

1 **REFERENCE: Undertaking from R. Peters, per email May 28, 2014**

2 **QUESTION:**

3 a) MIPUG recommended that the incremental financial benefits that would
4 flow to the Province, be shared with Ratepayers for approximately 15
5 years post in-service of the new PDP assets.

6 Please provide a schedule that quantifies the amount of the 'financial
7 benefit' MIPUG recommends be foregone by the Province for each the 15
8 years post in-service, together with the calculation of the rate impact of
9 such 'sharing of the benefit'. Please provide the calculations at 100%
10 'sharing' as well as at '50% sharing' levels by the Province.

11 **ANSWER:**

12 **(a)**

13 For clarity, MIPUG's final written argument recommended that:

14 "During the period when customers face upward pressure on rates and added
15 risks due to this plan, the provincial government sees significant and ongoing
16 added recoveries compared to the need-based plans (with benefits already
17 occurring today, such as from the capital taxes on the \$1 billion plus spent on
18 Keeyask and Conawapa) regardless of the economic conditions that arise in the
19 future, including drought conditions. Under the current approach, any financial
20 risks as a result of this plan are to be paid for by ratepayers. The provincial
21 recoveries include both benefits for debt guarantee fees, capital taxes and water
22 rentals, as well as benefits from economic activity associated with the
23 construction, such as income and other taxes from construction employment and
24 related business activity. Even a time-limited revised sharing arrangement (such
25 as an exemption of government charges for new projects to the end of 15 years
26 post-ISC of each project) would be a substantial assistance to ratepayers to
27 balance the rate pressures and risks of advancing Keeyask with the 750 MW

1 line, and the government would continue to receive charges for Hydro's existing
2 system.”¹

3 In MIPUG’s view the requirement for a revised sharing approach is justified regardless
4 as to the specific approach adopted. The specific form of a benefit sharing approach
5 requires careful consideration by Manitoba Hydro and the Province. One example, that
6 MIPUG notes may work, is to provide an exemption on government charges (water
7 rentals, debt guarantee fees, capital taxes) for major new projects (Keeyask, 750 MW
8 line, and to the extent pursued, Conawapa) for the entire pre-construction period (on a
9 go-forward basis) as well as the period after in-service for 15 years after the ISD.

10 Based on the available information, MIPUG has approximated the effect of this approach
11 as follows, with the specific noted limitations:

12 **ESTIMATION OF CASH IMPACT ON GOVERNMENT/RATEPAYERS**

13 1) With regard to the effect on the provincial government, MIPUG can compare the
14 government charge levels for Plan 5 (K19/750 MW) or Plan 14 (PDP) to the level
15 of charges for Plan 1 (All Gas) and assume the difference is foregone. This
16 analysis will provide an estimate of the annual cash foregone by the provincial
17 government. This is not a perfect comparison, for a number of reasons, but the
18 effects are likely offsetting:

19 a. This estimation of foregone government revenue is somewhat
20 understated, as Plan 1 All Gas also includes some government charges
21 for gas assets. For this reason a simple comparison of the two plans fails
22 to capture the full impact of pursuing Plan 5/6 or Plan 14 with revised
23 charge levels. This is assumed to be a relatively small factor during the
24 relevant time periods, particularly for NPV purposes, as the gas
25 investment to 2034 or 2040 remains relatively small and later in this time
26 frame.

27 b. The conceptual approach is intended to be based on the premise that
28 government forgoes all charges for Plans 5/6 or Plan 14 that relate to the
29 specific plants noted. The estimation approach, however likely

¹ MIPUG-28, MIPUG Final Argument Written Submission, page xii – xiii. (May 21, 2014)

1 understates the amounts foregone. As Plan 1 All Gas includes debt
2 guarantee fees and capital taxes on balances related to unamortized
3 planning costs through the first 18 years, the scale of forgone government
4 charges is somewhat understated in the attached analysis. Given that this
5 only applies to approximately \$1.4 billion in planning costs, decreasing
6 with time (compared to almost \$20 billion of assets) the understatement is
7 assumed to be relatively small, and the analysis approach in the attached
8 materials is assumed to portray a representative approximation of the
9 effect of this approach.

