in doing so, I would ask you to
8 note that under number 3, you offer a -- you offer an
9 explanation relating to lack of underlying data. So
10 it would be helpful, if -- if possible, to get some
11 sort of narrative. And I -- I'd invite you to discuss
12 that with your legal counsel and -- and Manitoba
13 Hydro.

14 MR. CHRISTIAN MONNIN: I -- I have no
15 problem doing that, Mr. Williams, but in addition to
16 your invitation to me, I would invite you to maybe
17 tighten up the undertaking a little bit. And -- we --
18 we'll, certainly, consider that. And I at first
19 blush, subject to speaking with counsel for Hydro, I
20 have no problem with the undertaking, but it will be
21 part of the -- it will have to go through the process
22 of vetting for CSI.

23 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: So what I would
24 suggest is that, with regards to cons -- Hydro
25 consultants reports 2 through 5, that Manitoba Hydro -

1 - excuse that Potomac consi -- undertake to examine
2 whether it would be possible to provide a -- a
3 narrative of the reasons that these reports -- and
4 some were not recommended, including a discussion of
5 data, assumption, and modelling limitations.

6

7 (BRIEF PAUSE)

8

9 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: I think Manitoba
10 Hydro's position on that undertaking would at best --
11 that it be taken under advisement. It certainly -- we
12 would have to see the results of the CSI review that
13 is going to take place. I wouldn't want our friends
14 at Potomac to, unnecessarily, have to go through
15 preparing an undertaking, only to have it redacted.

16 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: I think that was
17 the thrust is that you had taken under advisement, so
18 if that's satisfactory.

19 MR. CHRISTIAN MONNIN: If I can just
20 echo Ms. Ramage's comments, I will take that under
21 advisement, as well.

22 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: If I could maybe
23 help you out a little bit further, I could see if you
24 were looking at this without the advantage of the text
25 that you may discern -- like a sort of mystery,

1 because I see now that you -- in some of these, what's
2 left in, say different things than each time.

3 So you're wondering -- I can see why
4 you might think that, but really for the most part,
5 the reason so -- for the most part, they've all sort
6 of -- the conclusion was similar that we mentioned
7 some results of the analysis. And we basically, say
8 we don't understand how they could get there. And
9 without the underlying data, we don't recommend them
10 being used. That's basically, this would be the same
11 for each of those.

12 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Then -- and I
13 thank you for that. I was actually, trying to short-
14 circuit things with the undertaking, but I think I'll
15 withdraw the -- the undertaking, and I'll accept your
16 representation, in terms of the narrative for that.

17 THE CHAIRPERSON: Mr. Williams, the mo
18 -- when I was going residential school, the most
19 dangerous job in the school was to stand between the
20 meal and the students. So I think it's probably an
21 appropriate time to -- to take a break, and to have
22 lunch.

23 And I would say that if Dr. Patton was
24 to arrive late, then what we would do then, Me.
25 Monnin, is we would probably, take a -- a break for

1 you to be able to consult with your -- with your
2 witness -- your client, rather. So let's -- let's
3 play that by ear, but I suggest we take a half hour --
4 half hour. Is that too short? A half hour I'm doing
5 a -- that represent enough time or would you like a
6 little bit more time? Do you want -- a half hour's
7 enough or do you thing three-quarters (3/4s) an hour -
8 - half an hour?

9 MR. CHRISTIAN MONNIN: Forty-five (45)
10 minutes is -- is fine.

11 THE CHAIRPERSON: Then do forty-five
12 (45) minutes. Thank you.

13

14 --- Upon recessing at 1:09 p.m.

15 --- Upon resuming at 2:13 p.m.

16

17 THE CHAIRPERSON: Good afternoon. I
18 believe that we're ready to continue with today's
19 proceedings. Before we start, I wonder if there are
20 any administrative matters to attend to? If not, then
21 back to you Mr. Monnin.

22 MR. CHRISTIAN MONNIN: Merci, Me.
23 President. I'm pleased to announce that Dr. Patton
24 has -- has joined us. What I propose to do at this
25 point in time is have Dr. Patton sworn in and then

1 qualified as an expert to then proceed with the cross-
2 examinations.

3

4 DAVID PATTON, Sworn (Qual.)

5

6 QUALIFICATION OF WITNESS:

7 MR. CHRISTIAN MONNIN: Good afternoon,
8 Dr. Patton. I just have some preliminary questions
9 for you.

10 Dr. Patton, you are here on behalf of
11 Potomac Economics Inc., which has been retained by the
12 Manitoba Public Utilities Board in order to assist the
13 PUB to conduct a Needs For and Alternatives To Review
14 of Manitoba Hydro's prefor -- Preferred Development
15 Plan and, according to the terms of reference and
16 Potomac Economics's scope of work dated September
17 20th, 2013, to critically review certain aspects of
18 Manitoba Hydro's Preferred Development Plan and
19 filings in support thereof.

20 Is that correct?

21 DR. DAVID PATTON: Yes.

22 MR. CHRISTIAN MONNIN: Dr. Patton,
23 Potomac Economics prepared a report in accordance with
24 the terms of reference and scope of work.

25 Is that correct?

1 DR. DAVID PATTON: Yes.

2 MR. CHRISTIAN MONNIN: Was that report
3 prepared by you or under your supervision and control?

4 DR. DAVID PATTON: It was.

5 MR. CHRISTIAN MONNIN: And in
6 addition, there was a presentation which was relied
7 upon by Dr. Sinclair this morning.

8 Was that also prepared by you or under
9 your supervision and control?

10 DR. DAVID PATTON: Yes.

11 MR. CHRISTIAN MONNIN: Dr. Patton, can
12 you please describe for the Board the primary areas of
13 focus in your work for the PUB for these proceedings?

14 DR. DAVID PATTON: Yes. Primarily, we
15 -- we were engaged to review the -- the energy and
16 capacity price forecasts, and in -- in doing that, we
17 prepared our own forecast of energy and capacity
18 prices to -- to serve as a benchmark for comparison.

19 MR. CHRISTIAN MONNIN: Thank you. Dr.
20 Patton, your curriculum vitae has been filed with the
21 PUB as part of Exhibit Hill Co. Number 8, specifically
22 at Tab 1(b).

23 Can you please describe your
24 qualifications and experience related to the work
25 undertaken by Potomac for these proceedings?

1 DR. DAVID PATTON: Yes. I'm a PhD
2 economist. I've been working on wholesale electricity
3 issues for around twenty (20) years. I'm president of
4 Potomac Economics, and in that -- that role, we
5 oversee and evaluate wholesale electricity markets,
6 primarily RTO -- RTO electricity markets in -- in the
7 United States.

8 MR. CHRISTIAN MONNIN: Can you
9 generally describe the type of clientele that you work
10 for, Dr. Patton?

11 DR. DAVID PATTON: Yeah, most of our -
12 - our work is in the area of independent market
13 monitoring of -- of RTO markets. We also do some work
14 providing independent monitoring services of
15 individual utilities who have undertaken a -- a
16 variety of -- of obligations, including market power
17 mitigation obligations associated with -- with
18 mergers.

19 MR. CHRISTIAN MONNIN: Thank you, Dr.
20 Patton. Mr. Chair, with that, I would ask that Dr.
21 Patton be accepted by the Board as an expert for
22 giving evidence with respect to the presentation given
23 by Dr. Sinclair today, and as well as the report.

24 THE CHAIRPERSON: Before we do that,
25 I'd like to hear from the Intervenors, please, to see.

1 Me. Williams, s'il vous plait.

2 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Thank you, Mr.
3 Chair. We take no issue with the qualifications of
4 the witness as presented.

5 THE CHAIRPERSON: Merci, Me. Williams.
6 Me. Hacault, s'il vous plait.

7 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: On behalf of
8 MIPUG, we also take no objections to the
9 qualifications of this witness as presented.

10 THE CHAIRPERSON: Mr. Orle, please?

11 MR. GEORGE ORLE: I take no objection
12 to them being qualified as an expert witness.

13 THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr. Orle.
14 And Ms. Saunders, please?

15 MS. JESSICA SAUNDERS: We have no
16 objection to the qualifications as presented.

17 THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Ms.
18 Saunders. Me. Ramage, s'il vous plait.

19 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: No objections from
20 Manitoba Hydro.

21 THE CHAIRPERSON: Yes. The panel is
22 prepared to accept Dr. Patton as an expert witness.
23 So, back to you, Me. Monnin.

24 MR. CHRISTIAN MONNIN: Merci, Mr.
25 President. With that, Potomac is prepared to pre --

1 continue with the cross-examination.

2 THE CHAIRPERSON: Mr. Williams,
3 please.

4

5 CONTINUED CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. BYRON WILLIAMS:

6 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Thank you, and
7 good afternoon again, members of the panel. I think I
8 only have eight (8) or nine (9) questions. I somewhat
9 anticipate four (4) of the last five (5) may be
10 objected to, so they may take a little longer than --
11 than four (4) or five (5) minutes, but we'll see.

12 And, Dr. Patton, welcome. I think
13 these are probably to your colleague, Dr. Sinclair,
14 but feel free to chip in.

15 Dr. Sinclair, you went through this
16 with your direct evidence this morning, but at a high
17 level, when we look at the overall forecast of energy
18 prices, one (1) step would include a -- a forecast of
19 the energy prices, including both on peak and off
20 peak.

21 Would that be fair, sir?

22 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

23 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And another step
24 that you undertake is a look at a -- a forecast of
25 capacity prices, agreed?

1 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

2 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And when we put
3 these together at an aggregate or composite level, we
4 have the overall forecast for energy prices.

5 Would that be accurate, sir?

6 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

7 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: So -- and -- and
8 we can turn to Potomac Exhibit 2-1, page 5.

9 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Just one (1)
10 more point. You might say that the ener -- off-peak
11 and on-peak energy prices and the capacity prices
12 represent electricity prices, not just energy prices.

13 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Yes, and if I
14 misspoke, I'm -- I apologize for that. And so, sir, I
15 -- I want to stay at that aggregate or composite level
16 of electricity prices for a moment.

17 It would be fair to say that at that
18 aggregate level, your results generally forecast lower
19 prices than those of the Hydro consultants?

20 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

21 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And again at that
22 aggregate level, your models tended or generally
23 relied on lower natural gas prices, lower growth rates
24 of demand, and lower quantities of coal plant
25 retirements.

1 Would that be fair?

2 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

3 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Directionally,
4 sir, would it be fair to assume that with regard to
5 CO2 prices, your assumptions tended to be lower than
6 the assumptions employed by the Hydro consultants?

7

8 (BRIEF PAUSE)

9

10 MR. CHRISTIAN MONNIN: We may be
11 venturing into CSI, so we need to come to a landing on
12 that, Mr. Williams.

13 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: So -- go ahead,
14 sir.

15 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: Mr. Williams, the
16 concern here is you're asking for relative comparisons
17 with Manitoba Hydro's consultants, higher and lower,
18 and that would be CSI information. It allows a party
19 to eventually get to what the number is, if you keep -
20 - if you -- if it's on the record, what is higher,
21 what is lower, and you carry on with that line of
22 cross, or if someone else picks up on it.

23 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Okay. And -- and
24 just so I'm clear, I'm seeking not the individual
25 estimates, but the estimates in aggregate, and if

1 Hydro's...

2

3 (BRIEF PAUSE)

4

5 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And certainly for
6 the panel, we'll await deliberations tomorrow, and --
7 and see if we have room to proceed on that ground of
8 inquiry.

9 THE CHAIRPERSON: There are no other
10 references to carbon prices that -- as part of the
11 unredacted version of your report, as far as you know,
12 addressing this particular issue?

13 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Sir, to -- to my
14 knowledge, I -- I can't say that categorically. But
15 in terms of trying to get at the information that we
16 require, I -- I was not able to.

17

18 CONTINUED BY MR. BYRON WILLIAMS:

19 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And similarly,
20 and you'll -- you'll be, again -- I'm sorry. Dr.
21 Sinclair, I am again venturing from the aggregated
22 level to the modestly disaggregated level, and moving
23 from electricity prices to energy prices.

24 In terms of your energy price forecasts
25 versus the energy price forecasts of Manitoba Hydro,

1 would it be fair to assume that with regard to off-
2 peak energy prices, your forecasts tend to be lower
3 than the forecasts of Manitoba Hydro?

4 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: Mr. Chair, that
5 would be the same objection.

6 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And we -- we
7 raised the question for the purposes of pursuing it if
8 -- if -- depending on what happens tomorrow, and get
9 ready again, Ms. -- Ms. Ramage.

10

11 CONTINUED BY MR. BYRON WILLIAMS:

12 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: With regard to,
13 again, Dr. Sinclair, on-peak energy prices, would it
14 be fair to assume that your forecasts tend to be
15 somewhat lower than those of Manitoba Hydro?

16 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: And -- and again,
17 that -- the relative comparison puts Manitoba Hydro at
18 a -- a disadvantage in the marketplace if our
19 competitors learn that information, so Manitoba Hydro
20 would object to that question also.

21

22 CONTINUED BY MR. BYRON WILLIAMS:

23 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And finally, Dr.
24 Sinclair, with regard to capacity prices, would it be
25 a -- fair to assume that your forecasts tend to be

1 somewhat lower than those of Manitoba Hydro?

2 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: I will jump in one
3 (1) last time. I think this is the last one for Mr.
4 Williams, at least on this run, and again, Manitoba
5 Hydro objects to the -- the -- to -- to responding to
6 that question.

7 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And certainly,
8 Mr. Chair, without belabouring the point, our clients
9 believe that those questions are important, relevant,
10 and necessary for the formation of their ultimate
11 position, and would also suggest that at that highly
12 aggregated level, there would not be a material
13 prejudice to the position of Hydro, so that's our
14 position, just so it's stated.

15 THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr.
16 Williams. Your comments are noted.

17

18 CONTINUED BY MR. BYRON WILLIAMS:

19 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Just finally, Dr.
20 Sinclair, I think you can answer this one. In terms
21 of the Information Requests of CAC (Manitoba) posed to
22 Potomac, our records seem to show that response to
23 CAC-19 is still outstanding.

24 Is -- is that your understanding, as
25 well?

1

2

(BRIEF PAUSE)

3

4

5 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: I -- I would
6 have to check. I thought there was a request that
7 came in for it and we submitted, but I'd have to
8 double check.

9

10 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Okay. So I don't
11 think this needs to be an undertaking, but perhaps it
12 could be, Mr. Monnin -- Me. Monnin, you could take it
13 upon yourself to let us know the status of that IR.

14

15 MR. CHRISTIAN MONNIN: Certainly.
16 That's CAC-19?

17

18 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Yeah.

19

20 MR. CHRISTIAN MONNIN: I'll follow up
21 after today's proceedings.

22

23 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And, Mr. Chair, I
24 -- I think I estimated around an hour. I came in
25 fairly close, so thank you for those -- this
26 opportunity on behalf of our clients.

27

28 THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr.
29 Williams. I'm sorry, Dr. Patton, I didn't welcome you
30 to Winnipeg. Welcome back. Thank you.

31

32 DR. DAVID PATTON: Thank you.

33

34 THE CHAIRPERSON: Yeah. I'm glad

1 you're here. Me. Hacaault, s'il vous plait.

2

3 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. ANTOINE HACAULT:

4 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: Good afternoon,
5 Dr. Sinclair and Dr. Patton. As I indicated briefly
6 when I didn't object to your qualification, Dr.
7 Patton, I represent some industrials, Manitoba Power
8 Industrial Users Group.

9 And the -- you may or may not have been
10 following the record, but by way of preface, the basic
11 filing for the Needs For and Alternatives To had some
12 2012 assumptions, and those were updated with new
13 energy price forecasts in 2014.

14 Were the 2014 update in Manitoba
15 assumptions on expert prices provided to your firm?

16 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: I -- I was aware
17 -- we aware of a 2013 update.

18 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: Or sorry, 2013.

19 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yeah. We -- we
20 got that.

21 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: And -- and those
22 are the prices that you've considered in your report,
23 are they?

24 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

25 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: Now, the next

1 thing that has evolved somewhat in this hearing as a
2 result of some DSM analysis is whether the Preferred
3 Development Plan with Conawapa being in service in
4 2026 can be deferred to a later date because you're
5 lowering Manitoba load, which might defer this next
6 major generation Conawapa, perhaps to 2030 and 2031
7 instead of being put in 2026.

8 Was that information that you had
9 available when you were preparing your report?

10 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: No.

11 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: Okay. So I have
12 a couple questions with respect to that. I'm not
13 trying to prejudge what this Board will or won't
14 decide are relevant questions, but this last facility,
15 Conawapa, as I understand it, and Hydro will correct
16 me if I'm wrong, but is like a -- a nine (9) year
17 decision window. So if we count back, the 2026 date,
18 we were looking at a magic date of 2018 to decide
19 whether we'd proceed with this second generating
20 station. Are you following me so far?

21 If we push that generating station
22 another five (5) years, it may or may not push that
23 decision date. There's differing views on that, but I
24 give that as a preface to ask -- there's been a lot of
25 discussion about uncertainty in pricing, and the

1 discussion that I'm going to have with you and the
2 following questions relates to pursuing this
3 opportunity today as opposed to perhaps postponing the
4 decision to pur -- pursue that opportunity to 2018 or
5 later. So that's the background.

6 With respect to deferring the decision
7 for Conawapa, in other words, not making a decision in
8 its report that's supposed to come out in June, what
9 elements might there be that would increase the
10 certainty between now and 2018 related to a decision
11 to pursue the -- I'm going to call it 'Conawapa
12 opportunity'?

13 Can you address that question, please?

14 DR DAVID PATTON: Go ahead.

15 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Well, I think
16 the first thing would be you'd have -- you'd have more
17 clarity on energy prices and capacity prices, so you
18 would know better -- you'd still have -- you would
19 still have the -- the time frame to deal with, but you
20 would certainly know how the -- the capacity of
21 surplus in MISO would shake out, for instance.

22 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: So that you had
23 a discussion with respect to the MISO market model
24 being -- I don't know if I'm paraphrasing correctly --
25 but somewhat imperfect.

1 Would that be something that we'd have
2 a better idea of as to whether or not that's been
3 corrected by 2018?

4 DR. DAVID PATTON: You certainly would
5 know more, I think. There's been a fair amount of
6 resistance to fixing the -- the capacity market in
7 MISO, but I think the more -- the more relevant
8 point, and we talked about this in -- in the report,
9 is that our capacity price forecasts are essentially
10 bilateral capacity prices. We assume that as the
11 surplus dissipates, load serving entities in -- in
12 MISO will -- will either be building capacity to meet
13 their own needs, or -- or be available to contract
14 with Manitoba Hydro to import capacity.

15 So that's why when you look at our
16 capacity price forecast, it -- it rises rapidly over
17 the next two (2) or three (3) years because the
18 surplus is -- is dissipating. So you'd have a --
19 you'd have a better sense of whether you've hit the
20 point where we no longer have a surplus, and -- and
21 the bilateral market is -- is more robust.

22 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: Okay. Would I
23 be correct in suggesting that if Manitoba Hydro's
24 negotiation efforts in long-term contracts securing
25 capacity price, or firm exports, that that would be

1 another avenue that might remove some uncertainty as
2 to whether or not the Conawapa opportunity should be
3 pursued?

4 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: I -- I think the
5 contracts that could be supported by the Keeyask
6 alone, then you'd have a better idea of how those
7 turned out also because you would expect the same
8 types of contracts would have to be -- you would want
9 to see the same types of contracts be successful with
10 the second generator -- the second dam.

11 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: Now, let me
12 transition to some of the scenarios that we've been
13 discussing in this hearing where it may be possible
14 with increased DSM initiatives that the need to build
15 this next generating station Conawapa is actually
16 deferred from 2026 to 2030 or 2031.

17 With respect to the ability to have
18 certainty in your area of expertise does the
19 uncertainty continue, or are there items after 2018,
20 if we go another five (5) years, that change and need
21 to be taken into account?

22 DR. DAVID PATTON: Well, I -- I think
23 there's always going to be a significant amount of
24 uncertainty when you look out that far, so, I think
25 there are certain uncertainties that perhaps will be

1 clarified. Perhaps we'll have a better idea of
2 whether the -- the United States is going to implement
3 a carbon tax, for example. Perhaps we'll have a
4 better understanding of the surplus situation in MISO
5 over the longer term.

6 But I -- but I think that the time
7 frame that you're talking about, you're -- you're
8 never going to get to a point where there's not
9 significant uncertainty.

10 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: Thank you. That
11 brings me to another related subject in other areas of
12 this proceeding. For example, Manitoba Hydro had
13 certain targets on certainty with respect to its own
14 load forecast within the province, and in a five (5)
15 year time frame had a tighter -- tighter bandwidth,
16 and then when it went out ten (10) year metric it had
17 a wider metric as to what it might expect on
18 certainty.

19 With respect to the load forecasting,
20 do you have any sense, or could you explain to me, are
21 there kind of key time frames in which you achieve
22 certain certainty levels? For example, in the first
23 two (2) years out, do we have a sense of how that
24 compares to ten (10) years out, and then twenty (20)
25 years out, and finally we saw thirty-five (35) years

1 out being the analysis.

2 Could you address that question,
3 please?

4 DR. DAVID PATTON: Well, it's -- I
5 think it's really outside of the -- the -- our scope.
6 Yeah, I would say that -- to the -- when -- when you
7 get out past two (2), three (3) years the uncertainty
8 grows because the economic -- the impacts of economic
9 cycles on -- on load growth, you -- you introduce that
10 economic uncertainty and -- and uncertainty associated
11 with -- with underlying fuel prices.

12 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: As I understand,
13 your model is essentially based on two (2) historical
14 years, correct?

15 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: That's correct.

16 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: And then there's
17 certain assumptions and analysis that you've made
18 based on industry information with respect to the
19 future, and you combined both the two (2) historical
20 years with these future projections.

21 Is that a fair assumption, or a fair
22 way to state your work?

23 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

24 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: Sorry. If I
25 were to suggest to you then, even with the 2013 data

1 being used, that it might change your conclusions
2 somewhat, as opposed to just relying on 2011 and 2012,
3 how do you think, if anything, the year of 2013 might
4 affect your views?

5 DR. DAVID PATTON: Well, I don't think
6 it would significantly change our -- our forecast,
7 because we -- the -- the primary things that change
8 year-to-year are fuel prices, and our analysis
9 attempts to adjust for changes in -- in fuel prices,
10 so the under -- the underlying supply-demand
11 relationship that underlies our -- our supply curve
12 analysis of -- of the energy market when it -- when it
13 changed significantly year-to-year.

14 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: Thank you. Now,
15 before I leave the long forecast period subject,
16 you've, as I understand it, basically provided a
17 twenty (20) year outlook for this Board, correct?

18 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Correct.

19 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: And you've
20 provided some recommendations with respect to the time
21 period between the twenty (20) year metric and the
22 thirty-five (35) year metric by Manitoba Hydro, that
23 being a low sensitivity at zero growth, correct?

24 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: That's correct.

25 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: Do you have any

1 other recommendations that you might be able to make
2 to this Board with respect to long lived Hydro assets
3 and the, I'm going to call it, huge challenge that
4 people have to decide economic and financial metrics,
5 as it relates only to your work though, for thirty-
6 five (35) and up to sixty-seven (67) year time
7 periods?

8 DR. DAVID PATTON: Well, I -- I think,
9 in -- in general, that's -- that's why we -- we tried
10 to produce a set of cases that -- that bounded an
11 expected level of growth in -- in prices: capacity
12 prices and -- and energy prices. You know, I think
13 what you're talking about is -- is basically risk and
14 the importance of not just relying on a reference
15 case, but also trying to do some estimate of -- of how
16 much lower the expected revenues would be under a --
17 under a reasonably probably low price case.

18 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: And there's been
19 much talk about the low price case, but in economics
20 we should be considering both the opportunity of
21 higher prices and the significant benefit that that
22 might bring to Manitobans also, correct?

23 DR. DAVID PATTON: Yes.

24 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: So you've
25 provided the lower and higher scenarios that you think

1 are probable for the first twenty (20) years, but my
2 question, as you may -- if I go back to it, is do you
3 have any recommendations on how to deal with Manitoba
4 Hydro's need to look at this past a twenty (20) year
5 time period, because of the long life of these
6 hydraulic assets?

7 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Well --

8 MR. CHRISTIAN MONNIN: And again, just
9 to state the obvious, that's within the scope of their
10 responsibilities?

11

12 CONTINUED BY MR. ANTOINE HACAULT:

13 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: Yes, within the
14 scope of their responsibilities as set out in the
15 scope.

16 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yeah, I think
17 what -- after 2035 we -- we indicated that it becomes
18 very difficult to -- to make a projection, and that
19 Manitoba had -- had some marginally positive growth
20 rates until 2050 than when it goes to zero. So I
21 think -- I think -- to provide guidance, I think we
22 would support a sensitivity where we used the margin -
23 - marginally positive rates that Manitoba uses along
24 with the sensitivity we recommended: zero. And then
25 after 2050 nobody knows what's going to happen.

1 So, again, if you just use the real
2 rates at zero that could probably provide a basis to -
3 - to do some comparisons of the economics.

4 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: Thank you. Now,
5 in the context of that -- and I'd ask you to pause
6 every time if -- if you think I'm getting into CSI; I
7 don't want to get into that -- is the new low, as
8 revised in the fall of 2013, an appropriate low with
9 respect to Manitoba Hydro?

10 So Manitoba Hydro has used a
11 low/reference, assigned a certain probability. It's
12 used a ref/ref and a high with respect to your area.
13 And my question to you is if we're going to look at
14 the bands, in your opinion is the low/reference with
15 respect to export the appropriate number?

16 Is it too low or too high as a low?

17 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: You're referring
18 to Manitoba's low?

19 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: Yes, Manitoba
20 Hydro's low.

21 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: I think we've asked
22 a directional question at that point, Mr. Hacaault.

23 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: Well --

24 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: The -- the
25 inevitable answer is if it's -- if the answer was it's

1 too low, it suggests that I -- I can tell you that
2 it's lower than the low. If it's too high it's higher
3 than my low.

4 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: Well, I've asked
5 the question, and I think the way it was asked, I
6 understand Ms. Ramage's ob -- objection is that if
7 this witness comments on whether or not the new low in
8 2013 as chosen by Manitoba Hydro, is in fact not low
9 enough or a bit too high, it may give some direction.
10 But I don't think that that general answer is specific
11 enough to give any competitors any kind of idea as to
12 wheth -- what the actual number is, 'cause I don't
13 even have Potomac's low on everything.

14 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: Well, Mr. Hacault,
15 the good news on that is you do have Potomac's low;
16 it's in their report. And if our competitors read
17 what Potomac's low is, and are then told that our low
18 is lower or higher than that low, that's giving them
19 market information on -- on where Manitoba Hydro sees
20 the prices going, and -- and that's the concern we
21 have. And as you heard from Mr. Cormie a -- a week or
22 two (2) ago, our -- our market competitors are -- are
23 reading these transcripts and they are watching this
24 hearing very carefully to see what information is
25 there. And I say hello to them.

1 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: Well, I guess I
2 asked the question subject to what comes out of the
3 hearings on commercially sensitive information
4 tomorrow. It seems to me it's -- it's pretty hard for
5 Intervenors if we don't even have any kind of
6 directional idea as to what's happening. It's pretty
7 hard to make any kind of submissions as to whether or
8 not the CONE uncertainty is wide enough or should be
9 narrowed out.

10 But I'm cognizant of the submissions by
11 Ms. Ramage. And if there was some kind of a solution
12 that could be achieved at and that may be discussed
13 tomorrow that would certainly be achieved because --
14 appreciated. Because in the past on some of these
15 areas, as I understand it, we were given ranges and we
16 were able to at least deal with the subject matter
17 within ranges in such a way that it didn't affect the
18 competitiveness of Manitoba Hydro, which we understand
19 is very important to Manitobans, including the
20 industrials that I represent. So I'll move on.

21 THE CHAIRPERSON: Your concerns, Me.
22 Hacaault, are noted.

23 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: Yeah.

24 MR. CHRISTIAN MONNIN: Sorry, Mr.
25 Hacaault. But, Mr. Chair, if I may?

1 To state the obvious, the IECs take no
2 position to these objections that are going back and
3 forth. And this is a blanket comment on a going-
4 forward basis that we take no position and we are at
5 the -- waiting for the direction from the Board on
6 that, so.

7

8 CONTINUED BY MR. ANTOINE HACAULT:

9 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: And without
10 getting into the same debate, I intended to also ask
11 whether or not the high chosen was a reasonable
12 choice, and I'll take it, subject to the same
13 objections. But, again, to know whether or not if
14 we're looking at economic benefits, and we looked at
15 the quilt, what -- what's the reasonable expectation
16 of what we might lose if we don't go ahead with some
17 of these constructions as opposed to what's the risk
18 if -- if we go ahead with them; what additional costs
19 might there be to Manitobans, just to know whether
20 that bandwidth was wide enough.

21 So, I'll make that question, again
22 subject to all the comments, and hoping to get a
23 response as to what's going to happen.

24 The -- let me try and attack it from
25 just a certainty level. With respect to the lower

1 amounts, I think you said in your presentation, Dr.
2 Sinclair, that you ascribed about a 20 percent
3 certainty related to the lower threshold.

4 Did I understand that correctly?

5 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

6 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: And that's -- is
7 that a certainty that goes up to the twenty (20) year
8 time period, because we just had a discussion that
9 certainty might change over the time period?

10 So can you give me a sense as to
11 whether it's the view of Potomac that you ascribe a 20
12 percent probability as of the end of the twenty (20)
13 year time period, firstly, and whether than changes
14 during that twenty (20) year time year -- period?

15 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: I think that 20
16 percent probability is the probability we would assign
17 to that path, so that once you go down that pa -- one
18 (1) of those paths, you would -- you would have to
19 assign different probabilities going off different
20 directions. You can imagine that you're standing on a
21 -- a road where there's different ways to go and
22 certain things happen if you go down one (1) road, but
23 once you -- once you start going on one (1) road, you
24 close off certain probabilities.

25 So that would be the probability of

1 standing here today looking forward: 20 percent.

2 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: Thank you. Now,
3 at page 5 of your report, there is a statement in the
4 first full paragraph -- or second full paragraph on
5 that page, where it talks about the six (6)
6 consultants. And then there is a sentence:

7 "However, we believe certain
8 assumptions made by the consultants
9 tended to overstate the level of
10 future prices."

11 And my question is: Can you -- and
12 again, I don't know whether it gets into CSI -- give a
13 bit -- bit more precision to that statement in
14 relation to capacity off-peak and on-peak?

15

16 (BRIEF PAUSE)

17

18 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: Does the
19 statement hold true for each, I'm going to call it, of
20 the three (3) products?

21 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: I think -- I
22 think the report provides some detail on that question
23 with respect to Brattle. But I think if we were to
24 discuss the assumptions that we find at fault in the
25 other consultants' forecast, we might -- it might be

1 considered a CSI.

2 So you can read a little bit about it
3 under the -- with the Brattle to see where we had
4 exceptions.

5 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: Okay. So --

6 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: That's on page -
7 - that starts on page -- page 10, for instance.

8 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: I understand
9 that there's some discussion with respect to the
10 Brattle Group, but this particular sentence was
11 preferenced -- prefaced by reference to the six (6)
12 consultants, and my question was with respect to that
13 initial preface. There is a statement which I just
14 read into the record:

15 "The consultants tended to overstate
16 the level of future prices."

17 And my -- what I wanted to have, if
18 possible, on the public record is if that statement
19 was true as it relates to the six (6) consultants with
20 respect to each of firm, and off-peak and on-peak.

21 DR. DAVID PATTON: Yes. So if your
22 question is does that sentence --

23 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: Excuse me --

24 MR. CHRISTIAN MONNIN: Sorry, Dr.
25 Patton, I believe there's an objection.

1 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: I -- I think we
2 have the same concern with that is, it's a directional
3 -- it's going to be asking a directional comparison in
4 terms of where future prices are going by the
5 consultants.

6

7 CONTINUED BY MR. ANTOINE HACAULT:

8 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: So I've asked
9 the question, subject to the same determination by
10 this Board. Hopefully after the CSI, if there's
11 something that can be done to help us understand on
12 the public record with respect to the three (3)
13 categories; if it only applies to one (1) category, or
14 two (2), or three (3) of the categories of energy and
15 capacity. And I'll move on.

16 At page 9 of the report, in the --
17 under the heading 'products' there is an indication,
18 and we've heard this, that Potomac estimated the
19 twenty (20) year outlook. My question is, Has Potomac
20 done some work in the MISO market, which is the area I
21 believe you're addressing here, for prices past the
22 twenty (20) year metric?

23 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: You mean whether
24 we've developed a fore -- forecast; no, we -- we just
25 went to 2034.

1 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: Okay. That --
2 but have you done a forecast past twenty (20) years
3 for anybody else in this market?

4 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Oh, I see.
5 Generally the price forecasts we do are -- are shorter
6 term in nature. We -- although in some of our non-
7 MISO cases we have dealt with longer-term forecasts
8 going on more than twenty (20) years. Mainly what we
9 do in those cases is -- is -- what we're doing here is
10 looking at the forecast and determining whether it's a
11 reasonable forecast or not. But those sometimes go
12 out past twenty (20) years.

13 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: Okay. With
14 respect to the MISO market area, can -- would you have
15 done any kind of analysis that goes past the twenty
16 (20) years in the last two (2) or three (3) years,
17 say?

18 DR. DAVID PATTON: Not of energy
19 prices. We do -- we do take -- comment on long-term
20 capacity price trends, but -- but I can't think of
21 anything that we've done specifically that goes beyond
22 twenty (20) years in the last two (2) or three (3)
23 years.

24 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: And that
25 includes with respect to capacity?

1 DR. DAVID PATTON: Well, with respect
2 to capacity, we -- we do offer an evaluation of what
3 the long-run equilibrium is. So that's not a -- it's
4 not a specific -- a specific forecast in -- of prices
5 as much as it is a general forecast of the equilibrium
6 condition that should prevail over the long term.

7 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: And with respect
8 to -- I'm trying to better understand your answer. To
9 the extent it goes over twenty (20) years, that work
10 that you have done on capacity prices, what happens
11 directionally after the twenty (20) years on the
12 capacity equilibrium pricing?

13 DR. DAVID PATTON: Well, I think, in -
14 - in that regard, what -- it's dependent on a couple
15 of things: One (1) is the -- the evolution of
16 shortage pricing in the energy market because that
17 will tend to -- to pull the capacity prices down to
18 the extent that they're -- you have a fuller
19 representation of the value of shortages in the energy
20 market. And then -- and then it's dependent on the --
21 the trends and the cost of new entry.

22 So what I was saying about we -- we
23 haven't produced specific forecasts. You won't find a
24 document from us that projects that in the year 2040
25 the capacity price will be 'X'.

1 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: But my question
2 was more directionally, because we've seen some
3 projections and -- and how the capacity price changes
4 over the next twenty (20) years.

5 Once you hit the twenty (20) years
6 directionally is your analysis showing that the prices
7 stay at zero, or directionally do you still have them
8 going up for some time after the twenty (20) year time
9 period? Or is it unfair, because you really don't
10 address that as a twenty (20) year time period?

11 DR. DAVID PATTON: Well, I think you
12 can see from our forecast that -- that it's relatively
13 flat, that our forecast doesn't project that capacity
14 prices are -- are rising significantly over time. So
15 I think when -- if you're talking about what could
16 happen after twenty (20) years, I think generally I
17 would say we would expect it to be relatively flat to
18 declining, because technological improvements will --
19 will tend to -- to reduce capacity prices. But there
20 are factors that could cause it to -- to increase.
21 It's -- it's -- there's a fair amount of uncertainty
22 when you go out that far.

23 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: Thank you. And
24 at page 42 of your report you do talk about
25 technological advances. And the one (1) thing I would

1 have been interested in -- in understanding is these
2 two (2) categories that you speak of in your report:
3 Firstly, increased deficiency of the marginal CT.
4 And, secondly, that there may be alternative
5 technologies that displace the CT.

6 So can you perhaps elaborate on your
7 current industry knowledge, or is there anything in
8 the experimental stage, I'm going to say, that you
9 guys are aware of because of your expertise that can
10 give us concrete examples of what you state at page
11 42?

12 DR. DAVID PATTON: You want us to
13 explain what we're saying there or -- or talk about --

14 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: Yes. You know -
15 - you know, are you talking about solar? Are you
16 talking about fusion -- hydrogen fusion? Are you
17 talking about -- you know, what are we talking about?
18 Is it -- is it just like lowering CO2 emissions on
19 coal production to bring it so that you're not going
20 to have, you know --

21 DR. DAVID PATTON: Well, to be clear,
22 we're not talking about any specific technology. The
23 -- but as far as the economic theory goes for where --
24 where you're going to find the long-run equilibrium in
25 the capacity market, it's -- it's at that price level

1 that will cause the marginal entrant to break even.

2 So the reason that has to be the long-
3 run equilibrium is if the capacity price is higher
4 than that, then -- then -- and you can build something
5 that can earn a margin at that price level, then
6 you'll get continued investment in that technology,
7 which will bring the price down. And if it's below
8 that, then you won't get investment and that'll bring
9 the price up.

10 So what we're talking about here is --
11 is to the extent that over time technology develops
12 that is -- is more efficient or a lower cost than the
13 combustion turbine technology that we priced as the
14 basis for our cost of new entry, then that will tend
15 to point to a lower long-run equilibrium.

16 So we're not experts on what the
17 technology may be twenty (20) years from now. It'd be
18 great if it was solar; I'm not sure how optimistic I
19 am about that. But -- but even in some of the markets
20 in the US, what we've seen is that combined-cycle
21 generation is -- is demonstrably lower cost than
22 combustion turbines.

23 So that's just a -- sort of a short-
24 term example of -- of a technology that in some places
25 is -- is significantly lower cost and -- and would

1 therefore bring down the -- the price of capacity.

2 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: Thank you, sir,
3 for that helpful general answer. But I'm going to
4 push you a little bit with respect to concrete
5 examples. Let me suggest to you if somebody says it's
6 plausible that you might have technological advances
7 or it's plausible that alternative technology might
8 displace the CT, I'd want more than just a general
9 answer.

10 I'd like some examples of emerging
11 technologies that might even form the possibility of
12 this plausibility.

13 DR. DAVID PATTON: Well, I -- well, I
14 think what I'm saying is when -- when you are
15 producing a forecast over twenty (20) or more years,
16 it -- it's virtually guaranteed that there'll be
17 technological advancements. And what we are limited
18 by in our forecast is -- is the current state of
19 technology. So the -- the section that you're
20 pointing to here is a section that deals with
21 uncertainties around the -- the band of -- of cases
22 that we've produced.

23 I -- I frankly am not an expert in
24 emerging electricity technologies, so I -- I can't
25 point to which one it may be. But what I do know is,

1 looking at -- at the history of this industry, it --
2 it's always been the case that the technology
3 continues to advance. So just to not recognize that
4 over the next twenty (20), thirty (30), forty (40)
5 years that trend will continue would be -- would, I
6 think, be an oversight.

7 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: Thank you. That
8 was helpful. If we could flip back to page 20 of your
9 report. There is a statement that there's a
10 substantial risk. This is at the very bottom on the
11 screen, Diana:

12 "This presents a substantial risk for
13 Manitoba Hydro that its capacity
14 revenues may be much lower than
15 expected."

16 And lawyers like to hang up on
17 adjectives. Somebody has chosen the word 'substantial
18 risk' that its capacity revenues may be much lower.

19 So the first thing I'd like either one
20 of you to expand on is: What do you consider as a sub
21 -- substantial risk?

22 DR. DAVID PATTON: Well, I can
23 describe qualitatively the -- the sort of risk that
24 we're -- we're talking about here and don't know if
25 this is what you're looking for. But -- but clearly,

1 all of the capacity price forecasts are forecasting a
2 long-run equilibrium price for capacity which is the
3 price that -- that is -- will be produced when you're
4 in the long-run equilibrium state, which is a state
5 where there is not a lot of surplus.

6 If -- if, for a variety of reasons, the
7 -- a surplus emerges -- emerges either due to
8 overbuilding or -- or load dips or the -- the capacity
9 price you would expect would be far below the long-run
10 equilibrium level, which is basically the case today,
11 and I think is why all -- substan -- all of the price
12 forecasts are very, very low relative to the long-run
13 equilibrium level. And the -- the capacity market in
14 MISO currently is pricing pretty close to zero.

15 So to the extent that your -- your
16 investments are predicated on prices remaining at --
17 at that breakeven point for a new resource, any factor
18 that could cause the price to be significantly below
19 that would be a substantial risk.

20 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: Would you be
21 able to help us -- because we've been talking in, you
22 know, probabilities of high, lows, and ref scenarios.

23 Is this more than a 50/50 percent? Can
24 I have more certainty than flipping a coin as to
25 whether there's a risk that capacity revenues may be

1 much lower?

2 DR. DAVID PATTON: Well, I think
3 partly what I'd say about how -- how much risk there
4 is, is it relates to how long a -- a contract Manitoba
5 could sign, because what we -- what we said in this
6 report is that the -- the prices that we're
7 forecasting are largely bilateral market prices.

8 We don't think with -- short of
9 significant changes in the framework in MISO, that the
10 -- the MISO capacity auction market -- auction-based
11 market is going to provide prices that are close to
12 what we forecast.

13 So there, I think, we -- we'd have to -
14 - and we -- and this was out of the scope of -- of
15 what we were asked to look at, is how -- how long a
16 lock-in can -- can Manitoba Hydro achieve in the
17 bilateral contract market, because that would affect
18 the size of this risk.

19 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: So that gets
20 back to our in -- initial discussion that there's ways
21 to manage risk. And you have Mr. Cormie sitting in
22 the back row with Manitoba Hydro that does his best to
23 manage that risk in negotiating long-term contracts.

24 But to the extent that he's not able
25 to, I was trying to get a sense from you with respect

1 to the portion that's uncontracted, do I just flip a
2 coin to decide whether I'm going to be assuming this
3 substantial risk, or is there a greater likelihood
4 that if there's no contracts, I'm going to see that
5 substantial risk?

6 DR. DAVID PATTON: Well, I -- I think
7 it's slightly more complicated than that, because I
8 think there's -- there's -- it's not re -- it's not
9 really a question of just can you sign contracts of a
10 certain duration or can't you. It's how much of a
11 price concession do you have to make in order to get
12 the buyer to be willing to sign contracts that -- that
13 go out that far.

14 So if you -- if you set that aside and
15 you're talking about being -- having a significant
16 amount of time that's -- that's not contracted, yeah,
17 I think the -- the risk is high that you would not be
18 close to the long-run equilibrium price.

19 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: So maybe I can
20 put the question in relationship to the decision that
21 does not yet need to be made with respect to Conawapa.

22 Is it the view of Potomac that if those
23 contracts are not in place and we don't know what
24 those numbers are, that making a decision today
25 represents a substantial risk for Manitoba Hydro and

1 its ratepayers?

2 DR. DAVID PATTON: If the contracts
3 are not in place for Conawapa?

4 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: Yeah.

5 DR. DAVID PATTON: Yeah, I think
6 there's -- there's a significant amount of risk. But
7 given what you were saying about a -- the -- the nine
8 (9) year lead time -- you said nine (9) year lead
9 time, right, to build Conawapa?

