



“When You Talk - We Listen!”



MANITOBA PUBLIC UTILITIES BOARD

Re: 2016 PAYDAY LOAN REVIEW

Before Board Panel:

Karen Botting	- Panel Chairperson
Regis Gosselin	- Panel Member
Anita Neville	- Panel Member
Susan Proven	- Panel Member
Allan Morin	- Panel Member

HELD AT:

Public Utilities Board
400, 330 Portage Avenue
Winnipeg, Manitoba
April 18, 2016
Pages 944 to 1120

1 APPEARANCES

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3

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1 --- Upon commencing at 9:05 a.m.

2

3 THE PANEL CHAIRPERSON: Good morning,
4 everyone, and welcome back to the 2016 Tri-Annual
5 Payday Loans Review Hearings. This morning we will
6 begin with our closing comments and we will open up
7 with the Honourable Stan Keyes who is representing
8 CPLA.

9 And just prior to that I'm going to
10 just ask Mr. Williams if he's like to read this into
11 the record.

12 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Well, I don't
13 want to read it into the record quite yet.

14 THE PANEL CHAIRPERSON: I mean not
15 yet.

16 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: We could mark
17 that, I believe, as Coalition Exhibit 41.

18 THE PANEL CHAIRPERSON: Okay. Thank
19 you.

20 MS. KATHLEEN MCCANDLESS: Madam Chair,
21 perhaps prior to the closing submissions from the
22 Intervenors I will simply summarize the issues for the
23 Board.

24 THE PANEL CHAIRPERSON: I would
25 appreciate that. Thank you.

1 MS. KATHLEEN MCCANDLESS: Thank you.

2

3 CLOSING COMMENTS BY BOARD COUNSEL:

4 MS. KATHLEEN MCCANDLESS: Thank you,
5 Madam Chair, and members of the panel. As counsel for
6 the Board I take no position on any of the positions
7 advanced by the Intervenors. I will take this
8 opportunity simply to summarize the issues that are
9 before the Board in this 2016 Tri -- Tri-Annual Payday
10 Loans Review.

11 Pursuant to Section 164 of the Consumer
12 Protection Act of Manitoba and as requested by the
13 Minister in accordance with Section 164.1(2) of the
14 Act, the Board conducted this public review of
15 specific aspects of amounts charged to consumers
16 respecting payday loan transactions.

17 In this year's review the Board was
18 required to review amounts charged to consumers to
19 obtain payday loans, and the Board was specifically
20 asked by the Minister to analyse the impacts of
21 reducing the maximum allowable rate that may be
22 charged for a payday loan from seventeen dollars (\$17)
23 per one hundred dollars (\$100) borrowed to fifteen
24 dollars (\$15) per one hundred doll -- dollars (\$100)
25 borrowed, and the impacts of reducing the proportion

1 of a borrower's net pay, which is used to determine
2 the maximum loan amount, from 30 percent to 25
3 percent.

4 As part of the review, the Board has
5 heard a comprehensive examination of the issues
6 respecting payday loans in Manitoba. There has been a
7 significant accumulation of information on the subject
8 matter of payday loans in the course of this process.

9 In addition to the specific matters po
10 -- and questions posed by the Minister in this
11 hearing, the Board has heard evidence and received
12 information in respect of the components of the cost
13 of credit for a payday loan, the rates for extensions,
14 renewals, and replacements for payday loans, the
15 financial viability of the payday loans industry and
16 lender issues respecting cost of credit and other
17 regulated matters, perspectives on the industry from
18 the consumer and lender side, demographics of payday
19 loans consumers; and any changes to those demographics
20 or trends since the last review, repeat borrowing and
21 its impact on consumers and the industry, payday
22 lending on payments other than salary or wages, the
23 development of alternatives to payday lenders --
24 payday loans -- pardon me -- and their possible effect
25 on the industry and consumers, internet payday lending

1 and its effect on the industry and consumers, and
2 regula -- regulatory practices in other Canadian
3 jurisdictions and US states.

4 In conclusion, Madam Chair, I've
5 attempted to comment on the main issues that arose and
6 were explored in this review. There are certainly
7 other issues I'm sure that I have not commented on.

8 Certainly I would like to thank the
9 Board as well as the Intervenors and the presenters
10 for their cooperation extended throughout this
11 process. Subject to any questions that the Board has
12 for me, those are my comments. Thank you.

13 THE PANEL CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Ms.
14 McCandless. Do I have questions from the panel? No
15 questions. Thank you very much.

16 Now I'll call upon the Honourable Stan
17 Keyes to present on -- to give his closing submissions
18 on behalf of CPLA.

19

20 CLOSING COMMENTS BY CANADIAN PAYDAY LOANS ASSOCIATION:

21 MR. STAN KEYES: Thank you, Madam
22 Chair, Karen Botting, Me. President, Mr. Gosselin,
23 members of the PUB, fellow Intervenors, ladies and
24 gentlemen. For the record, pursuant to the Consumer
25 Protection Amendment Act, payday loans, the Act, the

1 Public Utilities Board, the Board convened this
2 proceeding to review charges and fees for payday loans
3 to inquire into matters respecting payday loans
4 generally and consider two (2) specific matters being,
5 firstly, the impacts of possibly reducing the maximum
6 allowable -- allowable rate from seventeen (\$17) per
7 one hundred dollars (\$100) borrowed to fifteen (\$15)
8 per one hundred dollars (\$100) borrowed and, secondly,
9 the impacts of reducing the proportion of the
10 borrower's net pay which is used to determine the
11 maximum loan amount from 30 percent to 25 percent.

12 The Board may make other
13 recommendations as it deems useful. During these
14 hearings, the Board has been provided with a large
15 volume of information and has heard from consumers,
16 payday loan lenders, experts, and Intervenors. The
17 CPLA has always endeavoured to participate as fully as
18 possible and to present accurate and helpful
19 information.

20 The Canadian Payday Loan Association is
21 an industry association incorporated in 2004. It
22 represents the interests of licensed payday lenders in
23 Canada and is an advocate for fair and balanced
24 regulation that allows for a viable industry while
25 protecting the interests of consumers. Today there

1 are forty-three (43) payday loan licenses issued here
2 in Manitoba, and thirty (30) of those licenses are
3 issued to members of the Canadian Payday Loan
4 Association.

5 Our members operate nine hundred and
6 forty (940) outlets or online lending sites across
7 Canada which represents approximately 67 percent of
8 the sites and outlets of the licensed industry in
9 Canada.

10 So who uses payday loans? Due to
11 limited resources, the CPLA did not undertake any new
12 research. However, we did file CPLA Exhibit 4, the
13 research conducted by Environics in 2013, the
14 Environics research, which was also filed and accepted
15 in the last hearing.

16 The Coalition filed very thorough,
17 thoughtful, and detailed research by Dr. Buckland, Dr.
18 Simpson, and Ms. St. Aubin. We commend the Coalition
19 for undertaking this work and adding to the body of
20 knowledge in the area.

21 Dr. Simpson was able to compare
22 findings in his most recent research with the findings
23 from a study he conducted back in 2012. It was noted
24 that there was increased use of the product among
25 those who are older, have higher incomes, and higher

1 education. Dr. Simpson noted that this was consistent
2 with comments of the presenters that borrowers include
3 teachers, nurses, office workers, and tradespersons.

4 It has been shown by the research that
5 has been presented, comments of the consumers panel,
6 as well as letters submitted by borrowers in this
7 hearing that there is a need for the product. The
8 option for access to a short-term, small-sum loan
9 repayable on payday is highly valued by many, many
10 Manitobans.

11 So what is the impact of reducing the
12 maximum allowable rate from seventeen dollars (\$17)
13 per one hundred (100) borrowed to fifteen dollars
14 (\$15) per one hundred (100) borrowed?

15 There is no doubt that a payday loan is
16 a high-cost credit product. That is, it is because it
17 is an expensive product to provide, the shorter the
18 term and the smaller the amount of the loan, the
19 higher the annualized percentage rate will be.

20 Much of the hearing focussed on the
21 costs to provide the product. It is the position of
22 the CPLA that the maximum allowable rate should not be
23 reduced below seventeen dollars (\$17).

