



1 **1.0 Introduction**

2 Manitoba Hydro's Rebuttal Evidence addresses the written evidence filed by Whitfield Russell
 3 Associates ("WRA") on behalf of the Manitoba Métis Federation with respect to the Needs For
 4 and Alternatives To review of Manitoba Hydro's Preferred Development Plan ("PDP"). Through
 5 these sections of the rebuttal evidence, Manitoba Hydro will justify the reliability of the
 6 proposed PDP.

7
 8 **1.1 Likelihood of Common Mode Failures Impacting Three Bipoles**

9 WRA states the following in MH/MMF/WRA-004a (lines 75-78): "However, the nature of the
 10 causes of common mode failures postulated by Manitoba Hydro as a source of extended
 11 outages of Bipoles I & II (tornados, wide front windstorms, fire – terrorism and earthquakes
 12 were not mentioned) could just as well take out all three Bipoles." In response to this
 13 contention, Manitoba Hydro submits that the reliability of the three Bipole system was
 14 thoroughly vetted during the CEC proceedings for Bipole III. The 2012 Teshmont study¹ filed in
 15 the CEC proceedings indicates that the probability of losing all three Bipoles is significantly
 16 reduced based on the final route of Bipole III. In terms of tornado and wide-front wind
 17 performance, for example, the risk was reduced by a factor of 200 (i.e. the probability of losing
 18 all three bipoles is about a 1 in 3700 years event compared to the loss of two bipoles which is a
 19 1 in 16 years event)². The probability of losing both Bipoles I and II due to excessive wind and
 20 ice loading is 1 in 20 compared to a 1 in 200 years return period for losing all three bipoles.
 21 Therefore, the planned route and design of Bipole III is such that a common mode failure of all
 22 three bipoles is too low a probability to reasonably consider such failure as a credible
 23 contingency which must be mitigated under NERC transmission planning standards.

24
 25 **1.2 HVdc System Adequacy Criteria**

26 WRA states the following in MH/MMF/WRA-004a (lines 95-97): "In this NFAT proceeding,
 27 Manitoba has implemented a deterministic criterion for adequacy of the HVdc system that is

¹ Weather Hazard and Reliability Assessment for the Preliminary Preferred Route of the Bipole HVDC Transmission Line, January 2012.

² From BPIII IR CEC/MH-II-023

1 less restrictive than it insisted upon in the CEC's Bipole III proceeding." Manitoba Hydro
2 disagrees with WRA's conclusion. Manitoba Hydro utilizes several different criteria, including
3 both probabilistic and deterministic criteria, to ensure the reliability and adequacy of its
4 system. All of these criteria were used in Manitoba Hydro's analysis of Bipole III, though not all
5 of the criteria were specifically addressed in the CEC proceedings. The same criteria have been
6 used to ensure the reliability and adequacy of Manitoba Hydro's recommended PDP. The key
7 criteria include:

- 8 • Manitoba Hydro Generation Planning Criteria (NFAT Appendix 4.1) – These criteria
9 include a capacity criterion that ensures a minimum generation reserve of 12% above
10 the demand forecast as well as an energy criterion to ensure sufficient resources are
11 available to supply the energy needs in the event that the lowest recorded river flow
12 conditions are repeated.
- 13 • NERC Transmission Planning Standards TPL-001 through TPL-003 – These criteria
14 determine the minimum transmission requirements needed to meet the performance
15 criteria for withstanding credible single and multiple contingencies as defined in Table 1
16 of the NERC TPL standards.
- 17 • HVdc Adequacy criteria – Manitoba Hydro has adopted criteria in addition to the NERC
18 standards that help to plan the HVdc system, including the following.
 - 19 (i) Since 1986, Manitoba Hydro has had an HVdc pole over load criterion for
20 determining the supply adequacy in the event of a dc pole outage.
 - 21 (ii) Conducting an annual probabilistic reliability assessment regarding loss of load
22 expectation ("LOLE") has also been used as a guideline since 1996, but was added as
23 an explicit criterion in 2012 to comply with new Manitoba regulations governing
24 NERC data reporting requirements. The annual NERC long term reliability
25 assessments require an assessment of whether the Planning Authority can meet a
26 0.1 day/year LOLE metric³.

³ The NFAT Reliability Evaluation included in Appendix 13.1 demonstrates the ability of the alternatives to meet the 0.1 day/year metric.