10 I think that's a risk that's inherent
11 in that decision. In other words, pushing it out and
12 if you're still going to have a nine (9) year window,
13 you're still going to be faced with a -- a situation
14 where you -- you may not have bilateral contracts in
15 place when you make the decision.

16 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: But if I put the
17 -- the decision into context; if we have until 2018 to
18 make that decision and indirectly not quite four (4)
19 years, but another four (4) years to deal with this
20 risk, until we've dealt with the risk, you believe
21 it's a substantial risk?

22 DR. DAVID PATTON: I guess what I'm
23 saying is -- is the -- I'm not sure you're going to be
24 in a better position in 2018. There will be some
25 things you may know more about. You may know if the

1 US has a carbon tax or not.

2 But I don't know if your bilateral
3 contract situation will be better, because now,
4 instead of having to negotiate contracts that would
5 begin in mid-2020s, you're going to now be contracting
6 for a facility that won't be operable until 2030 or
7 2031.

8 So I don't -- I don't know that you're
9 going to be able to deal with that risk.

10 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: I didn't ask my
11 question correctly. The 2018 decision point, my
12 understanding, that's with respect to a 2026
13 construction date.

14 DR. DAVID PATTON: Okay.

15 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: But what I was
16 trying to focus on, sir, is there's -- appears to be
17 not quite four (4) years, but a -- a window of another
18 three (3) and some years to negotiate contracts with
19 respect to the Conawapa output.

20 And it was in that context, sir, that I
21 was asking you, in the absence of contracting for
22 capacity for the successfulness of those negotiations,
23 does it continue to be the opinion of Potomac that the
24 absence of these contracts represents a substantial
25 risk for Manitoba Hydro that its capacity revenues may

1 be much lower than expected?

2 DR. DAVID PATTON: Yes.

3 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: Okay. And I
4 said I was a stickler for adjectives. I don't know
5 whether you're able to give a sense on the public
6 record -- and that's always a hint for people in the
7 back, take your -- pregnant pause before you answer my
8 question.

9 Would the -- when you say, "much
10 lower," in your view could -- could you expand at all
11 on that adjective, 'much lower than expected'?

12 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: I think we're
13 looking at CSI again. It's projecting a different
14 number, but...

15

16 (BRIEF PAUSE)

17

18 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: My question --

19 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: Can I suggest, Mr.
20 Hacaault, if we take that question under advisement,
21 because what I'm hearing from our people, if they knew
22 what the answer was, they'd know if it was CSI or not.
23 It could be or it couldn't be. So without knowing
24 that, and if maybe our people could talk to the
25 witnesses for a moment, that would -- would help us.

1 We don't want to not answer questions that can be
2 answered.

3

4 CONTINUED BY MR. ANTOINE HACAULT:

5 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: Okay. Well,
6 perhaps it -- you know, at the break, is -- if we -- I
7 think we still have some flexibility, but certainly --
8 and I may try to ask in a different way. Again, I may
9 have asked the question in a way that it leads to CSI.
10 But let me ask it with respect to the statement, "much
11 lower than expected."

12 Can that answer be given in
13 relationship not to Manitoba Hydro, but in respect to
14 Potomac estimates? In other words, when -- there's a
15 statement here that:

16 "Its capacity revenues may be much
17 lower than expected."

18 Is that another way to say that the
19 capacity revenues may be those estimated at the lower
20 band of capacity revenues assigned by Potomac?

21 DR. DAVID PATTON: Yeah, I think our -
22 - that's -- that statement really is a statement that
23 points to there may be situations where the -- you
24 won't get the long-run equilibrium price that we
25 forecasted, so we haven't put a number on it but it --

1 I think it certainly would be less than any of the
2 capacity price forecast that we -- we did provide.

3 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: If I -- if I may
4 add, this -- these statements about the capacity price
5 risks, this is really the introduction you're
6 referring to. We clarify it in the capacity section.
7 We -- we talk about the three (3) caveats, or the
8 three (3) risks, sort of expand on that.

9 So some of the language here may
10 suggest spec -- something specific, but really what
11 we're referring to is what's on page 42 of the
12 uncertainties.

13

14 (BRIEF PAUSE)

15

16 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: And I think
17 later on in your report, I don't know if it's at page
18 42, you use the word 'significant' or something.

19

20 (BRIEF PAUSE)

21

22 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: In fact, if we
23 could go to page 41, at the bottom of that page.

24 This is pretty much with respect to the
25 recommendations that are made by Potomac with respect

1 to capacity prices, correct?

2 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Page 41?

3 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: Yes.

4 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

5 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT:

6 "The opinion of Potomac with respect
7 to the forecast capacity price --
8 prices, [and I'm quoting] we do not
9 find them to be credible and
10 recommend that PUB evaluate the
11 business case for Manitoba Hydro
12 development plans on the basis of
13 Potomac's forecast."

14 Are you able to put on the public
15 record whether or not Potomac's forecasts as set out
16 in this report were more closely aligned to the 2012
17 assumptions in the NFAT than the 2013 update?

18

19 (BRIEF PAUSE)

20

21 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: While people are
22 considering it let me perhaps explain some of the
23 reasoning we had...

24 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: I think given what
25 Manitoba Hydro has already put on the record about the

1 difference between the 2012 adjusted forecast and the
2 2013, if we start answering these kind of questions
3 we're boxing ourselves in again because we have put on
4 the record directionally between those two (2)
5 forecasts. So now you know which way they go and then
6 you add in a line in terms of where Potomac sits.

7 So again, Manitoba Hydro objects to
8 that line of questioning.

9 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: What --

10 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: If, however, Mr.
11 Hacault, you want to ask about the Brattle forecast,
12 that was the purpose of putting that forecast, is so
13 that these type of questions could be answered. And -
14 - and that option seems to have been ignored thus far,
15 but that was the purpose of having Brattle on the
16 public record.

17 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: Oh, I -- I thank
18 very much -- thank you very much for your comments.
19 One (1) of the things that I think at least the
20 Intervenors are trying to grapple with is whether or
21 not the updated information on export prices brought
22 in as the new ref under the 2013 assumptions, if we
23 would ignore those kind of increases and go back to
24 2012, if that was the conclusion that this Board came
25 to, whether or not the 2012 assumptions, and the Board

1 will have to conclude, I guess, are the ones that we
2 should put more weight on than the 2013 conclusions.

3 There's some comments by Potomac that
4 it recommends that its capacity prices are the
5 credible ones. And if its capacity prices are the
6 credible ones, then they more closely align with the
7 2012 assumptions. I would understand that that would
8 lead to the economics and financial information being
9 different and moving down as far as whether it -- it's
10 favourable to proceed with the Preferred Development
11 Plan.

12 So I'm not too sure whether there's
13 some way that that can be addressed so that the
14 Intervenor can make useful comments on what
15 assumptions might be more appropriate to use. But it
16 was in the context of trying to use existing analysis
17 and comparing existing analysis that I was asking the
18 questions.

19 So again, if that can be considered in
20 the CSI or -- portion, if there's some way to put on
21 the public record that type of information, that would
22 be appreciated.

23 THE CHAIRPERSON: Your comments are
24 noted, Me. Hacaault.

25 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: Okay.

1 (BRIEF PAUSE)

2

3 CONTINUED BY MR. ANTOINE HACAULT:

4 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: I'm jumping over
5 some of the questions I had here, but Mr. Williams
6 asked some questions of page 44 of your report. I
7 also had some questions. And it related to repricing
8 some of the capacity to a peak opportunity price.

9 And without necessarily knowing the
10 exact numbers, are you able to comment on the public
11 record as to whether if that was done the difference
12 would be material?

13 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: For the benefit of
14 the back row, could you repeat the question? In
15 particular, I wasn't sure what "that was done" was --
16 what that referred to.

17

18 CONTINUED BY MR. ANTOINE HACAULT:

19 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: Well, at page 44
20 of the report, I believe -- I'll just pull out my
21 copy, there was at the bottom of the page some
22 criticism by Potomac, or recommendations, I shouldn't
23 say it's criticism, indicating that its view was that
24 not all the dependable capacity should be assumed to
25 be sold on a forward basis all at that price.

1 That, in fact, it would be better to
2 re-price about 9 percent of this capacity to peak
3 opportunity sale metrics. And my question was: If
4 that was done would that lead to a material difference
5 that we should be worried about as people who don't
6 know the actual numbers?

7

8 (BRIEF PAUSE)

9

10 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: So we don't
11 really know because we -- Capra -- La Capra was more
12 geared up to address that kind of question, so we --
13 we referred this to them.

14 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: Thank you. Now,
15 with respect to the alternatives, there has been some
16 discussion and alternatives put with respect to
17 whether or not Manitoba Hydro goes with a 750 megawatt
18 line giving it access to certain parts of the American
19 market, or another alternative which has been
20 indicated to be no longer viable is going with a
21 smaller 230 kV line.

22 Does the choice of line have any impact
23 on your analysis of capacity prices?

24 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: No. There was a
25 slight adjustment we made in the energy prices because

1 the 230 kV line would have reduced congestion slightly
2 in Minnesota, so you may see slightly higher
3 congestion but really it wouldn't have much of an
4 impact at all.

5 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: What about going
6 to a 500 kV because, as I understand it, we're talking
7 about increasing the transmission not only in Manitoba
8 but in the -- down -- down into the States to a 500
9 kV.

10 Does that impact your analysis, or is
11 it part of your assumptions, that that would in fact
12 be built?

13 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: We are basing
14 our analysis on the assumptions in the Preferred
15 Development Plan which included, I believe a 700 kV
16 line coming in -- 750 kV line coming in. I -- I'm not
17 sure what your supposition is.

18 Are you saying if we had additional
19 capacity going in, or less?

20 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: No, I was just
21 trying to understand whether your analysis had the
22 assumption that that line was going in, or -- and how
23 it would be impacted if we backed out from that whole
24 process of a 500 kV transmission line down to a 230 kV
25 transmission line.

1 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Okay, so our
2 analysis is impacted by that line in two (2) ways.

3 First, the size of that line determines
4 the quantities that Manitoba Hydro can import and
5 that's something that, really, they provide to us, so
6 that really is -- would affect the total revenues
7 which, again, really flows into the scope of the La
8 Capra because they -- they're going to take those
9 revenues.

10 So, if they are going to cut back on
11 the quantities, that won't affect out prices except at
12 a -- at a secondary degree, because our prices do
13 depend, to some degree, on the level of additional
14 imports into MISO by Manitoba Hydro.

15 So if they do back out some of their
16 quantities, that would tend to slightly -- have a
17 slightly upward pressure on the -- the prices we
18 estimate.

19 But again, it would be very
20 insignificant, but it would -- it would tend to raise
21 them a little bit.

22 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: There was some
23 discussion in this Hearing and some thought that this
24 500 kV line would be advantageous because it would rea
25 -- it would open up additional markets as compared to

1 the 230 kV line.

2 Do either of you have any knowledge of
3 the market to be able to comment on whether or not
4 that belief should be given any credence?

5 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Well, we
6 certainly acknowledge that the MISO market -- I think
7 -- I don't quite understand what the delta would be.

8 Are you saying that --

9 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: Well, I put it
10 in a simplistic way that I understood. If I have a
11 pipe that can only handle 230 gallons of water and the
12 other one that can handle 750 megawatts, the water
13 analogy may be totally inappropriate, but if -- does
14 this open up more opportunities when one considers the
15 ther -- two hundred and thirty (230) versus the seven
16 hundred and fifty (750).

17 As -- as a layman, I'm kind of
18 thinking, Well, you know, do I sink my dollars in --
19 in for a pound, in for a dollar, and go for the 700 kV
20 and -- and drop the two hundred and thirty (230)?

21 As -- as a Manitoban, do I like that in
22 -- in the MISO market, or don't I like it?

23 DR. DAVID PATTON: Yeah, let -- let me
24 take a stab at this. So it's certainly a lot more
25 complicated than -- than that because you can't direct

1 electricity the way you can water or other
2 commodities.

3 So really, the -- the -- the question
4 you want to ask is -- is: How much chance for
5 capability is it going to create and -- and what's the
6 resulting impact on the market?

7 So you may -- you may increase the size
8 of the transmission investment, and if -- if along the
9 same corridor you hit a limiting element that doesn't
10 allow you to fully utilize that -- that increased
11 line, then the amount of transfer capability you've
12 created could be significantly less than just the --
13 the electrical rating of -- of the line you've built.

14 But that requires a transmission study
15 to determine how the -- the transfer capability is
16 impacted by one project or the other and that's cer --
17 certainly outside the scope of -- of our analysis.

18 I will say there are -- there are two
19 (2) things that increasing the transmission capability
20 would do.

21 One (1) is it would -- it would make
22 Manitoba Hydro megawatts increasingly deliverable to
23 the -- the mid west ISO market. I assume that
24 whichever project is built, it would need to be large
25 enough to ensure that -- that you're able to deliver

1 the -- the megawatts that -- that you imagine you want
2 to deliver in the capacity market. So there shouldn't
3 be a big difference between those two (2).

4 But, secondly, the bigger line will
5 reduce the congestion coming in from -- from the west
6 side of the MISO footprint.

7 And, so, you can see the -- the -- the
8 magnitude of the congestion we show in -- in our price
9 forecast. So -- so, basically, what you would be
10 looking at is -- is a reduction in the -- in the size
11 of that congestion.

12 And, so, were you to study that, you
13 could quantify how much that would be worth. It
14 shouldn't affect the capacity price in MISO but it --
15 it -- it can affect the energy price.

16 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: Thank you. That
17 was a useful explanation. The Chairman may have
18 additional questions, I'm not too sure, arising out of
19 that. No? I just...

20 THE CHAIRPERSON: I do, but I'm not
21 sure that it's the appropriate time to ask them, but
22 you -- you mentioned trans -- transmission study as
23 something that would typically be done to evaluate the
24 merits of a transmission line.

25 Is that, in fact, the case? Is that

1 typically how companies proceed to determine whether
2 or not to -- to proceed with a particular line in --
3 in the MISO region?

4 DR. DAVID PATTON: Yes, in the MISO
5 region there are reliability investments. And so --
6 so there the analysis is -- is what's needed for
7 reliability. But -- but then they also do evaluations
8 of the economic impacts of transmission projects. So
9 projects that are not -- not, perhaps, justified for
10 relia -- on reliability grounds or not needed for
11 reliability may still be undertaken as part of the
12 planning process because their economic benefits are -
13 - are significant.

14 And so there, generally, the -- the
15 criteria is how much would you be reducing the -- the
16 production cost of the system by putting in a
17 transmission line. And you'd reduce the production
18 cost because it allows you to -- to increase the
19 dispatch of low cost resources and decrease the
20 dispatch of high cost resources. And so the net of
21 those two (2) would -- would tell you what this new
22 transmission capability you've created is -- is worth.

23 THE CHAIRPERSON: And -- and on top of
24 that you would layer the actual transmission revenues
25 in addition to the capacity benefits?

1 DR. DAVID PATTON: Well, generally,
2 yeah. I think the -- as an economist we would argue
3 that the -- the production cost savings are really the
4 only thing you should look at. And if you -- if you
5 don't overbuild your transmission, then the savings
6 you get from building should be large enough to pay
7 for the line. So there should be -- there should be
8 no increase in -- in transmission rates necessary to -
9 - to recover the cost of the line. But I think, you
10 know, we don't always succeed in not overbuilding
11 transmission.

12

13 CONTINUED BY MR. ANTOINE HACAULT:

14 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: Thank you. I'm
15 hoping these questions can be answered again on the
16 public record.

17 Is Potomac able to put on the public
18 record whether in its opinion Manitoba Hydro's 2013
19 low price scenario is a credible scenario?

20

21 (BRIEF PAUSE)

22

23 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: I -- I think --
24 I think the answer we had given earlier for some --
25 some of these similar questions, and that is because -

1 - because we -- it wasn't totally transparent to us
2 how those forecasts were developed, that we could not
3 rely on them and we did not find them to be something
4 that the Board should rely on.

5 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: Now, let me try
6 to rephrase it a bit. I want to focus less on the
7 methodology and all the data used to arrive at the
8 methodology and more on the number.

9 I don't need to know what the number
10 is, but I'd like to know whether Potam -- Potomac's
11 view -- because trying to determine whether or not
12 we've got credible lows and credible highs and
13 credible reference values in the context of, is the
14 low number that's been chosen something that can be
15 used in a credible way as a lower limit or not.

16 DR. DAVID PATTON: Well, I think -- I
17 think what we've said is -- is we would advise you to
18 use our low rather than the Manitoba low. So -- and I
19 -- and I don't think I can tell you whether their low
20 is higher or lower than ours.

21 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: Understood.
22 Okay. And with respect to the reference value, is the
23 answer the same, that the recommendation is to use the
24 recommended value as the ref? Because we've got --
25 without knowing the numbers, Hydro has given us three

1 (3) price points, a high price point, a reference
2 price point, and a low price point. I have the answer
3 with respect to the low price point.

4 With respect to the reference price
5 point, what's --

6 DR. DAVID PATTON: Well --

7 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: -- Potomac's
8 view?

9 DR. DAVID PATTON: Well, we gave you
10 two (2) references, right. We gave you a with and
11 without carbon. And those two (2) references look a
12 lot different than each other. So I think it's hard
13 for us to even tell you which of our two (2)
14 references to use because, ultimately, it's going to
15 go back to your expectations about the likelihood of -
16 - of a carbon tax in the US.

17 We think the probability is no greater
18 than 50/50, so. But, you know, you may have a more
19 pessimistic or optimistic view. But I -- I certainly
20 think that the -- those -- those two (2) reference
21 cases, even though they're intended to be sort of the
22 middle, they -- they create a pretty significant bound
23 -- or pretty significant band of uncertainty just in
24 and of themselves.

25 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: So I don't know

1 if I can push you this far. Would it be fair in that
2 circumstance that if we chose somewhere in the middle
3 of those two (2) given that they've got a 50/50
4 chance, that would be a fair number to use as a
5 reference case between the CO2 and non-CO2 given
6 that's 50/50, we just pick somewhere in the middle?

7 DR. DAVID PATTON: Well, I think that
8 would be reasonable, but I -- I don't think it would
9 be unreasonable to be risk adverse either given --
10 given the -- the consequences of being wrong. So, you
11 know, if you were risk neutral, you'd -- and you --
12 and 50/50 was a reasonable expectation, then -- then
13 I'd choose the number right in the middle.

14 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: So if I had a
15 \$10 billion decision to make, I might want to be risk
16 adverse and I might not but that would be a decision
17 that somebody has to make?

18 DR. DAVID PATTON: Correct.

19 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: My last question
20 with respect to the high, what's Potomac's
21 recommendation with respect to the high? Is it the
22 highest number we see for energy and capacity, as
23 shown on your graphs? Is that the higher -- higher
24 outbound?

25 Is that what Potomac is recommending?

1 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: I think that the
2 high and the low was meant to put bounds on not
3 necessarily what we could expect as possible, but the
4 -- the range of plausible outcomes. So I think the
5 answer is the same as for the low, that we would
6 recommend using the -- our high, given its developed
7 in a transparent way as opposed to the Manitoba high -
8 - Manitoba Hydro high.

9 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: Now, the last
10 thing we've seen in this hearing, which I confess, I
11 still don't understand exactly how it's been
12 calculated, I have some idea, is we've talked about
13 low reference and high, and finally an expected value,
14 which is not only related to your subject matter, but
15 I understand it also assigns kind of a different
16 expectation in your area, also export forecasts, of
17 what's expected as opposed to a ref case.

18 Do you have any other comments with
19 respect to that that you can put on the public record?
20 Do you understand, firstly, anything about the
21 expected value of Manitoba Hydro, how it considers
22 that to be and whether there's something on the public
23 record that you can put as to what your recommendation
24 is on the expected value notion as it relates to your
25 area of expertise?

1

2

(BRIEF PAUSE)

3

4

DR. DAVID PATTON: I'm -- I'm not sure

5 I know what you're asking, but I would say our -- I

6 think what we said is our -- our cases are relatively

7 symmetric. In other words, the -- the two (2)

8 reference cases are equally likely, the -- the high

9 and low are pretty equally likely, so an expected

10 value of our cases would be -- would be pretty much

11 the middle of the band.

12

The -- but I don't know whether you

13 were asking, really, about the methodology that

14 Manitoba Hydro used to come up with an expected value,

15 and we don't have a comment on -- on that.

16

MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: No, I wasn't

17 asking on the methodology, but given that I have a

18 little bit of a math background, and probabilities can

19 be a fun area to play with when we choose and assign

20 certain probabilities, and try to relate that to

21 practical experience, and expected values may be a

22 different question, and it was in the context not so

23 much of what Manitoba Hydro has done with that, more

24 so than with respect to what's expected.

25

And if I understand, what's expected

1 would be somewhere between your ref/CO2 and ref/no
2 CO2, is that fair?

3 DR. DAVID PATTON: Yes.

4 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: Thank you very
5 much for your helpful explanations. Those are all the
6 questions I have.

7 THE CHAIRPERSON: Probably would be an
8 appropriate time to take a break. The panel intends
9 to continue sitting until 5:15, so I just wanted to
10 put the parties on notice that it's our intention to
11 work longer today to take advantage of the presence of
12 -- of Dr. Patton and Sinclair. So 5:15 today we will
13 expect to adjourn, so take -- let's take ten (10)
14 minutes.

15

16 --- Upon recessing at 3:44 p.m.

17 --- Upon resuming at 4:02 p.m.

18

19 THE CHAIRPERSON: I believe we're
20 ready to resume the proceedings. I had a few
21 questions that I wanted to ask Drs. Patton and
22 Sinclair.

23 In your position as independent market
24 monitors, are you very aware of -- of the power
25 purchase agreements that are assigned by MISO

1 participants?

2 DR. DAVID PATTON: I would say we --
3 we don't routinely review power purchase agreements or
4 bilateral contracts. We -- because generally, the
5 scope of our monitoring is -- relates to the
6 performance of the -- the day ahead and real time
7 energy markets and the capacity market, so to the
8 extent that bilateral contracts affect how somebody
9 behaves in our markets, then we'll review the
10 contracts in that context.

11 But we're not -- our scope -- the scope
12 of our market monitoring doesn't extend to the
13 bilateral contract market, so we don't routinely
14 review those contracts.

15 THE CHAIRPERSON: But you do review
16 them fairly regularly -- fairly regularly?

17 DR. DAVID PATTON: Yeah, I would say
18 fairly regularly we're -- we're reviewing contracts
19 and evaluating them.

20 THE CHAIRPERSON: So is the trend in
21 MISO towards more power purchase agreements, or less
22 power purchase agreements? I mean, are you in a
23 position to comment on that?

24 DR. DAVID PATTON: That's a good
25 question. I don't -- I don't know that I could say

1 whether it's more or less. I think the -- it's really
2 sort of a state-by-state determination of how they
3 want to encourage their LSEs to satisfy their
4 obligation.

5 So I think some states would have a
6 preference for self-build projects, and, you know,
7 other states might -- might not. I don't -- I don't
8 know that I could say whether -- whether the overall
9 trend is upward or downward.

10 THE CHAIRPERSON: How about the
11 duration of those agreements? Are you in a position
12 to comment whether they're getting longer, shorter,
13 they're...

14

15 (BRIEF PAUSE)

16

17 DR. DAVID PATTON: Yeah, I think --
18 yeah, I don't know that I could say whether they're
19 getting longer or shorter.

20 We're -- we're in a -- we've been in a
21 -- in a -- a period for some time now where -- where
22 there's a substantial excess or a surplus of capacity.
23 So -- so LSEs generally have not had to go out and --
24 and sign contracts or -- or build a significant amount
25 of -- of generation, at least over the last few years.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

I think the -- the big thing that we're going to see over the next few years is -- is as certain environmental regulations come into effect, that it's going to cause coal units to retire. I think you're going to have a lot of load-serving entities that are in a position of -- of needing some capacity.

And, so, I don't -- I don't -- I would have a hard time predicting, at this point, what the preferences of the States would be when once they're in a position where their load-serving entities need to do something to increase their capacity.

THE CHAIRPERSON: We've kind of already addressed this, but I -- you know, in your experience, what are the factors that are considered by those load-serving entities when they make a decision about whether or not to self-build or to -- to buy from a third party?

DR. DAVID PATTON: Well, I think generally there would be -- well, first let me say, if you're in an area with -- with excess capacity, then -- then there's going to be a preference for -- for buying just because you -- you likely can -- can buy at a lower cost than building your own capacity.

1 But -- but even having said that, I
2 think in a -- in a largely vertically integrated
3 regulatory -- or regulated framework or -- or regime
4 which covers most of the mid-west ISO footprint,
5 there's -- I think there's naturally going to be an
6 incentive to build -- self-build because -- because of
7 the return you can make on -- on those investments for
8 the regulated companies versus if they -- if they
9 procure and buy lateral contracts, those are costs
10 that are generally just going to be passed through.

11 THE CHAIRPERSON: So why bother at
12 all? Like, why -- why not just self-build as an
13 option if you're a load-serving entity? I mean, if
14 you're going to get the return -- guaranteed return to
15 the regulatory rates, why even bother with a -- with a
16 power purchase agreement in that context?

17 DR. DAVID PATTON: Well, I think if it
18 was up to the load-serving entities, a lot of them
19 would build. I think the -- the -- the regulators
20 have an objective of minimizing costs to the retail
21 customer, so if there are lower cost options than --
22 than building, then it would be -- the regulators,
23 generally, are going to -- to have a mandate to ensure
24 that the load-serving entities explore those options
25 rather than just assuming that they're going to build.

1 I mean, even in a -- even in a case
2 where -- where there isn't a lot of surplus capacity,
3 it may very well be that building elsewhere within the
4 MISO footprint or outside the MISO footprint is -- is
5 lower cost than building in the control area of the
6 utility.

7 So even in that case, you -- you may be
8 contracting for essentially a -- a new-build resource.
9 But I do think, all other things equal, there --
10 assuming the costs are equal, there would be a
11 preference for self-build over contract.

12 THE CHAIRPERSON: In the report
13 there's some reference to the ability of Manitoba
14 Hydro to get premium prices for -- for non-contracted
15 electricity.

16 Why is Manitoba Hydro -- I would have -
17 - I would have thought that Manitoba Hydro is purely a
18 price taker. Why is Manitoba Hydro able to get a
19 premium relative to general prices available in a MISO
20 marketplace?

21 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: I -- I think
22 that part of the testimony -- our report talks about
23 some of the supply issues, and, so, there's a premium
24 that is assumed to be earned on -- on peak opportunity
25 sales.

1 So when you're selling on-peak, in a
2 way you're -- you're allowing a utility to satisfy
3 some of its capacity requirement, so it's sort of like
4 buying a week ahead so that if you -- if you can buy a
5 week ahead on -- on-peak, then you can avoid going
6 short in -- in the day ahead or in the real time. And
7 so you're willing to pay a -- a premium to have the
8 on-peak, even if it's not te -- technically a firm
9 product.

10 THE CHAIRPERSON: But I thought they
11 were getting a -- they were getting a premium on day-
12 ahead markets as well.

13 Did I misread that?

14 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: I think they
15 sell -- I mean, it -- it's a day ahead, but I think
16 they sell some of it -- there's a premium, because
17 they sell it at different lengths -- different lengths
18 of time forward.

19 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: If I could
20 interject, this might be a discussion we'd want to
21 have in the CSI session.

22 THE CHAIRPERSON: Now, I was a bit
23 surprised by your comment regarding capacity. I'm
24 looking on page 41. You know, given that you were --
25 you were given access to -- to the Brattle

1 information, I was a bit surprised that you would come
2 out with a statement that would include Brattle in --
3 in that statement; in other words, find -- not --
4 don't find them to be credible, and to recommend that
5 -- that PUB use the Potomac forecast, and specifically
6 in relation to capacity price.

7 Now, is it because the different -- the
8 methodology you didn't agree with, or is it some other
9 issue?

10 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: I -- I think
11 Brattle was in with the other consultants to the
12 extent that we -- we're not able to identify or work
13 with the mechanisms that -- that supported their
14 models. Although we saw some of the input data, and
15 we saw more with Brattle, but we still -- it was not
16 possible to get the model itself and understand how
17 some of these outputs were developed. So again, it's
18 still -- even with Brattle, there was a transparency
19 issue, and so that's why we recommend using our
20 forecast instead.

21 THE CHAIRPERSON: Now, the propit --
22 propitire -- pardon me, the -- the veil that's in
23 place because of the agreement that's with the
24 forecasters is not unusual.

25 I mean, that -- that's quite common,

1 isn't it, in the marketplace for a price forecast from
2 -- to be covered by a -- a veil of confidentiality,
3 isn't it?

4 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: I think if
5 you're buying the price forecast for your internal
6 use, I think that's right. Yeah.

7 THE CHAIRPERSON: But in terms of --
8 of the regulator, I mean, do regulators typically have
9 access to -- to this kind of information if they -- if
10 they seek access to it?

11 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: I think if
12 you're in a regulatory proceeding and you're putting
13 forth a -- a price forecast to support a capacity
14 purchase or a development plan, I think there is more
15 transparency than we're seeing here.

16 THE CHAIRPERSON: Now, in respect of
17 the -- of the price load forecasters, without --
18 without any reference to whom -- whom they might be,
19 my expectation would be that they're using name-brand
20 kind of forecasters in their price forecasts.

21 And I guess the question is: Wouldn't
22 the counterparty be using the same forecasters, in
23 terms of establishing what future prices will be like?
24 Or am I wrong there?

25 I mean, are -- aren't they all using

1 the same people, in terms of establishing price
2 forecasts?

3 DR. DAVID PATTON: They very well
4 might be, but without talking about the specifics of
5 the -- the actual forecasts, I think we're -- and then
6 the -- well, tell me if I'm straying into CSI. But I
7 think our criticism that you pointed to on 41 applies
8 with far less force to Brattle than -- than most of
9 the other forecasts.

10 THE CHAIRPERSON: Okay. Thank you. I
11 would now pass the microphone over to Ms. Saunders.

12

13 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. JESSICA SAUNDERS:

14 MS. JESSICA SAUNDERS: Good afternoon,
15 Drs. Sinclair and Patton. My name is Jessica
16 Saunders. I represent the Manitoba Metis Federation.
17 The MMF's IRs, I believe, are still awaiting some
18 responses, so I will endeavour to ask some
19 foundational questions, leaving specifics to the
20 questions we asked in the IR process. And, of course,
21 some of the questions I did have have been addressed
22 by the other Intervenors, so I just have a few short
23 questions in about three (3) areas.

24 Wind was considered as a capacity
25 addition in your analysis, correct?

1 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

2 MS. JESSICA SAUNDERS: And this is
3 just for clarification. So you indicated that most of
4 it is de-rated.

5 And I just wanted to be sure, Dr.
6 Sinclair, was that 80 percent you said if it ha -- 80
7 percent was de-rated?

8 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: 80 percent,
9 right.

10 MS. JESSICA SAUNDERS: Okay. So then
11 that means then 20 percent is included -- 20 percent
12 of the four hundred (400) -- or, sorry, 4,000
13 megawatts of wind is counted in the capacity
14 additions.

15 Is that correct?

16 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: When we de-rate
17 wind, what we mean is that whenever there's a capacity
18 accounting we have to do --

19 MS. JESSICA SAUNDERS: M-hm.

20 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: -- such as --
21 such as whether we're in surplus or not, we only use
22 80 -- 20 percent of the wind capacity to account for
23 that.

24 MS. JESSICA SAUNDERS: Thank you for
25 clarifying that. And I just have one (1) more

1 question on capacity addition.

2 I'm just wondering if you're aware if
3 there is any US Energy Information Agency cases that
4 include solar as a capacity addition?

5 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: I'm not aware of
6 any, no. I mean, not for the marginal capacity.
7 There may be some that -- certainly some of the
8 capacity profiles of some regions will -- will include
9 additional solar, if that's what you mean, just for --
10 yes, there would be some cases like that, some
11 regions, yes.

12 MS. JESSICA SAUNDERS: Okay. Would --
13 would you happen to know which regions?

14 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: They were --
15 they weren't in the Midwest, but I would expect that
16 in the Southwest.

17 MS. JESSICA SAUNDERS: Thank you. And
18 still on wind but moving to another area, did your
19 energy price forecast include a declining cost of
20 wind?

21 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: It wasn't
22 necessary to have the cost of wind --

23 MS. JESSICA SAUNDERS: Okay. Sorry.

24 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: -- in the
25 forecast.

1 MS. JESSICA SAUNDERS: My apologies.
2 And then I believe the only other question we had from
3 our -- our IR dealt with the -- the reference case
4 with no carbon. We were going to ask if the energy
5 prices you used were less than Manitoba Hydro's low
6 energy price case established in the 2012/2013
7 electricity export price forecast.

8 Of course, I am aware of the comments
9 from Ms. Ramage and Mr. Hacault, so those are all my
10 questions. Thank you.

11

12 (BRIEF PAUSE)

13

14 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: Thank you. And if
15 it's now over to Manitoba Hydro, we have a little bit
16 of housekeeping before we get started. We're going to
17 be -- our people have been hard at work over the
18 weekend, so we have a number of undertakings to file.

19 Also, we'll be filing Manitoba Hydro's
20 book of documents. It's almost useless at this point,
21 but we'll get it out there. When I say, "useless,"
22 because as we tore pieces out as other -- as questions
23 were responded to and dealt with, it's primarily just
24 excerpts of the report. But we'll get it out on the
25 record and -- and, if necessary, refer to it.

1 THE CHAIRPERSON: I don't mind doing
2 that, but I just want to make sure that of -- I
3 should, for the PUB -- for the record, ensure that --
4 Mr. Orle, I just want to confirm that you have no
5 questions to ask of these witnesses.

6 MR. GEORGE ORLE: No, I didn't. Thank
7 you, Mr. Chair.

8 THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you for that.

9 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: Okay. And while
10 they're being distributed, I'll just read into the
11 record what is being filed. And I'll begin by noting
12 that on last Friday, Manitoba Hydro electronically
13 filed Exhibits 138, 139, and 140. There we go.

14 Exhibit 138 was -- was not a formal
15 undertaking. It dealt with a response to a PUB
16 request for Manitoba Hydro to recreate a table
17 plotting the Manitoba Hydro firm energy based on DSM
18 Level 2. And that -- I -- I believe Mr. Simonsen has
19 already confirmed that's Exhibit 138, but we thought
20 just so the transcript reflects that.

21

22 --- EXHIBIT NO. MH-138: Table plotting Manitoba
23 Hydro firm energy based on
24 DSM Level 2

25

1 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: One thirty-nine is
2 Undertakings number 26 and 42.

3

4 --- EXHIBIT NO. MH-139: Response to Undertakings 26
5 and 42

6

7 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: And Exhibit 140 is
8 Undertaking number 36.

9

10 --- EXHIBIT NO. MH-140: Response to Undertaking 36

11

12 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: And in terms of
13 what is being distributed around the room right now,
14 we have Exhibit Manitoba Hydro 141, which is
15 Undertaking number 63:

16 "Manitoba Hydro is to file the
17 information on the statistics
18 associated with the HNTEI initiative
19 as a table."

20

21 --- EXHIBIT NO. MH-141: Response to Undertaking 63

22

23 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: Then number --
24 Undertaking number 64 is filed as Hydro Exhibit 142:

25 "Manitoba Hydro is to provide a

1 breakdown of the number of people
2 that have undergone the Tataskweyak
3 and War Lake training initiative."

4

5 --- EXHIBIT NO. MH-142: Response to Undertaking 64

6

7 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: Exhibit 143 is
8 Undertaking number 65. And that is how many hires for
9 the Keeyask project to date on Table 1 of page 105
10 were HNTEI trainees, 'HNTEI' being H-N-T-E-I.

11

12 --- EXHIBIT NO. MH-143: Response to Undertaking 65

13

14 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: Exhibit 144 is
15 Manitoba Hydro Undertaking number 66, and that's:

16 "Provide the annual capital tax,
17 water rental, debt guarantee fee, et
18 cetera, as shown on Table 13.3 over
19 the planning period that led to the
20 present value calculations."

21

22 --- EXHIBIT NO. MH-144: Response to Undertaking 66

23

24 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: Exhibit 145 is
25 Manitoba Hydro Undertaking number 68:

1 "Manitoba Hydro is to file a high-
2 level description or a matrix of each
3 of the offsetting programs as per the
4 Adverse Effects Agreement."

5

6 --- EXHIBIT NO. MH-145: Response to Undertaking 68

7

8 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: Exhibit 146 is
9 Undertaking number -- well, Undertaking number 72:

10 "Manitoba Hydro to determine on the
11 table included in Undertaking
12 PUB/Manitoba Hydro Second Round
13 423(c) whether Manitoba Hydro can
14 reframe, in terms of person years as
15 opposed to hires."

16

17 --- EXHIBIT NO. MH-146: Response to Undertaking 72

18

19 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: The next is Exhibit
20 147, Manitoba Hydro Undertaking number 44:

21 "Manitoba Hydro to explain why its
22 historical accuracy doesn't align
23 with the probabilistic analysis
24 presented in Exhibit 103."

25

1 --- EXHIBIT NO. MH-147: Response to Undertaking 44

2

3 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: Exhibit 148 is

4 Manitoba Hydro Undertaking number 69:

5 "Manitoba Hydro to file the

6 intensity-based GHG emissions for the

7 development plans filed in the NFAT,

8 listing per kilowatt hours or

9 gigawatt hours of electricity

10 produced."

11

12 --- EXHIBIT NO. MH-148: Response to Undertaking 69

13

14 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: Then we have

15 Manitoba Hydro Exhibit 149, which is Undertaking

16 number 48:

17 "Manitoba Hydro to indicate the

18 impact of proceeding with the

19 Preferred Plan and then switching

20 from the Preferred Plan to Pathway 5

21 at the end of 2017."

22

23 --- EXHIBIT NO. MH-149: Response to Undertaking 48

24

25 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: And then finally,

1 Manitoba Hydro Exhibit 150, which is Undertaking
2 number 54:

3 "Manitoba Hydro to update the table
4 on page 52 of the MIPUG book of
5 documents for Manitoba Hydro's
6 projected net debt balances and the
7 new increased capital costs in
8 Keeyask and Conawapa."
9

10 --- EXHIBIT NO. MH-150: Response to Undertaking 54
11

12 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: So -- and now I
13 need a break. Oh, and then lastly I guess we'll ask
14 that the book of documents be marked as an exhibit,
15 and that'll be 151.
16

17 --- EXHIBIT NO. MH-151: Book of documents
18

19 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. PATTI RAMAGE:

20 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: Good afternoon, Dr.
21 Patton, Dr. Sinclair. It's good to see the front of
22 your faces instead of the back of your heads. You
23 look quite different from this angle.

24 In your presentation this morning, you
25 indicated that the availability of the underlying data

1 was restricted, and here I'm quoting from page 10 of
2 your presentation, and that:

3 "As a result, we developed our own
4 forecast that would enable us to
5 assess the Company's forecast."

6 Is that correct?

7 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

8 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: Yes? And could I
9 ask you to turn to Potomac Exhibit 3, which is your
10 scope of work?

11 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Okay.

12 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: And if I look at
13 number 4 of your scope of work, it indicates that:

14 "Potomac is to review the energy
15 revenues projected by Manitoba Hydro,
16 benchmarked against your own fore --
17 forecast MISO energy prices in the
18 short term and long term."

19 Have I read that correctly?

20 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

21 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: And in number 5 it
22 indicates that:

23 "Potomac is to review the capacity
24 revenues projected by Manitoba Hydro,
25 benchmarked against your own forecast

1 of MISO capacity prices in the short
2 term and long term."

3 I've --

4 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

5 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: -- read that
6 correctly? So wouldn't it be true that you developed
7 your own forecast because you were directed to do so
8 by the PUB?

9 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: No. We didn't
10 interpret this benchmarking that you refer to as the
11 kind of forecast we ended up doing. We expected to be
12 able to use the underlying assumptions of the Manitoba
13 consultants -- Manitoba Hydro consultants and get an
14 understanding of the underlying models and then from
15 that develop a forecast.

16 We didn't expect to develop -- have to
17 develop a forecast that required as much focus and as
18 much sort of bottoms-up kind of -- of work. So we
19 were expecting to come up with some kind of forecast,
20 which you might think is sort of a -- maybe a
21 composite, if we could understand what was going on in
22 those forecasts.

23 Instead, we -- because couldn't really
24 get to the bottom of it, we had to develop from the
25 bottom up an alternative forecast.

1 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: So in a sense you
2 would be picking different components of the various
3 forecasts, the ones that you agreed with.

4 Would that have been your plan?

5 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Not that we
6 agree with, but we wanted to vet the individual ones.
7 And we may have differences about the assumptions and
8 wanted to be able to correct the individual models.

9 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: This morning we
10 reviewed some of the work you do aside from in the
11 MISO market monitor. And you indicated you produce
12 forecasts for various parties that foreca -- and those
13 forecasts forecast out five (5) to twenty (20) years.

14 Is that right?

15 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: If I said that I
16 meant to say that we monitor such forecasts and we
17 evaluate their reasonableness.

18

19 (BRIEF PAUSE)

20

21 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: We have --
22 sometimes we have power supply procurement monitoring
23 assignments that rely on production cost savings and
24 future prices and we're asked to sort of vet those
25 forecasts to determine their reasonableness so that we

1 -- we can make conclusions about future revenues and
2 future prices.

3 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: And when you
4 monitor those forecasts, do the parties typically turn
5 over their models to you?

6 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: As much as we
7 want, yes.

8 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: Sorry, I didn't
9 catch --

10 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: As -- as much as
11 we require to -- to accomplish our task.

12 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: Would those models
13 be third-party independent models, or are they utility
14 models that are retaining you?

15 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: A combination.
16 A utility model sometimes informed by an outside
17 consultant.

18 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: So is the model
19 that you used -- you used for this -- this proceeding,
20 is that something you created yourself?

21 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yeah, I guess
22 you could say that. You know, we had to develop it
23 based on public data.

24 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: As -- as referenced
25 by the Chairman this morning, does it surprise you

1 that parties that might see you as a competitor in the
2 business would not provide you unfettered access to
3 their proprietary models and underlying methodologies?

4 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: I -- I think
5 that -- that it's right that they should protect
6 themselves. I think there could have been ways to
7 provide the necessary data and underlying processes to
8 help us better understand and perhaps develop
9 sensitivities that we needed.

10 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: At page 4 of your
11 report -- I don't know that you need to turn to it.
12 Because I'll just say you state that:

13 "The Preferred Development Plan is
14 expected to deliver the expected
15 benefits if actual conditions meet
16 critical projections. And among
17 these critical projections is the
18 revenue that can be earned from sales
19 of energy and capacity to the MISO
20 markets in the US."

21 Do you recall that statement?

22 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

23 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: Insights into how
24 the market might perform in the future is a key
25 element to the success of those doing business in the

1 MISO market.

2 Would you agree?

3 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

4 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: And future market
5 prices are a critical factor in assessing investments
6 in new generation also.

7 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

8 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: And another
9 critical factor would be the ability to lock in
10 pricing to reduce risk by means of bilateral
11 contracts, correct?

12 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

13 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: And as with any
14 negotiation the party who has the most knowledge and
15 the insight into what the other is thinking will have
16 the edge in the negotiations.

17 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

18 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: So the party with
19 the most knowledge is likely to get the best deal for
20 their ratepayers.

21 Would you agree?

22 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

23 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: Now, in your role
24 as MISO monitor, who's your client?

25 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: MISO.

1 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: So would -- would
2 it be fair to say your role is to be independent. You
3 answer to no one and answer to everyone at the same
4 time?