24 If that occurred, it would result in
25 store closures, loss of jobs, restricted access to

1 credit in terms of geography, and denial of credit to
2 a portion of borrowers who currently qualify for
3 loans.

4 The Coalition presented the evidence of
5 Dr. Chris Robert -- Robinson to support the argument
6 that the maximum rate should be lowered to fifteen
7 dollars (\$15) per one hundred dollars (\$100) borrowed.

8 Now, Dr. Robinson's projections -- or
9 sorry, Dr. Robinson's evidence, by his own admission,
10 was based on a multitude of assumptions and
11 projections. Repeatedly when cross-examined on
12 statements in his evidence, he would have to
13 acknowledge that they were incorrect.

14 At the conclusion of his evidence in-
15 chief, he concluded that seventeen dollars (\$17) may
16 be the maximum rate where a lender was not making
17 excessive profit. Dr. Robinson stated on page 474:

18 "Certainly, Manitoba's rates are
19 lower than everyone else's, but it
20 is also perfectly consistent with 17
21 percent being the equilibrium rate.
22 And therefore, you should not change
23 from 17 percent."

24 On page 476, in cross-examination, he
25 stated:

1 "It is certainly true that there are
2 so many estimates involved in all of
3 this work, especially since the CPLA
4 will not provide any data, that 17
5 percent may also be the correct
6 rate."

7 For the record, we would like to note
8 that the CPLA is an industry association and does not
9 and has never had any of its members' data.

10 Those comments of Dr. Robinson confirm
11 the rest of his testimony that his conclusions were
12 based on variables and estimates. When he plugged
13 Cash Money's information into his model, it
14 determined, as Ms. Soper had indicated, that the
15 stores would not be profitable. He did that.

16 Ms. Soper of Cash Store -- of Cash
17 Money indicated that they have one hundred eighty-five
18 (185) locations across Canada, but only four (4)
19 locations in Manitoba. She went on to state:

20 "Over the last two (2) -- [quote] --
21 over the last two (2) years, we have
22 opened about forty-five (45)
23 locations across Canada.
24 five (45)]. None of these new
25 locations were in Manitoba as a

1 result of the impact of the current
2 regulations and our ability to
3 operate profitably."

4 Excuse me. Dr. Robinson made the
5 argument that there was no growth in Manitoba because
6 Money Mart is the market leader, and no other operator
7 could get a foothold.

8 He ignored the fact that new lenders
9 regularly open up in close proximity to existing
10 lenders, and certainly in Manitoba where a borrower
11 may need more than 30 percent of their net pay or may
12 need a loan within seven (7) days following a loan
13 from Money Mart. One would expect a new lender to
14 open up in Manitoba if there was an opportunity to
15 make excessive profits.

16 And one would expect Cash Money, with
17 one hundred and eighty-five (185) outlets across
18 Canada, a nationally recognized brand, a long-term
19 presence here in Manitoba, and an expansion program
20 opening forty-five (45) new outlets in the past two
21 (2) years, would have opened outlets here in Manitoba
22 if there were excess profits to be made. Instead,
23 Cash Money closed one (1) location, and has elected
24 not to renew the lease of one (1) of their remaining
25 locations but to continue there on a month-to-month

1 basis.

2 With one hundred and eighty-five (185)
3 outlets, one thousand five hundred (1,500) employees
4 in Canada, and twenty-four (24) years in the business,
5 Cash Money is not an inefficient operator. While Cash
6 Money is not the size of Money Mart, there is no
7 reason to believe that Money Mart has any materially
8 greater economies of scale when it comes to operating
9 in any province in Canada. Excuse me.

10 Manitoba has the lowest lending rate in
11 Canada at seventeen dollars (\$17) per hundred, the
12 lowest. However, Manitoba is also the only province
13 to have a seven (7) day cooling off, and have the
14 lowest maximum loan amount in Canada at 30 percent of
15 net pay.

16 When regulations came into effect,
17 appro -- approximately half -- half of the operators
18 in Manitoba closed their doors. Certainly Manitoba
19 has -- currently, rather -- currently Manitoba has
20 three point zero-nine (3.09) stores per one hundred
21 thousand (100,000) outlets of population -- of
22 population, which is lower than the national average
23 of three point nine-nine (3.99) per one hundred
24 thousand (100,000) of population.

25 It is also well below other

1 jurisdictions of comparable populations, such as
2 Saskatchewan, which has four point six-nine (4.69)
3 stores per one hundred thousand (100,000) population.
4 All these factors are evidence that there are not
5 excessive profits being made. Real business and real
6 jobs, and access to credit for real borrowers hang in
7 the balance, so it is important that any
8 recommendation not be speculated.

9 We believe that on the evidence,
10 including the evidence of Dr. Robinson, it is
11 abundantly clear that licensed lenders are not making
12 excessive profits at seventeen dollars (\$17) per
13 hundred, and the impact of reducing the rate from
14 seventeen dollars (\$17) to fifteen (15) would be
15 extensive store closures, loss of jobs, and denial of
16 access to credit for many Manitobans from licensed
17 lenders.

18 So what is the impact of reducing the
19 portion of the borrower's net pay, which is used to
20 determine the maximum loan amount, from 30 percent to
21 25 percent? Presentations from Ms. Soper of Cash
22 Money, and Ms. Janet Davis from the Money Tree
23 indicated that borrowers often feel constrained about
24 being only able to borrow 30 percent of their net pay.
25 If a borrower has a need, they will be forced to get

1 an additional loan from another lender.

2 Ms. Soper stated at page 168 of the
3 transcript:

4 "The current maximum of 30 percent
5 of net pay is far lower than
6 anywhere else in the country.
7 Customers do frequently tell our
8 staff that they need to visit
9 another lender to get the additional
10 amount they need."

11 On the other hand, the research of Ms.
12 St. Aubin, as well as comments from the consumer's
13 panel, show that borrowers know their specific needs
14 and borrow what they need, not what they can. This is
15 also reflected in the Grant Thornton report filed in
16 Schedule H of the CPLA's pre-filed evidence. This
17 study is a review of all of the 2014 transactions of
18 the three (3) largest payday lenders in Canada, which
19 found that 62 percent of borrowers elect to borrow
20 less than what they are approved for, and on average,
21 those borrowers only choose to borrow 68.1 percent of
22 what they were approved to borrow.

23 Dr. Robinson was clear and firm in his
24 evidence, both written and oral, that he did not
25 recommend that the maximum loan amount -- excuse me --

1 be reduced below 30 percent of net pay. CPLA believes
2 the impact of reducing the proportion of the
3 borrower's net pay, which is used to determine the
4 maximum loan amount, from 30 percent to 25 percent,
5 would be of no benefit to borrowers.

6 It would force many consumers to seek
7 credit from more than one (1) lender, putting them in
8 a position where they are trying to juggle two (2)
9 concurrent loans. In such cases, they may well have
10 to seek borrowing from unlicensed lenders. On the
11 other hand, this will impact the viability of current
12 licensed operators through a reduction in revenue.

13 Excuse me. And I -- I'd like now to
14 address the online lending and impact of -- of
15 regulation. The central, perhaps fundamental question
16 of this hearing is if access to credit is denied, will
17 borrowers turn to online lenders?

18 Online payday lending is a new and
19 emerging issue. And as such, there remains much to be
20 learned in this area. There is some research and
21 information available, and the CPLA believe that it's
22 all valuable to the Board's consideration.

23 What the Board has before it is this:
24 As was commented on by many parties in this hearing,
25 while we all know online unlicensed lending exists, it

1 is difficult to get actual data on this phenomenon.
2 The Consumer's Counsel of Canada report consumer
3 experiences in online payday loans, by Denise Barrett,
4 called the Barrett Report, sometimes, and filed as
5 CPLA Exhibit 8, and the copies of unlicensed payday
6 lender websites in Manitoba, filed as CPLA Exhibit 6,
7 show significant growth in online lending in Canada.

8 The Barrett Report finds that -- show
9 payday lenders in other countries are going online,
10 and Canadian lenders and regulators observe the same
11 here in Canada. Indeed, in her presentation, Ms.
12 Soper indicates that in the past three (3) years, the
13 Cash Money's online lending has grown by 245 percent.