10 c. At the same time, the net effect on government (lost potential revenue
11 from Hydro) from foregoing the noted charges is likely overstated, since
12 the analysis includes no offset for the added economic effects on
13 government from lower electricity prices, whether that be for government
14 facilities, from added taxes from larger amounts of disposable income for
15 Manitobans, or from added business growth.

16 2) With regard to the effect on Hydro's finances, the assumption is that any
17 government charges foregone in a year flow directly 1:1 to ratepayer savings in
18 the same year. This approach also has some modest limitations, as follows (as
19 these are small, they are not expected to materially undermine the analysis):

20 a. The analysis does not recalculate a rate increase scenario; it simply takes
21 the rate increase scenario already generated by Hydro and makes
22 adjustments to the annual rates paid. In practice, some "smoothing"
23 would be expected, but the effect on the analysis is expected to be small.

24 b. The effect on Hydro's cash flow is expected to be neutral each year (less
25 cash paid to government equals less cash received from customers)
26 however in this analysis there would be a modest mismatch on the
27 income statement accounting for debt guarantee fees during times when
28 the project is in the planning stages. Specifically, Hydro presently
29 capitalizes all amounts paid for debt guarantee fees to the project to
30 which the fees apply (this only affects debt guarantee fees, as capital
31 taxes are not capitalized, and there are not water rentals during
32 construction). If these charges were foregone, then the implicit savings

1 would be to the capital cost of the project. MIPUG is unable to precisely
2 model this, so for simplicity it is assumed that the effect is to lower rates
3 in the year the charges are paid, rather than to lower project capital costs.
4 As this only applies to project planning stages, and at times when the
5 cumulative project spending is lower than during operating phases, this
6 effect is expected to be relatively small in the attached analysis. Note
7 however that a side benefit of this approach is that it would reduce the
8 capital costs of projects modestly.

- 9 3) Finally, MIPUG notes that the updated scenarios provided in the various parts of
10 Exhibit MH-104 (including most specifically the financials in Exhibit MH-104-12)
11 do not update the total debt balance or debt guarantee fee payment breakdown,
12 as was originally provided in PUB/MH I-73a for the 2012 scenarios. For this
13 reason, the analysis of changes to government charges uses the original
14 financials from Appendix 11.4 and 2012 assumptions. As the analysis is focused
15 only on the incremental effects of a change in Manitoba Government charges,
16 the effect of using the older data (as compared to the latest scenarios) is
17 expected to be relatively modest.

18 **ESTIMATION OF IMPACT ON RATES PAID**


- 19 1) To estimate the impact on rates, the above estimation of the cash impact of a
20 revised government charges regime was compared to the rate levels in effect for
21 each year. As the best estimation of projected rate levels is contained in Exhibit
22 MH-104-12, this rate level was used as the baseline for Plans 1 (All Gas), 6
23 (K19/750 MW) and 14 (PDP). The scenarios with DSM #2 were utilized, without
24 pipeline load, as this was the only scenario that was consistently provided for
25 Plans 1, 6 and 14. Note that Plan 6 and Plan 5 are expected to be similar in
26 almost all respects, so for consistency with the approach adopted above, Plan 6
27 rates were used rather than Plan 5. Note that use of this approach also
28 introduces some time mismatches, as the Conawapa ISD varies between
29 Appendix 11.4 and the DSM #2 scenarios depending on load demand. The
30 effects of this mismatch on the NPV of rates are expected to be small.
- 31 2) MIPUG cannot accurately model the iterative impact of rate changes. As a result,
32 the estimates focus on how the revisions change the total amount paid by

1 ratepayers over the relevant period (Net Present Value from 2013 to 2040) rather
2 than the percentage rate increases.


3 For all of the above reasons, the analysis below should be considered a reasonable
4 approximation of the effect of the revised government charge levels on ratepayer NPVs.

5 Note that the attached analysis only reflects the REF-REF-REF condition and does not
6 fully represent the degree of risk and variability that ratepayers continue to be exposed
7 to under the scenarios.