5 DR. DAVID PATTON: Yeah, I'd -- I
6 would say our -- our client is also the FERC, but
7 because -- because it's important to recognize that --
8 that a large share of our monitoring responsibility is
9 actually monitoring MISO. So -- so ultimately I think
10 we -- the -- the monitoring function is specified
11 under the tariff. So we -- we ultimately answer to
12 FERC and, to a lesser extent, to MISO.

13 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: Would it be fair to
14 say in the world you operate in, transparency is
15 critical?

16 DR. DAVID PATTON: Yes.

17 THE CHAIRPERSON: Dr. Patton, when you
18 mentioned, "the tariff," you're meaning which tariff?

19 DR. DAVID PATTON: The Midwest ISO
20 tariff; that is the -- the FERC-approved tariff that
21 governs the -- the market.

22 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Transmission
23 tariff that also governs the market.

24

25 CONTINUED BY MS. PATTI RAMAGE:

1 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: Manitoba Hydro
2 provided you with the -- both the 2012 and 2013
3 individual consultant reports and appendices as you --
4 as was requested.

5 Is that correct?

6 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Correct.

7 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: And is it your
8 understanding that Manitoba Hydro provided you with
9 everything it had in its possession?

10 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: That's my
11 understanding, yeah.

12 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: So you would have
13 received, with respect to the -- the six (6)
14 consultants' reports, gas and coal prices.

15 Is that correct?

16 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: I think, if I
17 recall, there was gas and coal prices in -- in the
18 data. And I can't recall now, but I do believe seeing
19 those from some of the consultants.

20 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: Carbon prices?

21 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: I believe so.

22 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: Supply additions
23 and retirements, including renewables?

24 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: We did see those
25 in some summary fashion.

1 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: Overnight capital
2 costs?

3 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

4 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: Load and load
5 growth, those were included?

6 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Again, some of
7 it I remember seeing in a summary basis. For
8 instance, I believe that Manitoba Hydro had put
9 together a sort of a cover -- a little cover report,
10 and in the appendices were all the consultants'
11 reports.

12 And I believe in the Man -- Manitoba
13 Hydro part of it, there was some summary statistics on
14 various assumptions.

15 I don't recall for each individual
16 consultant whether they provided a whole series of
17 values for each year for those -- all those particular
18 inputs you're talking about. I just don't recall.

19 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: How about emerging
20 environmental regulations?

21 Do you recall seeing that material in
22 those reports?

23 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: In some form,
24 yes.

25 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: And renewable RPS

1 targets?

2 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: There's some of
3 that in there.

4 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: That's renewable
5 portfo -- renewable portfolio standard targets, for
6 those who aren't familiar with the -- that acronym.

7 Having seen -- you saw those materials,
8 but in your materials, you relied primarily on EAI
9 (sic) data. You relied on EAI's (sic) natural gas
10 forecast?

11 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

12 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: If I didn't say it
13 right, it's EIA.

14 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Okay.

15 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: I'm sure -- you
16 appeared to know what I was referring to --

17 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

18 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: -- even if Ms.
19 Flynn wasn't sure. You relied on EIA's electricity
20 demand growth rates?

21 Is that correct?

22 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

23 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: And you relied on
24 EIA's capacity additions and retirements, including
25 their coal retirement figures?

1 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

2 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: And were there
3 other sources or inputs that you relied on, sourced
4 directly from EIA?

5 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Did you mention
6 the capital costs?

7 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: No, I did not.

8 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: There's another
9 one.

10 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: Does EIA have any
11 specific insight on these items not available or
12 evident to industry analysts that would mean EIA long-
13 term forecasts are not subject to the same underlying
14 risk that is present in a long-term forecast produced
15 by private industry?

16 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Can you -- what
17 -- what was the first part again? Do they have...?

18 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: Do they have any
19 specific insight on these items that's not available
20 or evident to industry analysts?

21 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: I don't think
22 so. I think it's all public.

23 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: But EIA, they have
24 no special ability to predict the future?

25 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Not that a

1 private firm couldn't assemble.

2 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: And then each
3 individual component forecast assumption sourced from
4 EIA would have some band of uncertainty around it,
5 depending on how the future actually unfolds?

6 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Certainly.

7 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: And outside of EIA,
8 are there public sources that would provide the same
9 level of detailed information?

10 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yeah, there's a
11 number of private companies that produce a forecast of
12 these various inputs.

13 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: But are they -- are
14 they public and available, or are they for purchase?

15 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Oh, oh. I mean,
16 not that I'm immediately familiar with. But I know
17 there's some companies that produce sort of high-level
18 forecasts and give them away free, and then sort of
19 they produce more detailed ones for -- for their
20 clients, yeah.

21 So there's -- there's public firm --
22 private firms that make their output public.

23 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: But they're high
24 level, probably loss leaders, would that be fair?

25 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: I don't...

1 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: Now, you had other
2 sources in your forecast -- or assumptions that
3 weren't forse -- weren't sourced from EIA; for
4 example, the cost of new capacity, would you --
5 overnight capital.

6 Was that one that you did yourself?

7 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: I believe that's
8 based on EIA.

9 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: Okay. What about
10 the debt-to-equity ratio of developers?

11 Was that one that you would develop on
12 your own?

13 DR. DAVID PATTON: Yeah, those are
14 assumptions that we've developed over time in
15 evaluating the cost of new entry, but they're --
16 they're generally consistent with assumptions that
17 have been developed by -- by a number of RTOs who --
18 who use that as an input for their capacity markets.

19 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: You say,
20 "generally." Is there a range or is -- did you arrive
21 at -- at specific numbers, or how did you deal with
22 debt-to-equity?

23 DR. DAVID PATTON: Oh, the debt-to-
24 equity? To -- for those -- for those calculations
25 that I'm aware of, or in the various contexts that I'm

1 thinking of, I think a 50:50 debt-equity ratio was --
2 was used by everybody.

3 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: What about O&M
4 costs? Is that something you dealt with on your own,
5 or where did you get those from?

6 DR. DAVID PATTON: Variable O&M or a
7 fixed O&M?

8 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: I think both.

9 DR. DAVID PATTON: The -- the -- I
10 think for purposes of this calculation, our -- our O&M
11 figures came from -- from EIA, as well.

12 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: What about your
13 assumptions on inflation, where did they come from?

14 DR. DAVID PATTON: Our assumptions on
15 inflation? Generally, they've -- I think generally
16 they are consistent with -- with the assumptions made
17 by other RTOs in this calculation. But general -- but
18 I would say primarily they -- they come from our --
19 our own judgment on, you know, a reasonable inflation
20 rate to use.

21 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: And the tax rates
22 that you applied?

23 DR. DAVID PATTON: The tax rates? I -
24 - I don't recall the -- the source of the tax rates.
25 But -- but we've used the same tax assumptions going

1 back to when we first performed this calculation a few
2 years ago. But I -- I'd have to go back and determine
3 where we -- where we -- what the source was for those.

4 MR. CHRISTIAN MONNIN: If I may, just
5 to chime in on one particular point for Dr. Sinclair
6 and Dr. Patton. Certain -- certain administrative
7 boards have their own way of proceeding. In here, for
8 CPF to go back, or if you want to check something,
9 it's -- your answer would be subject to check, yeah,
10 just to -- to couch that matter.

11

12 CONTINUED BY MS. PATTI RAMAGE:

13 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: Where would you
14 have got -- drawn your assumptions for property taxes
15 and insurance costs?

16 DR. DAVID PATTON: Again, I would have
17 to check.

18 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: Would they come
19 from EIA?

20 DR. DAVID PATTON: No.

21 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: What about the rate
22 of return on equity that was applied in the -- in that
23 calculation?

24 DR. DAVID PATTON: The return on
25 equity was a value that's consistent with the -- the

1 return on equity used by other RTOs for this
2 calculation.

3 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: When you say,
4 "other RTOs," plural, does that mean the same rate of
5 return was applied, or was there a band of -- of
6 values?

7 DR. DAVID PATTON: Well, primarily I'm
8 thinking of the NYISO.

9 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: And would its rate
10 of return, the New York one, be the same as the MISO,
11 or any -- any other ICO -- ISO?

12 DR. DAVID PATTON: I would have to
13 check their most -- their most recent -- I'm not --
14 I'm not sure about that.

15 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: And the specific
16 input assumptions, they'd be different whether it's a
17 regulated utility or a merchant generator constructing
18 the plant? Would that be correct?

19 DR. DAVID PATTON: They would. These
20 -- these calculations are -- generally assume it's a
21 private investment.

22 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: And then to
23 calculate the net cost of new entry, anticipated
24 market revenues also need to be calculated for the --
25 the estimated number of hours that the marginal unit

1 will run in a particular year.

2 Is that correct?

3 DR. DAVID PATTON: Yes.

4 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: And is that
5 something -- a number that you would have come up
6 with?

7 DR. DAVID PATTON: Yes, based on our -
8 - that's a number you can calculate based on the --
9 the energy model that we developed.

10 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: So you would have
11 had to pull together all these numbers in -- in order
12 to develop your forecast, correct?

13 DR. DAVID PATTON: Correct.

14 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: And are these
15 numbers all documented in your report?

16 DR. DAVID PATTON: No, certainly
17 they're --they're not all in the report.

18 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: And for carbon
19 pricing, you indicated you relied on MNP's carbon
20 forecast and that Mr. Sabine stated a 50 percent
21 probability that these would or would not -- that
22 there would or would not be a carbon price on the
23 future.

24 Can you provide the reference in the
25 MNP evidence for that probability?

1 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: No. It was done
2 by telephone call.

3 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: And during cross-
4 examination by Mr. Williams, I understood you to say
5 that you agreed with that assessment of my -- is that
6 correct?

7 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: I think we had a
8 feeling for it, and then we talked to Mr. Sabine and
9 we asked him: What do you think about a 50/50
10 probability? That's what we're thinking.

11 He said, That's what we're thinking,
12 too.

13 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: Do you have
14 specific expertise in the area of carbon pricing?

15 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Well, we have a
16 lot -- like I said earlier, we often deal with -- we
17 every day deal with a wide range of market
18 participants, including buyers, sellers, regulators.
19 And this is a question that's interesting to us, of
20 course. So I suppose you could say that our expertise
21 is derived from canvassing, in a way, a large number
22 of market participants in understanding what they
23 expect.

24 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: And those market
25 participants would each come with their own unique

1 perspectives and potential biases, their -- their
2 level of risk adversity, and that sort of thing.

3 Would that be correct?

4 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

5 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: And just to finish
6 off on this, you didn't do independent analysis of
7 carbon pricing? You've relied just on MNP's, correct?

8 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Correct.

9 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: In your report you
10 also described that you made adjustments to the
11 historical supply curve. And here I'm referring to
12 page 22, where you say -- and you -- you can turn to
13 it, if you like. It's -- you -- you said:

14 "To clear the hourly market and
15 establish the forecast price for that
16 hour, we adjust each historical
17 hourly supply curve based on
18 anticipated changes in each key
19 variable [And then in brackets]
20 (fuel costs, et cetera)."

21 Did I get that correctly?

22 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

23 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: Yeah. Can you
24 explain how you adjust the historical supply curve for
25 the addition of wind generation?

1 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes. Wind
2 generation goes in at basically a zero price because
3 they often actually been -- been negative prices. So
4 they would go at the bottom of the supply curve.
5 Remember, the supply curve is built up from offers.

6 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: What is the shape
7 of that curve over the course of the day?

8 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: I'm -- I'm
9 sorry?

10 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: The shape of the
11 curve over the course of the day, what is the shape?

12 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Okay. The shape
13 of the curve depends on the actual historical shape
14 for that hour. We know in each hour what units were
15 committed. We know what their as-offered costs are.
16 So we just stack them up and you get a shape. And I
17 think we did an example in the report that shows you
18 an example of July, I think. So it tends to be shaped
19 like the ones I put on the board this morning, sort of
20 hockey stick shaped.

21 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: Now, you've talked
22 in something I can relate to. So with that shape,
23 that shape is developed based on the historic -- the
24 historic information. That would be two (2) years of
25 historic information?

1 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: For each hour,
2 we have information on what units were turned on and
3 ready to produce, and so we simply took their as-
4 offered costs and stacked them from highest to lowest,
5 and we -- we get the shape.

6 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: But each hour over
7 two (2) years. Is that right?

8 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: We do actually
9 each hour -- yes, each hour over two (2) years. So we
10 had, like, seventeen thousand (17,000) supply curves,
11 historical supply curves.

12 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: Okay. Can you
13 explain how you adjust the supply curve for changes in
14 imports and exports from the MISO market?

15 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yeah, those --
16 the -- the net imports are put in the supply curve
17 also. They -- they basically adjust the demand. So
18 if you have a net import, then your demand goes down.
19 If you have a net export, then your -- you have more
20 demand you have to satisfy, but that really doesn't
21 affect the supply curve. It affects demand.

22 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: And then how does
23 it change for the future?

24 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: We know the
25 demand in the future from our projections, and we --

1 we keep the net imports for each hour constant over
2 time, except the projected imports for Manitoba. We
3 add those in over time. We don't add any -- we don't
4 project other imports over time.

5 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: And how do you
6 adjust for potential -- okay -- for potential
7 increases in future demand response?

8 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: The future
9 demand will reflect any kind of demand response that's
10 -- they -- the EIA projected demand is going to
11 reflect demand response. It -- it's sort of the --
12 what they call the net energy -- I can't remember
13 exactly what it's called in -- in the -- in the data,
14 but it will reflect the demand that needs to be served
15 by generation.

16 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: And do you also
17 adjust for degradation of gas turbine performance over
18 time?

19 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: You mean if we
20 have a existing CCGT?

21 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: Yes, as it ages.

22 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: No, the heat
23 rate stays constant as it ages.

24 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: How do you map out
25 fuel prices to each specific unit?

1 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: The fuel price,
2 if it's a gas price for each unit, is the Henry Hub
3 price plus the transportation for every unit.

4 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: So would you agree
5 you're exercising your professional judgment in each
6 one (1) of these variables?

7 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

8 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: And as there's
9 judgment, is it possible for someone to completely and
10 identically recreate your forecast?

11 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes. They may
12 have -- they may have questions like yours, but they
13 could do it, and we'd be open -- we'd give -- we'd be
14 transparent in that regard.

15

16 (BRIEF PAUSE)

17

18 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: And when they're --
19 when comparing -- when comparing with different
20 experts, would you agree it's likely that two (2)
21 different experts working independently would have
22 different opinions on at least some of the variables
23 we've been discussing that go into calculating the
24 electricity price forecast?

25 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes. It could -

1 - it could differ.

2 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: And these
3 differences and assumptions would result in some
4 variation in long-term prices?

5 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

6 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: And none of these
7 experts have -- have any sort of ability to predict
8 the future better than another.

9 Is that correct?

10 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: I would think
11 that there -- of those -- you're referring to these
12 consultants or any expert?

13 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: Any expert can
14 reasonably -- can a reasonable expert reasonably
15 disagree, I guess is the question.

16 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes. I mean,
17 there's better experts than others, but there can be
18 legitimate disagreements about how to proceed.

19 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: If I could get you
20 to turn to Tab 2 of the Manitoba Hydro book of
21 documents, which is simply an excerpt of your report.

22 This is page 37 from the Potomac
23 report, and I'm interested in what you have to say in
24 the third full paragraph on the page where you're
25 discussing adding generation for capacity and using a

1 CT versus a CCGT.

2 Do you see that paragraph?

3 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

4 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: And before I go on,
5 to make sure we're -- I have my acronyms straight,
6 'CCGT' is a combined-cycle gas turbine, and a 'CT' is
7 a combustion turbine, correct?

8 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

9 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: And I speak in
10 terms of combined cycle and single cycle, so when you
11 say, "CT," you're talking a single cycle.

12 Is that correct?

13 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: CT, yes.

14 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: Yes, okay. Now, in
15 that third paragraph it says:

16 "We estimate the net-CONE of an
17 advanced CT, given the parameters
18 published by EIA, given the typical
19 price duration curve in the MISO
20 market, a CT is generally the most
21 economical way to meet capacity
22 needs. While it is conceivable that
23 a CCGT, because it runs longer at
24 lower costs, could overcome its
25 higher capital cost relative to a CT,

1 our analysis indicates that the
2 forecasted energy prices always
3 results in a CT being the most
4 economical addition for capacity,
5 i.e., having the lower net-CONE."

6 Did I read that correctly?

7 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

8 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: I'm an excellent
9 reader. Can you explain why you concluded that a
10 single-cycle combustion turbine is always the most
11 economical addition for capacity?

12 What -- what did your analysis tell
13 you?

14 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: So in order to
15 get -- basically, the logic is in order to get a CCGT
16 to be the marginal unit, you'd have to be fairly far
17 into a capacity shortage so that the marginal capacity
18 being added at a higher cost can run long enough hours
19 to make up its capacity costs -- more than make up its
20 capacity costs relative to a CT.

21 DR. DAVID PATTON: Yeah, I'll -- I'll
22 add a little bit to that. The -- so I think what this
23 -- the -- the narrow interpretation of what we're
24 saying in this paragraph is that you can calculate the
25 net revenues of both technologies, given the price

1 forecasts that we produce, the hourly prices.

2 And then for all of the cases we ran,
3 the -- the net revenue -- the larger net revenue of a
4 combined-cycle unit was not enough larger -- was not
5 enough larger to make it a more economic investment
6 than the advanced CT.

7

8 (BRIEF PAUSE)

9

10 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: In that quote I
11 read to you, you refer to a -- a new advanced CT.

12 In that context, what does 'advanced'
13 mean?

14 DR. DAVID PATTON: I believe it's an
15 air-derivative gas turbine. It's not a -- it's not a
16 industrial turbine.

17 We put 'advanced' in quotes because the
18 -- the table published by EIA refers to it as an
19 advanced CT, so we wanted the reader to -- to know
20 what technology we were referring to in the EIA
21 report.

22 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: Would it be fair to
23 say that that's the -- a lower capital cost plant?

24 DR. DAVID PATTON: Lower than what?

25 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: How about lowest

1 capital cost plant. Is that what you selected?

2 DR. DAVID PATTON: I -- yeah, I
3 believe that's right on a -- a cost-per-kilowatt
4 basis.

5

6 (BRIEF PAUSE)

7

8 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: I'm going to turn
9 to page 31 of your report now. Here you discuss your
10 capacity price forecast. And if I have it correctly -
11 - page 31. I'm sorry, I said, "of your report." It's
12 page 31 of your presentation I'm on.

13

14 (BRIEF PAUSE)

15

16 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: So for the purpose
17 of your price forecast, do I have it correct that you
18 assume the value of capacity will be determined by the
19 cost of an advanced combustion turbine, eighty-nine
20 ninety-five (89.95) -- eighty-nine dollars and ninety-
21 five cents (\$89.95) per kilowatt, the advance CT?

22 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes, subject to
23 check. Now, the way you're asking this question just
24 sounds like maybe we got something mixed up, but,
25 okay.

1 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: Sometimes I like
2 you to agree with me. We're not always in
3 disagreement.

4 But if a utility were to were -- were
5 to choose another capacity resource as its new
6 resource, would the eighty-nine dollars and ninety-
7 five cents (\$89.95) per kilowatt still be the
8 appropriate adder if you didn't use the advanced CT;
9 for example, if you used hydro?

10 DR. DAVID PATTON: I'm not sure
11 exactly what you're asking, but I think the -- the
12 nature of what we're doing in this capacity price
13 forecast is we're identifying the -- the marginal
14 capacity resource, which should be the most economic
15 resource to -- to build.

16 So it's irrelevant what any particular
17 utility chooses to build. If it chooses to build
18 something else, and that's a higher cost resource, the
19 -- that doesn't make the capacity worth more in the
20 market. If there is a lower cost technology that
21 would be the marginal technology, then that would
22 reduce the capacity price.

23 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: But parties
24 entering, for example, into bilateral contracts to
25 deal with capacity issues, it would be relevant in

1 that sense if, for example, they weren't necessarily
2 interested in the lowest cost product; they have other
3 motivations, for example, the environmental attributes
4 associated with a product or fear of carbon or simply
5 fear of the future.

6 They -- they may look at a different
7 value for that for their purposes?

8 DR. DAVID PATTON: Well, yes. So I
9 guess what I would say is that the -- the forecast of
10 the -- the market price for capacity would still be
11 based on this. What -- what you're talking about is -
12 - is a willingness to incur a premium over and above
13 the -- the market price because there are certainly
14 positive attributes of different types of capacity
15 that are not recognized in -- in the capacity market
16 price.

17

18 (BRIEF PAUSE)

19

20 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: Now, if I could get
21 you to turn over to page 35.

22 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: You mean slide
23 35?

24 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: Yes, it's slide 35
25 of your presentation. I have to read my own notes.

1 (BRIEF PAUSE)

2

3 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: With respect to
4 your statement regarding the use of historical data,
5 is this statement related to the pers...

6 Is this statement related to the 9
7 percent reduction you refer to in your report on page
8 44 where you recommend Manitoba Hydro re-price? I
9 apologize. I...

10 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: You're correct.

11 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: Did that make sense
12 to you? Because --

13 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yeah, that's --
14 that's right.

15 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: Mr. Cormie slipped
16 me a note and I'm having a little trouble with his
17 penmanship.

18 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yeah, the slide
19 35 refers to the passages on page 44 of the report.

20 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: And in the past
21 years in which Manitoba Hydro did not fill -- fully
22 sell out its dependable energy, were these years ones
23 where Manitoba Hydro's dependable hydraulic energy was
24 valued because it is zero emit -- emitting?

25 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yeah. I -- I

1 don't -- we -- we don't really know why you didn't
2 sell 100 percent firm, but we recommended that you
3 provide extra support for that, which could include
4 what you're saying there.

5

6 (BRIEF PAUSE)

7

8 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: In the future, do
9 the forecasters indicate there's a significant risk
10 that carbon will have a significant price associated
11 with energy?

12 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Who's -- or the
13 who that -- can you repeat that, please?

14

15 (BRIEF PAUSE)

16

17 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: No, we're not going
18 to pursue that question right now, and I'm not taking
19 Mr. Cormie's notes. It's only once I read and start
20 realizing what's he's asked me. Let's move on to
21 congestion and losses.

22 Can you confirm your work on congestion
23 and losses was to apply the effect of congestion and
24 losses on the MISO system marginal price relative to
25 the price forecast for the MHEB pricing note?

1 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes, we
2 estimated congestion and losses to adjust the system
3 marginal price to arrive at the Manitoba border
4 locational marginal price.

5 THE CHAIRPERSON: Could you repeat the
6 question, please, just to...?

7

8 CONTINUED BY MS. PATTI RAMAGE:

9 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: Can you confirm
10 your work on congestion and losses was to apply the
11 effect of congestion and losses on the MISO system
12 marginal price relative to the price forecast for the
13 Manitoba Hydro Electric Board pricing note that
14 Manitoba Hydro bore?

15 What I'm talking about is there is the
16 MISO region price over in the -- in MISO, Minnesota,
17 Wisconsin, through there, and then there is a node at
18 the Manitoba border, and I believe we've got
19 confirmation that -- that the price was -- was dealt
20 with at the border.

21 And based on your review of the price
22 consultant reports, can you confirm that Manitoba
23 Hydro receives electricity market forecasts for the
24 Minnesota Hub region?

25 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

1 Consultants' prices were at the Minnesota Hub.

2 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: And those market
3 forecasts accounted for congestion and losses to the
4 Minnesota Hub?

5 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: We didn't check
6 that, but that's what we assumed, yes.

7 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: And that being the
8 case, Manitoba Hydro would only have to account for
9 congestion and losses between the Minnesota Hub and
10 the Manitoba border, correct?

11 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: That's correct.

12 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: And that would mean
13 that the factor you applied to your report to account
14 for congestion and losses would be different than the
15 factor Manitoba Hydro would be applying for congestion
16 and losses?

17 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yeah. We
18 estimated different congestion and loss than you --
19 than Manitoba did, because our -- our congestion and
20 losses come from farther away.

21 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: If I could get you
22 to turn to Tab 3 of the Manitoba Hydro book of
23 documents?

24

25 (BRIEF PAUSE)

1 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: And that -- that
2 would be the same graph that you produced in your
3 presentation this morning, too, at -- it's Figure 11.

4 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yeah, I believe
5 that's right. Yes.

6 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: So I -- I believe
7 you explained this -- this morning, but the top line
8 represents the MISO SMP.

9 Is that correct?

10 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

11 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: And that's in 2015,
12 around thirty-seven dollars (\$37) a megawatt hour, and
13 it steadily climbs to forty-four dollars (\$44) a
14 megawatt hour in about 2021. It takes a jump to about
15 -- it looks like fifty-six dollars (\$56) a megawatt
16 hour when you introduce the carbon pricing, and
17 thereafter steadily climbs.

18 Would that be a fair description?

19 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yeah.

20 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: All right. And
21 then similarly, it's almost a parallel line after you
22 account for congestion and then losses. The LMP at
23 the Manitoba border also steadily climbs.

24 Is that correct?

25 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yeah, same

1 shape.

2 DR. DAVID PATTON: Yeah, just a quick
3 note. It's not really a parallel line. If -- if you
4 look at the gap in 2033, it's quite a bit larger than
5 the -- the gap in 2020, or 2017, and mainly that's
6 because the -- the increasing natural -- fuel prices
7 increase the cost of re-dispatching generation to
8 manage congestion. So that -- those two (2) wouldn't
9 -- wouldn't grow in parallel.

10 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: Okay. That's --
11 that's fair. I won't disagree with that, but you'd
12 agree that, for example, if we look at towards the end
13 of the forecast at 2029, you're projecting real price
14 growth in 2029.

15 DR. DAVID PATTON: Yes.

16 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: And then again in
17 2031, it climbs regardless of which one of the top or
18 bottom line, it -- it climbs?

19 DR. DAVID PATTON: Yes.

20 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: And in 2033,
21 there's real glo -- growth again?

22 DR. DAVID PATTON: Yes.

23 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: What would be the
24 key drivers facil -- facilitating that price growth
25 for on-peak energy?

1 DR. DAVID PATTON: Well, the -- the
2 growth in -- in fuel prices is -- is probably the most
3 important driver.

4

5 (BRIEF PAUSE)

6

7 MR. CHRISTIAN MONNIN: And -- and
8 just for the benefit of the record, I just wanted to,
9 like, clarify that. The graph which Ms. Ramage is
10 referring to is the same one on slide 23 of our
11 presentation. The slide doesn't have a -- a number --
12 a page number, but for the benefit of the record, that
13 is slide 23 of our presenta -- of Potomac's
14 presentation, rather, which is the same graph that you
15 find on page 34 of the report.

16

17 CONTINUED BY MS. PATTI RAMAGE:

18 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: Would that -- that
19 key driver or other drivers suddenly change at 2033?
20 Do you have any reason to believe that?

21 DR. DAVID PATTON: Well, I -- I think
22 it's difficult to -- to comment on, you know, a
23 portion that we -- we didn't forecast, but -- but if
24 you're asking would -- would we expect some
25 significant change in the trend for 2035, the answer

1 is probably no.

2

3 (BRIEF PAUSE)

4

5 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: Now, you've
6 indicated in your presentation that an advantage of
7 your modelling and the resultant price forecast over
8 the other price forecasters is that it is well-
9 calibrated to the past two (2) years of historic MISO
10 data.

11 Is that correct?

12 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

13 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: And if we could
14 turn to page 27 of your presentation?

15

16 (BRIEF PAUSE)

17

18 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: You indicate that
19 there are four (4) price scenarios are -- are
20 possible.

21 Is that correct?

22 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

23 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: And that the range
24 of prices for on-peak energy in 2033, so if we look at
25 that red line at the bottom? The range is from -- I

1 would think -- I would say thirty-four dollars (\$34)
2 or thirty-five dollars (\$35) a megawatt hour for the
3 low energy price scenario, up to sixty-three dollars
4 (\$63) a megawatt hour for the reference case scenario.

5 Is that correct?

6 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

7 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: So that range is --

8 DR. DAVID PATTON: I'm sorry. Which
9 case are you -- I don't see any one that starts at
10 '34, but maybe I'm --

11 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: Not starts at '34,
12 ends in 2030 --

13 DR. DAVID PATTON: Oh, ends, okay.
14 I'm with you now.

15 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: Okay. The range is
16 approximately thirty dollars (\$30) a megawatt hour.

17 Is that correct?

18 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

19 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: And that would be a
20 hundred percent range difference between your low and
21 your high?

22 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

23 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: Can you explain how
24 the advantage you've indicated your forecast has over
25 others regarding calibration helps with resolving

1 uncertainty in prices in 2033, given it results in a
2 hundred percent range of -- of difference?

3 DR. DAVID PATTON: Well, I -- I think
4 you can see that the majority of that range is -- is
5 the difference in the -- in the carbon price. What
6 we're saying about the advantage of it being
7 calibrated to the existing market is -- is that we
8 think this model accurately accounts for the -- the
9 actual supply in MISO, and -- and the -- the
10 expectation of how that supply will change over time.

11 Now, when you -- when you introduce a
12 cost factor as large as the -- the assumed carbon
13 price in 2033, then you're naturally going to get a --
14 a wide band, but I think that's -- that's not
15 measuring uncertainty with the underlying model,
16 that's measuring uncertainty with the -- the carbon
17 input.

18

19 (BRIEF PAUSE)

20

21 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: If we turn back the
22 clock, and we're in -- in 2005, and we took your same
23 model, and we used two (2) years of historical data to
24 forecast forward, would that model have been able to
25 predict today's energy price?

1 And in particular, what I'm thinking,
2 would it have predicted the impact of fracking on
3 natural gas, and ultimately, on electricity prices?

4 DR. DAVID PATTON: Likely not, but
5 it's important to note that -- that it wasn't within
6 our scope to produce an independent forecast of
7 natural gas.

8 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: I -- I think the
9 point I'm getting at, would you agree the quality of
10 model calibration has little to do with any predictive
11 ability? Rather, it's the underlying drivers of the
12 future that really -- that impact the -- the model's
13 ability to assist a party or to accurately predict the
14 future?

15 DR. DAVID PATTON: I think both are
16 important, but I'm -- I certainly would not disagree
17 that the -- the uncertainty around the inputs is -- is
18 a -- is a primary issue.

19 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: And in fact, the --
20 the uncertainty regarding carbon in your model is --
21 would be a -- a driver of -- of overall uncertainty.
22 That's the biggest driver, it's not calibration.

23 DR. DAVID PATTON: Well, it certainly
24 is a -- a -- it certainly is a big driver, and is
25 likely the biggest.

1 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: During your
2 testimony this morning, Dr. Sinclair, you talked about
3 MISO's projections of coal retirements at 12 gigawatts
4 versus Potomac's at 6 gigawatt hours.

5 And at that time, you explained the
6 difference, saying something to the effect that MISO
7 was focussed on planning, and you expect them to be
8 conservative, but that in price forecasting, you look
9 at what you expect to happen, not what you need to
10 plan for.

11 Do I have that roughly correct?

12 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: I think that was
13 one of the things I said in response to that question,
14 yes.

15 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: So 'conservative'
16 is not really a dirty word in the context of planning;
17 I take it you expect planners to be conservative?

18 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Yes.

19 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: And therefore, if
20 you aren't prepared to speculate on new technologies
21 for price forecasting purposes, would you agree it
22 would be less likely that a system planner would do so
23 for planning purposes?

24 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: What was -- what
25 was the first part of the question? We don't want to

1 speculate?

2 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: If you're not
3 prepared to speculate on new technology, so I'm -- I
4 sort of jumped over here because one (1) of your --
5 you had three (3), I think, factors of uncertainty, so
6 one (1) of them was new technologies. And your
7 evidence was about not speculating on those new
8 technologies, so I guess I jumped a question.

9 But if you aren't prepared to speculate
10 them on -- on them, would a system planner speculate
11 on those in their planning?

12 DR. ROBERT SINCLAIR: Well, first, I
13 don't think we said 'speculate.' I think we just said
14 that there's a risk that some technology may replace
15 the CT as the least-cost capacity unit. Now, I don't
16 know how that relates to a planner.

17 THE CHAIRPERSON: I think I will have
18 to put an end to these questionings, because we -- we
19 have to adjourn. We have no choice, because of -- one
20 (1) of the panel members has a commitment. So in ter
21 -- in the interests of having as transparent a public
22 record as possible, I wonder if could continue this
23 questioning tomorrow morning on the record if you
24 haven't finished your questions.

25 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: Tomorrow is the CSI

1 morning, correct?

2 THE CHAIRPERSON: I'm looking to
3 guidance here, but I would say that --

4 MS. PATTI RAMAGE: Mr. Peters has
5 questions anyways. I was just going to say, if I had
6 one (1) minute, I could find out if I really need
7 these ones so people don't have to come in, but they
8 have to arrive anyways in the morning for Mr. Peters.

9 THE CHAIRPERSON: That's right. Yeah,
10 they do. Yeah, because Mr. Peters has some questions
11 that he wants to ask of these witnesses, as well. So
12 we are in a position where we need to come back
13 anyways tomorrow morning.

14 So let's -- let's adjourn for the
15 evening, unless there's some business to attend to.
16 Me. Hacaault...?

17 MR. ANTOINE HACAULT: Just a reminder
18 that Hydro was going to consider whether some of the
19 questions that I had asked, there was some way to
20 provide some kind of a response once they knew what
21 the response was. So if -- if it's at all possible to
22 have that occur before the CSI session, we would
23 really appreciate that.

24 THE CHAIRPERSON: The -- Mr.
25 Peters...?

1 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And I'll just
2 indicate that in discussions I've had with Mr. Monnin,
3 we'll continue this mor -- in the morning before
4 coffee on the public session, and I believe we will be
5 with Dr. Sinclair only, and then approximately after
6 coffee, I believe Dr. Patton's other commitment will
7 be met, and he'll be able to join us, but I suspect
8 after coffee break, we'll be getting into the CSI
9 section.

10 THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you for that.
11 So with that, I will adjourn the proceedings for
12 today. We'll see each other again tomorrow morning at
13 nine o'clock. Thank you.

14
15 --- Upon adjourning at 5:18 p.m.

16
17 Certified correct,

18
19
20 _____
21 Cheryl Lavigne, Ms.

22
23
24
25

<u>\$</u>	<u>1</u>	4537:13	4552:24	4449:19
\$1,200	1	4556:1	146 4553:8	4451:15,22
4427:7		10:00	147 4553:20	4459:23
\$10 4390:13	4349:22,23	4347:1,16	148 4554:3	4460:2
4534:15	,25	100 4394:16	149 4554:15	4465:6
\$13 4389:10	4352:10	4587:2	14th 4351:11	4472:3,25
\$15 4455:23	4359:18	101 4427:3	4353:5,7,1	4490:17
\$20 4429:17	4366:8	103 4553:24	1	4492:23
\$23 4457:7	4368:17	105 4427:17	150 4555:1	4493:7,13,
\$25 4389:11	4369:4	4552:9	151 4555:15	19 4498:22
\$30 4453:15	4400:21,23	11 4349:7	15th 4353:12	4504:14
4455:8	4409:22	4431:19	4368:18	4505:16,22
4456:18	4413:19	4436:20	4377:17	4508:2
4594:16	4434:4	4590:3	16 4381:4	4521:4
\$34 4594:1	4438:1	12 4397:18	4384:8	4526:2
\$35 4456:22	4449:23	4409:21	4397:19	4528:19
4594:2	4450:6,10	4410:4,8	4403:13	4529:3
\$37 4590:12	4453:11	4428:10,17	4467:3	4530:21
\$40 4453:21	4464:25	4446:6	17 4381:12	4533:10,11
4455:12	4467:25	4469:8,14	4382:1	,13,20
4457:1	4480:18	4597:3	4385:17	4534:3
\$44 4590:13	4481:9	12:02	17,000	4536:7
\$5 4398:20	4485:3	4434:12	4396:5,8	4550:18,24
\$50 4429:19	4501:18,22	12:11	4576:10	4575:24
\$55 4378:6	,23	4434:13	18 4385:17	4576:7,9
4381:20	4504:13	12:45	19 4444:7	4578:20
\$56 4590:15	4506:15	4348:13,16	1990 4371:3	4579:20
\$58 4381:23	4507:25	,20	1993 4370:16	4591:8
\$59 4454:2	4521:19	13 4389:17		4593:9
\$6 4391:23	4528:21	13.3 4552:18		4595:23
\$60 4454:15	4547:25	138		2(d) 4435:16
\$63 4594:4	4552:9	4550:13,14	<u>2</u>	2,000
\$65 4381:7	4578:6	,19	2 4346:9	4388:21
\$70 4381:25	4598:4,6,2	139 4550:13	4349:12	2.1 4366:12
4411:8	0 4599:6	14	4356:8	4369:8
\$8 4457:11	1(a) 4357:22	4469:8,14,	4360:20	2.2 4366:20
\$89 4408:5	1(b) 4477:22	21	4369:2	2:13 4475:15
\$89.95	1(d) 4435:2	140 4550:13	4376:12	20 4358:6
4583:21	1.1 4393:12	4551:7	4384:23	4365:12,17
4584:7	1.12 4393:11	141 4551:14	4386:15	4376:4
\$90 4408:4	1:00 4434:10	142 4551:24	4394:15	4378:22
	1:09 4475:14	143 4552:7	4396:10,17	4387:1,15,
	10 4358:10	144 4552:14	4402:15	25 4388:11
	4390:3	145 4421:20	4413:17	4389:6
	4392:13		4416:18	4390:4
	4445:9		4420:14	4394:16
	4492:16,24		4422:21,24	4396:4
	4503:7		4424:11	4412:24
			4435:2	4431:19
				4440:2
				4452:10

4454:16	4549:6	4403:3	20th 4356:24	4385:18
4456:13	2013 4356:24	4591:5	4367:3	4386:7,22
4468:2	4367:3	2021 4389:10	4476:17	4391:23
4478:3	4439:12	4390:16	21 4348:23	4412:13
4492:24	4476:17	4453:20	4349:8,9,1	4418:19
4494:17,21	4487:17,18	4590:14	3 4392:6	4429:9
4496:1,4	4493:25	2022 4390:15	2-1 4438:23	4435:16
4501:2,7,1	4494:3	2026	4439:19	4436:18
1,12,14,15	4497:8	4488:4,7,1	4440:7	4457:2
4502:1	4498:8	7 4491:16	4441:22	4468:25
4504:19,22	4520:17	4516:12	4444:7	4472:8
4505:2,8,1	4521:2,22	2029 4455:13	4447:23,25	4490:17
2,16,22	4522:2	4591:13,14	4481:8	4493:7
4506:9,11	4531:18	2030 4462:21	21st	4502:20
4507:4,5,8	4563:2	4488:6	4352:3,8	4504:12,14
,10,16	2014 4343:24	4491:16	4353:21	4505:16,22
4509:17	4368:17	4516:6	4354:4	4516:18
4510:15	4439:20	4594:12	22 4348:11	4519:7,8
4511:4,8	4444:8	2031 4488:6	4349:12,13	4533:1
4547:11,22	4445:10	4491:16	4392:8	4546:23
4558:13	4461:21	4516:7	4574:12	4556:9
2000s	4487:13,14	4591:17	22nd 4350:3	4589:22
4406:23	2015	2033 4455:24	4352:4	4598:5
2004 4366:11	4379:10,11	4457:8,12	23 4393:18	3/4s 4475:7
2005 4595:22	,15,19	4591:4,20	4451:3	3:00 4377:17
2009 4406:20	4453:16	4592:19	4592:10,13	3:44 4537:16
2010 4439:12	4455:9	4593:24	230 4524:21	30 4365:17
2011	4456:19	4595:1,13	4525:1,24	4394:15
4376:13,15	4590:11	2033/2034	4527:1,11,	4405:11
4377:23	2015/2016	4455:20	15,20	4511:4
4465:2,12	4408:24	2033/'34	24 4394:24	31 4343:24
4494:2	2016 4409:22	4454:1	4398:6	4583:9,11,
2011/2012	2017	2034 4389:11	4403:14	12
4378:23	4409:8,12,	4431:20	26 4346:10	326 4390:23
4396:18	16,18	4462:7,12	4551:2,4	330 4343:22
2012	4554:21	4463:4	27 4452:13	34 4462:21
4376:13,15	4591:5	4504:25	4593:14	4592:15
4377:23	2018	2035 4462:19	2nd	4594:10,11
4379:10	4408:12,21	4496:17	4350:23,24	35 4492:25
4381:9	4409:12	4592:25	4351:4,7	4494:22
4382:18	4410:20,25	2040 4506:24		4495:6
4390:6	4488:18	2049	<hr/>	4585:21,23
4465:14	4489:4,10	4462:19,22	3	,24
4487:12	4490:3	,24	3 4353:2	4586:19
4494:2	4491:19	2050	4367:4	36 4346:12
4520:16	4515:17,24	4496:20,25	4372:7	4551:8,10
4521:1,24,	4516:11	2080 4462:12	4374:22	37 4421:8
25 4522:7	2020 4401:19		4375:1	4422:19
4563:2	4402:17,18		4382:4,6	4423:2
2012/2013				