14 The Barrett Report also finds that
15 unlicensed online lenders are largely noncompliant
16 with the applicable payday lending legislation. In
17 fact, Dr. Buckland refers to -- refers us to the Pew
18 Charitable Trusts Report, Fraud and Abuse Online:
19 Harmful Practices in Internet Payday Lending, the 2014
20 Pew Report, which cites numerous harms that online
21 payday loan borrowers face, including products
22 designed to promote renewals and long-term debt,
23 threats, unauthorized withdrawals from bank accounts,
24 aggressive practices, disclosure of personal
25 information, and fraud.

1 Dr. Buckland also refers us to the 2014
2 Pew Report for the proposition that greater regulation
3 does not necessarily lead to greater online payday
4 loan borrowing. And Anna Ellison from the UK based
5 research firm Policis presented a further perspective:
6 Greater regulation leads to greater presence of
7 unlicensed online payday lenders.

8 As the Coalition pointed out, the rese
9 -- research to date is not perfect and has
10 limitations. As a presenter, Ms. Ellison's
11 information was not available for testing by either
12 the Coalition or the CPLA.

13 In just the past year, the CPLA became
14 aware of the Pol -- that Policis had conducted and
15 presented research to the Government of the United
16 Kingdom on the effects of regulation on online lending
17 in the United States. This is the only research on
18 this issue that the CPLA was aware of, and
19 consequently, the CPLA contacted Policis to see if
20 they would present their findings to the Manitoba
21 Public Utilities Board.

22 Policis was very clear to us that they
23 are independent and they do not -- do not do work for
24 any interest group. They would not undertake
25 commissioned research, nor would they appear as a

1 witness for the CPLA.

2 Policis agreed to make a presentation
3 to the Board provided the CPLA covered their costs,
4 which the CPAL -- CPLA did. The CPLA understands the
5 Coalition's concerns and would also have preferred a
6 complete testing of the evidence.

7 However, as this was not possible, at
8 least not at these hearings, the CPLA was of the view
9 that because there is a key area of consideration in
10 the hearings, it was worthwhile to have the
11 information presented.

12 It is worthwhile to note that Policis
13 is a respected research think tank that has issued
14 many publications in the area of consumer credit and
15 financial inclusion. They were the research lead for
16 the UK government and regulators for framing both the
17 Consumer Credit Act of 2006 and introduction of the
18 new regulatory regime for consumer credit under the
19 new financial conduct authority in 2012.

20 Policis has also presented their
21 findings to may governments, policy groups, and
22 regulators, including the conference of state banking
23 supervisors in the USA, the Australian Commission on
24 small amount credit, and the UK HM Treasury. Very
25 significantly, Policis has presented to the Consumer

1 Financial Protection Bureau, that's the CFPB, in the
2 United States and has been asked to return and present
3 further findings in the areas of online illegal and
4 tribal lending.

5 The Coalition also put forth the
6 evidence of Dr. Buckland in this area. Now, his
7 evidence consisted of a literature review of studies
8 conducted several years ago. And it must be noted
9 that the authors of those studies were not available
10 to appear before the Board either.

11 Further, there are constraints on the
12 authorities Dr. Buckland relies on, including the PU -
13 - the Pew Charitable Trust's survey involved four
14 hundred and fifty-one (451) borrowers in 2011 and 2012
15 who were asked to select an option of a payday loan
16 was not available.

17 Well, the borrowers were not in the
18 circumstance where credit had been denied and were
19 merely asked to choose from seven options of credit if
20 credit was designed -- denied rather. Taking out an
21 online payday loan was not one (1) of the options they
22 could select.

23 The study Alex Kaufman conducted in
24 2013 was based on data from 2007 to 2012 which looked
25 at the lending patterns from a single lender. Kaufman

1 acknowledges that he did not have any data to
2 determine whether borrowers were using other lending
3 sources. He recognized and said that customer
4 activity outside of payday borrowing is unobserved.

5 The Kaufmann Ratcliff Keuhn study
6 covers a period from 2005 to 2009 and examines
7 outcomes in a state that bans payday lending. It also
8 concludes that, quote:

9 "Living in a state that prohibits
10 payday lending does not necessarily
11 prevent residents of that state from
12 getting a payday loan. People that
13 live near the border with another
14 state can go across state lines to
15 obtain a payday loan. Also,
16 internet payday loans are generally
17 available to people who live in
18 states that prohibit payday lending
19 businesses."

20 The Cumulative Costs of Predatory
21 Practices by Sara Wolfe which was published in 2015
22 but summarizes previous chapters written by Wolfe,
23 Wolfe is citing a telephone survey conducted in 2007
24 when ecommerce was in its infancy and the experience
25 of the UK which introduced new high-cost credit

1 legislation in 2015 has not -- has not been fully
2 studied nor accounted for. Excuse me.

3

4

(BRIEF PAUSE)

5

6 MR. STAN KEYES: The Board is tasked
7 with balancing these limitations. In his last day of
8 testimony Dr. Robinson urged each of us to look at the
9 story being presented and determined whether it agrees
10 with what we see and the evidence before us. He
11 appealed to simplicity and common sense, and the CPLA
12 does the same.

13 Technology for online lending has
14 evolved rapidly in the past five (5) years and will
15 only continue to evolve further. The undeniable fact
16 is that today there are more and more online lending
17 websites and more and more people using them.

18 Consumers are being increasingly
19 sophisticated in technology. And the widespread
20 availability of smartphone makes ecommerce more
21 accessible and commonplace in our society. Even to
22 those in more disadvantaged situations, it is evident
23 that we are experiencing rapid growth and ecommerce
24 and that online purchasing will continue.

25 Because technology is evolving rapidly

1 and online purchasing of goods and services is
2 following technological developments, the question is
3 not what borrowers might have done in 2010 or 2012,
4 for example, but what will they do in 2016, 2017, and
5 2018.

6 Thus, common sense tells us that, if
7 online payday loans can easily be obtained and a
8 borrower needs credit and is restricted or prevented
9 from getting credit where they live, that person, not
10 in every case but in many cases, will go online to an
11 unlicensed, unregulated, offshore, illegal lender to
12 obtain credit. And as more and more people in 2016,
13 2017, and 2018 become more familiar with technology,
14 this will continue.

15 That fact, that there is not, nor will
16 there be for some, complete and conclusive research on
17 all aspects of offshore illegal lenders and tribal
18 lenders, or the extent to which borrowers will
19 gravitate to these lenders if access to licensed
20 lenders is denied, does not mean that it is not going
21 to happen.

22 Hopefully, in the review in three (3)
23 years' time, there will be more research and evidence
24 for all parties to put forward before the Board.

25 So what are the conclusions? In

1 addition to the matters the Board was directed to con
2 -- consider, there are -- are further recommendations
3 the Board may wish to make in the area of payday
4 lending in Manitoba.

5 The CPLA has always recognized the need
6 for consumer protections in regulation as the balance
7 to allow for a viable industry. We have been
8 proactive with all governments, and at the hearing we
9 presented the seven (7) point plan which we have put
10 forward to other provinces for their consideration.

11 These are recommendations made to other
12 provinces. And because regulations in Manitoba are
13 unique, not all the recommendations are required.
14 There will not -- there was not, sorry, a fulsome
15 discussion of each point in detail during the hearing,
16 and we would like to provide more background and
17 context.

18 And we provide comments to only those
19 recommendations that would be appropriate to consider
20 in this province. And they are as follows.

21 The first is the optional extended
22 payment plan, or EPP. The CPLA poses the following:

23 (a) where a borrower takes out three
24 (3) or more successive loans which can be defined as
25 third or subsequent payday loans taken within a sixty

1 (60) day period -- sixty-two (62) day period;

2 (b) then for that and each subsequent
3 loan that would be qualified as a third or subsequent
4 loan in sixty-two (62) days, the lender must offer the
5 borrower, and the borrower has the option to accept,
6 repayment terms; and

7 (c) for the loan spread over at least
8 three (3) payment periods where no payment exceeds 35
9 percent of the principal and cost of borrowing.