8 The conclusion of the attached analysis is that government foregoing 100% of the
9 charges on major new development is a time-limited means of bringing the rate effects
10 of the large development plans closer to the All Gas Plan baseline. It is not sufficient to
11 bring the plans 100% to the All Gas level, much less to any equivalent of a hypothetical
12 All Gas scenario reflecting where ratepayers would be if \$1.4 billion had not been sunk
13 in the new projects. The analysis also suggests that while this approach may help bridge
14 the gap with All Gas, it does not provide net benefits (at least in any way sufficient to
15 deal with the risks ratepayers are bearing).



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Table 1: Part I - Effect on Government/Ratepayer Cash Flow (\$ Millions)

REF-REF-REF	NPV to 2040 (2014\$)	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030	2031	2032	2033	2034	2035	2036	2037	2038	2039	2040		
Applied to Plan 14																															
Foregone Government Benefit per year - 100%	1,397	-	-	2	7	19	34	54	75	101	122	145	164	181	201	221	225	224	219	215	215	215	213	109	110	104	99	88	85		
Foregone Government Benefit per year - 50%	699	-	-	1	4	10	17	27	38	51	61	73	82	91	101	111	113	112	110	108	108	108	107	55	55	52	50	44	43		
Based on:		Plan 14 minus Plan 1 (forego gov benefits from K19, 750 MW, C26)																					Plan 14 minus Plan 6 (forego gov benefits from C26)								
Applied to Plan 6																															
Foregone Government Benefit per year - 100%	621	-	-	1	5	15	27	44	60	78	85	86	84	83	83	79	81	79	73	75	81	84	82	-	-	-	-	-	-		
Foregone Government Benefit per year - 50%	310	-	-	1	3	8	14	22	30	39	43	43	42	42	42	40	41	40	37	38	41	42	41	-	-	-	-	-	-		
Based on:		Plan 6 minus Plan 1 (forego gov benefits from K19, 750 MW)																					No foregone gov benefits								

Table 2: Part II – Effect on Total Amounts Paid in Rates to 2040 (\$ Millions)