4426:13 4579:22 38 4426:16 3rd 4350:18 4351:7 <hr/> 4 4 4367:11 4386:14 4402:8,11 4451:3,8 4452:21 4457:15 4480:9,11 4515:18,19 4516:17 4556:13 4560:10 4593:19 4,000 4387:23 4388:11,23 4431:18 4547:12 4:02 4537:17 40 4429:7 4511:4 400 4343:22 4547:12 40s 4455:20 41 4421:9 4430:5 4441:23 4519:23 4520:2 4543:24 4546:7 42 4346:11 4431:5 4465:23 4507:24 4508:11 4519:11,18 4551:2,5 423(c) 4553:13 43 4464:4 4343 4343:25	4346 4345:3 4356 4345:7 4366 4346:4,5 4367 4346:7 4369 4345:8 44 4346:19 4465:25 4523:6,19 4553:20 4554:1 4586:8,19 4434 4345:9 4475 4345:11 4486 4345:13 45 4398:19 4459:2 4461:20 4464:10 4475:9,12 4546 4345:14 4550 4346:9,11 4551 4346:12,13 ,14 4552 4346:15,16 ,17 4553 4346:18,19 4554 4346:20,21 4555 4345:15 4346:22,23 4600 4343:25 4345:17 47 4392:18,23 48 4346:21 4392:23 4554:16,23 4th 4348:1,5,9 ,12,16	4352:5 <hr/> 5 5 4365:12 4423:13,24 4434:9 4460:19 4461:3,10 4471:6,20, 23 4472:25 4480:9,11 4481:8 4488:22 4491:20 4492:14 4502:3 4554:20 4556:21 4558:13 5:15 4537:9,12 5:18 4600:15 50 4389:6,15 4393:22 4572:20 50,000 4380:19 50/50 4389:17 4459:22 4460:3 4512:23 4533:18 4534:3,6,1 2 4573:9 50:50 4569:1 500 4525:6,8,2 4 4526:24 52 4555:4 54 4346:22 4555:2,10 58 4454:1 5th 4350:11 <hr/> 6 6 4374:20 4410:8,10,	16 4428:17 4437:18 4438:15 4448:9,20 4449:19,24 4450:9 4462:5 4469:22 4470:9 4471:5,11, 22 4472:3 4502:5 4503:11,19 4563:13 4597:4 6,000 4387:16 4409:18 60 4387:4 63 4346:13 4551:15,21 631 4390:23 64 4346:14 4551:24 4552:5 65 4346:15 4552:8,12 66 4346:16 4552:15,22 67 4495:6 68 4346:17 4552:25 4553:6 69 4346:20 4554:4,12 <hr/> 7 7,000 4388:19,20 7,500 4405:16 7,700 4387:14 700 4525:15 4527:19 72 4346:18 4553:9,17	75 4469:1 750 4524:17 4525:16 4527:12,16 7th 4348:18,20 <hr/> 8 8 4357:22 4435:16 4455:16 4477:21 4480:8 80 4388:24 4467:22 4547:6,8,2 2 82,000 4377:25 85 4421:16 89.95 4583:20 <hr/> 9 9 4396:18 4398:11 4447:18,19 4466:15,24 4480:8 4488:16 4504:16 4515:8,12 4524:2 4586:6 9,000 4387:17 4388:20 90 4408:3 90s 4406:23 95 4421:19 95-97 4422:20 98 4423:3 4425:11 4426:17 <hr/> A
--	---	---	--	--

a.m 4347:1,16	absolute 4468:20	accounting 4547:18	4546:5	addition 4365:8
abide 4449:7	absorb 4420:17	accounts 4595:8	4560:15	4371:13
ability 4374:15 4404:17 4449:13 4464:16 4491:17 4542:13 4561:9 4566:24 4579:7 4596:11,13	absorbed 4399:21	accumulation 4414:13	4575:13	4372:23
able 4352:11 4358:20 4377:14,18 ,24 4378:1 4388:1 4400:13 4416:16 4425:14,17 4426:23 4434:1 4437:24 4441:1,7 4444:23 4449:21 4468:16 4470:21 4475:1 4483:16 4495:1 4499:16 4512:21 4513:24 4516:9 4517:5 4520:14 4523:10 4527:3 4528:25 4531:17 4542:18 4544:12 4557:12 4558:8 4595:24 4600:7	accept 4366:4 4439:9 4456:10 4474:15 4479:22	accumulative 4458:2	4595:9	4381:21
	acceptable 4425:9	accuracy 4553:22	actually 4362:18 4364:5 4377:22 4382:5 4384:5,18 4387:24 4388:1 4396:23 4397:13 4414:18 4419:23 4427:9 4428:24,25 4430:23 4431:1 4432:18,25 4450:20 4452:15 4464:9 4474:13 4491:15 4562:9 4567:5 4575:3 4576:8	4388:19,21 4472:15 4477:6 4530:25 4546:25 4548:1,4 4574:25 4581:4,11
	accepted 4359:15 4395:25 4478:21	accurate 4363:21 4369:13 4438:6 4450:21 4481:5		additional 4347:22 4348:1 4372:1 4373:3 4382:19 4387:17 4400:2 4403:10 4419:6 4445:5,22 4458:2 4464:15,22 4465:19 4500:18 4525:18 4526:13,25 4529:18 4548:9
	access 4354:16 4418:9 4425:14 4432:4,5,1 6 4442:13 4446:22 4524:18 4543:25 4545:9,10 4560:2	accurately 4595:8 4596:13	add 4351:10 4378:18 4388:8,9 4396:6 4417:9 4431:10,18 4519:4 4521:6 4577:3 4581:22 added 4350:6 4351:15 4388:11 4581:18 adder 4584:8 adding 4382:21 4388:5 4412:25 4431:15 4579:25	
	accomplish 4559:11	achieve 4492:21 4513:16		additions 4385:25 4386:13,24 ,25 4387:22 4388:20 4431:16 4547:14 4563:22 4565:24
	accordance 4356:22 4357:5 4362:16 4373:16 4476:23	achieved 4499:12,13		address 4369:15 4372:7,9,1 2 4373:22 4421:2 4489:13 4493:2 4507:10 4524:12
	according 4348:21 4355:24 4476:15	acknowledge 4527:6		addressed
	account 4491:21 4547:22 4589:8,13 4590:22	acronym 4459:19 4565:6		
absence 4449:13 4516:21,24	accounted 4589:3	acronyms 4580:5		
		across 4350:5		
		action 4353:13 4460:18		
		activity 4386:18		
		acts 4386:5		
		actual 4376:11 4377:4 4425:6 4439:11 4498:12 4524:6 4530:24		

4522:13	4475:20	4389:14	4363:11	4489:14
4540:15	4570:6		4368:6	4500:16,18
4546:21		advisement	4556:16,25	4538:6
addresses	4362:18	4473:11,17		4543:4,5,6
4373:12	4511:3	,21	agencies	,12,15
addressing	4583:21	4517:20	4415:14	aiming
4422:25		advocate	Agency	4422:4
4483:12	advanced	4449:18	4387:2	air-
4504:21	4580:17		4389:4	derivative
adequate	4582:6,11,	affect	4548:3	4582:15
4396:20	12,17,19	4361:21	ages	airport
4407:14	4583:19	4372:10	4577:21,23	4458:25
adequately	4584:8	4389:24	aggregate	alert
4382:21	advancements	4400:16	4481:3,15,	4441:11
adjective	4510:17	4411:25	18,22	align 4522:6
4517:11	advances	4494:4	4482:25	4553:22
adjectives	4417:3	4499:17	aggregated	aligned
4511:17	4507:25	4513:17	4483:21	4520:16
4517:4	4510:6	4526:6,11	4485:12	allegation
adjourn	advantage	4529:14,15	ago 4460:19	4423:17,21
4537:13	4473:24	4538:8	4461:10	allow
4598:19	4473:24	4576:21	4498:22	4350:15
4599:14	4537:11	affected	4570:2	4367:25
4600:11	4593:6	4361:22	agreed	4399:20
adjourning	4594:24	4385:18,19	4348:7	4400:5
4600:15	4595:6	affecting	4442:19	4414:23
adjust	advantageous	4399:14	4443:8	4528:10
4376:20	4526:24	affects	4445:17	allowed
4379:11	adventures	4402:25	4449:15	4362:17
4390:1	4347:18	4576:21	4456:19	allowing
4433:1	adverse	Affirmed	4480:25	4399:24
4494:9	4362:13	4345:6	4558:3	4543:2
4574:16,24	4371:16	4356:13	4573:5	allows
4576:13,17	4534:9,16	afflicting	agreement	4482:18
4577:6,17	4553:4	4471:17	4415:5	4530:18
4588:2	adversity	afternoon	4541:16	alone 4491:6
adjusted	4574:2	4347:20	4544:23	already
4433:3	advice	4349:2	4553:4	4370:12
4521:1	4470:7	4351:13	agreements	4399:20
adjustment	advisability	4370:20	4537:25	4425:5
4430:22	4470:8	4434:21,22	4538:3,21,	4445:20
4524:25	advise	4475:17	22 4539:11	4520:25
adjustments	4371:18	4476:7	ahead	4540:15
4376:16	4422:23	4480:7	4348:22	4550:19
4574:10	4423:1	4487:4	4362:3	alternative
administrati	4435:11,20	4546:14	4364:9	4386:14
ve 4355:16	4436:2,11	4555:20	4375:20	4387:7
4406:12	4470:7	afterwards	4378:4,25	4393:18,20
	4532:17	4423:18	4405:4	
	advised	against	4482:13	

4436:13	analysis	4555:23	4370:15	4532:5,21
4463:18	4347:23		Antoine	4533:7,25
4508:4	4349:16	announce	4344:14	4534:14,19
4510:7	4365:10	4475:23	4345:13	4535:9
4524:19	4374:10	annual	4360:12	4536:16
4557:25	4412:3	4440:15	4479:7	4537:4
alternatives	4417:16	4462:20	4487:3,4,1	4599:17
4343:8	4426:20	4552:16	8,21,25	anybody
4356:21	4427:5	anomalies	4488:11	4434:7
4451:8	4437:22	4396:11	4489:22	4505:3
4467:5,16,	4439:14	answer	4490:22	anyone's
20,21	4460:1	4391:23	4491:11	4465:25
4476:13	4464:15,22	4397:25	4492:10	anything
4487:11	4465:18,19	4432:1	4493:12,16	4376:1
4524:15,16	4467:14	4459:11	,24	4414:23
altogether	4468:12	4470:21	4494:14,19	4466:22
4388:21	4469:16	4485:20	,25	4494:3
am	4474:7	4497:25	4495:18,24	4505:21
4413:18	4488:2	4498:10	4496:12,13	4508:7
4433:19	4493:1,17	4506:8	4497:4,19,	4535:20
4437:3	4494:8,12	4510:3,9	23 4498:4	anytime
4441:11	4505:15	4517:7,22	4499:1,23	4420:7
4453:3	4507:6	4518:1,12	4500:8,9	anyway
4459:15	4522:16,17	4531:24	4501:6	4385:6
4469:15	4524:23	4532:23	4502:2,18	4421:21
4483:21	4525:10,14	4533:2	4503:5,8	4422:10
4509:19	,21 4526:2	4535:5	4504:7,8	4427:13
4510:23	4528:17	4562:3,11	4505:1,13,	anyways
4545:24	4530:6	4570:9	24 4506:7	4599:5,8,1
4549:8	4546:25	4592:25	4507:1,23	3
American	4553:23	answered	4508:14	apart
4524:18	4574:6	4458:9	4510:2	4445:19
among	4581:1,12	4518:2	4511:7	apologies
4361:12	analysts	4521:13	4512:20	4549:1
4560:16	4566:12,20	4531:15	4513:19	apologize
amount	analyzed	answering	4514:19	4370:21
4428:3	4362:10	4521:2	4515:4,16	4437:14
4490:5	analyzing	anticipate	4516:10,15	4447:23
4491:23	4377:6	4480:9	4517:3,18	4465:25
4507:21	ancel	anticipated	4518:4,5	4466:2
4514:16	4359:25	4571:23	4519:16,22	4481:14
4515:6	ancillary	4574:18	4520:3,5,2	4586:9
4528:11	4362:4	anticipates	1	apologizing
4539:24	4404:23	4355:19	4521:9,17	4353:1
amounts	4405:1,8	antitrust	4522:25	apparently
4501:1	and/or	4358:5	4523:3,4,1	4449:20
analogy	4436:3	4371:2	8,19	appear
4527:13	Anderson	antitrust-	4524:14	4348:2,15
analyses	4344:17	related	4525:5,20	
4426:22	angle		4526:22	
			4527:9	
			4529:16	
			4531:13,14	

4466:11	4584:8	4529:18	4416:25	assume
APPEARANCES	approximatel	arrive	4425:20	4360:17
4344:1	y 4355:19	4438:4	4460:17	4402:25
appeared	4594:16	4474:24	4466:23	4405:13,14
4565:16	4600:5	4532:7	4573:5	4408:2
appearing	April	4568:20	assessments	4432:12
4348:5	4347:25	4588:3	4358:21	4482:4
appears	4348:5,9,1	4599:8	assets	4484:1,14,
4456:15	1,12,16,18	arriving	4495:2	25 4490:10
4516:16	,20,23	4433:23	4496:6	4528:23
appendices	4349:7,8,9	4458:19,21	assign	4571:20
4563:3	,12,13	arrow	4501:16,19	4583:18
4564:10	4350:3	4381:18,19	4536:19	assumed
appendix	4352:3,4,5	articulate	assigned	4523:24
4392:17	,8	4466:10	4436:25	4542:24
applicable	area 4360:7	ascribe	4451:20	4589:6
4471:19	4413:7	4501:11	4452:8	4595:12
applied	4418:25	ascribed	4497:11	assumes
4569:22	4419:22	4501:2	4518:20	4391:8
4570:22	4422:13,23	aside 4348:9	4537:25	4466:5
4571:5	4478:12	4514:14	assignment	assuming
4589:13	4491:18	4558:10	4435:5	4353:6
applies	4504:20	as-offered	4438:11	4409:21
4376:2	4505:14	4376:25	assignments	4428:18
4504:13	4535:16,25	4383:11	4558:23	4434:4
4546:7	4536:19	4575:15	assigns	4463:3
apply 4363:9	4540:22	aspects	4535:15	4514:2
4471:10	4542:5	4356:25	assist	4541:25
4587:23	4548:18	4476:17	4356:20	4542:10
4588:10	4573:14	assemble	4439:25	assumption
applying	areas	4567:1	4476:12	4388:6
4589:15	4352:14	assertion	4596:13	4389:11
appreciate	4370:14	4428:8	assistance	4390:9
4599:23	4371:2	assertions	4357:18	4427:22,24
appreciated	4419:9	4422:21	associated	4428:8
4499:14	4477:12	assess	4374:4	4466:11
4522:22	4492:11	4365:4	4393:5	4473:5
approach	4499:15	4374:13	4401:16	4493:21
4404:13	4546:23	4375:8	4415:9	4525:22
4468:18	aren't	4425:20	4425:16	4567:3
appropriate	4565:6	4438:17	4478:17	assumptions
4378:17	4597:20	4556:5	4493:10	4386:12
4474:21	4598:9	assessing	4551:18	4388:8
4497:8,15	argue 4419:9	4358:12	4585:4	4409:6
4522:15	4531:2	4437:15,17	4587:10	4410:16
4529:21	arguments	4561:5	Association	4424:2
4537:8	4353:7	assessment	4350:13	4432:8
	arising		4353:13	4440:11,16
				,23
				4441:15
				4445:17

4446:23	4513:10	4508:9	4389:12,25	4495:13
4464:16	automated	4537:24	4396:9,12	4512:10
4482:5,6	4362:3,7,9	4548:2,5	4397:1	4529:9
4487:12,15	,15 4363:2	4549:8	4400:12,17	4575:2
4493:17	4364:2	4568:25	4401:3	4576:17
4502:8,24		away 4567:18	4408:7,10	4581:15
4520:17	automatic	4589:20	4409:7,17	basing
4521:22,25	4364:1		4411:9	4525:13
4522:7,15	availability		4413:6	basis
4525:11,14	4370:22	<hr/> B <hr/>	4417:2	4350:21
4557:12	4375:5	backed	4427:25	4363:18,23
4558:7	4555:25	4525:23	4441:2	4364:19
4564:14	available	background	4451:21	4376:6
4568:2,14,16	4349:13	4489:5	4467:16	4383:2
4569:13,14	4352:8,12	4536:18	4493:13,18	4423:17,20
,16,25	4354:17	backyard	4550:17,23	4425:24
4570:14	4355:4,5	4415:23	4559:23	4448:11
4571:16	4374:1	Bakken	4568:8	4463:2,11
4579:3	4376:13	4390:25	4572:7,8	4470:9
attack	4377:8,11	balance	4574:17	4471:8
4500:24	4426:3	4355:25	4575:23	4472:4
attempt	4433:9	4388:3	4585:11	4497:2
4362:17	4441:2	4400:4	4588:21	4500:4
attempting	4488:9	4415:18	basic	4509:14
4361:23,24	4490:13	4423:2	4378:19	4520:12
attempts	4542:19	balances	4379:25	4523:25
4494:9	4566:11,19	4555:6	4487:10	4564:7
attend	4567:14	band 4510:21	basically	4583:4
4356:4	avenue	4518:20	4363:8,12	become
4475:20	4343:22	4533:23	4373:11	4412:23,25
4599:15	4491:1	4536:11	4375:9,23	4416:20
attendance	average	4567:4	4377:11	becomes
4350:15	4396:11,13	4571:5	4379:24	4496:17
attention	,17,19,20,	4595:14	4391:6,24	Bedford
4466:3	22 4398:13	bands	4397:2,20	4344:7
attractive	4400:24	4497:14	4399:23	begin 4351:3
4365:22	4438:18	bandwidth	4400:2,3,7	4353:20
attributable	4465:13	4492:15	,17	4516:5
4407:2,5	averages	4500:20	4401:15	4550:11
attribute	4400:18	barely	4403:12,15	behalf
4416:24	avoid 4543:5	4405:17	,22 4405:1	4350:10
attributes	await 4483:6	base 4418:14	4407:11	4356:18
4585:3,14	awaiting	based 4346:9	4408:5	4360:13,24
auction	4546:17	4358:20	4411:2,12	4476:10
4513:10	aware	4364:23	4419:8	4479:7
auction-	4348:13	4373:25	4420:23	4486:20
based	4352:2,7	4376:11,20	4429:21	behave
	4435:9,18,	4378:22	4432:21	4363:23
	25 4436:9	4387:1	4454:18	behaves
	4487:16,17		4460:21	
			4474:7,10	
			4494:16	

4538:9	4590:4,6	4492:1,4	4472:17	4434:24
behaviour	4592:20	4506:8	4473:23	4435:1,7,1
4358:13	4600:4,6	4515:24	4475:6	0,19
4359:7	believed	4516:3	4498:9	4436:1,10
4371:20	4456:4	4524:1	4502:13	4440:1
behind	benchmark	4560:8	4503:2	4449:8
4425:6	4477:18	4579:8,17	4510:4	4452:1
Bel 4343:16	benchmarked	beyond	4526:21	4456:2
4370:4	4556:16,25	4505:21	4532:6	4476:12
belabouring	benchmarking	biases	4536:18	4477:12
4485:8	4557:10	4574:1	4543:22	4478:21
belief	bends	biasses	4544:1	4488:13
4527:4	4384:19	4449:23	4549:15	4494:17
believe	beneath	bid 4363:5	4581:22	4495:2
4347:4,13	4422:22	4405:8	4591:4	4500:5
4360:19	beneficial	bids 4362:9	bitterness	4504:10
4369:8	4394:1	4363:10	4462:3	4521:24,25
4387:10,12	benefit	4364:4	black 4442:3	4532:4
4391:13,18	4347:14	bigger	4462:11	4575:19
4397:16	4372:16	4529:4	blackened	4588:13
4411:10	4392:4	biggest	4470:4	boards
4426:11	4426:11	4457:23	blacklined	4570:7
4427:25	4495:21	4458:1	4354:12	Board's
4430:2	4523:13	4459:12	blame	4446:17
4431:25	4592:8,12	4596:22,25	4410:12	Bob 4344:2
4433:6	benefits	bilateral	blanket	4347:9
4434:15	4436:3	4412:14,15	4500:3	4353:9
4435:16	4500:14	4413:20	blend	4367:22
4441:9	4530:12,25	4490:10,21	4365:20	4369:1
4442:21	4560:15	4513:7,17	blue	boils 4409:5
4450:25	besides	4515:14	4393:4,7	Bonjour
4456:7	4428:20	4516:2	4401:8	4352:18,19
4458:14,21	best 4350:21	4538:4,8,1	4402:19	book 4346:23
4475:18	4375:12	3 4561:10	4454:6	4549:20
4485:9	4417:7	4584:24	4455:4	4555:4,14,
4502:7	4473:10	billion	blush	17 4579:20
4503:25	4513:22	4534:15	4472:19	4589:22
4504:21	4561:19	bit 4350:6	board	border
4515:20	bet 4385:9	4370:12	4343:3,14,	4395:14,17
4523:20	better	4371:6	15,16,17,2	,21
4525:15	4349:3,21	4386:23	1 4344:2	4396:16
4537:19	4415:2	4389:18	4347:10	4399:11,19
4546:17	4458:9	4404:23	4349:22	,21 4401:7
4549:2	4459:11	4427:19	4354:10	4588:3,18,
4550:18	4465:10	4433:15	4356:19	20 4589:10
4563:18,21	4489:18	4446:7	4359:15	4590:23
4564:8,12	4490:2,19	4450:25	4367:25	bore 4588:14
4568:7	4491:6	4456:18	4368:8	bother
4582:14		4468:2	4370:6	4541:11,15
4583:3				
4588:18				

bottom	4422:25	4520:19	4584:15,17	4540:24
4380:1	4434:5,8	4523:1	building	4543:4
4442:2	4474:21,25	4524:8	4490:12	4545:5
4447:1,16	4509:1	4531:21	4531:6	Byron 4344:9
4511:10	4518:6	4536:2	4540:25	4345:9,12
4519:23	4537:8	4539:15	4541:22	4352:25
4523:21	4555:13	4549:12	4542:3,5	4353:16
4557:24,25	4600:8	4558:19	build-up	4360:6,19
4575:4	breakdown	4578:16	4406:22	4423:10,23
4591:18	4552:1	4582:8	built	4424:10
4593:25	breakeven	4583:6,14	4525:12	4433:19
bottoms-up	4512:17	4585:18	4528:13,24	4434:19,20
4557:18	breaking	4586:1	4575:5	4435:9,15,24
bought	4458:12	4587:6,15	bullet	4436:8,17,24
4404:19	brief	4589:25	4418:19	4437:5,12
bound	4348:15	4592:5	4422:19	4438:1,9,14,20
4468:20	4355:21	4593:3,16	4423:2	4439:8,18,25
4533:22	4361:5	4595:19	bullets	4440:5,13,19
bounded	4373:19	briefly	4422:22	4441:8,21
4495:10	4381:1	4370:12	business	4442:1,12,22
bounds	4385:14	4487:5	4364:11,16	4443:4,13,23
4468:14	4392:1,20	bring	4464:1	4444:5,12,17,25
4535:2	4393:1,15	4430:25	4520:11	4445:8,14,19
Bowman	4394:21	4495:22	4560:2,25	4446:4,15
4350:9	4405:21	4508:19	4599:15	4447:10,13,17,22
4351:3	4407:24	4509:7,8	button	4448:1,4,5,15
box 4378:5	4417:18	4510:1	4423:9	4449:2,10,11,17
boxing	4420:11	brings	4448:17	4450:5,24
4521:3	4421:5,13	4492:11	4469:11	4451:7,15,20,24
Boyd 4344:6	4422:16	broad	buttons	4452:8,12,20,25
brackets	4423:6	4467:21	4464:13	4453:7,12,19,25
4574:19	4424:6,15	broader	buy 4408:16	4454:5,11,19
Brattle	4436:22	4355:9	4415:12,14	4455:2,7,11,15,18,22
4427:5,6,1	4439:16	brought	4540:19,24	4456:1,7,14,17,21,25
1 4441:3	4441:19,25	4429:8	4541:9	4457:5,10,
4443:10	4443:21	4521:21	4543:4	
4445:4,15,24	4444:10	build	buyer	
4446:10,13	4445:12	4372:21	4362:14	
4469:18	4451:5	4373:2,25	4514:12	
4502:23	4452:18	4404:4	buyers	
4503:3,10	4459:7	4412:18	4361:22	
4521:11,15	4461:23	4414:23	4573:18	
4543:25	4463:7	4415:23	buyer's	
4544:2,11,15,18	4464:7	4433:14	4414:3	
4546:8	4470:13,24	4491:14	buying	
break	4473:7	4509:4	4408:17	
	4482:8	4515:9	4412:19	
	4483:3	4539:24	4414:4,13	
	4486:2	4541:6,19,25		
	4502:16			
	4517:16			
	4519:14,20			

14,21	4378:21	4373:2,4,2	4481:11	4584:5,12,
4458:8	4399:23	5 4374:25	4484:24	14,19,22,2
4459:9,10,	4408:6,10	4383:2	4489:17,20	5
15,25	4571:23	4385:18,25	4490:6,9,1	4585:10,14
4460:6,10	4572:8	4386:13,24	0,12,14,16	,15
4461:1,8,1	4581:24	,25	,25	4598:15
7,25	calculated	4387:17	4495:11	capital
4462:10,17	4535:12	4388:5,8,1	4502:14	4414:12
,25	4571:24	0,13,25	4504:15	4440:16
4463:19,24	calculating	4389:1	4505:20,25	4552:16
4464:3,9,2	4371:11	4398:17	4506:2,10,	4555:7
1,25	4578:23	4401:16	12,17,25	4564:1
4465:11,17	calculation	4403:6,7,9	4507:3,13,	4566:6
,22	4362:22	,12,15,21,	19 4508:25	4568:5
4466:9,14,	4408:2	23,25	4509:3	4580:25
20	4569:10,17	4404:4,12,	4510:1	4582:23
4467:1,10	4570:1,23	19	4511:13,18	4583:1
4468:10,15	4571:2	4406:1,7,1	4512:1,2,8	
,21	calculations	0,15,22	,13,25	Capra
4469:7,20,	4447:2	4407:1,3,9	4513:10	4466:21
25	4552:20	,13,14	4516:22,25	4524:11
4470:6,15	4568:24	4408:15,16	4518:16,19	4526:8
4471:24	4571:20	,17	,20	capture
4472:23	calibrated	4409:1,9,1	4519:2,4,6	4422:8
4473:16	4593:9	4	4520:1,7	4467:21,22
4474:12	4595:7	4410:19,20	4522:4,5	car 4460:18
4479:2	calibration	,21	4523:8,24	carbon
4480:5,6,2	4594:25	4411:2,7,1	4524:2,23	4386:2,3,1
3	4596:10,22	5	4525:19	6 4389:8,9
4481:2,7,1	CALISO	4412:6,10,	4529:2,14	4390:1,2,7
3,21	4371:11	15,16,19,2	4530:25	,8,13
4482:3,13,	camera	5	4534:22	4392:9
23	4368:4	4413:6,10,	4538:7	4393:6,7,9
4483:5,13,	Canadian	12,15	4539:22	,11,19,21
18,19	4350:12	4414:10	4540:8,13,	4400:20
4484:6,11,	canvassing	4415:1	22,25	4401:20,21
12,22,23	4573:21	4417:9,12,	4542:2	,24
4485:7,18,	capa 4414:12	14 4419:7	4543:3,23	4402:1,3,1
19	capability	4420:8	4544:6	0,15,20,25
4486:8,14,	4528:5,11,	4426:19	4545:13	4403:2
17 4600:1	15,19	4427:5	4546:24	4428:24
	4530:22	4428:13	4547:13,17	4429:3,16,
<hr/>	capacity	4431:6,7,9	,22	17
C	4359:4,19,	4436:17,20	4548:1,4,6	4430:18,20
CAC 4344:9	23 4360:1	4440:2	,8 4556:23	4436:6,14
4354:3	4364:21	4442:8,14	4557:1	4451:9,10,
4449:2	4365:4	4443:1,17	4560:19	17 4452:3
4485:21	4372:20,24	4444:2,13	4565:24	4453:1
CAC-19		4445:1,21	4568:4,18	4455:3
4485:23		4446:11	4579:25	4457:11
4486:13		4463:1	4580:21	4458:5,6
CAGR 4462:21		4466:5	4581:4,11,	4459:13,20
calculate		4477:16,17	17,19,20	,21
		4480:25	4583:10,18	

4460:3,4,1 4,18 4461:5,12 4483:10 4492:3 4516:1 4533:11,16 4549:4 4563:20 4572:18,19 ,22 4573:14 4574:7 4585:4 4587:10 4590:16 4595:5,12, 16 4596:20 care 4422:3 careful 4396:25 4423:21 4428:1,5 carefully 4498:24 carpal 4466:1 carry 4385:20 4482:21 case 4362:14 4378:18 4386:17,19 4387:3,6,8 ,10,12 4388:10 4389:4,9,1 4 4390:1,2,8 4391:7,8,1 0,14,17,19 4393:19,21 ,24 4394:7,10 4400:19 4401:10 4402:9,11, 13,16,22 4403:1 4404:2 4416:3,7	4418:4 4425:4 4430:3 4431:18 4443:10 4451:9,10, 11,12,17 4452:1 4453:1,13 4455:3,11, 16,24 4456:4 4457:23,25 4467:5,24 4495:15,17 ,19 4511:2 4512:10 4520:11 4529:25 4534:5 4535:17 4542:1,7 4549:3,6 4589:8 4594:4,9 cases 4359:8 4365:15 4371:14 4386:15 4387:5,6,7 4393:21 4394:14,15 4402:9,12, 15 4403:1 4414:5 4495:10 4505:7,9 4510:21 4533:21 4536:6,8,1 0 4548:3,10 4582:2 catch 4559:9 categoricall y 4483:14 categories 4386:22 4410:8 4504:13,14 4508:2	category 4428:14,18 4504:13 cause 4411:18 4413:9 4498:12 4507:20 4509:1 4512:18 4540:5 caused 4446:12 caveat 4356:1 caveats 4412:13 4519:7 CCGT 4429:1,9,2 0 4431:20 4577:20 4580:1,6,2 3 4581:15 CCGTs 4384:2,3 4429:5,12 central 4387:19 centralized 4359:3 Centre 4353:13 cents 4398:19 4583:21 4584:7 cer 4397:15 4528:16 certain 4350:23 4356:25 4361:20 4362:11,12 4363:5 4372:12 4384:3 4406:12	4432:16 4433:9 4476:17 4491:25 4492:13,22 4493:17 4497:11 4501:22,24 4502:7 4514:10 4524:18 4536:20 4540:4 4570:6 certainly 4347:16 4350:19 4353:17 4354:6,21 4360:6 4364:17,19 4397:15 4420:7 4422:1 4423:15 4431:25 4438:21 4471:25 4472:18 4473:11 4483:5 4485:7 4486:12 4489:20 4490:4 4499:13 4518:7 4519:1 4527:6,24 4528:17 4533:19 4548:7 4567:6 4572:16 4585:13 4596:16,23 ,24 certainty 4489:10 4491:18 4492:13,18 ,22 4500:25	4501:3,7,9 4512:24 Certificate 4345:17 Certified 4600:17 cetera 4552:18 4574:20 Chair 4351:25 4353:2 4368:14 4422:12,18 4448:24 4458:11 4462:1 4478:20 4479:3 4484:4 4485:8 4486:17 4499:25 4550:7 Chairman 4347:10 4349:20 4351:4,9,1 9 4367:23 4369:2 4370:2 4427:18 4529:17 4559:25 Chairperson 4343:13 4347:3 4351:22 4352:16,22 4355:2 4359:18 4360:3,11, 16,21,24 4361:3 4366:3 4367:16 4369:14,19 4388:15 4406:14,25 4408:20 4413:16
---	--	--	--	---

4415:4,8	4380:12	4416:20	4359:13	4380:4
4416:9,17	4384:13	4417:11	4366:7,18,	4383:3
4418:19	4386:9	4430:25	25 4367:9	4399:9
4419:12,16	4389:15	cheapest	4369:12,22	4412:17
4423:8	4395:1	4395:9	,23 4392:3	4470:16
4432:2,7	4411:18,25	check	4422:12,18	4482:24
4433:16,21	4430:10,11	4456:11	4424:24	4508:21
4434:15	4468:2	4457:5	4425:8	4574:14
4458:16,23	4491:20	4459:1	4426:9,10	cleared
4459:4	4494:1,6,7	4486:5,7	4447:24	4362:19
4462:1	4501:9	4570:8,9,1	4449:6	clearer
4474:17	4576:23	7 4571:13	4458:20,24	4376:8
4475:11,17	4592:19,25	4583:23	4470:18	clearing
4478:24	4595:10	4589:5	4472:14	4358:19
4479:5,10,	changed	checklists	4473:19	4377:4
13,17,21	4494:13	4422:21	4475:9,22	clearly
4480:2	changes	checkmark	4476:7,22	4350:7
4483:9	4347:12	4423:14	4477:2,5,1	4397:16
4485:15	4379:5,16,	4422:22	1,19	4401:23
4486:21,25	17	4423:14	4478:8,19	4423:12
4499:21	4381:15,16	Cheryl	4479:24	4424:25
4522:23	4382:13,14	4600:21	4482:10	4511:25
4529:20	,16 4393:8	chime 4570:5	4486:12,15	clears
4530:23	4402:3,21	chip 4480:14	4496:8	4364:5
4537:7,19	4411:24	choice	4499:24	client
4538:15,20	4415:16	4500:12	4503:24	4348:6
4539:10	4422:8	4524:22	4570:4	4350:22
4540:14	4494:9	4598:19	4592:7	4354:6,20
4541:11	4501:13	choose	circled	4423:16
4542:12	4507:3	4534:13	4385:23	4433:23
4543:10,22	4513:9	4536:19	circuit	4451:25
4544:21	4574:18	4584:5	4474:14	4470:7
4545:7,16	4576:13	chooses	circumstance	4475:2
4546:10	changing	4584:17	4534:2	4561:24
4550:1,8	4381:9,16	chose 4534:2	clarificatio	4562:6
4562:17	characterist	chosen	n 4368:15	clienteles
4588:5	ics 4397:8	4498:8	4451:25	4358:25
4598:17	characterize	4500:11	4547:3	4478:9
4599:2,9,2	4440:6,9	4511:17	clarified	clients
4 4600:10	4454:12	4532:14	4492:1	4359:5,11
challenge	charm	Christian	clarify	4485:8
4495:3	4356:17	4344:22	4519:6	4486:20
challenges	chart	4345:8	4592:9	4567:20
4437:7,17	4400:18	4352:19	clarifying	client's
chance	4411:4	4355:13	4547:25	4353:17,20
4413:11	chatting	4356:16	clarity	4354:13,24
4456:13	4470:16	4357:4,8,1	4489:17	4360:7
4467:25	cheaper	2,20	clear	4423:15
4528:4	4412:23,25	4358:23	4368:13	climbs
4534:4	4413:2,3		4369:2	

4590:13,17 ,23 4591:17,18 clock 4458:17 4595:22 close 4469:3 4486:19 4501:24 4512:14 4513:11 4514:18 closely 4358:17,18 4520:16 4522:6 closer 4365:16 4454:22 closing 4353:7,11 Co 4357:22 4477:21 CO2 4402:16 4430:13 4448:22 4454:13,21 ,23 4457:23,25 4460:8 4482:5 4508:18 4534:5 4537:2 coal 4379:25 4380:4 4383:25 4384:4 4386:1 4387:16 4389:6 4394:4 4402:2,25 4409:18 4427:21 4428:8,25 4429:2,4,1 0,11,12,16 ,23 4430:1,9,2	4 4481:24 4508:19 4540:5 4563:14,17 4565:25 4597:3 coal-fire 4383:14 coefficients 4399:4,7 coffee 4600:4,6,8 cognizant 4499:10 coin 4512:24 4514:2 collapse 4391:15 collapses 4407:13,15 colleague 4347:19 4351:5 4480:13 combination 4559:15 combine 4433:25 combined 4493:19 4580:10 combined-cycle 4431:11 4509:20 4580:6 4582:4 combining 4386:2 combustion 4404:3 4427:8 4431:11,12 4509:13,22 4580:7 4581:10 4583:19	comes 4389:19 4416:14 4499:2 comfort 4443:24 comfortable 4410:17 4470:20 coming 4348:7 4353:22 4384:16 4385:4 4387:18 4422:14 4429:13 4525:16 4529:5 commence 4356:6 commencing 4347:1 4354:20 comment 4360:18 4426:16 4438:5 4466:21 4500:3 4505:19 4523:10 4527:3 4536:15 4538:23 4539:12 4543:23 4592:22 commentary 4438:24 comments 4351:20 4355:11 4405:24 4473:20 4485:16 4498:7 4500:22 4521:18 4522:3,14,	23 4535:18 4549:8 commercially 4368:2,3,9 4499:3 Commission 4371:4 commit 4382:17,19 4388:9 commitment 4403:13 4432:20 4598:20 4600:6 commitments 4370:24 4435:13 committed 4377:1,16 4382:18,21 4388:2 4575:15 committing 4403:11 commodities 4528:2 common 4544:25 communicate 4351:5 communicated 4347:12 companies 4530:1 4541:8 4567:11,17 company 4414:13 4418:13 4427:12 4464:15 Company's 4374:13 4375:8,9,1 4 4463:16 4556:5	comparable 4416:13 4419:8 4429:1,4,2 1 compare 4375:14 compared 4412:8 4416:15 4436:12 4439:10 4450:10 4454:21 4457:22 4464:17 4468:18 4526:25 compares 4492:24 comparing 4522:17 4578:19 comparising 4578:19 comparison 4477:18 4484:17 4504:3 comparisons 4482:16 4497:3 compensates 4403:25 compete 4417:13 4418:17 competition 4358:9 4359:12 4361:8,21 competitive 4371:19,20 competitiveness 4499:18 competitor 4560:1
--	---	---	---	--

competitors 4484:19 4498:11,16 ,22	concern 4466:10 4482:16 4498:20 4504:2	4560:15 conduct 4356:20 4359:5 4362:22 4363:3,4,7 ,9,15,19 4364:2,18 4476:13	15,18,19,2 3,25 4399:7,11 4400:10,13 ,16 4401:6 4419:1,13, 21,22,24,2 5 4525:1,3 4529:5,8,1 1 4587:21,22 ,23 4588:2,10, 11 4589:3,9,1 4,15,18,19 4590:22 4591:8	4520:22 considers 4527:14 4535:21
complete 4351:20 4438:6	concerns 4354:25 4369:15 4446:13 4499:21	conducted 4437:21 CONE 4403:22 4405:25 4499:8	4419:1,13, 21,22,24,2 5 4525:1,3 4529:5,8,1 1 4587:21,22 ,23 4588:2,10, 11 4589:3,9,1 4,15,18,19 4590:22 4591:8	consistent 4423:14 4460:1 4568:16 4569:16 4570:25
completed 4349:7	concerted 4459:21	conference 4350:12,15 4356:3	4587:21,22 ,23 4588:2,10, 11 4589:3,9,1 4,15,18,19 4590:22 4591:8	consolidated 4448:11
completely 4578:9	concession 4514:11	confess 4535:10	4587:21,22 ,23 4588:2,10, 11 4589:3,9,1 4,15,18,19 4590:22 4591:8	constant 4382:12 4400:14 4411:7,13, 17,20 4412:4,5 4430:7,8 4577:1,23
complicate 4382:25	conclude 4450:22 4460:7,12 4522:1	confident 4461:10 4467:2	4587:21,22 ,23 4588:2,10, 11 4589:3,9,1 4,15,18,19 4590:22 4591:8	constraints 4395:11 4438:12
complicated 4398:14 4514:7 4527:25	concluded 4459:22 4581:9	confidential ity 4545:2	4587:21,22 ,23 4588:2,10, 11 4589:3,9,1 4,15,18,19 4590:22 4591:8	construct 4378:2
component 4398:18 4399:8 4567:3	concluding 4472:5	confirm 4361:10 4433:22 4550:4 4587:22 4588:9,22	4587:21,22 ,23 4588:2,10, 11 4589:3,9,1 4,15,18,19 4590:22 4591:8	constructing 4372:20 4571:17
components 4558:2	conclusion 4450:21 4474:6 4521:24	confirmation 4427:12 4588:19	4587:21,22 ,23 4588:2,10, 11 4589:3,9,1 4,15,18,19 4590:22 4591:8	construction 4516:13
composite 4481:3,15 4557:21	conclusions 4447:3 4470:11,17 4471:23 4494:1 4522:2 4559:1	confirmed 4550:19	4587:21,22 ,23 4588:2,10, 11 4589:3,9,1 4,15,18,19 4590:22 4591:8	construction s 4500:17
compound 4462:20	conclusive 4426:23	congest 4398:3	4587:21,22 ,23 4588:2,10, 11 4589:3,9,1 4,15,18,19 4590:22 4591:8	Consul 4471:19
comprehending 4426:22	conclusively 4450:3	congested 4413:8 4419:9	4587:21,22 ,23 4588:2,10, 11 4589:3,9,1 4,15,18,19 4590:22 4591:8	consult 4352:11 4368:11,12 4434:1 4475:1
computer 4362:10 4377:10	concrete 4508:10 4510:4	congestion 4378:10,18 4395:23 4396:7,15, 23,24 4397:2,7,1 0,18,20,24 4398:3,12,	4587:21,22 ,23 4588:2,10, 11 4589:3,9,1 4,15,18,19 4590:22 4591:8	consultant 4358:5 4370:16 4389:13 4425:17 4459:17 4469:22 4559:17 4563:3
con 4467:13	condition 4506:6		4587:21,22 ,23 4588:2,10, 11 4589:3,9,1 4,15,18,19 4590:22 4591:8	
Conawapa 4488:3,6,1 5 4489:7,11 4491:2,15 4514:21 4515:3,9 4516:19 4555:8	conditions 4358:21 4376:17 4397:1 4400:11,12		4587:21,22 ,23 4588:2,10, 11 4589:3,9,1 4,15,18,19 4590:22 4591:8	
conceivable 4580:22			4587:21,22 ,23 4588:2,10, 11 4589:3,9,1 4,15,18,19 4590:22 4591:8	
conceivably 4433:1			4587:21,22 ,23 4588:2,10, 11 4589:3,9,1 4,15,18,19 4590:22 4591:8	

4564:16	4470:19	4511:3	copies	4534:18
4588:22	4497:5		4351:16	4546:25
consultants	4515:17	contract	copy 4351:18	4547:15
4374:20	4516:20	4403:19	4454:6	4556:6
4376:5,10	4522:16	4413:25	4455:3	4558:8
4396:21	4532:13	4415:1	4456:15	4561:11
4404:13	4536:22	4490:13	4523:21	4563:5,6,1
4412:8	4538:10	4513:4,17		5 4565:21
4424:2	4541:16	4516:3	Corey	4571:18
4426:19	4582:12	4538:13	4344:20	4572:2,12,
4432:3	4597:16	4542:11		13 4573:6
4437:19	contexts	contracted	Cormie	4574:3,7,8
4442:8,19	4568:25	4514:16	4352:7,12	4579:9
4443:1,9,1	continue	contracting	4498:21	4580:7,12
6	4354:23	4516:5,21	4513:21	4583:17
4444:2,21	4393:10	4542:8	4586:15	4586:10
4445:5	4403:3	contracts	Cormie's	4589:10,11
4446:22	4417:5	4409:10	4587:19	4590:9,24
4447:6,16	4475:18	4412:15	corporate	4593:11,21
4448:10	4480:1	4413:20	4418:13	4594:5,17
4449:14	4491:19	4418:11	correct	4597:11
4450:15,18	4511:5	4436:14	4357:2,6	4599:1
4462:6,16	4516:23	4466:6	4437:3	4600:17
4467:6,13	4537:9	4490:24	4439:24	corrected
4468:9	4598:22	4491:5,8,9	4440:4	4427:11
4469:17	4600:3	4513:23	4444:4,16	4490:3
4471:17,20	continued	4514:4,9,1	4445:7	correctly
4472:3,25	4345:12	2,23	4446:14	4489:24
4481:19	4356:5	4515:2,14	4448:7,14	4501:4
4482:6,17	4426:9	4516:4,18,	4449:16	4516:11
4502:6,8,2	4448:4	24	4451:19	4556:19
5	4449:10	4538:4,8,1	4452:2,7,1	4557:6
4503:12,15	4459:9	0,14,18	1,16	4574:21
,19 4504:5	4480:5	4539:24	4453:3,24	4581:6
4544:11	4483:18	4541:9	4454:4	4583:10
4557:13	4484:11,22	4561:11	4456:23	corridor
4563:14,19	4485:18	4584:24	4457:4,15	4528:9
4564:10	4496:12	contribute	4459:16	cost
4579:12	4500:8	4439:4	4462:23	4363:14,15
4589:1	4504:7	control	4464:20,23	4365:8
Consumers	4509:6	4357:9,16	,24	4372:25
4353:12	4518:4	4477:3,9	4465:6,16	4373:1,4
contains	4523:3,18	4542:5	4466:19	4376:25
4369:6	4531:13	converging	4467:2	4377:15,20
content	4562:25	4430:4	4469:15,19	4378:8,13,
4426:13	4570:12	conversation	4476:20,25	14
CONTENTS	4588:8	s 4443:3	4488:15	4380:13,20
4345:1	4592:17	cooperation	4490:23	,22,24
context	continues	4447:7	4493:14,15	4381:5,9
4359:25	4354:11	cop 4454:6	4494:17,18	4383:8,11,
4364:25	4394:1		,23,24	18,19
	4402:23		4495:22	4384:4,14
			4520:1	