10 This addresses the cycle of debt issue.
11 We have heard in the evidence that many borrowers like
12 the fact that it is a short-term loan, that they know
13 exactly how much they have to pay, and it is very
14 short-term and how they know exactly when they have to
15 repay it. It allows them to control their
16 circumstances and provides self-imposed discipline.

17 Clear concern was expressed by
18 borrowers that instalment loans with longer-term loans
19 and multiple payments will be difficult to manage.
20 Participants in the focus groups and members of the
21 consumers panel were not necessarily comfortable with
22 the responsibility of having to manage a longer-term
23 loan.

24 However, if, as we have proposed, a
25 borrower has the right to the third or subsequent loan

1 within a sixty (60) day period which would indicate a
2 tendency to get into repeat borrowing, to extend
3 repayment of their loan over three (3) pay periods,
4 those people would have to pay a third of what it
5 would take on each payday.

6 It will result in a reduction of loans
7 granted by a payday lender which should allow the
8 lenders to remain viable. It is mandatory on the
9 lender and optional for the borrower. It will not
10 force those who do not want an instalment to take one,
11 but will allow those who need it to get out of the
12 cycle of debt.

13 An extended payment program is far more
14 helpful to borrowers than a seven (7) day cooling-off
15 period. As Dr. Buckland points out, not all
16 regulations achieve their objective.

17 The presumed intention of the
18 regulation is to prevent borrowers from getting into a
19 cycle of debt. Now, if a borrower requires a loan
20 within seven (7) days, which is actually eight (8)
21 days the way the the regulation is interpreted, does
22 not the regulation prevent re-borrowing, or does it
23 merely cause the borrower to go to a second lender?

24 An optional extended payment plan is
25 far more effective. However, the Board needs to

1 consider the effect of an extended payment plan
2 overlaid on a seven (7) day cooling-off period because
3 that could result in borrowers trying to juggle
4 multiple installment loans -- installment payments.

5 Second is the standard form contract.
6 The registrar of payday loans should prescribe a
7 standard form of payday loan contract. This would
8 include standardized terms and conditions in plain
9 wording, and in a consistent font addressing all areas
10 covered under the Act and regulations including areas
11 of collection rights, default fees, interest, use of
12 pre-authorized debits, promise to pay, payment rights,
13 and no rights of renewal.

14 The purpose is to provide a clear,
15 understandable, and succinct contract and avoid
16 attempts by any lenders to confuse borrowers with
17 convoluted and excessive legalize.

18 Dr. Buckland suggested that
19 interprovincial Consumer Measures Committee agree on a
20 standard form contract for all of Canada. While this
21 is laudable, the legislation in each province has
22 different definitions, and we have seen very province
23 has different views on what they think is appropriate.
24 This should not prevent Manitoba from having a clear,
25 plain language contract that is provided by every

1 lender. A standard form of contract is supported by
2 the industry.

3 The third is job loss extensive
4 program. CPLA proposes the following. If following a
5 borrower taking out a payday loan the borrower
6 experiences involuntary job loss or loss of income,
7 the borrower may notify the lender before the loan is
8 due and provide reasonable evidence of the job or
9 income loss. The lender then shall be obliged to
10 extend the payment date of the outstanding loan to a
11 date that is the next payday after the date of three
12 (3) months following the date of notification to the
13 lender, and during such period no interest or fees
14 will accrue on the outstanding loan.

15 There appear to be confusion by Dr.
16 Robinson about this proposal. It is not a proposal to
17 provide loans to those who have lost their jobs but
18 rather addresses those circumstances where someone has
19 an outstanding payday loan, and loses their job prior
20 to the due date of the loan with the result that the
21 repayment of the loan is very difficult.

22 It is not a comment occurrence, but can
23 be very stressful when it occurs. This provision
24 would, in effect, provide a three (3) month freeze on
25 repayment where the borrower is not accruing default

1 or interest charges.

2 The fourth is the restriction on
3 default fees and interest charged on loans in default.
4 Manitoba already has regulations in this area that are
5 far more restrictive than anywhere else in Canada.

6 Fifth is the mandatory acceptance of
7 settlement plans proposed by credit counsellors. When
8 an individual in financial stress meets with a credit
9 counsellor, the credit counsellor will develop a work
10 out proposal and approach all the creditors of their
11 client seeking an agreement to reduce and/or
12 reschedule repayment of the debts.

13 Some lenders refuse to accept those
14 proposals. Payday loans always compromise a very
15 small -- always comprise, rather, a very small portion
16 of the borrower's debt yet the refusal of a -- by a
17 payday lender to accept a proposal can create
18 difficulties for the credit counsellor.

19 It would be appropriate to introduce a
20 regulation requiring any licensed payday lender accept
21 a proposal put forward by a not for profit credit
22 counsellor that provides for settlement of their debt
23 pro rata with all other creditors. This would greatly
24 assist credit counsellors and their clients. This is
25 already a requirement of every member of the CPLA, and

1 we believe it should be a requirement of all licensed
2 lenders.

3 The sixth is the mandatory referral to
4 Credit Counselling Services. The government should
5 consider a regulation that requires a lender to
6 provide any borrower who has taken out three (3) or
7 more payday loans within a three (3) month period with
8 referral information to a credit counselling service
9 at the time of applying for their next loan.

10 Dr. Robinson made an analogy about,
11 "You can lead a horse to water;" however, what is
12 proposed here is not to refer everyone who takes out a
13 payday loan to credit counselling, but instead to
14 refer credit counselling to those who have taken out
15 three (3) or more loans within a three (3) month
16 period. That is the time when many people may find a
17 referral very useful.

18 Financial literacy, on an annual basis
19 every licensed lender contributes five hundred dollars
20 (\$500) to a financial literacy fund here in Manitoba.
21 We have never been advised of where these funds go or
22 how they are spent.

23 As we have reported to the Board in the
24 past, in our work with credit counsellors, they have
25 told us on average payday loans form less than 3

1 percent, less than 3 percent of the overall debt of
2 their clients. Those who have problems with payday
3 loans have problems with debt in general. And
4 financial literacy, in respect of all products, should
5 be investigated.

6 Licensed lenders are the point of
7 contact with borrowers and the delivery system for
8 financial information, certainly for CPLA members.
9 You will note from the letters filed by employees of
10 payday lenders as well as testimony of Janet Davis
11 that the customer service representatives are often,
12 in many respects, frontline credit counsellors.

13 We have to -- you know, we have a lot
14 to contribute and we believe the government should
15 include industry in consultation on use of the fund
16 for consumer research as well as development for --
17 for delivery of literacy materials.

18 Data collection, we have filed with the
19 Board in CPLA Exhibit 13 a summary of the information
20 collected by the provinces of BC, Ontario, and Nova
21 Scotia. The CPLA recognizes the need for collection
22 of appropriate information and has been supportive of
23 this initiative.

24 However, in determining what
25 information to collect, it is important to consult

1 with industry. Thought needs to be put into what
2 information is collected and why, and be mindful of
3 the ability of lenders to be able to provide such data
4 points. There are privacy concerns with disclosure of
5 data that need to be considered.

6 Other participants. The industry comes
7 under criticism over the high fees charged for payday
8 loan borrowers, but we feel this Board has a full
9 understanding of why our members need to charge those
10 fees. Everyone agrees that it would be helpful for
11 vulnerable consumers to have access to lower cost
12 credit and opportunities to create savings.

13 Providing those options is beyond the
14 ability of our members. However, that doesn't mean
15 that we are opposed to development of other options by
16 other participants so that consumers have a choice.
17 The initial hearing and the initial review of the
18 regulations of the Board did not seek input on
19 alternative credit products and credit providers like
20 credit unions, banks, trust companies.

21 But we noted that that mind of inquiry
22 was absent in these hearings. We would encourage the
23 Board to seek to engage financial institutions as part
24 of this process in the future.

25 In closing, we would like to thank the

1 members of the Board for allowing the Canadian Payday
2 Loan Association to participate in these hearings as
3 an Intervenor. If the Board has any further inquiries
4 or requires further information, we would be more than
5 happy to oblige. Thank you.

6 THE PANEL CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very
7 much, Mr. Keyes. I'm going to just call upon the
8 panel if they have any questions.