1 (iii) In addition, once Bipole III is constructed Manitoba Hydro will require the
2 minimum of one HVdc valve group in on-line spare⁴ capability equivalent to the
3 largest valve group above northern generation in a single northern collector system
4 configuration (i.e. 500 megawatts (MW) in on-line valve group spare pre-Conawapa).
5 Manitoba Hydro's initial plans were to have one HVdc valve group in on-line spare
6 capability in each of the two isolated northern collector systems after the
7 construction of Conawapa (i.e. 300 MW spare with Bipole I and 575 MW spare with
8 Bipoles II and III). However the criterion to be applied after the construction of
9 Conawapa is under review.

- 10 • NERC Standard TPL 004 – In addition to the above criteria, Manitoba Hydro also assesses
11 the risks to reliability of low-probability high-impact events according to NERC Standard
12 TPL-004. This NERC standard requires an evaluation of the risks and consequences of
13 extreme contingencies but, unlike standards TPL-001 through TPL-003, does not require
14 the transmission planner to mitigate such risks. In the context of Manitoba Hydro's
15 analysis of Bipole III, the risk and consequences of the loss of Bipoles I and II were
16 deemed too high by Manitoba Hydro to leave unaddressed. It was estimated that the
17 societal cost following the loss of the two HVdc bipoles in 2017 due to a projected
18 capacity shortfall of 1500 MW could be \$20 billion⁵. The Bipole III proceedings focused
19 mainly on the NERC TPL-004 criterion of reliability for low-probability high-impact
20 events.

21
22 Contrary to the assertion of WRA in MH/MMF/ WRA-004a (line 135-136), Manitoba Hydro has
23 not substituted its LOLE criterion for the deterministic criterion used in the CEC proceedings. As
24 noted previously and in the NFAT Reliability Evaluation (Appendix 13.1), performing an annual
25 LOLE assessment was added as an explicit Manitoba Hydro criterion in 2012 and has been used
26 as a guideline since 1996. The LOLE assessment does not replace the need to evaluate the risk
27 and consequences of extreme events as per NERC Standard TPL-004.


⁴ Page 83 of MH's rebuttal evidence, Feb. 28, 2014; on-line valve group spare will be required in 2017 after BPIII. The pole over load criterion will be retired around the same time.

⁵ From BPIII IR CEC/MH-II-023

1 WRA states the following in MH/MMF/ WRA-004a (lines 111-112): "...Manitoba Hydro does not
 2 intend to comply with the deterministic criterion it espoused in the CEC proceeding on Bipole
 3 III." While the NFAT proceedings have focused on other criteria, an assessment of the ability of
 4 the PDP to serve Manitoba load during the loss of Bipoles I and II was in fact conducted. The
 5 figure below indicates the ability of the PDP to supply Manitoba load to 2045. In 2041 and
 6 beyond, it is assumed gas turbines will be added in southern Manitoba to supply future load
 7 growth and ensure minimal power deficits.

8
 9

FIGURE 1: POWER SURPLUS/DEFICIT FOLLOWING LOSS OF BP I/II AT WINTER PEAK.



10

11 A key component of the PDP that ensures reliability for this extreme event is the addition of the
 12 750 MW tie line. Without the tie line, a deficit is expected as early as 2025⁶. This deficit was
 13 also identified in the Bipole III CEC proceedings.

14

15 1.3 Import Capacity

16 WRA contends in MH/MMF/WRA-004a (lines 130-133) that "...Manitoba Hydro will be deficient
 17 in import capacity under its assumptions for 2019/2020 and 2020/21 if Keeyask enters service

⁶ From BP III IR CEC/MH-VII-417

1 on schedule but completion of the second 500 kV ac line is delayed.” This conclusion is
2 unfounded, as Manitoba Hydro’s calculations shown in Figure 1, demonstrate that a delay in
3 the new 500 kilovolt (kV) tie line of one year will not result in a power deficit.

4 5 **1.4 Cost of Firm Imports**

6 WRA states the following in MH/MMF/ WRA-004a (lines 118-123) : “...under the Preferred
7 Development Plan, Manitoba Hydro does not plan to buy enough firm imports to cover the
8 capacity shortfall in the event of a loss of Bipoles I & II.... By not including in the Preferred
9 Development Plan the cost of purchased power needed to meet the criteria it developed for
10 the CEC proceeding, Manitoba Hydro has adopted a laxer criterion and made the Preferred
11 Development Plan appear to be less costly. ” In response, Manitoba Hydro submits that it has
12 not adopted different criteria, nor laxer criteria, since the CEC proceedings. Furthermore, with
13 respect to the cost analyses in the CEC proceedings versus the NFAT proceedings, WRA is
14 comparing apples to oranges.