4386:5	4385:5,19	counterparty	4520:9	4426:13
4389:5,21	4386:1,4,1	4545:22	4522:5,6	4431:24
4390:20,22	3,16,19	countervaili	4531:19	4441:10,13
4391:4,5,1	4389:3,6	ng 4446:12	4532:12,13	4442:4
1,24	4391:15	counting	,15 4544:4	4464:12
4398:4	4395:24	4428:13	credit	4470:1,7,2
4399:10,23	4396:24	couple	4415:13,14	2 4472:22
4403:22	4397:2	4353:14	,19	4473:12
4404:2,6,9	4400:8	4355:16	crisis	4482:11,18
4408:10	4401:4,7	4368:19	4406:20	4497:6
4411:8,9,1	4403:24	4382:10	criteria	4502:12
1,13,16,22	4404:20	4407:6,12	4530:15	4503:1
4417:25	4412:4	4427:16	critical	4504:10
4418:5	4419:12,19	4462:4	4435:12,21	4517:13,22
4419:7,19,	,20,21,22,	4471:1	4446:19	4518:9
20	25 4428:24	4488:12	4560:16,17	4522:20
4429:15,19	4430:4,21	4506:14	4561:5,9	4543:21
4430:19	4451:10	course	4562:15	4546:6
4448:21,22	4452:3	4372:17	critically	4598:25
4454:13,21	4453:1	4377:19	4356:24	4599:22
4457:25	4460:8,14	4402:13	4476:17	4600:8
4459:13,20	4461:12	4416:6	criticism	CT 4408:9
,21	4500:18	4460:22	4523:22,23	4411:10,16
4460:3,4	4541:9,20	4546:20	4546:7	,19,21,25
4461:5	4542:10	4549:8	cross 4349:3	4412:3
4506:21	4555:7	4573:20	4354:16	4417:8,14
4509:12,14	4564:2	4575:7,11	4457:2	4429:9
,21,25	4566:6	cover 4564:9	4476:1	4431:20
4530:16,18	4569:4	covered	4482:22	4508:3,5
,19,20	4570:15	4369:18	4573:3	4510:8
4531:3,9	4574:20	4545:2	cross-	4580:1,6,1
4540:25	4575:15	covers	examinatio	1,13,17,20
4541:21	4576:4	4541:4	n	,25
4542:5	4580:24	CPF 4570:8	4345:9,12,	4581:3,20
4548:19,22	4581:19,20	create	13,14,15	4582:6,11,
4558:23	couch	4372:23	4353:24	19 4583:21
4568:4,15	4570:10	4433:10	4355:25	4584:8
4571:23	counsel	4528:5	4434:19	4598:15
4580:25	4344:2	4533:22	4458:14	CTs 4405:6
4581:18	4349:17	created	4480:1,5	cumulative
4582:23	4355:21	4528:12	4487:3	4390:3
4583:1,19	4367:23	4530:22	4546:13	4450:8
4584:18,20	4368:11,12	4559:20	4555:19	curious
4585:2	4369:10,17	credence	CSI	4384:25
4591:7	4370:6	4527:4	4355:8,25	4385:4
4595:12	4472:12,19	credentials	4366:19	4392:8
cost-per-	count	4370:11	4412:7	4417:21
kilowatt	4388:25	credible	4422:14,23	current
4583:3	4411:2		4425:3,7	4347:15
costs 4373:9	4488:17			4348:21
4379:19	counted			4364:3
4380:12,21	4547:13			4369:9
4381:19				

4508:7		dates 4351:8	4572:3,7,1	4584:25
4510:18	<hr/>		3,16	
currently	<hr/> D <hr/>	dating	4581:21	dealing
4354:17	daily 4383:1	4438:16	4582:14,24	4369:9
4512:14	dam 4491:10	David	4583:2	4414:1
curriculum	dangerous	4345:10	4584:10	deals
4357:21	4474:19	4357:11	4585:8	4510:20
4477:20	dare 4351:2	4370:19	4591:2,15,	dealt 4505:7
curve	dark 4455:4	4476:4,21	19,22	4515:20
4377:15,21	data 4374:16	4477:1,4,1	4592:1,21	4549:3,23
4378:23	4375:6	0,14	4594:8,13	4550:15
4379:2,4,6	4377:2,7	4478:1,11	4595:3	4569:4
,11,23	4409:15	4486:24	4596:4,15,	4588:19
4380:3,10,	4425:15	4489:14	23	debate
13,23	4426:25	4490:4	day	4408:23
4381:4,22	4427:1	4491:22	4348:9,13,	4426:12
4382:3,5,1	4432:5	4493:4	25	4500:10
2,20,22	4437:8	4494:5	4349:3,22,	debt
4383:3,17	4439:11	4495:8,23	24 4350:1	4415:15,17
4384:18	4440:15,22	4503:21	4352:13	4552:17
4386:9,10	4441:2,15	4505:18	4362:3	4555:6
4407:11	4443:7	4506:1,13	4364:9	debt-equity
4412:6	4444:22	4507:11	4403:14	4569:1
4494:11	4446:1,3	4508:12,21	4405:4	debt-to
4574:11,17	4447:6	4510:13	4460:23	4568:23
,24	4472:9	4511:22	4538:6	debt-to-
4575:4,5,7	4473:5	4513:2	4543:6,11,	equity
,11,13	4474:9	4514:6	15 4573:17	4568:10,22
4576:13,16	4493:25	4515:2,5,2	4575:7,11	decide
,21	4532:7	2 4516:14	day-ahead	4488:14,18
4580:19	4537:2	4517:2	4376:6,8	4495:4
curves	4544:14	4518:21	4464:18	4514:2
4376:12,16	4555:25	4527:23	days 4349:13	decision
,20	4559:23	4530:4	4350:14	4425:25
4394:25	4560:7	4531:1	4360:20	4488:17,23
4398:8,9	4563:18	4532:16	day-to-day	4489:4,6,7
4433:2,10	4565:9	4533:6,9	4363:23	,10
4576:10,11	4577:13	4534:7,18	4364:19	4514:20,24
customer	4586:4	4537:3	deal 4347:23	4515:11,15
4541:21	4593:10	4538:2,17,	4349:15	,17,18
customers	4595:23	24 4539:17	4362:25	4516:11
4403:9	date 4348:24	4540:20	4364:24	4534:15,16
cut 4526:10	4352:3,7	4541:17	4368:22,23	4540:18
CVs 4362:1	4383:16	4546:3	4374:11	deck 4367:10
cycle	4488:4,17,	4562:5,16,	4489:19	4424:20
4580:10,11	18,23	19	4496:3	decline
cycles	4516:13	4568:13,23	4499:16	4384:5
4493:9	4552:9	4569:6,9,1	4515:19	4418:4
	dated	4,23	4516:9	declines
	4356:24	4570:16,20	4561:19	
	4367:3	,24	4568:21	
	4476:16	4571:7,12,	4573:16,17	
		19		

4463:13	4382:6,14, 16 4385:19	4387:23	detect	4559:22
declining	4386:5,20	4388:16,22 ,24	4362:11	4560:8
4507:18	4388:7,9	de-rated	detectable	4568:11
4548:19	4389:25	4547:4,7	4392:15	4572:12
decrease	4394:5	derived	determinant	developed
4530:19	4395:9	4393:12	4386:4	4374:13
decreasing	4397:22	4438:18	determinants	4375:7,15
4418:21	4406:21,24	4573:21	4382:4	4426:7
deduct	4407:11	describe	4385:21,24	4449:15
4373:2	4408:15	4357:24	4386:8,22	4504:24
defer 4488:5	4431:10	4358:24	4395:1	4532:2
deferred	4481:24	4477:12,23	determinate	4535:6
4488:4	4565:20	4478:9	4380:11	4544:17
4491:16	4576:17,18	4511:23	determinatio	4556:3
deferring	,20,21,25	described	n 4449:4	4557:6
4489:6	4577:7,9,1 0,11,14	4374:12	4504:9	4568:14,17
deficiency	demand's	4574:10	4539:2	4572:9
4508:3	4379:20	description	determine	4575:23
deficit	demonstrably	4346:2	4365:6,7	developer
4388:4	4509:21	4553:2	4376:21	4418:24
definitive	depart	4590:18	4394:12	developers
4447:3	4402:18	design	4401:2	4568:10
degradation	depend	4364:13	4409:25	developing
4577:17	4391:5	4407:5,19	4437:24	4362:2
degree	4404:1,16	4410:23	4528:15	4374:10
4431:8	4526:13	designing	4530:1	4439:6
4440:23	dependable	4358:19	4532:11	4465:9
4441:1,15	4466:5,16	desirable	4553:10	development
4526:12,13	4523:24	4418:6	4558:25	4343:10
deliberation	4586:22,23	detail	4570:2	4356:22
s 4483:6	dependent	4502:22	determined	4357:1
deliver	4506:14,20	detailed	4583:18	4372:2,25
4403:17	depending	4375:13,17	determines	4373:1,9
4528:25	4349:20	4437:22	4374:3	4416:25
4529:2	4484:8	4440:10	4526:3	4418:16
4560:14	4567:5	4442:7,13, 20,24	determining	4436:13
deliverable	depends	4444:21	4378:12	4476:14,18
4528:22	4420:23	4567:9,19	4395:4	4488:3
delta 4527:7	4575:13	details	4408:25	4520:12
demand	depress	4375:11	4505:10	4522:10
4377:3,24, 25 4378:2	4361:23	4408:2	Devel	4525:15
4379:5,7,8 ,11,17	derate	4425:6,15	4356:25	4545:14
4380:9	4389:1	4426:6	develop	4554:7
4381:6,24	de-rate	4432:12	4375:13,15	4560:13
	4547:16	4444:24	4402:23	develops
	derated	4445:22	4425:13	4509:11
			4426:1	deviations
			4557:15,16 ,17,24	4469:1
				devil's
				4449:18

dialogue 4354:9	4463:10,11 4496:18 4592:22	4473:25	dispatch 4432:21 4530:19,20	dollars 4378:6 4381:7,20, 23,25
Diana 4440:7 4511:11	difficulty 4426:21	disclosing 4470:21	dispensed 4471:13	4389:10,11 4391:23
differ 4579:1	dips 4512:8	discretion 4362:17	displace 4508:5 4510:8	4398:20 4408:4,5 4411:8,12
difference 4402:19 4428:16 4432:7,11, 13 4521:1 4523:11 4524:4 4529:3 4594:20 4595:2,5 4597:6	direct 4480:16 4527:25	discuss 4369:17 4372:8 4396:14 4471:25 4472:11 4502:24 4583:9	dissect 4413:16	4429:17 4453:15,21 4454:2,15 4455:8,12, 23
differences 4558:7 4579:3	directing 4466:3	discussed 4401:6 4408:4 4428:7 4445:20 4452:1 4499:12	dissipated 4409:16	4456:18,22 4457:1,7,1 1 4527:18 4583:20 4584:6 4590:12,13 ,15
different 4368:19 4369:10 4383:9 4387:8 4409:2 4432:18 4437:13 4468:17 4474:2 4501:19,21 4517:13 4518:8 4522:9 4533:12 4535:15 4536:22 4543:17 4544:7 4555:23 4558:2 4571:16 4578:19,21 ,22 4585:6,14 4589:14,18	directional 4497:22 4499:6 4504:2,3	discussing 4350:8 4491:13 4578:23 4579:25	dissipating 4490:18	4594:1,2,3 ,16
	directionall y 4482:3 4506:11 4507:2,6,7 4521:4	discussion 4350:16 4366:11 4392:10 4446:16 4456:2,8 4469:12,16 4470:3 4473:4 4488:25 4489:1,23 4501:8 4503:9 4513:20 4524:16 4526:23 4543:20	distances 4418:1	dominance 4361:17
	directions 4501:20		distinguish 4467:14	done 4356:4 4364:24 4377:9 4383:5 4414:10 4441:3 4463:21 4504:11,20 4505:2,15, 21 4506:10 4523:11,15 4524:4 4529:23 4536:23 4573:1
	directly 4458:25 4566:4		distributed 4550:10 4551:13	
	dirty 4597:16		document 4421:18 4438:25 4444:6 4445:9 4506:24	
	disadvantage 4484:18		documented 4572:15	
	disaggregate d 4483:22		documents 4346:23 4549:20 4555:5,14, 17 4579:21 4589:23	dotted 4393:5
	disagree 4579:15 4591:11 4596:16	discussions 4355:9 4600:2	dollar 4390:13 4405:13,15 4427:7 4429:19 4527:19	double 4389:5 4486:7
differing 4488:23	disagreement 4584:3	disentangle 4446:12		doubt 4368:10
difficult 4370:24 4394:12	disagreement s 4579:18	dismissed 4425:12,23		Douglas 4344:7
	discern			downside

4457:16,24	4415:6,11	4458:4	4501:1,5,1	4562:5,16,
downward	4416:11	4459:14,24	5 4502:21	17,19,22
4539:9	4417:1,20	4460:5,9,1	4503:6,21,	4563:6,10,
dozens	4418:7,23	5	24 4504:23	16,21,24
4387:5,6	4419:15,18	4461:7,15	4505:4,18	4564:3,6,2
Dr 4347:17	4420:13	4462:9,15,	4506:1,13	3
4352:21	4421:7,15	23	4507:11	4565:2,11,
4355:15,18	4423:3	4463:9,22,	4508:12,21	14,17,22
4356:1,2,7	4424:25	25	4510:13	4566:1,5,8
,17	4425:2,10	4464:20,24	4511:22	,16,21,25
4357:3,7,1	4426:15	4465:5,16,	4513:2	4567:6,10,
0,17,19,20	4432:2,6,1	20	4514:6	15,25
4358:2,23	5 4434:21	4466:8,13,	4515:2,5,2	4568:7,13,
4359:1,13,	4435:4,8,1	19,25	2 4516:14	23
14,19,22	4,18,23,25	4467:3,9,1	4517:2	4569:6,9,1
4360:14	4436:7,9,1	9	4518:21	4,23
4361:12,16	6,24	4468:13,19	4519:3	4570:5,6,1
4362:7	4437:4,20	,22	4520:2,4	6,20,24
4363:1,25	4438:8,13,	4469:19,24	4524:10,24	4571:7,12,
4364:8,17	15,19	4470:5,20	4525:13	19
4365:14,24	4439:1,13,	4471:1	4526:1	4572:3,7,1
4366:4,6,9	24	4473:22	4527:5,23	3,16
4367:16,23	4440:4,12,	4474:23	4530:4	4573:1,7,1
4369:25	18,25	4475:23,25	4531:1,23	5
4370:1,4,1	4441:17	4476:8,10,	4532:16	4574:4,8,2
9,21	4442:3,11,	21,22	4533:6,9	2
4373:21	18	4477:1,4,7	4534:7,18	4575:1,8,1
4381:3	4443:2,6,1	,10,11,14,	4535:1	2
4383:5,6,1	8	19	4536:4	4576:1,8,1
0,12,20,22	4444:4,16,	4478:1,10,	4537:3,12	5,24
,23	23	11,19,20,2	4538:2,17,	4577:8,19,
4384:7,17,	4445:6,18,	3 4479:22	24 4539:17	22
21	25	4480:12,13	4540:20	4578:1,7,1
4385:1,3,7	4446:14,24	,15,22	4541:17	1,25
,12,16	4447:12,15	4481:1,6,9	4542:21	4579:5,10,
4388:17	,21	,20 4482:2	4543:14	16
4391:3,22	4448:6,13	4483:20	4544:10	4580:3,8,1
4392:7,14,	4449:11,16	4484:13,23	4545:4,11	3
22	4450:2,12	4485:19	4546:3	4581:7,14,
4393:3,17	4451:14,19	4486:4,22,	4547:1,5,8	21
4394:23	,23	24	,16,20	4582:14,24
4398:2,5	4452:7,11,	4487:5,6,1	4548:5,14,	4583:2,22
4399:9,13,	13,24	6,19,24	21,24	4584:10
14,16	4453:5,10,	4488:10	4555:20,21	4585:8,22
4401:14	18,24	4489:14,15	4556:7,11,	4586:10,13
4404:25	4454:4,10,	4490:4	20	,18,25
4405:23	17	4491:4,22	4557:4,9	4587:12
4406:14,19	4455:1,6,1	4493:4,15,	4558:5,15,	4588:1,25
4407:4,6	0,14,17,21	23	21	4589:5,11,
4408:1,20	,25	4494:5,18,	4559:6,10,	17
4409:4	4456:6,12,	24	15,21	4590:4,10,
4414:6	16,20,24	4495:8,23	4560:4,22	19,25
	4457:4,9,1	4496:7,16	4561:3,7,1	4591:2,15,
	3,19	4497:17	2,17,22,25	19,22

4592:1,21	4403:18	4375:16	4427:21	4446:20
4593:12,22	4406:22	4420:16	ECONOMICS	4490:24
4594:6,8,1	4422:25	4422:7	4345:5	EIA
3,18,22	4501:14	4439:23	4356:12	4387:4,11
4595:3	4573:3	Easter	Economics 436	4388:5,8
4596:4,15,	4597:1	4348:23	7 4346:6	4389:9,19,
23		4349:2	Economics's	25
4597:2,12,	<u>E</u>	4350:1	4476:16	4390:6,12
18,24	EAI 4565:8	easy 4392:17	economist	4393:13
4598:12	EAI's 4565:9	echo 4473:20	4478:2	4410:16
4600:5,6	ear 4475:3	Eco 4431:4	4531:2	4427:25
drastic	earlier	economic	edge 4561:16	4428:1,21
4429:24	4353:15	4349:15	effect	4431:7,16
drawing	4366:12	4353:19	4358:15	4440:15,16
4384:11	4370:18	4416:12	4359:10	4565:13
drawn	4408:8	4436:12	4371:16	4566:4,10,
4409:11	4420:15	4493:8,10	4383:16	12,23
4570:14	4427:18	4495:4	4392:12	4567:4,7
drive 4391:1	4452:1	4500:14	4398:4	4568:3,8
driven	4531:24	4508:23	4431:2	4569:11
4430:3	4573:16	4530:8,12	4540:4	4570:19
driver	early	4582:5	4587:23	4577:10
4592:3,19	4351:13	4584:14	4588:11	4580:18
4596:21,22	4406:23	economical	4597:6	4582:18,20
,24	4446:16	4580:21	effects	EIA's
drivers	earn 4375:3	4581:4,11	4381:13	4565:19,24
4391:10	4404:6,17	economics	4382:3	eight
4591:24	4405:6,13,	4346:3,5,7	4446:12	4455:15
4592:19	14	4352:5,9	4553:4	4457:10
4596:11	4411:16,17	4355:15	efficiency	4480:8
drop 4406:24	4412:3	4356:18	4359:6	eight-nine
4527:20	4413:9	4357:5	4417:4	4408:5
Drs 4537:21	4414:17	4358:3	4430:11	eighty-nine
4546:15	4415:25	4359:17	4434:3	4583:19,20
DSM 4346:9	4419:2,10,	4366:15,22	efficient	4584:6
4488:2	23 4465:14	4367:7,13	4383:18	either
4491:14	4509:5	4369:7	4411:10	4388:7
4550:17,24	earned	4370:13	4417:8,14	4465:8
due 4424:2	4542:24	4425:11	4430:13	4490:12
4452:5	4560:18	4426:18	4509:12	4511:19
4512:7	earning	4427:4	effort	4512:7
duration	4375:3	4436:19	4350:14	4527:2
4350:24	4419:20	4476:11,23	4401:1	4534:9
4514:10	4420:2	4478:4	4428:3	elaborate
4539:11	earns	4495:19	4439:5	4446:6
4580:19	4411:19	4497:3	4443:9	4508:6
during	easier	4522:8	efforts	elasticities
4377:16	4418:10	Economic's	4350:21	4392:10
	easily	4356:23	4439:19	electric
				4358:8

4588:13	4414:2	4383:18	engage	equal 4385:9
electrical	emergens	4387:2	4418:10	4448:10
4528:13	4512:7	4389:4	engaged	4451:21
electricity	emerges	4402:10	4477:15	4462:20
4359:12	4512:7	4403:5,8,9	England	4542:9,10
4361:8	emerging	,10,13,17	4359:24	equally
4371:20	4510:10,24	4404:7,8,1	4371:10	4393:22
4386:20	4564:19	7 4405:2,4	ensure	4394:14
4392:11	emission	4408:8	4528:25	4536:8,9
4394:5,6	4430:6	4417:25	4541:23	equal-weight
4418:3	emissions	4420:6,8	4550:3	4448:11
4435:21	4508:18	4440:2,15	ensuring	equilibrium
4478:2,5,6	4554:6	4444:15,19	4371:19	4409:14
4481:12,16	emit 4430:13	4445:21	enter	4411:1,6
4483:23	4586:24	4446:11	4406:8,9	4412:2
4510:24	emitting	4454:22	4412:4	4506:3,5,1
4528:1	4586:24	4456:3	entering	2 4508:24
4542:15	employed	4458:7	4584:24	4509:3,15
4549:7	4449:14	4460:23	entire	4512:2,4,1
4554:9	4482:6	4466:16	4404:6	0,13
4565:19	enable	4477:15,17	entities	4514:18
4578:24	4375:8	4480:17,19	4490:11	4518:24
4588:23	4556:4	4481:4,11,	4540:7,12,	equity
4596:3	encompass	12	17	4568:24
electron	4416:22	4483:23,24	4541:18,24	4570:22,25
4399:11	encompassing	,25	entity	4571:1
electronical	4414:8	4484:2,13	4541:13	ERCOT
ly 4550:12	encourage	4487:13	entrant	4371:10
element	4539:3	4489:17	4403:25	errata
4528:9	encroaching	4494:12	4404:21	4346:5
4560:25	4350:1	4495:12	4509:1	4366:19,23
elements	endeavour	4504:14	entrants	4369:7
4375:18	4546:18	4505:18	4406:9	especially
4489:9	endorse	4506:16,19	entry	4364:21
eliminated	4360:9	4524:25	4403:22	4372:10
4409:9	ener 4481:10	4529:15	4404:6,9,1	essence
else 4361:14	energy	4534:22	5,16	4432:10
4380:1,8	4346:9	4538:7	4406:2,3,6	4446:21
4401:13	4358:5	4548:3,19	4411:9,13,	essentially
4420:3	4359:4	4549:4,6	16 4506:21	4399:25
4482:22	4371:3,4	4550:17,23	4509:14	4448:9
4505:3	4374:10,24	4556:14,17	4568:15	4462:18
4584:18	,25	4560:19	4571:23	4490:9
elsewhere	4375:21,22	4572:9	environmenta	4493:13
4542:3	,23,24	4577:12	l 4540:4	4542:8
email	4376:7	4581:2	4564:20	establish
4347:12		4586:22,23	4585:3	4374:20
embodied		4587:11		4378:20
		4591:25		4448:11
		4593:24		
		4594:3		
		4595:25		

4574:15	4558:17	4353:25	4375:9	excuse
established	evaluated	4354:8	4451:9	4424:12
4549:6	4422:6	4359:16	examining	4438:3
establishing	evaluating	4360:8	4355:7	4447:23
4410:22	4538:19	4367:25	4444:19	4473:1
4545:23	4568:15	4368:1	example	4503:23
4546:1	evaluation	4423:13,15	4381:25	exercising
estimate	4428:2	4438:22	4416:19	4578:5
4363:13	4436:3	4439:20	4440:13	exhaustively
4375:24	4506:2	4449:12	4492:3,12,	4438:21
4391:19	evaluations	4451:1	22 4509:24	exhibit
4397:3,9	4530:7	4452:15	4568:4	4346:2
4404:8	evening	4461:20	4575:17,18	4357:22
4408:3	4351:14	4464:4,10	4584:9,24	4366:12,15
4413:6	4599:15	4478:22	4585:1,3	,22
4495:15	events	4480:16	4591:12	4367:2,4,6
4526:18	4347:6	4572:25	examples	,11,13
4580:16	eventually	4598:7	4508:10	4368:17
estimated	4457:2	evident	4510:5,10	4369:8
4395:19	4482:19	4566:12,20	exceeded	4392:17
4398:8,12,	everybody	evolution	4388:7	4421:16
16 4399:3	4347:13	4506:15	excellent	4436:18
4400:10	4372:17	evolved	4581:8	4438:22
4486:18	4422:6	4488:1	except	4439:19
4504:18	4569:2	exact	4379:7	4440:7
4518:19	everybody's	4523:10	4398:13	4441:22
4571:25	4372:16	exactly	4443:10	4444:7
4588:2	everyday	4377:5	4446:1	4447:23,25
4589:18	4365:8	4378:24	4526:11	4451:3
estimates	everyone	4387:5	4577:2	4461:20
4397:17	4347:5	4535:11	exception	4477:21
4399:3	4562:3	4577:13	4430:6	4481:8
4400:17	everything	4584:11	4445:3	4550:14,19
4428:21	4380:1,8	examination	4454:14	,22
4433:13	4426:2	4354:17,23	exceptions	4551:4,7,1
4440:17	4498:13	4573:4	4503:4	0,14,21,24
4446:13	4563:9	Examination-	excerpt	4552:5,7,1
4482:25	everything's	in-chief	4579:21	2,14,22,24
4518:14	4379:7,19	4345:8	excerpts	4553:6,8,1
estimating	4426:3	4369:22	4549:24	7,19,24
4376:2	everywhere	examinations	excess	4554:1,3,1
et 4552:17	4416:7	4476:2	4373:25	2,15,23
4574:20	4419:8	examine	4406:3	4555:1,10,
Europe	4420:3	4349:4	4407:2,12	14,17
4371:17	evidence	4365:5	4539:22	4556:9
evaluate	4349:1	4371:23	4540:22	exhibited
4478:5	4351:8	4374:15	excessive	4437:6
4520:10		4473:1	4406:8	exhibits
4529:23		examined		4345:3
				4346:1
				4366:9

4368:16	4533:15	4371:3	explanatory	4437:19
4550:13	expected	4389:13	4399:5	4448:10
existed	4349:5	4462:6	explore	4449:14
4376:14	4354:16	4476:1	4442:23	extra
existing	4410:1	4478:21	4443:13	4373:1,2,4
4382:22	4495:11,16	4479:12,22	4541:24	,9
4388:7	4511:15	4487:15	export	4419:20,23
4522:16,17	4517:1,11	4510:23	4346:3	4466:1
4577:20	4518:11,17	4579:12,13	4366:16	4587:3
4595:7	4535:13,17	,14	4371:24	extract
expand	,21,24	expertise	4372:10,23	4391:12
4511:20	4536:9,14,	4360:9,14	4373:10,17	extracting
4517:10	21,24,25	4491:18	,22	4391:5
4519:8	4557:11	4508:9	4374:9,11,	extraction
expansion	4560:14	4535:25	21 4395:16	4391:15,24
4431:6,8,1	expecting	4573:14,20	4420:5,14	4402:23
7	4557:19	experts	4435:13	extremes
expect	expects	4421:24	4436:6,14	4469:5
4350:1	4372:1,5	4428:2	4437:1,16	
4354:22	expensive	4509:16	4438:5,18	<hr/>
4396:19	4413:3	4578:20,21	4439:11	F
4409:20,21	4419:10	4579:7,17	4440:21	<hr/>
4410:14	experien	explain	4441:13	face 4413:20
4468:7,24	4438:10	4362:6	4446:19	faced
4491:7	experience	4376:18	4469:17	4515:13
4492:17	4357:25	4378:16	4470:10	faces
4507:17	4358:20	4386:23	4471:8	4555:22
4512:9	4397:24	4388:16	4497:15	facil
4535:3	4417:3	4389:18	4521:21	4591:24
4537:13	4437:17	4390:2	4535:16	facilitate
4548:15	4454:23	4416:10	4549:7	4400:2
4557:16	4477:24	4492:20	4576:19	facilitating
4573:23	4536:21	4508:13	exports	4591:24
4592:24	4540:16	4520:22	4372:11	facility
4597:7,9,1	experienced	4553:21	4420:16	4488:14
7	4437:7	4574:24	4490:25	4516:6
expectation	4438:12	4576:13	4576:14	fact 4407:1
4349:6	experiences	4581:9	extend	4430:23
4425:5	4380:21	4594:23	4538:12	4471:16
4452:4	4382:16	explained	extended	4498:8
4500:15	4395:23	4428:10	4414:5	4519:22
4534:12	experimental	4437:21	extent	4524:1
4535:16	4508:8	4590:7	4391:2	4525:11
4545:19	expert	4597:5	4506:9,18	4529:25
4595:10	4355:23	explanation	4509:11	4596:19
expectations	4359:15	4425:4	4512:15	factor
4371:24	4360:23	4440:10,14	4513:24	4379:13
4435:13	4366:4	4472:9	4538:8	4512:17
4438:5	4370:11,16	4529:17	4544:12	4561:5,9
4446:19		explanations	4562:12	
		4537:5	external	

4589:13,15	4582:22	4480:14	4550:11,13	4353:14
4595:12	4590:18	feeling	4551:24	4598:24
factors	4591:11	4450:6	4554:7	finishes
4379:12	fairly	4573:8	filing	4455:18
4397:11	4373:5	fellow	4357:1	4456:21
4400:9,16	4384:13	4459:17	4487:11	firm 4346:9
4411:18	4447:7,9	felt 4375:12	4549:19	4351:6
4438:4	4454:13	4425:19	filings	4371:7
4460:12	4486:19	FERC	4349:5,7	4403:12,16
4507:20	4538:16,18	4562:6,12	4476:19	4466:6
4540:16	4581:16	FERC-	fill 4586:21	4487:15
4598:5	fairness	approved	finalized	4490:25
fails	4465:12	4562:20	4351:1	4503:20
4363:15	fall 4408:15	field 4371:7	finally	4543:8
fair 4365:19	4497:8	4391:12	4354:6	4550:17,23
4436:15	fallen	fifteen	4367:9	4567:1,21
4437:5	4418:5	4455:23	4372:12	4587:2
4438:7,10,23	familiar	fifty	4381:23	firms
4440:6,9	4377:21	4429:19	4402:21	4567:22
4444:18	4565:6	4527:16	4428:22	first 4363:3
4445:2	4567:16	fifty-eight	4484:23	4372:8,14
4446:10,20	farther	4381:23	4485:19	4383:7
4448:7	4375:11	4454:1	4492:25	4422:19
4451:13,18	4589:20	fifty-five	4535:13	4424:11,13
4452:23	fascinating	4378:6	4554:25	,20 4442:5
4453:17,23	4392:10	4381:20	finance	4469:21
4454:3,9,12,25	fashion	fifty-nine	4349:4	4471:2
4455:5,22	4563:25	4454:2	financial	4472:18
4457:25	fast 4410:10	fifty-six	4347:23	4489:16
4460:7	faster	4590:15	4349:15	4492:22
4461:3,9,14,17	4405:12	figure	4352:3	4496:1
4462:8,13	fault	4381:11	4353:19	4502:4
4463:2,5	4502:24	4454:8	4406:20	4511:19
4464:19	favourable	4457:1	4436:11	4526:3
4465:4,15	4522:10	4590:3	4448:8	4540:21
4466:7,18	favourite	figures	4495:4	4566:17
4467:8,12	4407:7	4565:25	4522:8	4570:1
4468:21	fear	4569:11	fine 4423:3	4597:25
4480:21	4585:4,5	file 4549:18	4469:9	4598:12
4481:17	federal	4551:16	4475:10	firstly
4482:1,4	4371:4	4553:1	finger	4501:13
4484:1,14,25	4460:19	4554:5	4423:9	4508:3
4490:5	Federation	filed	4448:16	4535:20
4493:21	4546:16	4357:21	fingers	five 4365:12
4507:21	fee 4552:17	4362:1	4464:13	4398:20
4534:1,4	feel 4410:17	4369:4	finish	4434:9
4537:2		4477:20	4574:5	4460:19
4562:2,13			finished	4461:3,10
4567:24				4471:20,23
				4480:9,11
				4488:22

4491:20	follow-up	4448:12	4591:13	4535:16
4492:14	4352:15	4449:15,25	4592:23	4545:20
4495:6	footprint	4450:11,16	4593:7	4546:2,5,9
4558:13	4413:10	,19	4594:24	4557:22
4583:21	4529:6	4453:20	4595:24	4558:3,12,
4584:7	4541:4	4454:16	4596:6	13,16,25
fixed 4569:7	4542:4	4455:13,19	forecasted	4559:4
fixing	force 4546:8	4456:23	4435:21	4566:13
4490:6	fore 4387:9	4457:6	4518:25	4567:18
flat 4412:5	4504:24	4462:6,16	4581:2	4582:1
4507:13,17	4556:16	4466:5	forecasters	4588:23
flaw 4407:19	foreca	4470:9	4437:11	4589:3
4410:23	4558:12	4471:7	4448:21	foresee
flaws	forecast	4477:17	4450:9	4417:2
4364:14	4372:4,8,1	4480:17,18	4544:24	form 4417:8
4449:23	5	,24	4545:17,20	4427:11
flexibility	4374:7,13,	4481:4,18	,22 4587:9	4510:11
4518:7	14,17,19,2	4490:16	4593:8	4564:23
flexible	4	4492:14	forecasting	formal
4431:22	4375:6,7,8	4494:6,15	4364:25	4550:14
flip 4469:13	,9,13,16,2	4502:25	4379:10	formation
4511:8	1,22,23	4504:24	4381:8	4485:10
4514:1	4376:4,5,7	4505:2,10,	4410:13	formed
flipping	,11	11	4437:1,16	4460:24
4466:1	4378:25	4506:4,5	4492:19	4470:8
4512:24	4379:14	4507:12,13	4512:1	formulas
flows	4385:22	4510:15,18	4513:7	4432:9
4457:18	4386:10	4513:12	4597:8,21	forse 4568:3
4526:7	4387:1,17	4519:2	forecasts	forth
fluctuate	4396:2,12	4520:7,13	4374:21	4373:24
4397:1	4397:5	4521:1,11,	4386:14	4500:3
flux 4351:5	4400:12,19	12 4529:9	4393:19	4545:13
fly 4452:14	4401:10,22	4544:5,20	4403:4	forty 4421:8
Flynn	4403:6,21	4545:1,5,1	4408:9	4453:21
4565:19	4408:7,8,1	3	4435:22	4455:12
focus	9	4548:19,25	4437:2,8,2	4457:1
4364:11,16	4410:18,19	4549:7	3 4439:2	4511:4
4372:3	4412:11,23	4556:4,5,1	4442:15	forty-five
4477:13	4421:23	7,25	4449:19,24	4398:19
4516:16	4422:5,10	4557:7,11,	4462:5,11,	4421:19
4532:6	4423:25	15,17,19,2	13 4477:16	4459:2
4557:17	4425:12,13	5 4558:13	4483:24,25	4475:9,11
focussed	,21	4565:10	4484:2,3,1	forty-four
4373:9,13	4432:4,9	4566:14	4,25	4590:13
4376:10	4437:11,18	4567:3,11	4487:13	forward
4597:7	4439:5,22	4568:2	4490:9	4349:8
	4440:1,20	4572:12,20	4505:5,7	4364:21,22
	4441:13	4574:15	4506:23	4365:10
	4442:8	4578:10,24	4512:1,12	
	4444:20	4583:10,17	4520:15	
	4445:21	4584:13	4521:5	
		4585:9	4532:2	
		4587:25		
		4588:12		

4368:15	4423:1	future	gas 4383:16	4530:14
4376:1	4473:13	4358:21	4384:3	4531:1
4411:3	front	4364:13,22	4386:1	4538:4
4500:4	4555:21	,25 4365:5	4388:5	4539:23
4502:1	frustrated	4376:18,22	4389:5	4540:21
4523:25	4446:21	4378:25	4390:22,25	4541:10,23
4543:18	fuel 4376:21	4379:7	4391:1,5,8	4568:16,20
4595:24	4379:19	4380:7	,10,14	4569:15
fossil	4380:12,13	4381:14	4394:1,4,6	4571:20
4386:2	,21,24	4383:1	4402:23	4580:20
4418:16	4381:5,9,1	4385:24	4406:22	generate
foundational	5,19	4387:9	4417:4	4432:9
4546:19	4384:13	4397:4	4430:8,25	generating
fourth	4385:5,19	4399:2,7	4431:10,11	4488:19,21
4386:3	4386:1,4,5	4400:12,13	,18	4491:15
fracking	,13,18,19	4417:11	4432:17	generation
4391:17	4388:14	4436:5	4452:5	4372:20
4393:25	4389:2,3,2	4460:3,4	4458:3	4398:24
4402:22	1 4390:20	4461:6	4481:23	4399:5
4596:2	4394:3	4463:1	4563:14,17	4412:23
frame	4401:4	4493:19,20	4565:9	4416:18
4412:22	4411:20	4502:10	4577:17	4488:6
4429:20	4493:11	4503:16	4578:2	4509:21
4489:19	4494:8,9	4504:4	4580:6	4539:25
4492:7,15	4574:20	4545:23	4582:15	4561:6
frames	4577:25	4558:24	4596:3,7	4574:25
4492:21	4578:1	4559:1,2	gauge	4575:2
framework	4591:6	4560:24	4433:13	4577:15
4362:23	4592:2	4561:4	geared	4579:25
4363:10	fuels 4386:2	4566:24	4524:12	4591:7
4513:9	full	4567:5	general	generator
4541:3	4349:22,24	4572:23	4358:24	4363:13
frankly	,25 4502:4	4576:23,25	4421:24	4400:5
4510:23	4579:24	4577:7,8	4471:18	4418:24
free 4480:14	fuller	4585:5	4495:9	4419:1,19,
4567:18	4506:18	4587:8	4498:10	22 4491:10
Friday	fully	4596:12,14	4506:5	4571:17
4347:21,25	4415:15	futures	4510:3,8	generators
4348:8,16	4426:21	4459:23	4542:19	4399:19
4349:1	4528:10	4460:2	4569:17	4413:8
4350:22,24	4586:21		generally	gentlemen
4351:3	fun 4536:19	<hr/>	4358:24	4347:11
4550:12	function	<hr/>	4359:2	genuine
Friend	4562:10	GAC 4344:11	4371:18	4417:23
4448:15	fundamentals	gallons	4373:23	George
4458:13,15	4379:3	4527:11	4374:6,19	4344:16
4469:10	fusion	Gange	4423:25	4360:22
friends	4508:16	4344:11	4443:11	4479:11
		4360:17	4478:9	4550:6
		4458:14	4481:18,22	gets 4393:11
		gap 4591:4,5	4505:5	
			4507:16	

4399:11	4524:18	,21	4541:14	4502:2,18
4413:3	glad 4347:18	greenish	guard 4368:6	4503:5,8
4424:21	4486:25	4401:9	guess 4353:2	4504:7,8
4456:25	glo 4591:21	grey 4422:13	4413:22,23	4505:1,13,
4502:12	gone 4352:6	ground	4442:23	24 4506:7
4513:19	Gosselin	4414:17	4463:10	4507:1,23
getting	4343:13	4483:7	4499:1	4508:14
4447:16	government	grounds	4515:22	4510:2
4497:6	4460:19	4530:10	4522:1	4511:7
4500:10	governs	Group	4545:21	4512:20
4539:12,19	4562:21,23	4360:14	4555:13	4513:19
4543:11	Grant	4445:15	4559:21	4514:19
4596:9	4343:17	4469:18	4579:15	4515:4,16
4600:8	4370:5	4487:8	4585:9	4516:10,15
GHG 4554:6	4383:5,6,1	4503:10	4598:8	4517:3,18,
gigawatt	2,22	groups	guessing	20
4554:9	4384:7,21	4433:9	4469:15	4518:4,5
4597:4	4385:3,12	grow 4390:9	guidance	4519:16,22
gigawatts	4392:7	4393:10	4496:21	4520:3,5,2
4410:4,10,	4398:2	4591:9	4599:3	1
16	4399:9,14	grows	guys 4508:9	4521:9,11,
4428:10,17	4417:20	4389:25		17
4597:3	graph 4590:2	4493:8	<hr/> H <hr/>	4522:24,25
given	4592:9,14	growth	ha 4547:6	4523:3,4,1
4349:11	graphs	4386:6,13	Hacault	8,19
4388:4	4534:23	4389:22	4344:14	4524:14
4407:20	grapple	4390:2,3,9	4345:13	4525:5,20
4413:23	4521:20	,12,14,18,	4350:5,8,1	4526:22
4420:15	great	20 4392:24	7,19	4527:9
4478:22	4364:24	4402:10,13	4360:11,12	4529:16
4499:15	4395:7	,14	4479:6,7	4531:13,14
4515:7	4428:3	4451:11	4487:1,3,4	4532:5,21
4518:12	4433:6	4452:5	,18,21,25	4533:7,25
4520:24	4468:23	4462:21	4488:11	4534:14,19
4527:4	4469:6	4463:18	4489:22	4535:9
4531:24	4509:18	4481:23	4490:22	4536:16
4532:25	greater	4493:9	4491:11	4537:4
4534:3,5,9	4374:11	4494:23	4492:10	4549:9
,10 4535:6	4449:25	4495:11	4493:12,16	4599:16,17
4536:17	4514:3	4496:19	,24	half
4543:24,25	4533:17	4564:5	,25	4431:10,12
4580:17,18	greatest	4565:20	4494:14,19	4459:2
4581:25	4354:19	4591:14,21	,25	4475:3,4,6
4595:1	4457:17	,24 4592:2	4495:18,24	,8
gives 4449:8	green	guarantee	4496:12,13	hand 4452:21
giving	4353:13	4403:17	4497:4,19,	handle
4359:16	4402:20	4552:17	22,23	4527:11,12
4429:23	4453:2,6,9	guaranteed	4498:4,14	hands 4383:6
4478:22		4510:16	4499:1,22,	hang 4511:16
4498:18			23,25	happen
			4500:8,9	4410:14
			4501:6	