9 MS. SUSAN PROVEN: Yeah, I've got my
10 light on here. You mentioned that you have 67 percent
11 of the members in Canada, but I didn't catch the
12 number. Like how many members are there in the CPLA?

13 MR. STAN KEYES: We have nineteen (19)
14 companies all together in the CPL -- Canadian Payday
15 Loan Association and some companies offer, of course,
16 payday loans through payday loan outlets, some offer
17 only through online, and some offer through both.

18 MS. SUSAN PROVEN: And I just wondered
19 what the membership fee is. You never did mention
20 that. What would they have to pay to belong to the
21 CPLA?

22 MR. STAN KEYES: They pay one thousand
23 dollars (\$1,000) per store --

24 MS. SUSAN PROVEN: Okay.

25 MR. STAN KEYES: -- per year.

1 MS. SUSAN PROVEN: Okay.

2 MR. STAN KEYES: And online is based
3 on a formula that can be seen on the CPLA website,
4 depending on how much money they have out in the mark
5 -- in the market.

6 MS. SUSAN PROVEN: And just for
7 clarification, you did mention that Policis -- Policis
8 --

9 MR. STAN KEYES: Policis, yeah,
10 Policis.

11 MS. SUSAN PROVEN: Received costs, but
12 they were for -- they were just expenses. They
13 weren't payment for time and labour or --

14 MR. STAN KEYES: Paid for the flight
15 accommodation and food.

16 MS. SUSAN PROVEN: Okay. Thank you.

17

18 (BRIEF PAUSE)

19

20 MR. STAN KEYES: And a fee. I should
21 include that. And -- and she charged -- she -- there
22 was a fee for -- for her -- for her coming to the CPLA
23 -- the -- the PUB to make the presentation, yeah.

24 MS. SUSAN PROVEN: Okay, that's what I
25 was trying to find out.

1 MR. STAN KEYES: Nobody does anything
2 for nothing anymore.

3 MR. REGIS GOSSELIN: Mr. Keyes, thanks
4 for coming down today. You -- you didn't comment at
5 all about the licence fee. Any -- any reason for
6 that? That fifty-five hundred dollar (\$5,500) fee
7 came up on a number of occasions during the
8 proceedings, and you haven't commented on that.

9 MR. STAN KEYES: Well, it would be
10 bold of me to suggest that it would be an assumption
11 that the industry certainly thinks that fifty-five
12 hundred dollars (\$5,500) is excessive when it comes to
13 a per store fee. The thing that is -- that the -- the
14 issue that is concerning members here in Manitoba and
15 in other provinces is that, not only, again Manitoba
16 being the lowest in some areas and the highest in
17 others, for example, the fee per store, we are now the
18 industry lenders and now confronted with challenges by
19 municipalities who are creating bylaws to keep stores
20 a certain distance from each other and, more
21 importantly, charging a fee for -- to be licensed in
22 their municipality.

23 So, in many cases, you have the
24 province charging their fee. Then you have a
25 municipality -- for example, in my hometown of

1 Hamilton, Ontario, they charge nine hundred and
2 seventy dollars (\$970) a store on top of the thousand
3 dollars that the -- the provincial government expects
4 from each -- or charges each -- each store to each
5 company.

6 MR. REGIS GOSSELIN: Now, one (1) --
7 one (1) of the practices that we were alerted to by
8 one (1) of the witnesses was the example of the
9 individual who went to the store to get a -- a payday
10 loan and -- and, of course, wasn't eligible for a loan
11 because they had maxed out the available credit. And
12 that person was referred to a computer, and they got a
13 loan from Alberta. Now --

14 MR. STAN KEYES: What?

15 MR. REGIS GOSSELIN: They got a loan
16 from Alberta through the web in a -- in an office of a
17 payday lender in Manitoba. And I guess the question I
18 have is in relation to the Association's position on
19 practices like that.

20 Have you taken a position -- an
21 official position with your members with respect to
22 that kind of a scenario?

23 MR. STAN KEYES: In that scenario, the
24 member of the CPLA wouldn't be a very -- a member for
25 very long. We -- we have a code of best business

1 practices. We were the first to initiate a no
2 rollover policy. We make it clear that when the
3 borrower is in the province they are located in, if
4 they choose to borrow, they must do it through a
5 licensed lender in that province. They certainly
6 can't get it from a -- another prov...

7 And even on websites, you will see that
8 we provide payday loans in this province, or this
9 province, or this province. And that is because
10 legislation in each of the provinces stipulates that,
11 if you live in that province, you borrow in that
12 province, you follow the regulations of that province.

13 I -- I can't imagine -- I mean, if it
14 is someone that is doing that, they could be caught by
15 inspector. Inspectors visit stores regularly. And --
16 and if it was -- and if it was actually a practice
17 that had occurred, then -- then the inspector should
18 do what they do on behalf of the province to insist
19 that the regulations in this province are followed to
20 the letter.

21 MR. REGIS GOSSELIN: Now, you
22 suggested that the panel didn't dwell -- didn't
23 examine payday-like loans, you know, the -- the other
24 lenders in this sector who are providing short-term
25 loans to Manitobans. And you indicated that that

1 should be a topic for review in the next -- the next
2 iteration of this process.

3 Could you be more specific about the
4 concerns that you have in that area as -- just to help
5 us understand?

6 MR. STAN KEYES: The first part of
7 that question was...?

8 MR. REGIS GOSSELIN: Well, you
9 indicated that your -- in your closing arguments, that
10 the panel had not spent much time examining short-term
11 loans done by other lenders in the province.

12 MR. STAN KEYES: Oh, right. Yes,
13 sorry.

14 MR. REGIS GOSSELIN: And I just wanted
15 to get clarification about -- could you -- could you
16 be more specific about the concerns you have in that
17 area?

18 MR. STAN KEYES: As president of the
19 CPLA, I'm -- I work closely with different credit coun
20 -- not-for-profit credit counselling agencies:
21 Henrietta Ross in -- in Ontario with the Ontario
22 Association of Credit Counselling Services; Scott
23 Hannah with Credit Counselling Society out of British
24 Columbia; the credit counselling service that's
25 offered here in Manitoba.

1 Our members work with the credit
2 counsellors. The CPLA works with them. I attend
3 annual general meetings. I'm questioned on the
4 industry. Credit counselling providers, credit
5 counsellors will ask me a myriad of questions, and I
6 try to explain why a payday borrower would -- would be
7 going to a payday lender, that kind of thing.

8 But invariably, before that annual
9 general meeting ends, or if I'm at a United Way think
10 tank, as I was in London, or I present to the national
11 association, it always -- it always comes back to the
12 same thing. A payday loan is there to service a
13 demand.

14 And there is no doubt that the demand
15 is huge. People want a small-sum, short-term loan.
16 And for a myriad of reasons, they can't get it from
17 their bank and they can't get it from a -- a credit
18 union, and they can't get it from the trust company.
19 And I'll let them explain why they don't offer that
20 particular product.

21 In some cases, credit unions have
22 actually come forward with an idea to offer a small-
23 sum, short-term loan to a client. But they are
24 constrained as well for many reasons.

25 Yes, they provide a product. Yes, it

1 is a small sum -- can be a small sum borrowed for a
2 short term. But what comes with it is a visit to the
3 office, spend an hour together, go through a credit
4 check.

5 And in this particular case, they would
6 lend the client the money, and a portion of that money
7 borrowed would be put into a -- an account that the
8 client would have to open with the credit union, which
9 is very positive and very building.

10 We support it, but it doesn't meet the
11 demand that's out there for a small-sum, short-term
12 len -- loan by payday loan borrowers. They want the
13 convenience. They need -- one (1) example, if you
14 turn to our website, for example, you will see real --
15 real borrowers like we had in the forum here speaking
16 to the reasons why they had to borrow.

17 One was, for example, a -- a
18 contractor, and he has two (2) employees. And he
19 finds himself in northern Alberta doing a job that he
20 priced, and he finishes the job and finds out that he
21 didn't charge enough.

22 He's short about four (4) or five
23 hundred dollars (\$500), but he says, My employees
24 still have to be paid. So he goes to a payday lender,
25 he borrows the five hundred dollars (\$500) until his

1 next pay cheque or his next job is done and he gets
2 the -- the money in, and his employees are paid.