REF-REF-REF	NPV to 2040 (2014\$)	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030	2031	2032	2033	2034	2035	2036	2037	2038	2039	2040
Impact on Plan 14 at 100%																													
Exhibit 104-12-4 Ratepayer Revenues	30,696	1,331	1,396	1,456	1,526	1,587	1,660	1,737	1,827	1,924	2,027	2,135	2,250	2,371	2,498	2,631	2,771	2,922	3,082	3,249	3,424	2,538	2,791	2,862	2,890	2,951	2,995	3,000	3,029
Revenue Reduction @ 100%	1,397	-	-	2	7	19	34	54	75	101	122	145	164	181	201	221	225	224	219	215	215	215	213	109	110	104	99	88	85
Reduced Ratepayer Revenues	29,299	1,331	1,396	1,454	1,519	1,568	1,626	1,683	1,752	1,823	1,905	1,990	2,086	2,190	2,297	2,410	2,546	2,698	2,863	3,034	3,209	2,323	2,578	2,753	2,780	2,847	2,896	2,912	2,944
Plan 1 All Gas Ratepayer Revenues change from All Gas	28,845 454	1,331	1,396	1,456	1,512	1,559	1,617	1,677	1,749	1,825	1,907	1,990	2,079	2,172	2,268	2,368	2,472	2,584	2,701	2,823	2,950	2,393	2,437	2,528	2,677	2,771	2,874	2,899	3,075
		-	-	(2)	6	9	9	6	3	(2)	(1)	(0)	7	18	29	42	74	114	161	211	260	(70)	140	224	102	77	22	13	(131)
Impact on Plan 14 at 50%																													
Exhibit 104-12-4 Ratepayer Revenues	30,696	1,331	1,396	1,456	1,526	1,587	1,660	1,737	1,827	1,924	2,027	2,135	2,250	2,371	2,498	2,631	2,771	2,922	3,082	3,249	3,424	2,538	2,791	2,862	2,890	2,951	2,995	3,000	3,029
Revenue Reduction @ 50%	699	-	-	1	4	10	17	27	38	51	61	73	82	91	101	111	113	112	110	108	108	108	107	55	55	52	50	44	43
Reduced Ratepayer Revenues	29,998	1,331	1,396	1,455	1,522	1,577	1,643	1,710	1,790	1,873	1,966	2,062	2,168	2,280	2,398	2,520	2,658	2,810	2,972	3,141	3,317	2,430	2,684	2,807	2,835	2,899	2,945	2,956	2,986
Plan 1 All Gas Ratepayer Revenues change from All Gas	28,845 1,152	1,331	1,396	1,456	1,512	1,559	1,617	1,677	1,749	1,825	1,907	1,990	2,079	2,172	2,268	2,368	2,472	2,584	2,701	2,823	2,950	2,393	2,437	2,528	2,677	2,771	2,874	2,899	3,075
		-	-	(1)	10	18	26	33	41	48	60	72	89	109	129	153	186	226	271	318	367	37	247	279	157	129	72	57	(88)
Impact on Plan 6 at 100%																													
Exhibit 104-12-4 Ratepayer Revenues	29,368	1,331	1,396	1,456	1,519	1,571	1,636	1,702	1,782	1,867	1,958	2,052	2,152	2,256	2,365	2,478	2,598	2,727	2,860	3,001	3,147	2,398	2,428	2,530	2,615	2,683	2,763	2,816	2,880
Revenue Reduction @ 100%	621	-	-	1	5	15	27	44	60	78	85	86	84	83	83	79	81	79	73	75	81	84	82	-	-	-	-	-	-
Reduced Ratepayer Revenues	28,747	1,331	1,396	1,455	1,514	1,556	1,609	1,658	1,722	1,789	1,873	1,966	2,068	2,173	2,282	2,399	2,517	2,648	2,787	2,926	3,066	2,314	2,346	2,530	2,615	2,683	2,763	2,816	2,880
Plan 1 All Gas Ratepayer Revenues change from All Gas	28,845 (98)	1,331	1,396	1,456	1,512	1,559	1,617	1,677	1,749	1,825	1,907	1,990	2,079	2,172	2,268	2,368	2,472	2,584	2,701	2,823	2,950	2,393	2,437	2,528	2,677	2,771	2,874	2,899	3,075
		0	(0)	(1)	2	(3)	(8)	(19)	(27)	(36)	(34)	(24)	(11)	1	14	31	45	64	86	103	116	(79)	(91)	2	(62)	(88)	(111)	(83)	(195)
Impact on Plan 6 at 50%																													
Exhibit 104-12-4 Ratepayer Revenues	29,368	1,331	1,396	1,456	1,519	1,571	1,636	1,702	1,782	1,867	1,958	2,052	2,152	2,256	2,365	2,478	2,598	2,727	2,860	3,001	3,147	2,398	2,428	2,530	2,615	2,683	2,763	2,816	2,880
Revenue Reduction @ 50%	310	-	-	1	3	8	14	22	30	39	43	43	42	42	42	40	41	40	37	38	41	42	41	-	-	-	-	-	-
Reduced Ratepayer Revenues	29,058	1,331	1,396	1,456	1,517	1,564	1,623	1,680	1,752	1,828	1,916	2,009	2,110	2,215	2,324	2,439	2,558	2,688	2,824	2,964	3,107	2,356	2,387	2,530	2,615	2,683	2,763	2,816	2,880
Plan 1 All Gas Ratepayer Revenues change from All Gas	28,845 212	1,331	1,396	1,456	1,512	1,559	1,617	1,677	1,749	1,825	1,907	1,990	2,079	2,172	2,268	2,368	2,472	2,584	2,701	2,823	2,950	2,393	2,437	2,528	2,677	2,771	2,874	2,899	3,075
		0	(0)	(0)	4	4	5	3	3	3	9	19	31	43	55	71	85	103	122	140	157	(37)	(50)	2	(62)	(88)	(111)	(83)	(195)