4463:16	4586:16	4504:11	4534:20,21	4439:22
4496:25	4598:21	4512:21	4535:2,6,7	4485:11
4500:23	head 4353:8	4517:25	,8,13	highs
4501:22	headed	4560:8	4536:8	4532:12
4507:16	4365:23	helpful	4553:1	Hill 4357:22
4548:13	heading	4423:11,16	4567:23	4477:21
4597:9	4445:15	4424:18	4594:21	hint 4517:6
happened	4504:17	4463:20	higher	hires 4552:8
4347:21	heads	4472:10	4379:9,14	4553:15
4364:12	4555:22	4510:3	4380:5,13,	historic
4377:22	hear 4351:13	4511:8	21,24	4378:23
4432:25	4360:4	4537:5	4381:6,10,	4386:11
happens	4478:25	helps	18	4575:23,24
4350:11	heard	4594:25	4382:7,8	,25 4593:9
4379:2,3,2	4349:11	Henry 4578:2	4385:25	historical
3 4380:12	4361:7	here's	4391:9	4376:19
4393:6	4367:25	4377:11	4397:20	4382:13
4484:8	4368:3	4403:20	4406:7	4386:9,10
4506:10	4433:22	4408:19	4414:16,19	4394:25
happy	4498:21	4410:19	4420:3	4396:9
4370:25	4504:18	he's 4347:18	4422:4	4397:2,7
4397:25	hearing	4356:4	4429:20	4398:8,13,
4420:7	4347:5	4360:17	4454:14	15 4400:11
4432:1	4348:25	4371:3,5	4461:11	4432:5
hard 4370:23	4366:5	4389:12	4465:13	4433:11,12
4417:2	4375:19	4434:1	4468:2	4466:12
4432:15	4390:24	4470:20	4482:17,20	4493:13,19
4450:20	4488:1	4513:24	4495:21,25	4553:22
4499:4,7	4491:13	4587:20	4498:2,18	4574:11,16
4533:12	4498:24	hesitant	4509:3	,24
4540:10	4517:21	4394:17	4525:2	4575:13
4549:17	4526:23	high 4377:20	4532:20	4576:11
hardly	4535:10	4382:9	4534:23	4586:4
4405:17	hearings	4384:1	4580:25	4595:23
haven't	4499:3	4393:23	4581:18	history
4352:10	heat 4384:1	4402:10,13	4584:18	4511:1
4412:20	4430:17,20	4406:1	highest	hit 4406:12
4464:1	4577:22	4418:25	4402:14	4490:19
4506:23	He'd 4433:23	4419:2,3	4468:5	4507:5
4518:25	HELD 4343:20	4420:1,2	4534:22	4528:9
4598:24	he'll	4447:7	4576:4	high-growth
having	4370:25	4451:7,11,	high	4386:17
4397:21	4458:25	25 4467:5	4394:7	HNTEI
4427:1	4459:1	4480:16	high-level	4551:18
4434:2	4600:7	4497:12,16	4567:17	4552:10
4514:15	hello	4498:2,9	highlights	H-N-T-E-I
4516:4	4498:25	4500:11	4472:4	4552:10
4521:15	help 4473:23	4512:22	highly	hockey
4541:1		4514:17	4375:16	4575:20
4565:7		4530:20	4413:8	hold 4502:19
4581:5		4533:1		

hole 4462:11	4577:1	4547:12	4466:4,22	4588:13,14
Hombach	4590:12,14	4594:20	4467:5,6,1	,23
4344:3	,16	4595:2	3 4469:17	4589:8,15,
honour	4594:2,4,1	hydraulic	4472:1,13,	22 4599:18
4395:10	6	4496:6	19,24,25	Hydro-85
hope	hourly	4586:23	4479:20	4421:16
4347:5,6	4574:14,17	hydro 4343:7	4481:19	hydrogen
4449:24	4582:1	4344:5	4482:6	4508:16
hopefully	hours	4346:8	4483:25	Hydro's
4347:25	4375:25	4347:22	4484:3,15,	4343:9
4504:10	4376:17	4348:4	17,19	4348:1
hoping	4378:25	4349:8	4485:1,5,1	4349:1,4,6
4500:22	4397:12,18	4352:2	3 4488:15	,14,23
4531:15	,19,22	4353:19	4490:14	4356:21,25
horizon	4400:9,21	4354:10	4492:12	4366:1
4374:2	4402:7	4361:4	4494:22	4424:1
4375:3	4403:14,18	4366:1	4495:2	4430:9
4403:19	4405:14,16	4368:8	4497:9,10	4436:4
4405:3	4554:8,9	4370:8	4498:8,19	4437:1,11,
horizontally	4571:25	4371:25	4499:18	16
4384:19	4581:18	4372:5,13,	4511:13	4438:5,16,
hour 4375:25	4597:4	19	4513:16,22	17 4442:8
4376:14,15	hour's	4373:16,24	4514:25	4444:19
,22,23,24	4475:6	4374:19,20	4516:25	4466:15
4377:1,13,	housekeeping	4375:2	4518:13	4473:10
14,17,23	4355:17	4376:5	4520:11,25	4476:14,18
4378:3,12,	4366:8	4395:15	4521:7	4482:17
21 4379:7	4368:24	4399:17	4524:17	4483:1
4380:7	4549:16	4403:8	4526:4,14	4490:23
4381:8,14	Hub 4578:2	4404:13	4528:22	4496:4
4382:15	4588:24	4412:14	4532:25	4497:20
4396:3	4589:1,4,9	4413:20,25	4535:8,21	4531:18
4397:4,8,9	huge 4390:24	4414:4	4536:14,23	4549:5,19
,10	4401:21	4415:1,7	4542:14,16	4555:5
4399:2,8	4495:3	4417:12	,17,18	4586:23
4405:13,15	Hugh 4343:17	4421:1,10	4549:15	
4430:16	4383:6,12,	4422:20	4550:12,16	<hr/>
4432:22	22	4423:1	,17,23	I
4433:10	4384:7,21	4425:12	4551:14,16	<hr/>
4453:16	4385:3,12	4427:2	,24,25	i.e 4581:5
4454:2,15	4392:7	4431:5,6	4552:15,25	ICF 4437:2,8
4455:8,13	4398:2	4432:3	4553:1,10,	ICO 4571:11
4456:22	4399:9,14	4437:19	12,13,20,2	I'd 4360:4
4457:8	4417:20	4442:16,17	1	4432:1
4459:2	hundred	,19,24	4554:4,5,1	4472:11
4475:3,4,7	4405:16	4443:14,25	5,17	4478:25
,8 4486:18	4421:19	4445:4	4555:1,3	4486:6
4574:16	4427:7	4447:8,23	4556:15,24	4497:5
4575:14	4527:15,16	4448:8,25	4557:13	4510:8,10
4576:1,6,9	,20	4449:15,20	4563:1,8	4511:19
		,21 4454:7	4564:8,13	4513:3
		4462:6,18	4579:20	4532:10
		4465:13,14	4584:9	4534:13
			4586:8,21	

4562:5	4390:1	4441:10	4586:16	4526:4
4570:2	4401:22	4442:3	4587:18	4576:18
idea 4425:17	4407:5	4447:24	4588:15	importance
4490:2	4450:5	4448:6	4594:8,10,	4416:24
4491:6	4451:2	4449:17	14	4495:14
4492:1	4459:18	4450:6	4596:1,9,1	important
4498:11	4462:3	4452:14	6 4598:3	4374:23
4499:6	4471:24	4454:20	4599:2	4376:9
4535:12	4474:14,15	4457:19	imagine	4400:15
identically	4486:15	4458:17	4501:20	4422:8
4578:10	4499:20	4464:12	4529:1	4428:6
identified	4500:12,21	4467:1,11	immediate	4429:13
4368:17,21	4504:15	4470:16,19	4364:20	4485:9
4390:12	4523:20	4475:4,23	immediately	4499:19
identify	4550:10,11	4478:1,3	4567:16	4562:7
4364:13	4560:12	4481:14	impact	4592:3
4445:24	4581:21	4482:24	4362:13,23	4596:5,16
4467:24	4600:1	4483:20	, 4363:3,7,9	imports
4544:12	illustrate	4486:22,25	,17 4364:2	4526:14
identifying	4401:23	4488:12,16	4392:9,13	4576:14,16
4584:13	4429:7	4489:1,11,	4398:25	4577:1,2,4
IEC 4344:22	4465:9	24 4495:3	4401:21,23	impression
4345:5	illustration	4497:6	,24	4429:23
4356:12	4377:5	4499:10	4402:1,2,2	4447:4
IECs 4449:7	illustration	4502:19	0 4428:23	improperly
4500:1	s 4389:23	4506:8	4429:24	4425:12
IFF 4438:16	I'm 4347:17	4508:8	4430:15,21	4426:18,25
IFF09	4352:23,24	4509:18	4431:14,21	improvements
4438:17,24	,25	4510:3,14	4524:22	4507:18
4439:10	4367:23	4514:2,4	4525:4,10	inability
ignore	4368:20	4515:22,23	4528:6	4442:13
4378:9	4371:22	4517:21	4554:18	inappropriat
4442:2	4378:25	4520:8	4596:2,12	e 4527:13
4521:23	4380:15	4522:12	impacted	Inc 4476:11
ignored	4383:6	4523:4	4458:5	incentive
4521:14	4384:25	4525:16	4525:23	4418:13
I'll 4347:7	4385:16,19	4527:17	4526:2	4541:6
4351:5,16	4386:2,4	4529:18,20	4528:16	incentives
4352:17	4390:21,24	4531:14	impacts	4416:4
4353:17	,25	4536:4	4493:8	inclined
4360:17	4392:8,22	4543:23	4530:8	4469:11
4367:19	4397:25	4546:6	imperfect	include
4370:11	4399:9	4548:2,5	4489:25	4361:13,15
4376:18	4400:22	4556:1	implement	,16,18,19
4377:4	4405:14	4565:15	4492:2	4374:21
4378:16,24	4408:22	4567:16	implemented	4382:2
4388:13	4413:22,23	4568:25	4461:6	4387:20
4389:2,18	4415:13	4571:7,13,	import	4439:2
	4420:7	14 4574:11	4490:14	
	4421:8,10	4575:8		
	4422:23	4579:23		
	4434:3,6	4581:8		
		4583:8,11,		
		12 4584:10		

4480:18	4530:18	4350:7	industrial	4522:8,21
4544:2	4531:8	4397:17	4360:13	4544:1
4548:4,8,1	4540:13	4428:22	4370:15	4545:9
9 4587:3	4591:7	4448:20	4371:2	4548:3
included	increased	4458:13	4487:8	4551:17
4428:25	4381:5	4554:17	4582:16	4567:9
4437:11	4452:6	4587:9	industrials	4575:24,25
4525:15	4491:14	4593:18	4487:7	4576:2
4547:11	4508:3	4600:2	4499:20	informed
4553:11	4528:10	indicated	industry	4427:14
4564:5	4555:7	4347:22	4377:22	4559:16
includes	increases	4348:24	4493:18	inherent
4402:14	4398:18	4367:24	4508:7	4515:10
4452:3	4521:23	4406:15	4511:1	initial
4505:25	4577:7	4408:21	4566:12,15	4503:13
including	increasing	4428:20	,20	4513:20
4358:12	4525:7	4456:3	inefficient	initiative
4371:3,9	4528:19	4487:5	4429:12	4551:18
4435:13,21	4591:6	4496:17	inevitable	4552:3
4436:6	increasingly	4524:20	4497:25	initiatives
4437:1	4528:22	4547:3	infer	4491:14
4440:15	increment	4555:25	4426:24	inner
4446:19	4378:9	4558:11	inflation	4425:22
4473:4	4411:24	4572:19	4569:13,15	4450:17
4478:16	incremental	4593:6	,19	input
4480:19	4378:13	4594:24	informa	4353:18
4499:19	incur	indicates	4465:2	4444:22
4563:23	4395:24	4390:14	information	4544:14
4565:24	4585:12	4393:8	4347:24	4568:18
4573:18	incurs	4556:13,22	4349:21	4571:16
inconsistent	4395:22	4581:1	4355:3,6	4595:17
4466:12	indep 4444:1	indicating	4368:2,3,7	inputs
incorporate	independent	4523:23	,9 4387:2	4376:21
4417:16	4459:17	indication	4389:4	4390:10
incorporated	4478:12,14	4504:17	4424:23	4395:2
4367:11	4537:23	indirectly	4426:6	4422:9
incorporatin	4559:13	4515:18	4442:7,14,	4424:3
g 4353:23	4562:2	indiv	25 4443:15	4425:18
increase	4574:6	4443:25	4444:1,21	4427:5
4381:24	4596:6	individual	4445:5,16,	4432:17
4384:13,22	independentl	4359:11	23 4465:2	4435:12,21
4389:5,6,1	y	4449:24	4482:18	4442:7,14,
0 4390:22	4443:15,25	4450:1	4483:15	25 4443:16
4398:17	4578:21	4478:15	4484:19	4444:2
4418:22	indeterminat	4482:24	4485:21	4446:19,21
4419:13	e 4428:14	4558:6,8	4488:8	4564:18
4463:3	indicate	4563:3	4493:18	4566:3
4489:9	4349:9	4564:15	4498:19,24	4567:12
4507:20		4567:3	4499:3	4596:17
4528:7			4521:21	inquiry

4483:8	4541:2	interrupting	4372:6	It'd 4509:17
ins 4438:11	intended	4353:1	involves	item 4350:5
inside	4500:10	Interveners	4372:3	4351:9
4411:4	4533:21	4349:3	4428:2	4366:8
insight	intends	Intervenors	IR 4486:11	4416:17
4365:21	4537:8	4349:18	4546:20	4418:3
4446:9	intensity-	4360:4	4549:3	4436:20
4561:15	based	4370:7	irrelevant	items
4566:11,19	4554:6	4434:6	4584:16	4491:19
insights	intent	4478:25	IRs 4546:17	4566:11,19
4365:22	4439:21	4499:5	isn't 4416:7	it'll
4468:17	intention	4521:20	4418:2,3	4395:16
4560:23	4375:15	4522:14	4423:23	it's 4348:23
insignifican	4467:20	4546:22	4424:4	4352:20
t 4526:20	4537:10	introduce	4449:21	4354:4
inst 4379:4	interested	4370:19	4542:2	4355:14
instance	4373:15	4493:9	4545:1,3	4362:16,17
4363:12	4390:21	4590:16	ISO 4359:24	4367:1
4388:25	4395:13	4595:11	4371:9,10	4368:18
4398:16	4413:18	introducing	4528:23	4369:8
4399:5	4414:4	4367:2	4541:4	4370:2
4407:22	4508:1	introduction	4562:19	4372:18
4409:11	4579:23	4365:2	4571:11	4376:8,9
4411:20	4585:2	4401:20	issue	4377:7,8,1
4417:5	interesting	4460:8,13	4354:12	0
4431:17	4412:9	4519:5	4355:7	4378:5,7,1
4471:4,5	4573:19	invested	4389:13	0,14
4489:21	interests	4362:2	4415:20	4381:25
4503:7	4598:21	investment	4417:24	4383:10
4564:8	interject	4414:16	4471:16,21	4387:5,12,
instead	4543:20	4415:25	4479:3	13,19
4348:4	internal	4509:6,8	4483:12	4392:17
4394:6	4545:5	4528:8	4544:9,19	4394:17
4415:3	interpolate	4571:21	4596:18	4397:14
4419:24	4462:20	4582:5	issued	4398:13
4463:17	interpret	investments	4434:25	4400:7,13,
4488:7	4557:10	4512:16	issues	14,24
4516:4	interpretati	4530:5	4348:8	4401:9,15,
4544:20	on 4436:4	4541:7	4370:15,17	17,25
4555:22	4581:23	4561:5	4371:18	4402:2,4,5
4557:23	interpreted	invitation	4372:7,9,1	,6 4404:19
insufficient	4426:19,25	4472:16	0 4374:4,8	4406:12
4406:4	interpreting	invite	4420:5,14,	4407:4,17
insurance	4413:15	4472:11,16	21 4421:1	4412:16,20
4570:15	interrupt	involved	4429:22	,21 4413:3
integrate	4447:14	4359:11,25	4435:10	4414:8
4396:15		4365:9	4478:3	4415:21
integrated		4371:19	4542:23	4416:3,7
			4584:25	4417:2,11
				4421:11,15
				4422:2,24
				4426:12

4428:22,23	4570:9	judgment	kilowatt	language
4429:21,25	4571:16,20	4451:21	4408:6	4519:9
4430:2,13	4574:13	4569:19	4427:7	large 4359:2
4432:15,20	4577:11,13	4578:5,9	4554:8	4361:17
4433:5	4578:2,20	judgmentally	4583:21	4371:8
4439:3	4582:14,15	4452:9	4584:7	4384:12
4445:6	4583:11	July 4377:17	knees 4383:7	4417:24
4447:5,18	4584:16	4575:18	knew 4400:11	4463:12
4450:20,25	4585:24	jump 4401:19	4517:21	4467:17
4453:10	4587:19	4402:17	4599:20	4528:24
4454:17,22	4590:3,21	4403:3	knowledge	4531:6
4462:24	4591:3,4	4485:2	4440:20	4562:8
4463:12,13	4592:22	4590:14	4441:12	4573:21
4468:6	4596:5,11,	jumped	4448:9	4595:12
4470:4	22 4599:21	4598:4,8	4463:20,23	largely
4474:20	I've 4358:10	jumping	4465:18	4513:7
4482:20	4370:4,12,	4523:4	4466:22	4541:2
4485:14	14,16	June 4489:8	4468:6	larger
4493:4,5	4429:7	justified	4483:14	4401:25
4497:11,25	4478:2	4530:9	4508:7	4582:3,4,5
4498:2,16	4498:4	justify	4527:2	4591:4
4499:4,6	4504:8	4365:7	4561:14,19	Larry
4501:11	4557:3	known		4343:15
4504:2,3	4600:2	4348:23	kV 4524:21	last 4347:21
4505:10			4525:1,6,9	4351:9
4506:3,14,			,15,16,24	4356:1
20			4526:24	4363:2
4507:12,21			4527:1,19	4366:8
4508:25				4384:7
4509:7				4412:24
4510:5,7,1				4466:4
6 4511:2				4467:4
4514:7,8,1				4480:9
0 4515:21				4485:3
4517:13				4488:14
4519:17				4505:16,22
4522:9				4534:19
4523:23				4535:9
4527:24				4539:25
4529:21				4550:12
4533:12,14				lastly
4535:11				4555:13
4537:10				late 4474:24
4539:1				later
4540:5				4383:21
4543:3,8,1				4389:19
5 4544:17				4417:21
4549:15,20				4455:16
,23				4488:4
4555:21				4489:5
4560:5				
4562:7				
4565:13				
4566:22				

4519:17	4552:19	4483:22	4532:15	4346:1
lateral	left-hand	4485:12	limitations	4436:20
4541:9	4400:20	4495:11	4445:23	listed
Lavigne	4453:14	4500:25	4447:5	4421:17
4600:21	legal	4502:9	4473:5	listing
lawyers	4472:12	4503:16	limited	4554:8
4511:16	legitimate	4508:25	4374:15	literally
layer	4579:18	4509:5	4445:16	4462:19
4530:24	lengths	4512:10,13	4446:22	little
layman	4543:17	4526:13	4510:17	4370:12
4527:17	less 4382:19	4550:18,24	limiting	4371:6
lays 4440:22	4418:11	4553:2	4528:9	4384:11
4441:14	4430:13	4567:9,24	line 4368:13	4386:23
lead 4515:8	4455:23	4574:2	4384:10	4389:18
4522:8	4456:18	levels	4393:4,5,6	4398:13
4524:4	4457:8,11	4430:2	,7 4400:25	4427:19
leader	4519:1	4466:17	4401:8,17	4430:15
4371:7	4525:19	4492:22	4424:12	4431:15
leaders	4528:12	licence	4453:2,9,2	4433:5,15
4567:24	4532:6	4350:7	1,22	4437:13
leads 4518:9	4538:21	life 4365:16	4454:7,13	4441:4
learn	4539:1	4496:5	4455:4	4446:6
4484:19	4546:8	light 4454:6	4456:15	4450:7
least	4549:5	likelihood	4482:21	4452:5
4413:17	4597:22	4461:5	4521:6,8	4468:2
4462:18	lesser	4514:3	4524:18,21	4472:17
4485:4	4562:12	4533:15	,22	4473:23
4499:16	let's	likelihoods	4525:1,16,	4475:6
4521:19	4372:14,16	4469:2,4	22,24,25	4480:10
4539:25	4379:3,17,	likely	4526:2,3,2	4503:2
4578:22	18 4415:12	4349:19	4 4527:1	4510:4
least-cost	4421:7,18,	4387:11	4528:11,13	4526:21
4598:15	22 4434:9	4389:14	4529:4,24	4536:18
least-	4475:2	4393:22	4530:2,17	4549:15
efficient	4537:13	4394:14	4531:7,9	4564:9
4383:25	4587:20	4402:2	4590:7,21	4581:22
leave	4599:14	4431:21	4591:3,18	4586:16
4348:12	letter	4436:5	4593:25	4596:10
4351:17	4349:1	4451:16	linear	lived 4495:2
4494:15	level 4346:9	4467:16	4384:9	LMP
leaves	4377:24,25	4536:8,9	4397:3,4,5	4398:6,18
4354:14	4381:6	4540:24	,6,14	4401:9,10
leaving	4406:6	4561:19	4433:7	4590:22
4546:19	4409:25	4578:20	lined	LMPs 4402:12
led 4460:12	4447:7	4596:4,25	4384:19	load
	4451:8	4597:22	lines	4372:21,22
	4460:11	Likewise	4384:24	,23
	4480:17	4360:12	lining	4378:9,13,
	4481:3,15,	4411:24	4442:3	14
	18,22	limit 4452:4	list 4345:3	4386:6,13

4389:22	4418:10	4378:10,18	4495:17,19	11
4390:2,8,9	4462:14	4395:11,20	4497:7,8,1	4518:11,17
,12,17,19	4466:15	,22	6,18,20	,19
4392:9,23	4494:15	4396:6,15,	4498:1,2,3	4532:15,20
4393:8,10	4495:2	16,23	,7,8,13,15	4540:25
4398:24	4496:5	4398:10	,17,18	4541:21
4399:4	4506:6	4401:8,12,	4512:12	4542:5
4400:6	4509:2	16,17,18	4530:19	4580:24
4401:3	4513:4,15	4587:21,23	4531:19	4581:5
4402:14,21	4556:18	,24	4532:14,18	4582:23,24
4411:24	4557:2	4588:2,10,	,19	4584:20
4488:5	4566:12	11	4533:2,3	lowering
4490:11	4581:18	4589:3,9,1	4535:2,5,1	4362:14
4492:14,19	longer	4,16,20	3 4536:9	4488:5
4493:9	4365:9,11	4590:22	4549:5	4508:18
4512:8	4375:10	Lost 4406:21	4594:3,20	lowest
4545:17	4462:4	lot	low/	4402:15
4564:4	4480:10	4364:18,20	reference	4404:3
load-serving	4490:20	4374:7	4497:11,14	4468:5
4540:6,12,	4492:5	4377:21	low-CO2	4576:4
17	4524:20	4387:22	4457:18	4582:25
4541:13,18	4537:11	4396:19	lower	4585:2
,24	4539:12,19	4397:21	4383:17	lowest-cost
locate	4580:23	4399:17	4384:4	4404:4
4419:1	longer-term	4413:17	4386:19	lows 4512:22
located	4505:7	4425:14	4390:14	4532:12
4418:24	long-run	4426:24	4391:18	LSEs
4419:21	4506:3	4439:6	4394:3,5	4539:3,23
location	4508:24	4471:13,14	4397:23	lump 4386:4
4396:1	4509:15	4488:24	4401:8	lumped
locational	4512:2,4,9	4512:5	4408:14	4448:9
4378:20	,12	4527:24	4418:20	lunch
4395:4,14,	4514:18	4533:12	4422:4,11	4433:25
16 4419:3	4518:24	4540:6	4423:25	4434:2,5
4420:1	long-term	4541:18	4430:23,24	4474:22
4588:4	4412:19	4542:2	4431:1	lusty
lock 4561:9	4413:24	4573:16	4468:14,20	4384:11
lock-in	4414:15	lots 4394:6	4481:18,23	
4513:16	4415:17	4397:21	,24	<hr/>
logic	4466:6	4400:15	4482:5,17,	M
4374:15	4490:24	low 4377:20	21	macroeconomi
4405:24	4505:19	4386:18	4484:2,15	c 4386:18
4581:15	4513:23	4391:14	4485:1	4394:8,9
logical	4566:14	4402:10,21	4495:16,25	macro-
4430:12	4579:4	,24 4406:9	4498:2,18	environmen
4461:16	lose 4500:16	4407:20,21	4500:25	tal 4348:8
long 4391:6	loss 4399:25	4454:22	4501:3	magic
4412:22	4406:21	4455:19	4509:12,15	4488:18
4417:25	4567:24	4456:3	,21,25	magnitude
	4589:18	4458:3,6	4511:14,18	
	losses	4467:4,24	4513:1	
		4494:23	4517:1,10,	

4457:18,20	4360:13	4485:1,4,2	4589:8,10,	4408:10
4461:11	4361:4	1	15,19,22	4411:22
4529:8	4365:25	4487:7,14	4590:23	4413:7
main	4366:1	4488:5	Manitoban	4428:25
4372:5,7	4368:8	4490:14,23	4527:21	4429:15,19
4373:11	4370:8	4492:12	Manitobans	4430:16,21
4385:21,24	4371:25	4494:22	4495:22	4508:3
4386:7,22	4372:5,12,	4496:3,19,	4499:19	4509:1
4425:18	19	23	4500:19	4548:6
mainly	4373:5,16,	4497:9,10,	Manitoba's	4571:25
4406:23	24	19	4396:21	4581:16,17
4505:8	4374:19,20	4498:8,19	4497:18	4584:13,21
4591:5	4375:2	4499:18	map 4577:24	4587:24
mainstream	4376:5	4511:13	March	4588:3,4,1
4427:23	4395:14,15	4513:4,16,	4343:24	2
4428:1,9	,17	22 4514:25	4366:11	marginally
major 4382:4	4396:22	4516:25	4368:17	4496:19,23
4395:1,2	4399:17,24	4518:13	4439:20	Marilyn
4488:6	4403:8	4520:11,25	4444:8	4343:14
majority	4404:13	4521:7	4445:9	4390:19
4595:4	4412:14	4524:17	4461:21	4391:21
Man 4417:12	4413:19,25	4525:7	margin	4401:11
4564:12	4414:4	4526:4,14	4406:13	4404:22
manage	4415:1,7	4528:22	4411:19,21	marked
4397:21	4417:12	4531:18	4412:1	4555:14
4400:4	4421:1,10,	4532:18	4416:8,9	market
4513:21,23	16 4422:20	4535:7,8,2	4429:11,18	4358:11,13
4591:8	4424:1	1	4430:25	,16,18
mandate	4425:12	4536:14,23	4431:1	4359:1,6,7
4446:17	4427:2	,17,18	4496:22	4360:2
4541:23	4430:5,6,9	4546:16	4509:5	4361:10,17
manipulation	4431:5,6	4549:5,15,	marginal	,18,22
4361:11	4432:3	19	4363:14,15	4362:5,10,
Manito	4437:1,11,	4550:12,16	4376:25	13,18,23
4396:21	15,19	,17,22	4377:15	4363:8,17,
Manitoba	4438:4	4551:14,16	4378:7,14,	19,22
4343:3,7,9	4442:8,16,	,25	19,21	4364:4,13,
,23 4344:5	17,19,24	4552:15,25	4380:6,20,	16
4346:8	4443:14,25	4553:1,10,	22	4365:8,20,
4347:22	4444:7,19	13,20,21	4383:8,11,	23
4348:1,4	4445:4	4554:4,5,1	19 4384:16	4371:8,16,
4349:1,4,6	4447:8	5,17	4385:5	18,25
,8,14,23	4448:25	4555:1,3,5	4391:4	4372:5,9,1
4351:12	4449:3	4556:15,24	4392:12	1,23
4352:2	4467:6	4557:12,13	4395:2,4,6	4373:3,14
4353:10,19	4472:1,12,	4563:1,8	,14,16,19,	4376:6,9,1
4354:3,10	25 4473:9	4564:8,12	21	0 4379:3
4356:19,21	4476:12,14	4577:2	4396:6,16	4380:5
,25	,18	4579:20	4398:7	4382:5,6
	4479:20	4586:8,21,	4401:2,6,8	4383:3
	4482:17	23	,12	4387:24
	4483:25	4588:3,13,		4388:2,23
	4484:3,15,	14,18,22		
	17,19			

4404:1,7,1	4440:3	matter	4499:12,25	4541:13
1,17,24	4484:18	4351:14	4508:4	4542:1
4405:1,9	4542:20	4368:24	4509:17	4543:15
4406:16,17	4545:1	4449:22	4510:25	4544:25
4407:1,5,1	markets	4499:16	4511:14,18	4545:8,25
0,18	4358:12,14	4535:14	4512:25	4547:17
4409:10,12	,15,21	4570:10	4515:14,25	4548:6,9
,14	4359:4,10,	matters	4516:25	4566:12
4410:21,23	12,20,23,2	4355:16	4518:8,16,	4567:15
4411:17	4 4360:1	4358:8	19,23	4571:4
4412:16	4361:9	4359:11	4519:3,9	4577:19
4414:24	4363:22	4447:7	4525:2	4579:16
4420:5,14	4364:22	4475:20	4527:13	4582:13
4435:22	4371:21,24	may	4528:7	4585:22
4436:6	4376:8	4350:2,10,	4529:17	4589:12
4438:5	4418:8	17,23,24	4530:11	meaning
4439:11	4460:23	4351:4,7,1	4533:18	4415:4
4478:12,16	4478:5,6,1	1	4536:21	4468:20
4489:23	3 4509:19	4353:5,11,	4542:3,7	4562:18
4490:6,21	4526:25	12	4548:7	means 4403:6
4494:12	4538:7,9	4361:20,21	4558:7	4547:11
4498:19,22	4543:12	4366:8	4570:4	4561:10
4504:20	4560:20	4368:11,23	4578:11,12	meant 4535:2
4505:3,14	4568:18	4372:10	4585:6	4558:16
4506:16,20	Marla 4344:6	4382:16	4598:14	meantime
4508:25	mass 4468:23	4385:5	maybe	4379:18
4512:13	4469:6	4392:3	4423:17	measured
4513:7,10,	match 4428:9	4399:19,21	4427:12	4363:4,16
11,17	material	4401:16	4446:1,6	measuring
4524:19	4353:24	4405:9	4467:11	4595:15,16
4527:3,6,2	4354:11,15	4412:18,23	4468:1,25	mech 4446:9
2	4442:16,17	4413:8	4471:18	mechanism
4528:6,23	,20	4415:20	4472:16	4446:9
4529:2	4448:23	4416:13,15	4473:22	mechanisms
4537:23	4465:2	4417:5,10	4514:19	4358:19
4538:7,12,	4471:14	4422:20	4517:24	4437:24
13 4558:11	4485:12	4426:10	4557:20	4544:13
4560:24	4523:12	4429:24	4583:24	meet 4355:20
4561:1,4	4524:4	4430:23	4594:10	4370:4,5
4562:21,23	4564:21	4431:1	meal 4474:20	4378:9,13
4571:24	materialize	4433:12	mean 4361:10	4395:9
4573:17,22	4458:6,7	4450:18,19	4377:9	4431:10
,24	4460:20	,22	4388:19	4490:12
4574:14	materials	4464:11	4392:12	4560:15
4576:14	4391:11	4469:10	4415:10	4580:21
4580:20	4565:7,8	4473:25	4418:4	meeting
4584:20	math 4536:18	4480:9,10	4432:10	4355:22
4585:10,13	matrix	4482:10	4447:14,20	4378:14
,15	4553:2	4487:9	4454:18	
4588:23		4488:22	4469:1	
4589:2		4491:13	4504:23	
4595:7		4496:2	4538:22	
marketplace		4498:9		

megawatt 4453:16,22 4454:2,15 4455:8,13, 23 4456:18,22 4457:1,7,1 1 4524:17 4590:12,14 ,15 4594:2,4,1 6	mentioned 4371:6 4391:9 4393:25 4394:24 4474:6 4529:22 4562:18 merchant 4571:17 Merci 4355:13 4475:22 4479:5,24 mergers 4478:18 merits 4529:24 message 4443:11 met 4370:4,5 4600:7 methodologie s 4560:3 methodology 4440:23 4441:15 4532:7,8 4536:13,17 4544:8 Metis 4546:16 metric 4492:16,17 4494:21,22 4504:22 metrics 4495:4 4524:3 Meyers 4459:18 MH-138 4346:8 4550:22 MH-139 4346:10 4551:4	MH-140 4346:12 4551:10 MH-141 4346:13 4551:21 MH-142 4346:14 4552:5 MH-143 4346:15 4552:12 MH-144 4346:16 4552:22 MH-145 4346:17 4553:6 MH-146 4346:18 4553:17 MH-147 4346:19 4554:1 MH-148 4346:20 4554:12 MH-149 4346:21 4554:23 MH-150 4346:22 4555:10 MH-151 4346:23 4555:17 MHEB 4587:25 M-hm 4547:19 Michael 4344:17,23 microeconomi cs 4358:4 microphone 4347:7 4352:17,23 4546:11	mid 4528:23 mid-2020s 4516:5 Midcontinent 4371:9 middle 4393:4 4533:22 4534:2,6,1 3 4536:11 mid-forties 4455:20 mid-January 4369:5 mid-west 4541:4 Midwest 4376:7,9 4548:15 4562:19 Miller 4344:12 mind 4407:7 4412:21 4413:15 4550:1 mindful 4354:1 minds 4356:8 minimal 4431:3 minimizing 4541:20 Minnesota 4399:22 4525:2 4588:16,24 4589:1,4,9 minor 4374:4 4384:8 4466:9 minus 4411:16 minute 4599:6 minutes	4405:11 4459:2,5 4475:10,12 4480:11 4537:14 MIPUG 4344:14 4350:10 4351:8 4360:13 4479:8 4555:4 MISO 4359:23 4362:4,24 4365:19,20 4371:10,24 ,25 4372:4,9,1 1,15 4376:11,25 4377:2,3,1 3,16,19 4378:8,11, 13,15,20 4382:16 4387:18,19 ,20 4388:9 4395:3 4400:25 4401:3,7 4404:1 4406:16 4407:2,9 4408:12,23 4409:10,19 ,24 4410:10,21 4412:16 4413:6 4420:16 4428:11,17 ,18 4432:25 4433:2 4440:3,20 4441:13 4464:17 4489:21,23 4490:7,12 4492:4 4504:20 4505:7,14 4512:14
---	--	---	---	---

4513:9,10	4478:17	modelling	monit	,24
4526:14	mixed	4440:11	4365:19	4464:11
4527:6,22	4583:24	4473:5	monitor	4469:10
4529:6,14	MKO 4344:16	4593:7	4358:12	4470:16,18
4530:3,4	4350:22,25	models	4359:8,20,	4472:1,14
4537:25	Mlle 4360:25	4363:24	22 4360:2	4473:19
4538:21	MMF 4344:19	4425:22	4364:16	4474:25
4542:4,19	4360:25	4426:5	4365:20	4475:9,21,
4556:17	4361:1	4430:3	4371:8	22
4557:1	MMF's	4442:7,14,	4558:11,16	4476:7,22
4558:11	4546:17	25	4559:4	4477:2,5,1
4560:19	MNP 4348:6,9	4444:1,22	4561:24	1,19
4561:1,24,	4349:11	4446:22	monitoring	4478:8,19
25	4389:12	4481:22	4358:11,19	4479:23,24
4562:9,12	4459:17,18	4544:14	4365:1,9	4482:10
4571:10	4572:25	4557:14	4371:8,14,	4486:10,12
4576:14	MNP's	4558:8	15,18	,15 4496:8
4580:19	4572:19	4559:5,12,	4414:10	4499:24
4587:24	4574:7	13,14	4478:13,14	4503:24
4588:11,16	mo 4474:17	4560:3	4538:5,12	4570:4
4590:8	mode	model's	4558:22	4592:7
4593:9	4380:16,18	4596:12	4562:8,9,1	4600:2
4595:9	model	modern	0	mor 4600:3
4597:6	4362:21,25	4384:2	monitors	morning
MISO's	4382:2	modest	4359:2	4347:3,10
4387:20	4397:5,14	4384:13	4537:24	4349:10
4428:10	4398:1	modestly	Monnin	4351:18,21
4597:3	4425:24	4483:22	4344:22	4352:20
MISO-wide	4426:2,7	moment	4345:8	4355:14
4378:8	4428:4	4449:18	4348:6	4356:2
misread	4429:2,25	4481:16	4352:18,19	4368:5
4543:13	4432:19,20	4517:25	4355:12,13	4369:10
misspoke	,21 4433:8	moments	4356:16	4370:1,3,6
4353:10	4443:16	4461:19	4357:4,8,1	,7 4449:13
4464:10	4445:17	momentum	2,20	4450:7
4481:14	4446:3	4460:20	4358:23	4477:7
misstate	4448:8	Monday	4359:13	4480:16
4452:16	4454:24	4348:17,20	4366:7,18,	4555:24
misunderstoo	4465:9	,23 4349:2	25 4367:9	4558:9
d	4489:23	4350:1,11,	4369:12,20	4559:25
4427:4,9,1	4493:13	12	,22,23	4575:19
3	4544:16	monetary	4392:3	4590:3,7
mitigate	4559:16,18	4399:10	4422:12,18	4597:2
4362:17	4572:9	money	4424:24	4598:23
mitigating	4595:8,15,	4372:20	4425:8	4599:1,8,1
4364:4	23,24	4404:7,10,	4426:9,10	3
mitigation	4596:10,20	17 4405:6	4433:22	4600:3,12
4362:4,8,2	modelled	4419:23	4441:11	mostly
3 4363:2	4448:21		4447:24	4400:7
4364:2			4448:2,18	4401:17
			4449:6	4460:17
			4458:17,20	motivations

4585:3	4383:16	4516:22	4515:7,8,1	4485:16
move 4352:1	4386:1	4561:16	2 4600:13	4499:22
4355:16	4388:5	neither	ninety	4522:24
4372:14	4389:5	4449:20	4408:3,4	notes
4379:1	4390:22	net	4583:20	4427:10
4381:12	4394:6	4379:21,22	4584:6	4585:25
4382:7,8,9	4402:23	4383:13	ninety-five	4587:19
4385:17	4431:10,18	4385:23	4421:19	nothing
4388:14	4452:5	4403:21,22	4583:20	4369:23
4389:2	4458:3	4405:24	nobody	4401:13
4403:6	4481:23	4411:2,14	4496:25	4424:21
4420:4	4565:9	4413:5	no-CO2	notice
4499:20	4591:6	4419:13	4448:21	4348:7
4504:15	4596:3,7	4530:20	4458:1	4401:19
4587:20	naturally	4555:6	nodding	4537:10
moved	4541:5	4571:23	4353:8	noting
4379:23	4595:13	4576:16,18	node 4588:17	4354:7,24
moves	nature	,19	non 4505:6	4550:11
4379:23	4384:16	4577:1,12	non-CO2	notion
4430:18	4505:6	4581:25	4534:5	4535:24
moving	4584:12	4582:3	non-	np
4350:17	near-term	net-cone	contracted	4344:3,7,1
4352:6	4364:7	4419:16	4542:14	2,17,20,23
4384:24	necessarily	net-CONE	none 4579:6	NYISO
4393:17	4414:23	4404:14	non-	4359:24
4430:17	4433:11	4406:5	functionin	4371:10
4451:25	4523:9	4408:3,14	g 4407:1	4571:8
4483:22	4535:3	4413:11	non-	
4522:9	4585:1	4418:20,21	transparen	
4548:18	necessary	4419:5,6,7	t 4450:23	
mystery	4368:21	,11	nor 4458:15	
4377:8	4372:22	4580:16	north	
4473:25	4422:8	4581:5	4387:19	
	4471:15,21	networks	note 4353:22	
	4485:10	4359:9	4466:4,20	
	4531:8	neutral	4472:8	
name-brand	4548:22	4534:11	4586:16	
4545:19	4549:25	new-build	4587:25	
narrative	4560:7	4542:8	4588:13	
4472:2,11	negative	news 4498:15	4591:3	
4473:3	4575:3	NFAT 4440:21	4596:5	
4474:16	negotiate	4441:4,14	noted 4355:3	
narrow	4516:4,18	4520:17	4362:2	
4581:23	negotiating	4554:7	4368:7	
narrowed	4513:23	nice	4369:7	
4499:9	negotiation	4370:4,5	4370:17	
national	4490:24	4458:12		
4350:12	4561:14	nine 4480:8		
4460:11	negotiations	4488:16		
natural				

4484:5	offer	4396:14	ones 4395:8	4358:15
4498:6	4353:17	4398:5	4421:17	4359:9
4503:25	4363:5,14	4399:16	4434:25	4361:19,20
objections	4376:25	4401:10	4471:4	4371:15,16
4360:14	4383:9	4404:25	4522:1,5,6	operator
4361:2	4443:24	4409:4	4558:3,6	4361:20
4423:11	4468:16	4413:21	4567:19	4395:23
4479:8,19	4472:8	4415:22	4575:19	operators
4500:2,13	4506:2	4420:4	4586:22	4359:3
objective	offered	4422:11	4599:7	opinion
4541:20	4576:4	4424:18	one-two	4355:5
objects	offering	4425:10	4393:10	4460:24
4485:5	4360:9	4430:5	ongoing	4470:8
4521:7	offers	4441:8	4354:9	4497:14
obligation	4362:9	4442:22	4408:23	4516:23
4415:17	4363:10	4446:4	4428:3	4520:6
4539:4	4364:3	4450:5	online	4531:18
obligations	4575:5	4453:10	4378:12	opinions
4478:16,17	off-peak	4458:4,23	4383:2	4360:9
observations	4374:25	4459:4	4384:16	4460:24
4398:22,23	4375:22,23	4462:25	4387:18	4578:22
4400:8	4384:6	4463:24	on-peak	opportunities 4527:14
4439:9	4397:19,20	4468:10	4374:24	opportunity
obtain	,22	4482:23	4375:22,23	4351:2
4442:6	4400:23	4486:8	4397:17	4436:14
4444:20,24	4402:1	4488:11	4464:16	4464:17
4445:4	4430:24	4490:22	4465:12,13	4466:16
obvious	4431:1	4503:5	4481:11	4486:20
4416:19	4481:10	4505:1,13	4484:13	4489:3,4,1
4496:9	4502:14	4516:14	4502:14	2 4491:2
4500:1	4503:20	4517:3	4503:20	4495:20
obviously	offset	4518:5	4543:1,5,8	4523:8
4416:7	4373:10	4522:25	4591:25	4524:3
occur	offsetting	4526:1	4593:24	4542:24
4387:11	4553:3	4532:22	onto 4430:25	opposed
4406:6	oh 4351:25	4546:10	open 4418:8	4414:13
4468:7,24	4388:17	4547:10	4526:25	4416:5,14
4599:22	4399:13	4548:12,23	4527:14	4489:3
occurred	4412:12	4550:9	4578:13	4494:2
4468:9	4447:13,21	4556:11	oper 4405:17	4500:17
occurring	4505:4	4565:14	operable	4535:7,17
4467:25	4521:17	4568:9	4516:6	4553:15
4468:3	4555:13	4575:12	operate	opposite
o'clock	4567:15	4576:12	4359:3	4351:6
4355:19	4568:23	4577:6	4405:17,18	optimistic
4433:23	4594:13	4580:14	4562:14	4461:5
4458:22	okay 4353:16	4583:25	operating	4509:18
4600:13	4362:7	4591:10	4405:3,15	4533:19
	4363:1	4594:13,15	operations	
	4383:22	old		
		4429:10,15		
		OMS 4408:23		

optimization 4374:2	otherwise 4447:6	4481:4 4539:8 4596:21	4427:2,17 4435:2,16 4438:15 4441:22 4442:2 4444:7 4445:9 4446:5 4447:18,19 4461:20 4464:4,10 4465:23,25 4467:3 4469:21 4471:6 4481:8 4502:3,5 4503:6,7 4504:16 4507:24 4508:10 4511:8 4519:11,17 ,23 4520:2 4523:6,19, 21 4543:24 4552:9 4555:4 4556:1 4560:10 4574:12 4579:22,24 4583:9,11, 12 4585:21 4586:7,19 4592:12,15 4593:14	4353:4,19 4354:2 4356:12 4366:3 4370:3 4383:5 4389:22 4392:5 4393:24 4400:20,23 4427:18 4433:20 4434:21 4453:8,11 4462:2 4479:21 4480:7 4483:6 4537:8 4598:20
option 4348:3 4350:20 4415:2 4521:14 4541:13	ours 4532:20 ourselves 4462:16 4521:3	overbuild 4531:5 overbuilding 4512:8 4531:10		
options 4541:21,24	outbound 4534:24	overcome 4370:24 4580:24		
order 4356:20 4362:10 4363:9 4372:22 4376:21 4378:16 4395:24 4397:23 4399:20 4400:2,4 4425:19 4476:12 4514:11 4572:11 4581:14,15	outcome 4355:8 4387:8 outcomes 4358:13,16 4359:6 4371:17,20 4387:9 4436:5 4467:18 4469:6 4535:4 outline 4460:11 outlook 4440:16 4494:17 4504:19	over- committed 4382:24 overnight 4564:1 4568:5 overruled 4354:22 oversee 4478:5 oversight 4511:6 overstate 4413:12 4502:9 4503:15 overview 4403:20 overwhelming 4416:3		
organization 4370:15 4371:2 4410:4 4428:12	output 4358:22 4516:19 4567:22			
organization s 4359:21	outputs 4446:22 4544:17			
original 4381:17 4421:18	outside 4362:11,12 4363:6,14 4409:10 4427:22 4428:1,9 4493:5 4528:17 4542:4 4559:16 4567:7	<hr/> P <hr/> p.m 4348:13 4377:17 4434:12,13 4475:14,15 4537:16,17 4600:15 pa 4501:17 page 4345:2 4346:2 4392:18,23 4421:20 4423:3,13, 24 4425:11 4426:17	pages 4343:25 4421:16 4469:8,14 pagination 4465:24 4467:2 paid 4405:9 panel 4345:5 4348:19,24 4349:10,20 ,23 4350:2 4351:4,9,1 1,20,23 4352:3,11	panels 4349:14 paper 4351:16 4453:8 4454:6 4455:2 4456:15 paragraph 4423:24 4424:13 4442:5 4466:4 4467:4,11 4502:4 4579:24 4580:2,15 4581:24 paragraphs 4424:11 parallel 4590:21 4591:3,9 parameters 4580:17 paraphrasing 4489:24 pardon 4544:22 participant
Orle 4344:16 4360:21,22 4458:15 4479:10,11 ,13 4550:4,6	outstanding 4485:23 overall 4480:17			
Orle's 4350:22				
others 4412:20 4441:5 4579:17 4594:25				