3 But there are all kinds of reasons.
4 The lady who says, My daughter came home from school.
5 She says, Mom, we're going on a field trip tomorrow,
6 and I need sixty dollars (\$60). This is how -- this
7 speaks to how tight credit is for some people.

8 She needed sixty dollars (\$60). She
9 wasn't going to have that much room in her paycheque
10 till the next pay cheque, so she needs it right away,
11 she goes to a payday lender, she borrows the sixty
12 dollars (\$60), because that's all she needs, and then
13 she repays it on her next payday. But she needed that
14 money at that moment.

15 So it's the convenience, it's the
16 quickness, it's the lack of a -- going -- having a
17 credit cheque. All this in combination is the demand,
18 and the payday loan offers the product for that
19 demand.

20 But, I'll say it again, it's expensive
21 because of the risk, because the cop -- costs of
22 operations, because of the costs of credit. All those
23 things that are put into -- as -- as you heard from
24 Melissa Soper, all these things have to figure into
25 how much we can charge in order to make a profit.

1 And it's been proven time and time
2 again. Not excessive profit, but a profit all the
3 same. And so we look to and support the idea of
4 banks, trust companies, credit unions, to come forward
5 with a product that can meet these kinds of demands.

6 MR. REGIS GOSSELIN: Now, Mr. Keyes,
7 we -- we did get a chance to review the -- the seven
8 (7) suggested initiatives, and there's a couple of
9 them you -- at least one (1) you didn't comment on,
10 and I'd like to get your views on this.

11 This is the one dealing with
12 restrictions on discounts and promotions of first time
13 loans. Now, you indicated that -- that lenders should
14 be restricted from offering discounts. Now, could you
15 indicate why you believe that to be an issue --

16 MR. STAN KEYES: I'll be honest with
17 you, it was probably an oversight after the hours we
18 put in this weekend. We tried to think of everything
19 we could but, yes, we would still support that.

20 MR. REGIS GOSSELIN: Okay. But you --
21 you can recall the context? I'm trying to understand
22 what the logic was of having that restriction on
23 discounts and -- and promotions of first time loan.

24 MR. STAN KEYES: Well, and I think the
25 -- the important piece of that recommendation is 'for

1 first time' because as some of -- as some of our
2 presenters made clear, if they have seen this
3 individual and they understand, for whatever reason it
4 is, they come to their payday loan store to borrow,
5 and if they can help them out in any way by reducing
6 the cost of that product on their second, or third, or
7 fourth, or fifth loan over -- over the course of the
8 year they will help out.

9 But on the first loan, it becomes more
10 of an issue of trying to pull the customer in the
11 door. So if Money Mart is competing against Cash
12 Money is competing against on -- non-members of the
13 CPLA, and luring them in with the -- with what appears
14 to be an inexpensive loan, that shouldn't be the
15 reason why they borrow the money.

16 They borrow the money because they have
17 a need. There's a cost to -- to charge for that loan,
18 and let's all have the same cost upfront.

19 MR. REGIS GOSSELIN: Okay. And -- and
20 --

21 MR. STAN KEYES: Not providing
22 discounts, and --

23 MR. REGIS GOSSELIN: Yeah. I guess
24 the other one that I wanted to just explore with you a
25 bit was the -- the number six (6), which was the

1 mandatory acceptance of settlement plans proposed by
2 credit counsellors. And you're suggesting that your
3 Association members already provide -- already do
4 that. They will accept the proposed -- the plans that
5 are prosed by credit counsellors.

6 And I -- I get the -- the inference was
7 that there are others who don't do that. And could
8 you -- could you enlighten us about that? Could you
9 enlighten us about the kinds of lenders that do not
10 accept settlement plans?

11 MR. STAN KEYES: Well, I couldn't
12 comment on the kinds of lenders they are. Probably
13 would prefer to offer you the members of the CPLA.

14 The responsible licensed lenders, in
15 this Province and in other Provinces assist in every
16 way they can, not just their client but also the not
17 for profit credit counselling agency that is doing
18 their job to help these individuals get on a firm
19 financial footing once more.

20 And we also support that financially so
21 that when a credit counselling agency agrees to terms
22 for all the customer's indebtedness, and as I've said
23 before the payday loan is usually the smallest amount
24 at less than 3 percent, the lender will make provision
25 for repayment even if they can only charge like twenty

1 dollars (\$20) a month in order to get their principal
2 back.

3 And as -- as a incentive and a thank
4 you to the credit counsellor, they will take a
5 percentage of that and return that to the credit
6 counsel -- not for profit credit counselling agency so
7 that we're helping them financially as well as helping
8 out their -- their client.

9

10 (BRIEF PAUSE)

11

12

13 MS. ANITA NEVILLE: Thank you, Mr.
14 Keyes. I have two (2) lines of question. You men --
15 I'm just looking for the number -- you mentioned about
16 two-thirds of the operations in Manitoba are members
17 of the Payday Loans Association. Am I -- am I right?
18 Sixty (60) odd percent?

19 MR. STAN KEYES: Sixty-seven (67)
20 percent nationally.

21 MS. ANITA NEVILLE: Okay.

22 MR. STAN KEYES: Specifically, we have
23 -- I'd have to go back --

24 MS. ANITA NEVILLE: Well, my question
25 is, why do others not join?

1 MR. STAN KEYES: The Association?

2 MS. ANITA NEVILLE: M-hm.

3 MR. STAN KEYES: A combination of
4 things. The product is expensive. A lender has to
5 pay their bills. And things are so tight in Manitoba
6 that even a thousand dollars a store per year is going
7 to impact their bottom line enough that they just
8 can't afford to join.

9 MS. ANITA NEVILLE: So it's really --

10 MR. STAN KEYES: And -- and/or --

11 MS. ANITA NEVILLE: It's a cost issue
12 is what you're saying. Okay.

13 MR. STAN KEYES: The regulations here
14 are -- are very strict.

15 MS. ANITA NEVILLE: My other question
16 is, I was looking at your recommendation on the
17 optional extended payment plan. And I'm wondering if
18 you could explain what your thinking was in suggesting
19 that it be after the third payment.

20 Why not the first payment? Why -- why
21 is it a more convoluted process for somebody to pay
22 something back on the installment plan?

23 MR. STAN KEYES: It's as simple as we
24 trying to find -- we're trying to -- we -- we think
25 we've found a way to -- to assist in -- in -- to

1 assist the -- the borrower for re-borrowing. And if a
2 -- if a borrower goes to a lender and says, I need,
3 say, a hundred dollars, for the sake of my -- and has
4 difficulty repaying that loan, on the third event --
5 on the third event within sixty-two (62) days,
6 everyone recognizes there -- this person is having a
7 financial issue.

8 And so to assist that client, to
9 prevent that client from going to see Byron to borrow
10 a hundred dollars, and -- I use that --

11 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: I'm --

12 MR. STAN KEYES: -- as a --

13 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: -- not going to
14 give it to --

15 MR. STAN KEYES: So for a hundred
16 dollars, instead of going to Byron to borrow a hundred
17 dollars to pay me the hundred dollars they owe me, we
18 say, If you're having difficulty, this is your third -
19 - third time borrowing in sixty-two (62) days, and on
20 that third loan, we're prepared to extend that loan
21 for three (3) equal pieces, three (3) equal
22 repayments, three (3) paycheques, 33.2 percent per --
23 per repayment so that that individual doesn't have to
24 go to the other lender to get the hundred dollars to
25 repay me.

1 Now they can repay that third loan and
2 at the same time, coupled with our suggestion that
3 they be referred to, or suggested that they see a
4 credit counselling -- a credit counsellor to assist
5 with their finances.

6 MS. ANITA NEVILLE: But my question
7 is, why the third loan? Why not the first loan and
8 have that option available as an option?

9 MR. STAN KEYES: Well, then you're
10 getting to a -- into a whole new loan product, quite
11 frankly. You're -- you're now moving from a -- a
12 traditional payday loan, which is a small sum, short-
13 term loan to be repaid in -- on their next payday, in
14 two (2) weeks, to a small sum, short-term loan that
15 could be extended for three (3) pay periods.