15
16 In analyzing alternatives to Bipole III, Manitoba Hydro included an analysis of the cost of an
17 import option under a hypothetical “import only” transmission line scenario. For this
18 alternative, Manitoba Hydro’s estimate included the cost of building gas turbines in the U.S., as
19 an “import only” transmission line must be connected to some form of firm generating
20 capacity. Thus, the capital cost of relying on imports was considered equivalent to the capital
21 cost of building gas turbines in Manitoba with the added cost of building the interconnection,
22 and was estimated at \$4.5 billion (2017 in-service cost). The gas turbines were estimated to
23 cost \$3.0 billion, and the interconnection \$1.5 billion. Due to the incremental cost of the
24 interconnection, the total cost of the import option was considered significantly higher than the
25 cost of building gas turbines in Manitoba.

26
27 In contrast to the import option analyzed in the CEC proceedings, the PDP does not include an
28 “import only” transmission line, or the associated costs of constructing a gas turbine in the U.S.
29 Because the proposed 750 MW tie line in the PDP can be justified by Minnesota Power as

1 necessary to supply Minnesota load, it has a high likelihood of being approved by the MPUC.
2 The proposed transmission line will have the added benefit of providing firm import
3 transmission to Manitoba. As a result, Manitoba Hydro will be able gain access to surplus
4 energy from the MISO market at essentially no incremental capital or operating costs. There
5 will only be variable costs associated with the cost of energy needed to supply Manitoba load in
6 times of unexpected outages.

7

8 Manitoba Hydro has purposely not included potential reliability costs or benefits of avoiding
9 load shedding following loss of Bipoles I and II in its analysis of alternatives in the NFAT
10 proceedings in order to avoid claims that Manitoba Hydro is inflating the value of the PDP. A
11 conservative estimate of the reliability worth of the PDP compared to the all gas plan was given
12 in Chapter 13 of NFAT as \$101 million but was not included in the overall monetized net
13 benefits.

14

15 **1.5 Compliance with NERC Standard TPL-002**

16 In its response to MH/MMF/WRA-004b, WRA contends that note b from NERC Standard TPL-
17 002-0b does not permit the curtailment of Firm Transfers following the loss of a single pole to
18 prepare for the next contingency. However, such a position is inconsistent with the clear
19 wording of the existing standard and the clarified version of the standard which has been
20 developed by NERC and approved by the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC")
21 to come into effect over the next year.

22

23 While note b of the standard does contain a provision directed at interruption of supply to
24 radial customers and local network customers, Manitoba Hydro does not rely on this provision
25 of footnote b. The temporary curtailment of firm transfers by Manitoba Hydro following loss of
26 a single pole would not lead to the interruption of supply to any customers, since Manitoba
27 Hydro is able to call upon contingency reserves from MISO. Manitoba Hydro relies on a
28 separate provision of note b governing curtailments of contracted Firm Transfers which states
29 that "To prepare for the next contingency, system adjustments are permitted, including

1 curtailments of contracted Firm (non-recallable reserved) electric power Transfers.” Since this
2 provision has no mention of radial customers, it would be unreasonable to interpret note b as
3 only allowing curtailment of radial customers, as suggested by WRA. WRA appears to
4 erroneously equate curtailment of Firm Transfers with interruption of supply.

5

6 It is also important to note that NERC has spent considerable time clarifying TPL-002, including
7 note b, in response to FERC Order 693. The new consolidated version of standards TPL-001-003
8 is TPL-001-4. This version, which was approved by FERC Order 786 on December 23, 2013,
9 contains the equivalent curtailment provision in note 9 and has no reference to radial
10 customers. Note 9 states: “Curtailment is allowed both as a System Adjustment and a corrective
11 action when achieved through appropriate redispatch of resources obligated to redispatch,
12 where it can be demonstrated that Facilities internal and external to the Transmission Planner’s
13 planning region remain within applicable Facility Ratings and the redispatch does not result in
14 any Non-Consequential Load Loss.” Accordingly, the new version of the standard also supports
15 Manitoba Hydro’s position that curtailment of firm transfers is permitted when achieved
16 through redispatch of resources, such as the delivery of contingency reserves.