4358:13	4541:10	4520:24	21,24	4490:4
participants	passing	4521:10	4578:4,8,1	4491:22
4359:7	4453:21	4523:13	8	4493:4
4361:22	past 4363:22	4543:19	4579:2,6,1	4494:5
4363:4,23	4364:1,12,	4549:14	3,19	4495:8,23
4460:23,25	18 4417:24	4550:9	4580:4,9,1	4503:21,25
4538:1	4493:7	4551:1,7,1	4 4581:8	4505:18
4573:18,22	4496:4	2,23	4582:10,22	4506:1,13
,25	4499:14	4552:7,14,	,25	4507:11
particular	4504:21	24	4583:8,16	4508:12,21
4392:4	4505:2,12,	4553:8,19	4584:1,23	4510:13
4424:12	15 4586:20	4554:3,14,	4585:20,24	4511:22
4442:4	4593:9	25	4586:3,11,	4513:2
4470:1	path 4461:18	4555:12,19	15,20	4514:6
4483:12	4501:17	,20	4587:8,17	4515:2,5,2
4503:10	paths	4556:8,12,	4588:8,9	2 4516:14
4523:15	4501:18	21 4557:5	4589:2,7,1	4517:2
4530:2	Pathway	4558:1,9	2,21	4518:21
4564:17	4554:20	4559:3,8,1	4590:1,6,1	4527:23
4570:5	Patrick	2,18,24	1,20	4530:4
4572:1	4350:9	4560:10,23	4591:10,16	4531:1
4584:16	pattern	4561:4,8,1	,20,23	4532:16
4596:1	4454:12	3,18,23	4592:17,18	4533:6,9
particularly	Patti 4344:5	4562:1,13,	4593:5,13,	4534:7,18
4383:17	4345:15	25	18,23	4536:4
4390:21	4351:25	4563:1,7,1	4594:7,11,	4537:3,12,
4413:19	4361:4,6,1	2,20,22	15,19,23	21
parties	4,25	4564:1,4,1	4595:21	4538:2,17,
4348:13	4362:20	9,25	4596:8,19	24 4539:17
4352:1,7	4363:20	4565:4,12,	4597:1,15,	4540:20
4365:22	4364:6,10	15,18,23	19	4541:17
4537:10	4365:11,18	4566:2,7,1	4598:2,25	4546:3,15
4558:12	,25	0,18,23	4599:4	4555:21
4559:4	4368:14	4567:2,7,1	Patton	4562:5,16,
4560:1	4369:16	3,23	4345:10	17,19
4584:23	4423:19	4568:1,9,1	4355:18	4568:13,23
partly	4424:8,17	9	4356:2	4569:6,9,1
4347:17	4425:2	4569:3,8,1	4357:11,19	4,23
4394:5	4437:9	2,21	4370:20	4570:6,16,
4513:3	4448:23	4570:12,13	4407:6	20,24
party	4473:9	,18,21	4474:23	4571:7,12,
4482:18	4479:19	4571:3,9,1	4475:23,25	19
4540:19	4482:15	5,22	4476:4,8,1	4572:3,7,1
4561:14,18	4484:4,16	4572:4,10,	0,21,22	3,16
4596:13	4485:2	14,18	4477:1,4,1	4581:21
pass 4546:11	4497:21,24	4573:3,13,	0,11,14,20	4582:14,24
passages	4498:14	24	4478:1,10,	4583:2
4586:19	4503:23	4574:5,9,2	11,20,21	4584:10
passed	4504:1	3	4479:22	4585:8
	4517:12,19	4575:6,10,	4480:12	4591:2,15,
		21	4486:22,24	19,22
		4576:6,12,	4487:5,7	4592:1,21
		22	4489:14	4594:8,13
		4577:5,16,		4595:3

4596:4,15, 23	4585:18	4457:1,7,1	perhaps	4364:7,20
Patton's	4586:1	1 4553:3	4351:3	4414:3
4366:9	4587:6,15	4554:8	4352:13	perspectives
4370:21	4589:25	4583:21	4355:9	4574:1
4600:6	4592:5	4584:7	4416:8,10	pertained
pause	4593:3,16	percent	4418:2	4426:13
4373:19	4595:19	4387:25	4430:10	pessimistic
4381:1	pay 4404:5	4388:24	4432:8	4533:19
4385:14	4531:6	4389:7,15	4435:1	Peter
4392:1,20	4543:7	4390:3	4446:5	4344:12
4393:1,15	peak 4374:3	4393:22	4448:17	Peters
4394:21	4375:25	4394:15,16	4461:3	4344:2
4405:21	4376:1,3	,17	4465:7	4347:7,9
4407:24	4400:21,22	4396:18	4486:9	4351:23
4417:18	4401:24	4397:18,19	4488:6	4353:3,9
4420:11	4402:6,7,1	4398:11,17	4489:3	4367:18,22
4421:5,13	2,13	4431:19	4491:25	4369:1
4422:16	4405:14,18	4452:10	4492:1,3	4599:4,8,1
4423:6	4452:22	4456:13	4508:6	0,25
4424:6,15	4466:16	4466:15,24	4518:6	Peters's
4436:22	4480:19,20	4467:22,25	4520:22	4353:8
4439:16	4484:2	4468:2	4530:9	PhD 4358:3
4441:19,25	4523:8	4469:1	4560:8	4370:13
4443:21	4524:2	4501:2,12,	period	4371:1
4444:10	4542:24	16 4502:1	4382:13	4478:1
4445:12	pen 4464:13	4512:23	4387:1,15	pick 4390:11
4451:5	penmanship	4547:6,7,8	4388:12	4410:24
4452:18	4586:17	,11,22	4389:6	4460:24
4459:7	people	4572:20	4390:4	4469:1,6
4461:23	4352:13	4586:7	4414:5	4534:6
4463:7	4377:21	4587:2	4431:19	picking
4464:7	4386:3	4594:20	4462:12,18	4410:20
4470:13,24	4408:14	4595:2	4494:15,21	4558:2
4473:7	4495:4	perfect	4496:5	picks
4482:8	4517:6,21,	4435:2	4501:8,9,1	4482:22
4483:3	24 4520:21	perfectly	3,14	piece 4352:9
4486:2	4524:5	4402:18	4507:9,10	pieces
4497:5	4546:1	perform	4539:21	4549:22
4502:16	4549:17	4560:24	4552:19	pipe 4527:11
4517:7,16	4552:1	performance	periods	Pittsburgh
4519:14,20	4599:7	4363:22	4376:18	4358:3
4520:19	peoples	4364:1	4383:1	4370:14
4523:1	4351:15	4538:6	4495:7	PJM 4360:1,2
4524:8	per 4396:5	4577:17	pers 4586:5	4407:21
4531:21	4400:21,24	performed	person	4409:10
4536:2	4408:6	4570:1	4352:10	4410:21,24
4539:15	4453:15,21	performing	4553:14	places
4549:12	4454:2,15	4438:11	perspective	
4558:19	4455:8,12,	perhap	4353:17	
4578:16	23	4468:1	4354:3,13	
4582:8	4456:18,22		4360:7	
4583:6,14				

4509:24	4429:10	4475:23	,5 4540:10	,14
plait	4430:11,19	pleasure	4549:20	4500:2,4
4479:1,6,1	,21	4352:20	4570:5	4515:24
8 4487:1	4481:24	4355:14	4596:9	4537:23
plan 4343:10	4571:18	plotting	pointed	4538:23
4353:15	4582:23	4346:8	4546:7	4539:11
4356:22	4583:1	4550:17,22	pointer	4540:7,12
4357:1	plants	plugged	4380:16,17	4599:12
4372:2	4384:1	4399:6	pointing	positive
4373:16,25	4417:4	plural	4510:20	4496:19,23
4410:4,11,	4429:4,12	4571:4	points	4585:14
15 4418:16	4430:8,9	plus 4373:1	4353:2	possession
4428:12	4431:10	4578:3	4370:10	4563:9
4436:12	plant's	poetic	4372:12	possibility
4476:15,18	4430:13	4350:7	4385:9	4412:18
4488:3	plausibility	point	4400:3	4467:22
4522:11	4510:12	4354:21	4411:3,4	4510:11
4525:15	plausible	4355:20	4421:22	possible
4545:14	4391:19	4373:6	4439:6	4387:9
4554:19,20	4394:10	4375:10	4518:23	4413:20
4558:4	4456:6,9	4381:22	4533:1	4472:2,10
4560:13	4467:7,15	4384:8	political	4473:2
4597:10	4468:6	4385:11	4460:17	4491:13
plane	4510:6,7	4390:11	pool 4395:7	4503:18
4458:21	4535:4	4393:10,12	poor 4459:12	4535:3
planned	plausibly	4400:5,6	Portage	4544:16
4350:22	4468:7	4410:25	4343:22	4578:9
4355:24	play 4449:18	4411:1	portfo	4593:20
planner	4475:3	4413:22	4565:5	4598:22
4597:22	4536:19	4422:2	portfolio	4599:21
4598:10,16	player	4426:4	4565:5	possibly
planners	4361:17	4430:14	portion	4422:13
4597:17	please	4442:23	4374:1	postponing
planning	4347:8	4446:25	4384:12	4489:3
4352:4	4352:23	4448:24	4514:1	POT-2-1
4406:3,4,8	4360:4,21	4450:13	4522:20	4346:3
,11,13	4367:21	4451:1	4592:23	4366:15
4407:13	4388:16	4458:12	posed	POT-2-2
4410:3,11	4416:10	4461:4,12	4485:21	4346:5
4428:11	4434:17	4470:17	position	4366:22
4530:12	4441:23	4475:25	4349:18,21	POT-3 4346:6
4552:19	4477:12,23	4481:10	4406:17	4367:6
4597:7,16,	4478:25	4485:8	4433:17	POT-4 4346:7
23 4598:11	4479:10,14	4490:8,20	4434:16	4367:13
plans	4480:3	4492:8	4443:24	Potam
4520:12	4489:13	4497:22	4448:19	4532:10
4554:7	4493:3	4509:15	4473:10	potential
plant	4587:13	4510:25	4485:11,13	4349:12
4365:16	4588:6	4512:17		
4428:25	pleased	4516:11		
		4533:1,2,3		

4449:22	4481:8	4414:14,18	4503:11	4598:3,9
4459:23	4485:22	4415:3,4,9	preferences	preparing
4460:2	4501:11	,12,14,22	4540:11	4354:16
4574:1	4504:18,19	4416:6,13,	Preferred	4435:5
4577:6	4514:22	14	4343:10	4473:15
potentially	4516:23	4418:11,15	4356:22,25	4488:9
4459:5	4518:14,20	,18	4372:2	presence
Potomac	4519:25	practical	4476:14,18	4537:11
4345:5	4520:6	4536:21	4488:2	present
4346:3,5,6	4521:6	pre 4467:7	4522:10	4348:19,20
,7 4354:8	4522:3	4479:25	4525:14	4351:24
4355:15	4523:22	precent	4554:19,20	4356:2
4356:12,18	4531:17	4524:2	4560:13	4439:22
,23 4357:4	4534:25	precision	pre-filed	4467:17
4358:1	4544:5	4502:13	4451:1	4468:1
4359:16	4556:9,14,	predicated	4452:15	4552:20
4360:8	23 4579:22	4512:16	prefor	4566:14
4362:1	Potomac-2-1	predict	4476:14	presenta
4366:2,10,	4461:20	4566:24	pregnant	4592:13
13,15,20,2	Potomac's	4579:7	4517:7	presentation
2	4362:2	4595:25	prejudge	4346:7
4367:3,6,1	4439:19	4596:13	4488:13	4348:15
3 4368:16	4444:8	predicted	prejudice	4354:21
4369:7,8	4446:20	4596:2	4354:14	4357:13
4371:5	4498:13,15	predicting	4355:1	4366:10
4423:13	,17	4540:10	4485:13	4367:10,14
4425:11	4520:13,15	predictive	preliminarie	4369:25
4426:18	4532:10	4596:10	s 4369:20	4370:10
4427:4,21	4533:7	preface	preliminary	4372:8
4431:4	4534:20	4487:10	4476:8	4373:8
4436:18,19	4592:13	4488:24	premium	4397:13
,25	4597:4	4503:13	4464:17,23	4426:14
4437:6,17	pound	prefaced	4465:3,14	4431:24
4438:2,22	4527:19	4503:11	4542:14,19	4452:21
4439:20,21	power	prefer	,23	4453:9,15
4440:8,24	4360:13	4354:3	4543:7,11,	4477:6
4441:16,22	4361:18	4412:18	16 4585:12	4478:22
4442:6,13	4362:18,23	4418:14	preparation	4501:1
4444:7	4395:25	preference	4355:1	4555:24
4446:11	4399:18	4353:20	prepared	4556:2
4447:25	4415:5,6	4413:21	4354:23	4583:12
4449:15	4478:16	4414:7,12,	4357:5,9,1	4585:25
4451:2,8	4487:7	21 4416:2	5,17	4590:3
4452:22	4537:24	4417:22,23	4476:23	4592:11,14
4460:1,12	4538:3,21,	4539:6	4477:3,8,1	4593:6,14
4462:6	22 4541:16	4540:23	7	presentation
4463:1	4558:22	4542:11	4479:22,25	s 4351:13
4473:1,14	PowerPoint	preferenced	4597:20	4410:7
4476:11,16	4425:16			4425:16
,23	4451:2			presented
4477:25	PPA			4349:10
4478:4				
4479:25				

4360:8,10, 15 4431:24 4438:22 4439:19 4470:3 4479:4,9,1 6 4553:24 presenter 4348:14,18 presenters 4348:17 presenting 4440:10 4467:15 4469:16 presently 4350:10 presents 4511:12 preserve 4350:14 president 4352:20 4355:14 4359:14 4366:7 4369:24 4371:5 4458:20 4475:23 4478:3 4479:25 press 4469:11 pressure 4526:17 pressures 4354:2 presumably 4418:5 presumes 4437:10 pretty 4392:12 4397:16 4407:20 4467:1 4499:4,6	4512:14 4519:24 4533:22,23 4536:9,10 prevail 4506:6 prevailing 4397:11 4400:9 previous 4408:21 previously 4348:10 4369:4 4444:13 price 4362:21 4374:16,19 4375:21,22 ,23,24 4376:22 4377:4 4378:1,5,7 ,8,17,19,2 1 4379:9,10 4380:3,5,6 4381:7,10, 15,17,19,2 2,24 4383:9 4384:3,6,1 2,21 4386:11,18 4389:16 4390:13 4391:2,14 4392:10 4393:6,7,9 ,11 4394:3 4395:3,5,1 4,15,17,19 ,21 4396:6,16, 22 4398:4,7 4399:15 4400:21,24 4401:2,5,2 0,21 4402:1,3,1 1	4403:4,6,7 ,8,10,21,2 3 4404:12 4406:1 4407:13,15 4408:17,19 4410:19 4411:2,7,1 5,21,23 4412:6,10 4413:6,7,1 0,12,15 4417:24 4419:3,7 4427:8,10 4429:3,16, 18,19 4430:16,18 4431:1 4432:9 4435:22 4442:15 4444:20 4445:21 4452:5 4454:14,22 ,23 4456:3 4459:12 4462:5 4464:18 4465:12 4469:17 4477:16 4483:24,25 4487:13 4490:9,16, 25 4495:17,19 4505:5,20 4506:25 4507:3 4508:25 4509:3,5,7 ,9 4510:1 4512:1,2,3 ,9,11,18 4514:11,18 4518:24 4519:2,4 4520:7 4523:8,25 4529:8,14, 15 4531:19 4533:1,2,3	,4 4542:18 4544:6 4545:1,5,1 3,17,20 4546:1 4548:19 4549:6,7 4572:22 4574:15 4575:2 4578:1,2,3 ,24 4580:19 4581:25 4583:10,17 4584:12,22 4585:10,13 ,16 4587:10,24 ,25 4588:3,4,1 2,16,19,21 4591:13,24 4593:7,8,1 9 4594:3 4595:5,13, 25 4597:8,21 priced 4509:13 prices 4346:4 4358:18,22 4361:23,24 4362:13,14 4364:23 4365:6 4366:16 4371:12 4372:4,9,1 5 4373:17,23 4374:9,11, 21,24,25 4375:1 4376:2,21 4378:20 4382:8 4385:24 4388:14 4389:8,24 4391:18 4395:6	4396:3,5,9 4400:23 4402:1,24, 25 4406:10 4407:16,20 ,21 4408:14 4410:13,21 ,22,24 4411:20 4418:25 4419:2 4420:1,3,6 ,8,9 4424:1 4427:15 4428:24 4429:24 4430:1,24 4431:14 4432:4,17 4436:6 4438:18 4440:3,21 4441:13 4442:9 4443:1,17 4444:3,13, 15 4445:1 4446:11 4458:1,3,5 ,6,7 4463:2,3 4477:18 4480:18,19 ,25 4481:4,11, 12,16,19,2 3 4482:5 4483:10,23 4484:2,13, 24 4487:15,22 4489:17 4490:10 4493:11 4494:8,9 4495:11,12 ,21 4498:20 4502:10 4503:16 4504:4,21 4505:19
---	---	--	---	--

4506:4,10, 17	4571:7	problem	4468:9	4399:21
4507:6,14, 19 4512:16	primary	4399:17	4472:21	4407:3
4513:6,7,1	4371:25	4407:9	4525:24	4451:11
1 4520:1,8	4477:12	4420:18	4530:12	4508:19
4521:21	4494:7	4472:15,20	4546:20	4530:16,17
4522:4,5	4596:18	problems	processes	4531:3
4524:23,25	print	4404:18	4394:7	4558:23
4526:11,12	4351:18	procedure	4560:7	products
,17	prior	4362:4	procure	4374:22,23
4542:14,19	4356:3,9	proceed	4414:9	4502:20
4545:23	private	4353:7	4541:9	4504:17
4549:5	4566:15	4369:25	procurement	professional
4556:17	4567:1,11,	4423:4	4365:1,5	4578:5
4557:1	22 4571:21	4424:25	4414:10	profiles
4558:24	probabilisti	4425:3	4558:22	4548:8
4559:2	c 4553:23	4476:1	produce	profitabilit
4561:5	probabilitie	4483:7	4388:2	y
4563:14,17	s	4488:19	4394:1	4364:22,23
,20 4575:3	4394:11,13	4522:10	4399:24	profitable
4577:25	,18	4530:1,2	4400:5	4406:2
4579:4	4468:24	4579:18	4433:5	profits
4581:2	4501:19,24	proceeding	4495:10	4418:21
4582:1	4512:22	4361:5	4558:11	program
4589:1	4536:18,20	4365:3	4567:11,17	4362:10
4591:6	probability	4373:24	,19 4576:3	4377:10
4592:2	4393:23	4423:22	4582:1	programming
4593:24	4451:21	4434:25	4596:6	4433:7
4595:1	4452:9	4440:22	produced	programs
4596:3	4497:11	4441:14	4437:25	4553:3
pricing	4497:11	4492:12	4467:5,13	project
4420:23	4501:12,16	4545:12	4506:23	4372:17
4436:6	,25	4554:18	4510:22	4374:1
4488:25	4533:17	4559:19	4512:3	4375:4
4506:12,16	4572:21,25	4570:7	4554:10	4376:16
4512:14	4573:10	proceedings	4566:14	4387:14
4561:10	probable	4347:4	4590:2	4400:13
4572:19	4467:17	4358:1	produces	4410:25
4573:14	4496:1	4475:19	4395:2	4412:2
4574:7	probably	4477:13,25	producing	4507:13
4587:25	4353:23	4486:16	4388:1	4528:16,24
4588:13	4409:11	4537:20	4405:7	4552:9
4590:16	4460:20	4600:11	4439:5	4577:4
primarily	4474:20,25	process	4467:15	projected
4371:24	4480:13	4362:9,15	4510:15	4376:20
4372:3	4495:17	4363:3	product	4399:4
4406:20	4497:2	4364:2	4543:9	4420:16
4477:14	4537:7	4388:10	4585:2,4	4438:18
4478:6	4567:24	4394:19,25	production	4466:15
4549:23	4592:2	4395:20	4391:8	4555:6
4565:8	4593:1	4416:16	4393:24	
4569:18		4437:16		

4556:15,24 4577:2,10	4443:7 4560:3	provocative 4450:7	4580:18 4582:18	puts 4484:17
projecting 4413:1 4470:10 4471:8 4517:13 4591:13	prospective 4364:3	PUB 4353:12 4356:20 4357:21 4369:3 4371:23 4476:13 4477:13,21 4520:10 4544:5 4550:3,15 4557:8	pull 4395:8 4434:23 4436:17 4506:17 4523:20 4572:11	putting 4368:6 4373:24 4404:2 4521:12 4530:16 4545:12
projection 4496:18	protect 4560:5	public 4343:3,21 4350:13 4354:9 4355:4,6,9 4356:19 4367:24 4368:1,5,7 4369:2 4377:1,7 4431:23 4434:24,25 4435:7,10,19 4436:1,10 4440:1,21 4441:2,9 4446:16 4448:19 4449:5 4476:12 4503:18 4504:12 4517:5 4520:14 4521:16 4522:21 4523:10 4531:16,17 4535:19,22 4559:23 4566:22 4567:8,14,21,22 4598:21 4600:4	pur 4489:4 purchase 4415:5,6 4537:25 4538:3,21,22 4541:16 4545:14 4567:14 purely 4542:17 purpose 4373:8 4521:12,15 4583:16 purposes 4359:16 4366:5 4375:19 4378:17 4448:8 4449:7 4484:7 4569:10 4585:7 4597:21,23 pursue 4489:4,11 4587:18 pursued 4491:3 pursuing 4484:7 4489:2 push 4416:16 4460:18 4488:21,22 4510:4 4534:1 pushing 4430:24 4515:11	<hr/> Q <hr/> Qual 4345:6,10 4356:13 4476:4 qualificatio n 4345:7,11 4356:15 4476:6 4487:6 qualificatio ns 4357:24 4360:23 4361:2 4420:21 4477:24 4479:3,9,16 qualified 4355:23 4356:7,9 4366:2 4476:1 4479:12 qualitative 4413:4 qualitativel y 4511:23 quality 4415:20 4596:9 quan 4439:14 quantified 4412:20 quantify 4413:13 4529:13 quantitative
projections 4387:2,13 4389:3 4390:3 4393:13 4401:3 4420:18 4427:25 4438:25 4493:20 4507:3 4560:16,17 4576:25 4597:3	provide 4403:11 4405:2,4,5 4426:6 4442:16 4464:15 4467:7 4470:21 4473:2 4496:21 4497:2 4513:11 4519:2 4526:5 4551:25 4552:16 4560:2,7 4567:8 4572:24 4587:3 4599:20	PUB/Manitoba 4553:12		
projects 4506:24 4530:8,9 4539:6	provided 4432:17 4437:18 4440:1,14 4463:16 4487:15 4494:16,20 4495:25 4563:2,8 4564:16			
properly 4427:14				
property 4570:14				
propit 4544:21				
propitire 4544:22				
proportional 4384:22	provides 4367:18 4405:1 4502:22			
propose 4355:22 4356:6 4475:24	providing 4370:16 4478:14			
proposed 4352:3 4375:3	province 4435:11,20 4436:2,11 4492:14			
proposing 4372:19,21	proviso 4367:18	published		
proprietary				

4439:14	4528:3	4549:10,22	4364:6,10	15,18,23
quantities	4534:19	4550:5	4365:11,18	4566:2,7,1
4372:11	4536:22	4578:12	,25	0,18,23
4373:15,22	4538:25	4598:24	4368:14	4567:2,7,1
,23 4374:5	4545:21	4599:5,10,	4369:14,16	3,23
4420:17,19	4548:1	19	4423:19	4568:1,9,1
4481:24	4549:2	quick 4591:2	4424:8,17	9
4526:4,11,	4573:19	quickly	4425:2	4569:3,8,1
16	4579:15	4446:5	4437:9	2,21
quantity	4583:23	4463:13	4441:10	4570:12,13
4374:6	4587:18	quilt	4448:16,23	,18,21
quarter	4588:6	4500:15	4464:11	4571:3,9,1
4434:4,10	4597:13,25	quite	4469:10	5,22
question	4598:8	4372:17	4473:9	4572:4,10,
4359:19	questioning	4410:9	4479:18,19	14,18
4363:2	4434:16	4515:18	4482:15	4573:3,13,
4368:15	4521:8	4516:17	4484:4,9,1	24
4373:7,12	4598:23	4527:7	6 4485:2	4574:5,9,2
4382:9	questionings	4544:25	4497:21,24	3
4383:12,21	4598:18	4555:23	4498:14	4575:6,10,
4390:17	questions	4591:4	4499:11	21
4391:4	4348:1	quote	4503:23	4576:6,12,
4392:5	4351:19,23	4582:10	4504:1	22
4407:8	4355:17	quotes	4517:12,19	4577:5,16,
4427:18	4356:7	4582:17	4520:24	21,24
4429:8	4361:5	quoting	4521:10	4578:4,8,1
4437:10,13	4366:1	4520:8	4523:13	8
4441:10	4383:4	4556:1	4543:19	4579:2,6,1
4442:4	4388:13	<hr/>	4549:9,14	3,19
4448:17	4389:21	R	4550:9	4580:4,9,1
4449:1,4	4397:25	raise	4551:1,7,1	4 4581:8
4458:9	4403:5	4361:24	2,23	4582:10,22
4459:12	4404:21	4526:20	4552:7,14,	,25
4484:7,20	4412:10	raised	24	4583:8,16
4485:6	4420:6,8	4372:12	4553:8,19	4584:1,23
4489:13	4432:1	4421:1,23	4554:3,14,	4585:20,24
4493:2	4433:17	4429:23	25	4586:3,11,
4496:2	4462:2	4484:7	4555:12,19	15,20
4497:13,22	4476:8	raising	,20	4587:8,17
4498:5	4480:8	4362:13	4556:8,12,	4588:8,9
4499:2	4485:9	Ramage	21 4557:5	4589:2,7,1
4500:21	4488:12,14	4344:5	4558:1,9	2,21
4502:11,22	4489:2	4345:15	4559:3,8,1	4590:1,6,1
4503:12,22	4518:1	4351:25	2,18,24	1,20
4504:9,19	4521:2,13	4352:17	4560:10,23	4591:10,16
4507:1	4522:18	4361:3,4,6	4561:4,8,1	,20,23
4514:9,20	4523:5,6,7	,14,25	3,18,23	4592:9,17,
4516:11	4529:18	4362:20	4562:1,13,	18
4517:8,18,	4531:15,25	4363:20	25	4593:5,13,
20 4518:9	4537:6,21		4563:1,7,1	18,23
4523:14	4546:19,20		2,20,22	4594:7,11,
4524:3,12	,21,23		4564:1,4,1	15,19,23
			9,25	4595:21
			4565:4,12,	4596:8,19

4597:1,15, 19 4598:2,25 4599:4 Ramage's 4473:20 4498:6 ran 4582:2 range 4363:5,6,1 5 4386:12 4421:24 4467:12,17 ,21 4468:12,17 4535:4 4568:20 4573:17 4593:23,25 4594:7,15, 20 4595:2,4 ranges 4362:11,12 4363:6 4499:15,17 rank 4457:24 rapidly 4490:16 rate 4418:14 4430:7,8,2 0 4462:21 4463:12,18 4569:20 4570:21 4571:4,9 4577:23 ratepayers 4515:1 4561:20 rates 4430:7,17 4481:23 4496:20,23 4497:2 4531:8 4541:15 4565:20 4569:21,23	,24 rather 4353:21 4355:23 4390:4 4397:15 4400:14 4410:2 4411:7 4412:19 4419:17 4422:7 4451:1 4467:14 4475:2 4532:18 4541:25 4592:14 4596:11 rating 4415:13 4528:13 ratio 4568:10 4569:1 re 4343:7 4514:8 rea 4526:24 reach 4409:14 4469:21 reader 4581:9 4582:19 reading 4424:9 4467:11 4498:23 ready 4347:4 4369:24 4433:19,20 4475:18 4484:9 4537:20 4576:3 real 4362:3 4411:3,12 4423:20 4463:3	4497:1 4538:6 4543:6 4591:13,21 realize 4395:10 realizing 4587:20 really 4373:8,14, 21 4382:5 4395:2 4396:2,4,1 1 4398:12 4409:5,12, 17 4410:14,20 ,22 4411:18 4417:15 4420:14 4422:2,3 4425:19 4426:3,23 4428:18 4429:2,3 4430:16,17 4431:15 4447:15 4450:3,4 4460:16 4462:11 4463:25 4465:21 4468:8 4471:17,21 4474:4 4493:5 4507:9 4514:9 4518:22 4519:5,10 4524:11 4525:3 4526:5,6,7 4528:3 4531:3 4536:13 4539:1 4557:23 4576:20 4587:1	4591:3 4596:12 4597:16 4599:6,23 reas 4387:13 reason 4411:10 4414:25 4416:23 4417:1 4474:5 4509:2 4592:20 reasonable 4374:7 4387:13 4391:13 4438:6 4456:4 4500:11,15 4505:11 4534:8,12 4569:19 4579:14 reasonablene ss 4365:4,6 4425:20 4435:11,20 4436:2 4438:17 4439:10 4446:18 4558:17,25 reasonably 4495:17 4579:14 reasoning 4520:23 reasons 4374:12 4425:13 4437:21 4465:1 4473:3 4512:6 rebuttal 4372:13 4421:1,11, 23 4422:20	4423:3 4425:11 4426:16,17 4427:2,10 recall 4349:23 4402:8 4560:21 4563:17,18 4564:15,18 ,21 4569:24 recalled 4349:14 receive 4403:11 received 4403:8 4563:13 receives 4588:23 receiving 4395:16 recent 4376:12 4417:3 4571:13 recently 4369:5 4370:23 recessing 4434:12 4475:14 4537:16 recognize 4400:15 4412:13 4511:3 4562:7 recognized 4585:15 recognizes 4405:25 Recognizing 4449:19 recommend 4463:15 4465:1,7
---	---	--	---	---

4466:15	4448:20	g 4591:7	4393:19,20	4464:4
4471:7	4449:5		4394:14	4497:17
4474:9	4466:12	reduce	4400:18,19	4519:6,11
4520:10	4482:20	4390:8	4401:10	4565:16
4535:6	4487:10	4401:5	4402:9,16	4574:11
4544:4,19	4503:14,18	4419:6	4421:17	4579:11
4586:8	4504:12	4507:19	4431:17	4582:20
	4517:6	4529:5	4434:24	4592:10
recommendati	4520:15,25	4530:17	4435:6,17	
on 4464:2	4521:4,16	4561:10	4438:2	refers
4532:23	4522:21	4584:22	4445:16	4582:18
4534:21	4523:11	reduced	4446:8	4586:19
4535:23	4531:16,18	4525:1	4447:18	refiled
recommendati	4535:19,23	reducing	4451:9,10,	4369:6
ons	4549:25	4530:15	16,17	
4494:20	4550:3,11	reduction	4452:1	reflect
4495:1	4592:8,12	4529:10	4453:1,13	4355:9
4496:3	4598:22,23	4586:7	4454:7,13,	4395:1
4519:25			23	4403:23,24
4523:22	records	ref 4512:22	4455:3,16,	4577:9,11,
	4485:22	4521:22	24	14
recommended	recover	4532:24	4457:8,23,	reflection
4425:24	4531:9	4535:17	25 4466:10	4468:16
4473:4			4467:4	reflects
4496:24	recreate	ref/CO2	4469:22	4386:19
4532:24	4550:16	4537:1	4476:15,24	4402:21
4587:2	4578:10	ref/no	4495:14	4550:20
recommending	red 4400:25	4537:1	4503:11	
4450:14	4456:15	ref/ref	4532:13,22	reformed
4464:14,22	4593:25	4497:12	4533:1,4,2	4412:16,17
4472:5	redacted	refer 4371:9	0 4534:5	reframe
4534:25	4366:11	4451:2	4535:13	4553:14
recommends	4368:18	4453:8	4536:8	refreshed
4522:4	4439:20	4549:25	4542:13	4347:6
recommit	4444:8	4557:10	4545:18	
4382:15	4445:10	4582:11	4549:3	refused
4383:1	4448:24	4586:7	4572:24	4442:16
recommits	4461:20		4594:4	reg 4358:4
4432:24	4469:8	reference	referenced	regard
reconcile	4471:4,14	4356:23	4559:24	4410:7
4408:22	4473:15	4357:6	references	4436:13
record	redactions	4362:21	4483:10	4439:7
4354:7,24	4368:19	4363:12,13	4533:10,11	4442:12
4355:4,7,1	re-dispatch	,17	,14	4443:1,16
0 4368:7	4395:11,24	4367:24	referred	4444:2
4369:12	4400:1,7	4371:12	4392:5	4445:20
4392:4	re-	4386:15	4523:16	4456:3
4423:12,18	dispatches	4387:3,6,7	4524:13	4482:4
4426:11,12	4432:23,24	,10,12	referring	4484:1,12,
4440:21	re-	4388:10,15	4421:10	24 4506:14
4441:9,13	dispatchin	4389:4,25	4422:19	4578:14
4447:25		4390:2,6	4444:15	regarding
		4391:7,10		

4408:24	4545:8	relation	4481:23	4552:17
4444:21	regulators	4502:14	4565:8,9,1	repeat
4445:16	4404:19	4544:6	9,23	4367:20
4460:13	4414:22	relationship	4566:3	4523:14
4543:23	4415:3	4373:6	4572:19	4587:13
4586:4	4541:19,22	4378:2	4574:7	4588:5
4594:25	4545:8	4384:3	relieving	rephrase
4596:20	4573:18	4397:9	4419:24	4532:6
regardless	regulatory	4399:1	relocation	replace
4591:17	4371:4	4400:10	4350:8	4384:2
regards	4416:16	4494:11	rely 4412:14	4598:14
4422:14	4541:3,15	4514:20	4532:3,4	replacements
4423:2	4545:12	4518:13	4558:23	4383:13
4472:24	relate	relationship	relying	replacing
regime	4536:20	s 4376:14	4357:13	4383:15
4541:3	4575:22	relative	4413:20	replicate
region	related	4417:23	4450:15	4441:2,6
4387:20,21	4357:25	4482:16	4470:9	report
4431:20	4359:25	4484:17	4494:2	4346:3,5
4530:3,5	4371:2	4512:12	4495:14	4349:21
4588:16,24	4372:9	4542:19	remain	4357:5,8,1
regional	4397:12	4580:25	4404:11	4 4359:16
4359:20	4404:20	4581:20	remaining	4366:10,15
4460:11	4433:11	4587:24	4512:16	,22
regions	4436:4	4588:12	remedy	4368:16,23
4548:8,11,13	4442:14	relatively	4364:13	4370:11
Regis	4443:15	4411:19	remember	4373:12,13
4343:13	4458:3	4440:10	4387:5	4392:16
regression	4477:24	4454:22	4389:22	4394:17
4397:3,5,6	4489:10	4461:6	4431:7	4397:16
,14	4492:11	4507:12,17	4461:16	4406:15
4398:1,14	4501:3	4536:6	4564:7	4412:12
4399:3,6	4523:7	release	4575:5	4427:6
regular	4535:14	4442:20	4577:12	4439:3
4380:18	4586:5,6	4443:8	reminder	4440:6,10
regularly	relates	relevant	4599:17	4444:8,15
4538:16,18	4489:2	4485:9	remove	4445:9
regulated	4495:5	4488:14	4380:4	4446:17,21
4541:3,8	4503:19	4490:7	4491:1	4447:18,19
4571:17	4513:4	4584:25	removing	4450:14
regulation	4535:24	relia	4379:24,25	4465:23
4358:4,8	4538:5	4530:10	renewable	4469:9,22
4405:5	4598:16	reliability	4564:25	4470:2,4
regulations	relating	4436:4	4565:4,5	4476:23
4540:4	4358:8	4530:5,7,1	renewables	4477:2
4564:20	4359:12	0,11	4563:23	4478:23
regulator	4437:8	relied	rental	4483:11
	4445:23	4375:18		4487:22
	4460:8	4472:6		4488:9
	4464:16	4477:6		4489:8
	4472:3,9			4490:8

4498:16	4586:8	4354:12	4545:16	4406:20
4502:3,22	repriced	resolving	4563:13	4414:19
4504:16	4466:16	4594:25	4586:3	4427:1
4507:24	repricing	resource	responded	4488:2
4508:2	4466:23	4393:24	4549:23	4556:3
4511:9	4523:7	4451:11	responding	4579:3
4513:6	re-put	4512:17	4485:5	resultant
4519:17	4449:3	4542:8	response	4593:7
4520:16	request	4584:5,6,1	4346:10,12	resulting
4523:6,20	4467:6	4,15,18	,13,14,15,	4528:6
4542:12,22	4486:5	resources	16,17,18,1	results
4549:24	4550:16	4402:2	9,20,21,22	4394:1,3,4
4560:11	requested	4408:22	4429:8	4423:25
4564:9	4563:4	4530:19,20	4448:25	4424:12
4572:15,17	Requests	respect	4467:6	4432:13,14
4574:9	4485:21	4354:19	4485:22	4444:22
4575:17	require	4358:1	4500:23	4473:12
4579:21,23	4404:19	4359:19	4550:15	4474:7
4582:21	4415:3	4368:1	4551:4,10,	4481:18
4583:9,11	4483:16	4374:9	21	4581:3
4586:7,19	4559:11	4376:2	4552:5,12,	4595:1
4589:13	required	4408:25	22	resume
4592:15	4347:23	4422:19	4553:6,17	4347:4
reported	4391:11	4426:13	4554:1,12,	4434:5,16
4427:9	4408:22	4478:22	23 4555:10	4537:20
reports	4557:17	4488:12	4577:7,9,1	resuming
4359:5	requirement	4489:6,23	1 4597:13	4434:13
4472:25	4543:3	4491:17	4599:20,21	4475:15
4473:3	requirements	4492:13,19	responses	4537:17
4563:3,14	4349:19	4493:18	4546:18	retail
4564:11,22	4403:16	4494:20	responsibili	4541:20
4588:22	requires	4495:2	ties	retained
represent	4528:14	4497:9,12,	4496:10,14	4356:19
4378:8	reserve	15 4500:25	responsibili	4476:11
4475:5	4406:13	4502:23	ty	retaining
4481:12	4449:3	4503:9,12,	4358:12	4559:14
4487:7	reserves	20 4504:12	4562:8	retire
4499:20	4405:2,5,1	4505:14,25	responsive	4383:25
4546:16	0	4506:1,7	4447:9	4428:14
representati	4406:3,4,8	4510:4	rest	4429:1
on	,11	4513:25	4370:3	4540:5
4474:16	4407:13	4514:21	restricted	retirement
4506:19	residential	4516:12,19	4375:6	4428:8
representati	4474:18	4518:10,13	4556:1	4565:25
ve	resistance	4519:24,25	result	retirements
4377:13	4490:6	4520:6	4347:17,24	4376:21
represents	resolved	4524:15,16	4375:7	4379:18,21
4386:17		4532:22	4386:14	,22 4380:7
4514:25		4533:3,4	4390:3	4381:21
4516:24		4534:20,21	4391:9	
4590:8		4535:19	4397:20	
re-price		4536:24		
4524:2				

4382:14	4436:14	4490:16	4383:10,20	,23
4383:14	4470:10	rising	,23	4452:7,11,
4385:23,25	4471:9	4507:14	4384:17	24
4386:25	4495:16	risk	4385:1,7,1	4453:5,10,
4387:15,16	4511:14,18	4413:1,2	6 4388:17	18,24
4388:19	4512:25	4417:11	4391:3,22	4454:4,10,
4401:3	4516:25	4457:16,17	4392:14,22	17
4409:5,6,7	4518:16,19	,24	4393:3,17	4455:1,6,1
,8,17,20,2	,20	4458:1,2	4394:23	0,14,17,21
5 4410:5	4526:6,9	4459:12	4398:5	,25
4411:25	4530:24	4495:13	4399:13,16	4456:6,12,
4427:21	4556:15,24	4500:17	4401:14	16,20,24
4428:19	4559:1	4511:10,12	4404:25	4457:4,9,1
4429:23	4571:24	,18,21,23	4405:23	3,19
4430:1	4581:25	4512:19,25	4406:19	4458:4
4481:25	review	4513:3,18,	4407:4	4459:14,24
4563:23	4343:9	21,23	4408:1	4460:5,9,1
4565:24	4356:21,24	4514:3,5,1	4409:4	5
4597:3	4373:5	7,25	4414:6	4461:7,15
retiring	4436:25	4515:6,10,	4415:6,11	4462:9,15,
4379:20	4438:4,16	20,21	4416:11	23
4384:4	4439:4	4516:9,25	4417:1	4463:9,22,
4428:20,25	4473:12	4534:9,11,	4418:7,23	25
4429:4,11	4476:13,17	15 4561:10	4419:15,18	4464:20,24
retrospect	4477:15	4566:14	4420:13	4465:5,16,
4471:13	4538:3,9,1	4574:2	4421:7,15	20
return	4,15	4587:9	4425:10	4466:8,13,
4356:5	4556:14,23	4598:14	4426:15	19,25
4414:16,18	4588:21	risks	4432:6,15	4467:9,19
4415:25	reviewed	4413:14	4435:8,14,	4468:13,19
4541:7,14	4357:18	4436:3,12	23	,22
4570:22,24	4435:6	4519:5,8	4436:7,16	4469:19,24
4571:1,5,1	4439:2	road	4437:4,20	4470:5
0	4558:10	4501:21,22	4438:8,13,	4471:1
revenue	reviewing	,23	19	4473:22
4346:4	4362:1	Robert	4439:1,13,	4480:22
4365:7	4387:12	4345:6	24	4481:1,6,9
4366:16	4538:18	4352:21	4440:4,12,	,20 4482:2
4373:3	revised	4355:15	18,25	4486:4
4375:2	4347:25	4356:13	4441:17	4487:16,19
4411:14	4497:8	4357:3,7,1	4442:11,18	,24
4419:14	Richard	0,17	4443:2,6,1	4488:10
4437:1,16	4343:16	4358:2	8	4489:15
4560:18	right-hand	4359:1,22	4444:4,16,	4491:4
4582:3	4400:22	4361:12,16	23	4493:15,23
revenues	rigorous	4362:7	4445:6,18,	4494:18,24
4364:25	4375:17	4363:1,25	25	4496:7,16
4373:3,10,	rise 4406:10	4364:8,17	4446:14,24	4497:17
14 4404:8	rises	4365:14,24	4447:12,15	4501:5,15
4408:6		4370:1,9	,21	4502:21
4413:5,9		4373:21	4448:13	4503:6
4419:6,11		4381:3	4449:16	4504:23
			4450:2,12	4505:4
			4451:14,19	4519:3