16 So that's a whole different product.
17 That comes with a whole new set of expenses. And --
18 and the costs, I'm not -- I'm not a -- an operator, so
19 I couldn't tell you what those costs are, but because
20 it -- it now becomes, in essence, an installment loan,
21 it's a -- it's an entirely different product with even
22 more cost.

23 MS. ANITA NEVILLE: I may have missed
24 it, but is the installment option offered elsewhere,
25 and have you factored in -- or done -- done an

1 analysis of the costs of installment loans?

2 MR. STAN KEYES: No, we have not.

3 MS. ANITA NEVILLE: Oh. Thank you.

4 MR. REGIS GOSSELIN: Just to clarify
5 in my own mind, this -- this is where a -- a payday
6 loan has been taken out and has -- you've been rolling
7 over for three (3) pay periods. Is this where the --
8 this is where the loan is non-performing to start
9 with. That's when you would offer the installment
10 loan, or did -- did I misunderstand that?

11 You've taken out three (3) loans. It's
12 one or the other, right? I mean, you've taken out
13 three (3) loans. The --

14 MR. STAN KEYES: Oh, it's -- it's the
15 third loan, not you -- well, you -- you've come in --
16 in sixty-two days (62), two (2) months, you've taken
17 out three (3) loans. You've repaid the first one.
18 You repaid the second one, but then you've got a third
19 one, and now you can't repay the third one, for
20 whatever reason, within that sixty-two (62) days.
21 That third loan then would be extended --

22 MR. REGIS GOSSELIN: Okay.

23 MR. STAN KEYES: -- at no cost to the
24 consumer.

25

1 (BRIEF PAUSE)

2

3 THE PANEL CHAIRPERSON: Okay, thank
4 you very much, Mr. Keyes. There are no more questions
5 for you at this time.

6 MR. STAN KEYES: Thank you very much,
7 Madam Chair.

8 THE PANEL CHAIRPERSON: So we
9 appreciate you coming.

10 MR. STAN KEYES: And if there's any --
11 any further information that's needed, please don't
12 hesitate to contact us, and -- or any detailed
13 explanation of what I've put forward to you today, the
14 CPLA has put forward to you today --

15 THE PANEL CHAIRPERSON: Okay. Okay.

16 MR. STAN KEYES: -- I'd more than
17 oblige.

18 THE PANEL CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very
19 much. I think this would be a good time to have a
20 break before we start with the Coalition's closing
21 submission. So I'm going to have a fifteen (15)
22 minute coffee break at this time. Thank you.

23

24 --- Upon recessing at 10:08 a.m.

25 --- Upon resuming at 10:33 a.m.

1 THE PANEL CHAIRPERSON: Okay, welcome
2 back. I'm going to call upon Mr. Byron Williams, of
3 the Consumer Coalition, to give his closing
4 submissions at this time.

5

6 CLOSING SUBMISSIONS BY THE COALITION:

7 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Thank you. And
8 just in terms of the presentation, I'll be doing the
9 bulk of it, by soon-to-be colleague, Ms. Dilay, will
10 be going through the recommendations with the panel.

11 I did want to note that Ms. Desorcy is
12 -- is here in the back row. And -- and she -- and
13 also in the audience is Ms. Kelsey MacKay, who's a --
14 just finished law school at Robson Hall and was a
15 public interest intern at the centre for the -- since
16 January on some pretty cool cases, a bit of
17 advertising.

18 And behind Kelsey is Ms. Amanda
19 Beaumont, who is kind of -- who you might have seen on
20 a bunch of emails. She's been organizing the file and
21 does a lot of quiet work that rarely acknowledged.

22 Just one (1) matter before I start our
23 presentation. I did want to, with the instructions of
24 my -- of Mr. Keyes, in terms of the chair -- question
25 from Board -- or chairperson Gosselin in terms of the

1 payday lender where they hit the -- they went across
2 and -- and accessed a lender in Alberta.

3 We can't say, of course, with
4 certainty, but that sounds like the scenarios in --
5 associated with the Cash Store when it was in business
6 in 2012, 2013, et cetera. So when I heard this
7 scenario that's what immediately sprung to mind. And
8 certainly in discussion with one (1) -- both Mr. Keyes
9 and -- and one (1) of the -- the lenders that seems
10 like the most likely scenario, so it's an important
11 issue.

12 But that -- I don't think that has come
13 up in terms of our -- it didn't pop up in any of the
14 today research. Like, it -- it comes out of one (1)
15 of the focus groups, I think, but it's not -- it --
16 it's not something that we identified as an ongoing
17 issue in Manitoba, so.

18 I do want us to -- to focus on the
19 title for a second here because when -- when one gets
20 buried in the -- the minutiae of a hearing sometimes
21 one forgets, certainly from the consumer perspective,
22 the -- the regulatory activities in the Province of
23 Manitoba area really a success story, from our
24 client's perspective. And they're very proud of the
25 Manitoba model and the Manitoba approach and they know

1 that it is watched with great interest, not just in
2 this province, but elsewhere across Canada.

3 And so I'm sure the lending industry's
4 eyes are on Manitoba, but I can assure you, from the
5 consumer perspective, eyes are on Manitoba as well.
6 And our clients certainly want to note -- and we're
7 going to spend a bit of time noting from their
8 perspective, the success -- success of that regulatory
9 process in balancing protection, access, and
10 sustainability.

11 You've -- you've met our clients many
12 times. The one (1) thing that I didn't notice about
13 the con -- note about the Consumers' Association --,
14 or perhaps I didn't, although it appears in the
15 literature -- is CAC (Manitoba), in association with
16 the Public Interest Law Centre, did do some
17 significant work for the Office of the Privacy
18 Commissioner in 2014 and/or '15 on issues relating to
19 -- to the internet and privacy issues.

20 So number of the recommendations that
21 you will see My Friend, Ms. Dilay, present flow
22 directly from -- from that research, which is
23 referenced on the record of -- of this proceeding.

24 You're well aware of the tremendous
25 contributions of Winnipeg Harvest and CFCS. And I --

1 I won't dwell on them. We dwell -- spoke about them a
2 bit in -- in our opening statement.

3 I do want to talk about three (3) or
4 four (4) of our clients' objectives in this hearing.
5 And one (1) was -- and we -- we hope we've been
6 successful in that aim -- is to provide a voice for
7 Manitoba consumers and, to the degree possible in a
8 regulatory process, to -- to take away the filters
9 from that voice.

10 You heard directly from -- from three
11 (3) consumers. You saw the really -- the report and
12 the very insightful commentary from Ms. St. Aubin's
13 work, as well as Dr. Buckland's and Dr. Simpson's.
14 And -- and we do thank the CPLA for their kind words
15 about the quality of that research.

16 And I want to underscore that -- that
17 our clients' instructions -- and I think the -- the
18 work shows that -- was to try to the degree possible
19 to bring those voices without filters. There's always
20 limits, but we think that that was an important
21 objective of our client which we believe has been
22 achieved.

23 Obviously, our clients' objectives for
24 this hearing -- there are issues of consumer
25 protection, access, and industry sustainability.

1 We're starting just for the first time in Canada to
2 see some products creep into to the market from
3 mainstream financial producer, firms. Vancity is the
4 most notable one.

5 But those products are not here yet in
6 Manitoba, and they're not likely to be available to
7 all consumers who are interested in this type of
8 product.

9 So in -- in the absence of other market
10 solutions, there is an importance from our clients'
11 perspective in maintaining affordable access to -- to
12 these types of products in Manitoba. And -- and my
13 clients have asked me to underscore that point.

14 Two (2) other objectives of our client
15 are to enhance Manitoba's reputation as a Canadian
16 leader, and also to provide to -- good advice to
17 government. And this report from this Board to the
18 government, noting today is April 18th and tomorrow is
19 April 19th, is particularly important.

20 It -- it will give guidance to the
21 government both in terms of the success of the
22 Manitoba model and also how to look critically at this
23 industry.

24 And by "critically," I don't mean in a
25 negative light, but to understand, when the government

1 comes to its ultimate decision-maker -- decision in
2 terms of rates and -- and the -- the amount for
3 borrowing, when it comes to that decision, what are
4 big issues?