4520:2,4	4583:22	4371:8	4479:14,15	4348:10,14
4524:10,24	4585:22	4568:17	,18	4350:10
4525:13	4586:10,13	4569:17	4546:11,13	scheduling
4526:1	,18,25	4571:1,4	,14,16	4370:22
4527:5	4587:12	rules	4547:2,10,	schemes
4531:23	4588:1,25	4358:17	19,24	4389:23
4535:1	4589:5,11,	run 4364:20	4548:12,17	school
4542:21	17	4391:6	,23 4549:1	4474:18,19
4543:14	4590:4,10,	4405:9	save 4417:20	scoll
4544:10	19,25	4408:9	4420:24	4438:14
4545:4,11	4593:12,22	4485:4	savings	scooped
4547:1,8,1	4594:6,18,	4509:3	4531:3,5	4462:1,2
6,20	22	4572:1	4558:23	scope 4346:6
4548:5,14,	4597:12,18	4581:18	saw 4362:21	4356:23
21,24	,24	running	4426:24	4357:6
4556:7,11,	4598:12	4399:20	4460:21	4366:25
20	robust	runs 4580:23	4492:25	4367:2,6
4557:4,9	4386:17		4544:14,15	4371:22
4558:5,15,	4394:9	<hr/>	4565:7	4436:3,18
21	4490:21	<hr/>	scale	4438:3
4559:6,10,	role 4358:7	Sabine	4420:15	4476:16,24
15,21	4364:15	4389:12,20	scenario	4493:5
4560:4,22	4478:4	4459:17	4391:15,19	4496:9,14,
4561:3,7,1	4561:23	4572:20	4393:8	15 4513:14
2,17,22,25	4562:2	4573:8	4394:9	4526:7
4562:22	room 4352:2	sake 4434:3	4448:22	4528:17
4563:6,10,	4483:7	sale 4417:12	4452:10	4538:5,11
16,21,24	4551:13	4524:3	4454:21,22	4556:10,13
4564:3,6,2	roughly	sales 4372:1	4456:3,5	4596:6
3	4378:5	4373:15	4457:18	scratch
4565:2,11,	4384:22	4403:16	4459:13,21	4433:15
14,17,22	4394:16	4464:17	4531:19	screen
4566:1,5,8	4455:23	4465:13	4594:3,4	4511:11
,16,21,25	4457:7,10	4466:17	scenarios	scroll
4567:6,10,	4459:22	4542:25	4451:16,22	4435:1,16
15,25	4460:3	4560:18	4452:22	4438:15
4568:7	4597:11	satisfactory	4457:3,15,	4442:2
4573:1,7,1	Round	4473:18	17	scrolling
5	4553:12	satisfy	4467:7,15	4435:24
4574:4,8,2	rounds	4539:3	4491:12	4465:23
2	4394:16	4543:2	4495:25	scrubbed
4575:1,8,1	routinely	4576:20	4512:22	4366:19
2	4538:3,13	Saturday	4593:19	searching
4576:1,8,1	row 4513:22	4350:17	schedule	4468:5
5,24	4523:14	Saunders	4347:24	second
4577:8,19,	RPS 4564:25	4344:19	4348:21,22	4352:22
22	RTO 4361:19	4345:14	4350:18	4363:16
4578:1,7,1	4478:6,13	4360:25	4351:10,15	4381:19
1,25	RTOs 4359:2	4361:1	4353:3,18	
4579:5,10,			scheduled	
16				
4580:3,8,1				
3				
4581:7,14				

4383:12	4535:10	4492:20,23	serving	4381:4
4390:21	4565:7	4501:10	4371:4	shifts
4423:24	sees 4498:19	4513:25	4372:23	4380:23
4424:12,13	select	4517:5	4490:11	short
4442:5	4433:9	4558:1	session	4348:7,19
4453:11	4467:20	4585:1	4368:5	4391:22
4466:4	selected	4586:11	4412:7	4406:10
4469:15	4418:18	sensitive	4543:21	4474:13
4471:12	4583:1	4368:2,3,9	4599:22	4475:4
4488:19	self 4415:22	4499:3	4600:4	4509:23
4491:10	self-build	sensitivitie	sets 4451:8	4513:8
4502:4	4415:2	s 4560:9	seven	4543:6
4553:12	4416:5,12,	sensitivity	4527:15	4546:22
secondary	13,15	4390:13,14	seventeen	4556:18
4526:12	4539:6	4463:16,21	4396:4,8	4557:1
secondly	4540:18	4465:19	4576:10	shortage
4508:4	4541:6,12	4494:23	seventy	4506:16
4529:4	4542:11	4496:22,24	4381:25	4581:17
section	self-	sentence	4411:8	shortages
4355:8	building	4424:13	seventy-five	4506:19
4444:14	4413:21	4442:5	4405:16	shorter
4510:19,20	4414:7	4445:15	shake	4505:5
4519:6	4417:22	4502:6	4489:21	4539:12,19
4600:9	4418:12	4503:10,22	shale	shortly
securing	self-	separate	4390:25	4458:19
4490:24	interest	4375:25	shape	showed
seeing	4414:2	September	4380:9,10	4395:20
4382:1	selfish	4356:24	4454:18,19	4402:4
4407:16,21	4354:2	4367:3	4575:6,10,	showing
4409:18	sell 4374:3	4476:16	11,12,13,1	4507:6
4424:20	4543:15,16	series	6,22,23	shown
4545:15	,17	4564:16	4576:5	4381:10
4563:18	4586:22	serious	4591:1	4534:23
4564:7,21	4587:2	4404:18	shaped	4552:18
seek 4545:10	sellers	serve	4575:18,20	shows
seeking	4361:23	4372:21	share 4562:8	4400:18
4441:10	4573:18	4477:18	sheepishly	4402:20
4442:4	selling	served	4350:4	4409:15
4470:1,6,1	4543:1	4577:14	sheet	4575:17
7 4482:24	send 4399:17	service	4415:18	sic 4565:9
seem 4439:4	sense	4383:15	Shefman	sigh 4539:24
4485:22	4354:14	4415:24	4344:20	sign 4413:24
seems 4499:4	4383:24	4488:3	shift 4379:8	4513:5
4521:14	4388:22	services	4380:2,14	4514:9,12
seen 4412:24	4410:2,3	4362:5	4381:21	significant
4418:8	4417:23	4404:23	4384:18	4401:25
4466:22	4443:4,6	4405:1,8	shifted	4402:6
4507:2	4490:19	4478:14		4417:4,5
4509:20				

4460:7,13	ly 4448:6	4406:14,19	,25	4525:13
4491:23		4407:4	4456:6,12,	4526:1
4492:9	simply	4408:1,20	16,20,24	4527:5
4495:21	4375:25	4409:4	4457:4,9,1	4531:23
4513:9	4377:19	4414:6	3,19	4535:1
4514:15	4378:10	4415:6,11	4458:4	4537:12,22
4515:6	4379:9	4416:11	4459:14,24	4542:21
4519:18	4381:10	4417:1	4460:5,9,1	4543:14
4530:13	4396:17	4418:7,23	5	4544:10
4533:22,23	4398:9	4419:15,18	4461:7,15	4545:4,11
4539:24	4400:10	4420:13	4462:9,15,	4546:15
4587:9,10	4576:3	4421:7,15	23	4547:1,6,8
4592:25	4579:21	4423:3	4463:9,22,	,16,20
	4585:4	4424:25	25	4548:5,14,
significantl	simulation	4425:3,10	4464:20,24	21,24
y 4391:18	4363:7	4426:15	4465:5,16,	4555:21
4402:3,5		4432:2,6,1	20	4556:7,11,
4411:11	Sinclair	5 4434:22	4466:8,13,	20
4494:6,13	4345:6	4435:4,8,1	19,25	4557:4,9
4507:14	4352:21	4,18,23,25	4467:3,9,1	4558:5,15,
4509:25	4355:15	4436:7,10,	9	21
4512:18	4356:7,13,	16,24	4468:13,19	4559:6,10,
4528:12	17	4437:4,20	,22	15,21
s'il	4357:3,7,1	4438:8,13,	4469:19,24	4560:4,22
4479:1,6,1	0,17,20	15,19	4470:5,20	4561:3,7,1
8 4487:1	4358:2,24	4439:1,13,	4471:1	2,17,22,25
sim 4471:22	4359:1,14,	24	4473:22	4562:22
	15,19,22	4440:4,12,	4477:7	4563:6,10,
similar	4360:15	18,25	4478:23	16,21,24
4365:3	4361:12,16	4441:17	4480:13,15	4564:3,6,2
4426:16	4362:7	4442:3,11,	,22	3
4431:4	4363:1,25	18	4481:1,6,9	4565:2,11,
4454:13	4364:8,17	4443:2,6,1	,20 4482:2	14,17,22
4471:3,22	4365:14,24	8	4483:21	4566:1,5,8
4474:6	4366:4,6,9	4444:4,16,	4484:13,24	,16,21,25
4531:25	4367:17,23	23	4485:20	4567:6,10,
similarly	4369:25	4445:6,18,	4486:4	15,25
4483:19	4370:1,9	25	4487:5,16,	4568:7
4590:21	4373:21	4446:14,24	19,24	4570:5
	4381:3	4447:12,15	4488:10	4573:1,7,1
Simonsen	4383:10,20	,21	4489:15	5
4356:10	,23	4448:7,13	4491:4	4574:4,8,2
4366:12	4384:17	4449:11,16	4493:15,23	2
4550:18	4385:1,7,1	4450:2,12	4494:18,24	4575:1,8,1
	6 4388:17	4451:14,19	4496:7,16	2
simple	4391:3,22	,23	4497:17	4576:1,8,1
4379:12	4392:14,22	4452:7,11,	4501:2,5,1	5,24
4396:18	4393:3,17	13,24	5 4502:21	4577:8,19,
simplistic	4394:23	4453:5,10,	4503:6	22
4373:5	4398:5	18,24	4504:23	4578:1,7,1
4431:7	4399:13,16	4454:4,10,	4505:4	1,25
4448:6	4401:14	17	4519:3	4579:5,10,
4527:10	4404:25	4455:1,6,1	4520:2,4	16
simplistical	4405:23	0,14,17,21	4524:10,24	4580:3,8,1

3	4459:10,25	4454:15	4390:10,14	4499:11
4581:7,14	4460:10		4409:20,22	somebody
4583:22	4462:4,8,1	sixty-five	,23	4413:24
4585:22	3	4381:7	4414:16	4510:5
4586:10,13	4464:3,23	sixty-seven	4419:10	4511:17
,18,25	4465:18,22	4495:6	4429:20	4534:17
4587:12	4466:3,10,	sixty-three	4465:24	4538:8
4588:1,25	14	4594:3	4514:7	
4589:5,11,	4467:8,10		4525:1,2	somehow
17	4468:11	size 4513:18	4526:16,17	4449:21,24
4590:4,10,	4469:13,15	4526:3		someone
19,25	,21,23	4528:7	slipped	4380:16
4593:12,22	4470:1,2,7	4529:10	4586:15	4482:22
4594:6,18,	4480:21	sketchy	sloping	4578:9
22	4481:5,14	4433:5	4384:12	
4597:2,12,	4482:4,14	slide	slow 4390:5	somewhat
18,24	4483:13	4357:13	slower	4454:14
4598:12	4510:2	4367:10	4390:10	4480:8
4600:5	4516:16,20	4379:1		4484:15
Sinclair's	sit 4350:2	4381:4,12	small	4485:1
4347:17	4355:24	4382:1	4392:12	4488:1
single	site 4377:2	4384:8	4401:16	4489:25
4448:11	sits 4521:6	4385:17,20	4431:22	4494:2
4580:10,11	sitting	4392:5,6,8	smaller	somewhere
single-cycle	4351:12	4393:18	4524:21	4534:2,6
4581:10	4513:21	4394:24	SMP 4398:10	4537:1
sink 4527:18	4537:9	4398:6	4399:5	sooner
sir 4354:5	situation	4401:22	4401:1	4409:22
4368:13	4492:4	4408:21	4590:8	sophisticati
4436:15	4515:13	4409:3		on 4422:7
4437:3	4516:3	4421:8	sneak	sorry
4438:7,12,	situations	4422:19	4464:12	4352:24
20,25	4518:23	4423:2	so-called	4392:22
4439:9,18	six 4374:20	4425:1,3	4378:7	4400:22
4440:13,20	4387:15	4426:13,15	4402:22	4405:14
4442:5,10,	4390:23	4429:6,7	4403:21	4412:6
15 4443:14	4391:23	4430:5	4404:14	4437:9
4444:12,18	4437:18	4431:5	software	4447:13,24
,25	4448:9,20	4451:3	4362:4,22	4457:20,21
4445:14	4449:19,24	4452:13	solar	4483:20
4446:8,15	4450:8	4585:22,24	4416:21	4486:22
4447:17	4462:5	4586:18	4508:15	4487:18
4448:5,20	4471:10,22	4592:10,11	4509:18	4493:24
4450:7,24	4502:5	,13	4548:4,9	4499:24
4451:7,16,	4503:11,19	slides	sold 4466:6	4503:24
22 4452:23	4563:13	4382:11	4523:25	4547:12
4453:4,13	sixteen	4421:9	Soldier	4548:23
4454:9,20	4403:13	4427:17	4343:15	4559:8
4455:5,9,2	sixty 4387:4	4447:21,22	solid 4393:7	4575:9
0		slight	solution	4583:11
4456:5,19		4524:25		4594:8
4457:14,22		slightly		sort 4377:19

4382:14	south	speculate	4521:2	4492:2
4385:5	4387:20	4597:20	4587:19	4525:8
4391:15	south's	4598:1,3,9	started	4539:5,7
4396:22	4387:20	,10,13	4549:16	4540:11
4400:24		speculating	starting	station
4403:2	Southwest	4598:7	4370:22	4488:20,21
4413:4	4548:16	spelled	4453:14	4491:15
4414:24	space 4411:5	4397:15	starts	statisticall
4416:8	spare	spend	4395:3	y 4397:12
4418:13	4367:19	4372:19	4455:8	statistics
4433:9,13	spared	4439:6	4456:17	4551:17
4467:24	4367:17	stab 4527:24	4503:7	4564:13
4468:23	speak	stable	4594:9,11	status
4471:16	4347:11	4430:1,2	state	4486:11
4472:11	4350:19	stack	4420:15	stay 4411:19
4473:25	4355:18	4377:19	4493:22	4412:4
4474:5	4391:16	4380:1,2	4496:9	4461:18
4509:23	4508:2	4575:16	4500:1	4481:15
4511:23	4580:9	stacked	4508:10	4507:7
4519:8	speaking	4576:4	4510:18	staying
4533:21	4348:17	staff 4370:7	4512:4	4444:6
4539:2	4373:23	stage 4508:8	4560:12	stays
4543:3	4448:6	stand	state-by-	4380:9,10
4557:18,20	4470:19	4405:10	state	4411:7,13,
4558:24	4472:19	4474:19	4539:2	17 4412:5
4564:9	spec 4519:10	standard	stated	4577:23
4567:17,18	special	4468:25	4485:14	steadily
4574:2	4566:24	4565:5	4572:20	4590:13,17
4575:19	specific	stand-by	statement	,23
4577:11	4498:10	4405:7	4413:4,24	steel
4579:7	4506:4,23	standing	4423:24	4414:17
4598:4	4508:22	4405:19	4424:4	step
sought	4519:10	4501:20	4425:5	4480:18,23
4443:14,25	4566:11,19	4502:1	4471:10,19	stick 4469:3
soundness	4568:21	start	4502:3,13,	4575:20
4435:12	4571:15	4347:16	19	stickler
4446:18	4573:14	4354:4	4503:13,18	4517:4
sounds	4577:25	4360:5	4511:9	stock
4583:24	specifically	4383:25	4518:10,15	4415:20
source	4357:23	4384:1	,22	stop 4424:22
4569:24	4383:24	4386:24	4544:2,3	straight
4570:3	4413:19	4387:9	4560:21	4380:23
sourced	4477:21	4389:9	4586:4,5,6	4384:18
4566:3	4505:21	4405:11	statements	4580:5
4567:3	4544:5	4406:10	4413:17,18	straightforw
4568:3	specifics	4453:1	4426:23	ard 4447:9
sources	4546:4,19	4475:19	4450:14	
4440:15	specified	4501:23	4519:4	
4566:3	4562:10		states	
4567:8			4478:7	
4568:2				

strategies 4436:13	4516:24 4539:22	summarize 4370:10 4371:22 4445:2	4595:9,10 supply- demand 4494:10	4536:4 4547:5 4550:2 4565:15,19 4571:14 4580:5 4584:10
stray 4422:22	subtract 4398:10,11 4404:8	summarizes 4472:4	supplying 4403:9,25	
straying 4546:6	succeed 4531:10	summary 4424:11 4563:25 4564:7,13	support 4357:1 4464:23 4465:7 4476:19 4496:22 4545:13 4587:3	surpl 4407:2
strength 4449:22	success 4560:25	summing 4378:11		surplus 4406:15 4407:18,21 4408:12,13 4409:9,13, 16 4489:21 4490:11,18 ,20 4492:4 4512:5,7 4539:22 4542:2 4547:21
structure 4358:14	successful 4491:9	supervision 4357:9,16 4477:3,9	supported 4374:16 4465:3 4491:5 4544:13	
students 4474:20	successfulne ss 4516:22	supplement 4431:8		
studied 4358:4 4370:14	suddenly 4592:19	suppliers 4406:1	supporting 4464:15	surprise 4559:25
studies 4359:5	suffering 4466:1	supply 4365:1 4376:12,14 ,16,20 4377:14,21 4378:2,23 4379:1,4,6 ,10,23 4380:3,10, 13,22 4381:4 4382:3,4,1 2,20,22 4383:3,17 4386:9,10 4390:25 4394:2,25 4398:8,9 4403:13 4412:6 4433:10 4452:6 4494:11 4542:23 4558:22 4563:22 4574:11,17 ,24 4575:4,5 4576:10,11 ,13,16,21	supports 4362:22	surprised 4543:23 4544:1
sub 4435:25 4436:9 4511:20	sufficient 4365:7 4406:11 4444:24		suppose 4347:14 4379:17,18 4427:12 4573:20	survey 4409:24
subject 4351:19 4456:10 4457:5 4459:1 4472:19 4492:11 4494:15 4499:2,16 4500:12,22 4504:9 4535:14 4566:13 4570:9 4583:22	suggest 4368:9 4438:10 4454:20 4472:24 4475:3 4485:11 4493:25 4510:5 4517:19 4519:10		survey 4409:24	surveys 4408:24
submissions 4353:11 4499:7,10	suggested 4349:2		supposed 4489:8	suspect 4459:1 4600:7
submitted 4486:6	suggesting 4430:9 4452:2 4457:16 4459:16 4490:23		supposition 4525:17	sustain 4429:25
substan 4512:11	suggestion 4369:11 4431:13 4442:6		sure 4347:14,17 4352:12 4367:23 4368:12 4395:24 4404:15 4410:9 4424:21 4456:12 4470:20 4509:18 4515:23 4522:12 4523:15 4525:17 4529:18,21	Sven 4344:3 swear 4356:8 switching 4554:19 sworn 4345:10 4355:22,23 4475:25 4476:4
substantial 4511:10,12 ,17,21 4512:19 4514:3,5,2 5 4515:21	suggests 4498:1 sum 4449:25			symmetric 4536:7 system 4378:7,19, 21 4380:6

4382:17,23 ,24 4388:3 4395:2,6,1 9,21,22,23 4396:5,15 4397:1 4398:7 4399:12 4400:2,4 4404:18 4405:2,3 4411:1 4413:7 4417:9 4431:16 4432:23,24 4530:16 4587:24 4588:2,11 4597:22 4598:10 system-wide 4377:3 <hr/> T <hr/> Tab 4357:22 4477:22 4579:20 4589:22 table 4345:1 4346:8 4351:17 4383:21 4550:16,22 4551:19 4552:9,18 4553:11 4555:3 4582:18 taker 4542:18 taking 4383:14 4587:18 talk 4374:5,17 4375:20 4389:22 4412:12 4420:22 4427:19	4495:19 4507:24 4508:13 4517:24 4519:7 talked 4370:12 4383:13 4408:7 4427:17 4450:25 4490:8 4535:12 4573:8 4575:21 4597:2 talking 4444:13 4492:7 4495:13 4507:15 4508:15,16 ,17,22 4509:10 4511:24 4512:21 4514:15 4525:6 4546:4 4564:18 4580:11 4585:11 4588:15 talks 4416:18 4418:20 4502:5 4542:22 target 4351:7 targets 4492:13 4565:1,5 tariff 4362:16 4562:11,18 ,20,23 task 4438:1 4559:11 tasks	4436:25 Tataskweyak 4552:2 tax 4390:10 4392:9 4492:3 4516:1 4533:16 4552:16 4569:21,23 ,24,25 taxes 4414:19 4415:9,13 4570:14 te 4543:8 team 4435:4 technical 4397:15 technically 4543:8 techniques 4397:5,7 technologica l 4416:24 4417:3 4507:18,25 4510:6,17 technologica lly 4402:24 technologies 4416:21 4508:5 4510:11,24 4581:25 4597:20 4598:6,8 technology 4412:23 4416:18 4508:22 4509:6,11, 13,17,24 4510:7,19 4511:2 4582:20 4584:20,21	4598:3,14 telephone 4573:2 ten 4358:10 4390:13 4392:13 4492:16,24 4537:13 tend 4371:14 4382:7 4408:13 4433:14 4484:2,14, 25 4506:17 4507:19 4509:14 4526:16,20 tended 4481:22 4482:5 4502:9 4503:15 tendency 4382:8 4414:9 tends 4364:11 4432:20 4575:18 ter 4598:20 term 4362:8 4364:13 4365:9,11 4411:3 4418:11 4462:5 4466:16 4492:5 4505:6 4506:6 4509:24 4556:18 4557:2 4566:13 terms 4352:4,6,9 ,14 4353:3,18 4354:8,11 4356:23	4357:6 4362:16 4364:6 4365:23 4367:24 4434:23 4435:6,17, 20 4436:2,11, 19 4437:7,15 4438:2,24 4439:10,18 4445:22 4446:8,10, 13 4454:23 4457:16,17 ,22 4458:11 4459:12,22 4460:2,3 4461:11 4462:4,11 4463:1 4465:3 4467:4,12 4468:11 4470:1,3,8 4474:16 4476:15,24 4483:15,24 4485:20 4504:4 4521:6 4545:7,23 4546:1 4551:12 4553:14 4580:10 territory 4415:24 test 4363:16,17 4364:2,3 4414:25 tested 4363:7 testified 4358:7 testify 4348:10
---	--	--	---	--

testimony	4524:14	4448:13	4584:18	25 4415:11
4350:9	4529:16	4449:16	4586:13,14	4416:1,2
4351:3	4531:14	4451:19	4589:6,11	4417:11,24
4370:17	4537:4	4452:7,11	4590:5,11	4419:22,25
4542:22	4546:10	4453:5	4591:5,10,	4420:6
4597:2	4547:24	4454:18	11	4431:9,13
	4548:17	4457:4	4595:14,16	4449:4
testing	4549:10,14	4458:12	4596:22	4470:3
4387:8	4550:6,8	4461:15	4599:9	4488:23,24
text 4473:24	4600:10,13	4462:15,23	themselves	4490:5
thank 4347:9	that'll	4463:19	4412:19	4491:23
4348:5	4509:8	4465:5,7	4533:24	4492:8
4351:22	4555:15	4469:9,19	4560:6	4493:16
4352:16		4473:18		4495:18
4355:2,10	that's	4474:10	theory	4501:21
4358:23	4351:4,14	4485:13	4508:23	4503:9,25
4359:13	4356:8	4486:13	ther 4527:15	4504:10
4360:3,23	4364:8,9,1	4489:5,8	thereafter	4507:21
4361:2,25	5,16	4490:2,15	4590:17	4511:9
4362:20	4365:25	4493:15		4512:25
4367:22	4368:16	4494:24	therefore	4513:20
4368:13	4369:13	4495:9	4349:8	4514:4,8
4369:11	4373:11	4496:9	4386:11	4515:6
4385:12	4380:22	4498:18,20	4510:1	4516:16
4391:21	4383:5,20	4501:6	4597:19	4518:14
4425:9	4385:1,11	4503:6	there'll	4522:3,12,
4431:25	4388:5,6	4506:3	4510:16	20 4535:22
4434:20	4391:3,18	4509:23		4539:22
4435:1,3,1	4393:4,12	4514:1,16	thereof	4540:23
7 4436:9	4394:10	4515:10	4357:1	4541:5
4447:10	4401:1,14,	4516:12	4476:19	4542:13,23
4448:1	20	4517:6	there's	4543:16
4452:12	4404:3,10,	4518:22	4357:12	4547:17
4458:9,10	11 4405:25	4526:5	4359:23	4565:2
4461:1	4407:17	4528:16	4366:18	4566:8
4469:7	4410:2,23	4532:14	4369:5	4567:10,17
4474:13	4411:8	4534:6	4375:21	,21 4578:8
4475:12	4412:5	4538:24	4377:8	4579:17
4477:19	4413:8	4544:19,22	4382:10	4587:9
4478:19	4415:2	,23,25	4388:4,18	4591:21
4479:2,13,	4416:12,13	4545:6	4389:15	4598:14
17 4480:6	4418:4	4548:9	4391:6	4599:15
4485:15	4421:22	4550:19	4393:23	they'd
4486:19,21	4424:18	4552:15	4399:11	4517:22
,23,24	4425:8	4563:10	4400:15,20	4571:16
4492:10	4429:18	4565:4	4401:12	they'll
4494:14	4430:12	4566:19	4404:18	4464:12
4497:4	4431:23	4568:7	4407:18	they're
4502:2	4435:2	4570:25	4408:15,16	4349:18
4507:23	4439:24	4572:8	4411:10	4362:12
4510:2	4440:4	4573:10,11	4412:17	4372:21
4511:7	4444:4	,19 4577:9	4413:11	4388:2
4521:17,18	4446:14,25	4582:23	4414:8,15,	
	4447:25	4583:3		

4396:5	4594:2	4347:12	4361:7	4400:3
4404:6	thirty-four	today	4407:7	transformati
4405:7,18	4594:1	4347:19	tops 4453:25	on 4384:10
4408:17	thirty-nine	4352:12	tore 4549:22	transit
4409:21	4551:1	4354:14	tot 4404:16	4355:18
4410:3,8	thirty-one	4355:1	total 4373:4	transition
4419:20,21	4390:23	4357:14	4401:15	4491:12
4428:20	thirty-seven	4367:10	4526:6	translate
4506:18	4590:12	4451:2	totally	4398:4
4526:8	Thompson	4478:23	4404:16	translates
4533:21	4351:12,14	4489:3	4407:2	4399:10
4539:12,13	4353:4,10	4502:1	4527:13	transmission
,18	thoroughness	4512:10	4532:1	4359:3,9
4540:11	4435:12	4514:24	towards	4361:19
4541:25	4446:18	4537:11,12	4353:22	4371:15
4545:19	thousand	4600:12	4454:16	4395:10,22
4550:10	4387:16	today's	4455:19	4401:12,17
4567:23	4396:4,8	4347:16	4456:23	4418:5,9
4568:15,16	4576:10	4475:18	4457:6	4525:7,24,
4572:17	they've	4486:16	4538:21	25
4578:18	4474:5	4595:25	4591:12	4528:8,14,
they've	three-	tomorrow	track	19
4474:5	quarters	4355:8	4368:25	4529:22,24
4534:3	4475:7	4356:2	4386:6	4530:8,17,
4569:15	threshold	4370:21	4402:17	22,24
third	4363:6,11,	4407:8	trade 4418:6	4531:5,8,1
4356:16	18 4501:3	4412:7	traded	1 4562:22
4380:11	thrust	4420:22,24	4418:3	transmitting
4445:15	4449:12	4421:24	trainees	4417:25
4455:4	4473:17	4431:25	4552:10	transparency
4540:19	Thursday	4483:6	training	4433:6
4579:24	4353:12	4484:8	4552:3	4437:23
4580:15	thus 4521:14	4499:4,13	trans	4438:12
third-party	tighten	4598:23,25	4529:22	4441:4,14
4559:13	4472:17	4599:13	transaction	4450:10
thirteen	tighter	4600:12	4416:2	4471:16,20
4389:9,17	4468:12,13	tools	4417:25	4544:18
thirty	,17	4365:21	transcript	4545:15
4365:17	4492:15	top 4380:1	4345:17	4562:14
4405:11	till 4348:22	4400:25	4347:14	transparent
4453:15	4420:22	4421:17	4550:20	4375:16
4455:8	4434:4,10	4446:5	transcripts	4422:5
4456:18	4455:13	4453:11	4498:23	4425:24
4495:5	time's	4454:7	transfer	4426:1
4511:4	4356:17	4455:4	4528:11,15	4439:22
4527:15,20	timetable	4464:5,10	transfers	4440:14
4594:16	4350:6	4471:6		4450:10,16
thirty-five	timetabling	4530:23		,22 4532:1
4456:22		4590:7		4535:7
4492:25		4591:17		4578:14
4494:22		topics		

4598:21	4532:5	4467:3	4558:13	uncertain
transparentl	4536:20	4469:8,21	twenty-five	s 4491:25
y 4440:22	trying	4481:8	4389:11	4510:21
transportati	4395:8	4556:9	twenty-four	4519:12
on 4578:3	4408:22	4559:4	4403:14	uncertainty
travel	4416:5	4560:11	twenty-six	4374:12
4347:18	4423:22	4574:12	4390:23	4460:8,13
travelling	4424:21	4579:20	twenty-three	4461:18
4351:11	4432:23	4583:8	4457:7	4488:25
treat	4469:3	4585:21	twice	4491:1,19,
4415:14	4474:13	4589:22	4409:23	24 4492:9
treated	4483:15	4593:14	type 4358:25	4493:7,10
4415:16	4488:13	4595:21	4404:3	4499:8
treatment	4495:15	turned	4478:9	4507:21
4396:25	4506:8	4491:7	4521:13	4533:23
trend 4511:5	4513:25	4576:2	4522:21	4567:4
4538:20	4516:16	turning	types	4595:1,15,
4539:9	4521:20	4399:23	4365:10	16
4592:25	4522:16	4465:22	4398:24	4596:17,20
trends	4525:21	twelve	4429:9	,21 4598:5
4505:20	4532:11	4427:7	4491:8,9	uncontracted
4506:21	Tuesday	twenty	4585:14	4514:1
Tribunals	4348:10	4358:6	typical	under-
4350:13	4350:3	4365:12,17	4580:18	committed
tried 4426:1	4353:21	4376:4	typically	4382:23
4469:6	tunnel	4378:22	4359:4	undergone
4495:9	4466:1	4387:1,15	4365:15	4552:2
trouble	turbine	4388:11	4388:24	underlies
4368:25	4404:3	4389:6	4529:23	4494:11
4586:16	4427:8	4390:4	4530:1	underlying
true 4429:25	4509:13	4396:4	4545:8	4374:15,16
4447:5	4577:17	4412:24	4559:4	4375:6
4502:19	4580:6,7	4429:17		4391:10,24
4503:19	4581:10	4431:19		4425:15
4557:6	4582:15,16	4440:2		4437:8,18,
trust 4450:8	4583:19	4454:16		24 4446:2
try 4350:14	turbines	4456:12	ultimate	4472:9
4376:16	4431:11,12	4478:3	4396:21	4474:9
4381:13	4509:22	4492:24	4485:10	4493:11
4397:9	turn 4347:7	4494:17,21	ultimately	4494:10
4401:1	4348:22	4496:1,4	4533:14	4555:25
4442:2	4352:17,23	4501:7,12,	4562:9,11	4557:12,14
4450:5	4399:22	14	4596:3	4560:3,7
4457:21,23	4440:6	4504:19,22	unable	4566:13
4462:3	4441:21,22	4505:2,8,1	4442:6	4595:15
4500:24	4444:6	2,15,22	4444:20	4596:11
4518:8	4445:8	4506:9,11	4445:4	underpinning
	4446:5	4507:4,5,8	4446:11	s 4444:19
	4452:13	,10,16	unavailable	understa
	4461:19	4509:17	4446:3	4447:19
	4465:24	4510:15		
		4511:4		

understand	undertake	4384:4	4544:24	usually
4347:19	4473:1	4399:22,23	update	4403:13
4353:3	4480:24	,24 4404:2	4487:14,17	utilities
4354:10	undertaken	4415:23	4520:17	4343:3,21
4413:22	4464:22	4418:16	4555:3	4354:10
4421:20	4465:18	4419:8	updated	4356:19
4422:6	4477:25	4429:16	4349:5,15	4367:25
4423:16	4478:15	4571:25	4440:16	4368:8
4424:19,25	4530:11	4577:25	4487:12	4383:9
4433:15	undertaking	4578:2,3	4521:21	4408:16
4453:2	4346:12,13	4581:16	updating	4412:18
4468:11	,14,15,16,	4582:4	4362:3	4415:22
4474:8	17,18,19,2	4598:15	upon 4347:1	4416:6
4488:15	0,21,22	United	4357:13	4418:10
4493:12	4357:25	4478:7	4434:12,13	4434:24,25
4494:16	4361:20	4492:2	4435:19	4435:7,10,19
4498:6	4437:6	units	4436:1,11	4436:1,10
4499:15,18	4471:25	4376:25	4438:3	4440:1
4501:4	4472:17,20	4377:16,19	4467:16	4446:17
4503:8	4473:10,15	4378:11	4468:16	4476:12
4504:11	4474:14,15	4379:20,25	4470:9	4478:15
4506:8	4486:9	4380:5	4472:6	utility
4522:7	4550:15	4382:19,22	4475:14,15	4350:13
4525:6,21	4551:8,10,	4384:16	4477:7	4358:8
4527:7	15,21,24	4385:5	4486:11	4365:5
4535:11,15	4552:5,8,1	4395:8	4537:16,17	4414:9,23
,20	2,15,22,25	4428:19	4600:15	4542:6
4536:25	4553:6,9,1	4429:2,9	upper	4543:2
4544:16	1,17,20	4430:25	4384:11	4559:13,16
4557:21	4554:1,4,1	4433:8	4468:14,20	4571:17
4560:8	2,15,23	4540:5	up-to	4584:4,17
understandin	4555:1,10	4575:14	4383:15	utilize
g 4369:13	undertakings	4576:2	upward	4528:10
4442:15,18	4346:10	University	4526:17	<hr/>
4445:3	4349:16	4358:3	4539:9	<hr/>
4453:3	4549:18	4370:14	useful	validate
4485:24	4551:2,4	unless	4372:18	4449:14
4492:4	unfair	4369:10	4394:18	validation
4508:1	4507:9	4599:15	4450:16	4450:9
4516:12	unfettered	unnecessaril	4522:14	validi
4557:14	4560:2	y 4382:25	4529:17	4449:14
4563:8,11	unfolds	4473:14	useless	valuable
4573:22	4567:5	unreasonable	4549:20,21	4354:8
understands	unilateral	4534:9	users	4450:23
4372:17	4361:18	unredacted	4360:13	value
understood	unique	4483:11	4383:18	4363:13,17
4375:17	4385:4	unsuccessful	4487:8	4403:24
4439:23	4573:25	4443:10	usual	4418:21
4459:11	unit 4380:19	unusual	4367:18	4427:11
4527:10	4383:15,16			
4532:21				
4573:4				

4462:20,22	4482:11	4510:16	4490:1	we're
4506:19	4483:21	visually	4513:13	4347:4,15,
4532:22,24	verify	4469:14	4543:20	18
4535:13,21	4443:15	vitae	4578:13	4350:1,23
,24	4444:1	4357:21	Wednesday	4354:1
4536:10,14	4449:21	4477:20	4351:11	4358:20
4552:20	version	vous	4353:5,10	4360:1
4570:25	4369:6,8	4479:1,6,1	week 4350:15	4368:13,22
4583:18	4483:11	8 4487:1	4353:4,23	4369:18,24
4585:7	versions		4498:21	4373:14
valued	4368:19,22		4543:4,5	4377:14,23
4586:24	,25 4369:3	<hr/> W <hr/>	weekend	,25 4378:1
values	versus	waiting	4347:5,13	4379:9
4363:12	4432:13	4500:5	4549:18	4381:3,12,
4399:4	4459:21	walk 4453:12	weeks	14,15
4418:20	4483:25	walking	4353:14	4382:1
4532:13	4527:15	4368:13	week's	4395:13
4536:21	4541:8	War 4552:3	4347:6	4398:6
4564:17	4580:1	wasn't	weight	4403:23
4571:6	4597:4	4392:6	4522:2	4407:21
variable	vertical	4427:8,13	Weinstein	4409:15,17
4399:6	4384:23	4433:6	4344:23	,18
4418:20	4385:8	4446:1	4348:6	4410:20
4569:6	4407:10,11	4471:21	welcome	4413:1
4574:19	vertically	4523:15	4366:5	4422:13
variables	4384:20	4532:1	4480:12	4423:19,21
4398:24	4541:2	4536:16	4486:22,23	4424:18,19
4399:1	vet	4548:21	we'll	,20
4578:6,22	4558:6,24	4565:19	4369:9,17	4431:15
variance	vetted	4596:5	4374:5,17	4434:2,15
4430:19	4428:4	watching	4378:18	4452:13
variation	vetting	4498:23	4386:24	4475:18
4579:4	4472:22	water 4374:2	4409:8,16	4497:13
variety	viable	4527:11,12	4412:7	4500:14
4478:16	4348:2	4528:1	4420:24	4505:9
4512:6	4404:11,21	4552:17	4421:24	4508:13,22
various	4524:20	ways 4414:19	4427:19	4509:10,16
4362:1	view 4354:25	4448:10	4434:9	4511:24
4365:15	4501:11	4501:21	4459:18	4513:6
4397:11	4514:22	4513:20	4472:18	4517:12
4420:23	4517:10	4526:2	4480:11	4519:11
4558:2,12	4523:23	4560:6	4483:6	4521:3
4564:14	4532:11	website	4492:1,3	4525:6
4567:12	4533:8,19	4367:1	4538:9	4537:19
4568:25	views	4369:3	4549:19,21	4538:11,18
vary 4396:19	4488:23	we'd 4359:14	,24	4539:20
veil 4544:22	4494:4	4425:23	4555:13	4540:2
4545:2	virtually	4471:3	4600:3,8,1	4544:12
venturing		4488:19	2	4545:15
				4546:5
				4547:21
				4549:16
				4558:24
				4573:10,11

4580:5	4362:11,12	4564:16	23	,23
4581:23	4365:7	wholehearted	4444:5,12,	4481:2,7,1
4584:2,12,	4373:9	ly 4360:8	17,25	3,21
13 4587:17	4428:14	wholesale	4445:8,14,	4482:3,12,
4595:6,22	4438:6	4478:2,5	19	13,15,23
west	4442:24	whom 4370:4	4446:4,15	4483:5,13,
4397:23,24	4443:14	4545:18	4447:10,13	18,19
4399:18,20	4448:20	who's	,17,22	4484:6,11,
4528:23	4468:8	4561:24	4448:1,4,5	12,22,23
4529:5	4473:2	4587:12	,15	4485:4,7,1
we've	4488:2,19	whose	4449:2,10,	6,18,19
4358:17,18	4490:2,19	4353:13	11,17	4486:8,14,
4370:5	4491:2	wide 4499:8	4450:5,24	17,22
4412:24	4492:2	4500:20	4451:7,15,	4523:5
4414:10	4498:7	4573:17	20,24	4573:4
4445:20	4499:7	4595:14	4452:8,12,	4600:1
4463:10	4500:11,13	wider	20,25	Williams 4479
4491:12	,19	4492:17	4453:7,12,	4345:12
4497:21	4501:11,13	William	19,25	willing
4504:18,24	4502:12	4344:11	4454:5,11,	4514:12
4505:21	4504:23	Williams	19	4543:7
4507:2	4505:10	4344:9	4455:2,7,1	willingness
4509:20	4512:25	4345:9	1,15,18,22	4585:12
4510:22	4514:2	4352:24,25	4456:1,7,1	wind 4387:22
4512:21	4517:5	4353:10,16	4,17,21,25	4388:22
4515:20	4520:15	4355:3	4457:5,10,	4397:21
4532:12,17	4521:20,25	4360:5,6,1	14,21	4398:17
,24	4522:9,12	9	4458:8	4416:19
4535:10,12	4523:11	4423:8,10,	4459:9,10,	4546:24
4539:20	4524:17	19,23	15,25	4547:13,17
4540:14	4525:21	4424:9,10,	4460:6,10	,22
4568:14	4527:3	17	4461:1,8,1	4548:18,20
4569:25	4530:1	4433:16,19	7,25	,22
4578:23	4531:18	4434:17,19	4462:10,17	4574:25
4588:18	4532:10,11	,20	,25	4575:1
whatever	,19	4435:9,15,	4463:19,24	window
4403:18	4535:22	24	4464:3,9,2	4351:2
4449:7,8	4536:12	4436:8,17,	1,25	4488:17
4467:23	4539:1,8,1	24	4465:11,17	4515:12
whenever	2,18	4437:5,12	,22	4516:17
4547:17	4540:18	4438:1,9,1	4466:9,14,	Winnipeg
whereas	4547:21	4,20	20	4343:23
4402:15	4553:13	4439:8,18,	4467:1,10	4356:3
4428:24	4564:16	25	4468:10,15	4366:6
whereby	4571:16	4440:5,13,	,21	4486:23
4362:9	4599:18	19	4469:7,20,	wis 4450:8
4363:3	whichever	4441:8,21	25	Wisconsin
wheth	4528:24	4442:1,12,	4470:6,15,	4588:17
4498:12	white 4411:5	22	19 4471:24	wisdom
whether	whole	4443:4,13,	4472:15,23	
	4413:10		4473:16	
	4525:23		4474:12,17	
			4479:1,2,5	
			4480:2,5,6	

[illegible]