5 What are the things we need to focus
6 on, including operating costs, volume, bad debt, for
7 example? So that's important from our clients'
8 perspective from this proceeding.

9 And at the end of my submissions -- and
10 I think this is really important for the government.
11 We've tried to underline from the start, there's a
12 difference between an evidentiary process and a
13 lobbying process.

14 We think a key objective from this
15 hearing is to make evidentiary findings to put any
16 lobbying efforts from any party, from whi -- whichever
17 spec -- spectrum of -- of position into context. We
18 really encourage the Board to make evidentiary
19 findings from this hearing that can be -- give good
20 advice to -- to the government.

21 Sometimes I wonder why I get paid any
22 salary whatsoever. And Mr. Shemley, I thought,
23 highlighted that the fact that my clients may wish to
24 turn simply to community witnesses rather than lawyers
25 for advice because I think Mr. Shemley said something

1 very important about the Manitoba model, and he was a
2 pretty entertaining witness.

3 But he gave a big shout out, a big
4 thank you, because for a man like Mr. Shemley, and for
5 many other Manitobans, the Manitoba model has made a
6 big difference. And there he is, he's thanking you
7 guys. I don't think I could say that, but he did.
8 And I think those were heartfelt words that -- that we
9 should pay attention to.

10 So when we talking about the success of
11 the Manitoba model, and I'm going to spend a bit of
12 time on this, let's talk about what was that original
13 choice. And one of the Board members was here when
14 that happened. She can certainly correct me if -- if
15 she thinks I'm mistaken. But the original choice was
16 a judgment that an efficient industry could be
17 sustainable at seventeen dollars (\$17) on -- at a
18 hundred.

19 But there were some key pre-conditions.
20 Controlling those bad debt costs. Controlling
21 operating costs. And in the urban centres, taking
22 advantage of economies of scale. And at the time this
23 recommendation was made, it was anticipated there
24 would be some consolidation.

25 There was the firm, as Dr. Robinson

1 talked about, which had the 14 percent bad debt cost.
2 There was the operations of Cash Store and Rent --
3 Rent Cash which raised some eyebrows from many
4 different viewpoints in this room. It was clear there
5 was going to be some consolidation and that volume was
6 going to go somewhere. And in the urban centres,
7 there were opportunities for -- for economies of scale
8 because the costs are relatively fixed so volume
9 grows. The cost per hundred should decline.

10 In the rural economy, that seventeen
11 dollars (\$17) per hundred was made very consciously
12 with the idea that volume is not big enough in -- in
13 those rural centres for a stand alone payday loan
14 operator. You just have to look at the number of
15 stand alone payday loan operators, store front
16 operators in Prince Edward Island, all two (2) of
17 them, to get a sense that there's only -- there is a
18 need for a certain volume.

19 So in the rural environment the Board's
20 judgment, as we understand the order, was that
21 efficient lenders would have to take advantage of
22 economies of scope. They'd have to put more non-
23 payday loan products in the doors, and -- and
24 hopefully sell it.

25 So this is the -- the original choice,

1 and there was a judgment by the -- the Public
2 Utilities Board that price competition would not exist
3 in an imperfect marketplace. The argument from
4 industry, whether it was the CPLA at I think twenty-
5 one dollars (\$21) per hundred or Rent Cash at twenty-
6 five dollars (\$25) per one hundred (100), was: Set
7 the rates there and then completion will bring the
8 costs down. Just set a loose cap.

9 And -- and so that was an argument that
10 we believe was properly and -- and expressly rejected
11 by the Public Utilities Board. I've talked here
12 about consul -- no consolidation and flagged Rent Cash
13 as well as the -- others. Go ahead.

14 So here's what the Board said: For the
15 survival and continuance in business of efficient
16 payday lenders, acknowledging that there will be
17 considerable con -- consolidation. So from our
18 client's perspective, a very prescient order by the
19 Board. And as Mr. Shemley says, A good decision that
20 brought significant savings to consumers.

21 There's our Manitoba prices versus
22 Ontario, et cetera. Now, there's accountants in the
23 room so I have to be careful but I'm going to suggest
24 to you that the Ontario rate is about 23 percent
25 higher. So there's very significant savings for

1 vulnerable consumers, or not all payday lenders
2 consumers are vulnerable but they are
3 disproportionately vulnerable. We think that's a very
4 positive outcome of the Manitoba model.

5 Here's another excerpt from that Board
6 order. It was rejecting the premise that existing
7 completion was sufficient to protect consumers, and to
8 lead to efficient pending -- payday lenders offering
9 low -- lower rates, highlight that very symbiotic
10 relationship amongst the firms in the industry.
11 You've seen how they co-locate. Very interesting
12 model, indeed.

13 And so the Board rejected the premise
14 that existing competition would protect consumers, and
15 rejected that higher price cap. And again, we think
16 that decision has been supported very strongly in
17 terms of research. In the American marketplace, Pew
18 Trust clearly found that when caps are in -- in place,
19 that's where the prices move. That's where payday
20 lender prices moved. Whether they're below it or
21 above it, they moved to the cap. And that is clearly
22 the Canadian experience as well.

23 Both in 2008, as well as 2013, Dr.
24 Robinson talked about Money Mart roughly charging
25 around nineteen (19) per hundred, Cash Money charging

1 that flat twenty (20) per hundred, and we've seen a
2 migration from the Canadian -- from the big lenders
3 towards the cap.

4 Now, there are little blips in the
5 market, there's discounts and that, but very clearly,
6 setting a higher cap is not an invitation to price
7 competition. It's an invitation to rates moving
8 towards that cap.

9 Our clients clearly see Manitoba
10 regulation is leading in Canada in terms of price
11 caps. There is some interesting evidence from Dollar
12 Financial Group in terms of its operating margins, in
13 Europe in retail; in Canada in retail; in the US in
14 retail; and in e-commerce. And you'll see the
15 striking figure there is -- in terms of significantly
16 higher operating margins, which is a good thing,
17 Canada is very strongly situated.

18 Now, this is the last data we have,
19 because this is the last publically available filing
20 by Dollar Financial Group. That's from its 10-K.

21 The other point that we wanted to
22 highlight -- so that is -- is focussing on economies
23 of -- of scope. And there was a really interesting
24 excerpt from the 2013 Board order from a firm in -- in
25 Dauphin, and talking about how they adjusted to

1 regulation.

2 And if you'll see about the fifth line
3 down, they chose to diversify. They expanded their
4 lines of business to furniture, scrap gold purchases,
5 cheque cashing, jewellery sales. So there's an
6 example of the economies of scope that -- that our
7 client anticipated would be necessary for rural
8 service providers to stay in business.

9 Back in 2013, both the CPLA and Money
10 Tree recommended going to twenty-three (23). We note
11 that Money Tree is still around and, in fact, I think
12 made a presentation earlier in this hearing. And
13 clearly, in our view, the Board showed good judgment
14 in 2013 in terms of noting that there was an
15 opportunity for efficiently run payday lenders to
16 continue their operations.

17 So that's the Manitoba model and its
18 success in our client's view in terms of protecting
19 consumers in terms of prices.

20 From our client's perspective, as well,
21 there was some good evidence on the record of this
22 hearing that there is reasonable access to the payday
23 lending -- to the regulated payday lending industry in
24 Manitoba. And our client loves this quote from Ms.
25 St. Aubin, from her focus group, this participant 8

1 talking about hours being flexible. There's one (1)
2 at twenty-four (24) hours, so if you're out of town,
3 you can -- you can get to it. They're all over,
4 talking about the urban situation.

5 They're accessible all -- all over.
6 Like, there's just one (1) right behind here. So our
7 client has seen no evidence in the urban setting that
8 there are challenges in accessing payday loans. We
9 also note from Dr. Simpson that there is statistically
10 significant evidence from the SFS that Manitobans make
11 comparable or higher usage of payday loans in other
12 provinces.

13 So from our client's perspective, that
14 does not suggest an access issue. Certainly in terms
15 of the inner city, there was clearly some dislocation
16 after the initial rates go -- went in. But after the
17 most recent Board order in 2013, we simply flagged the
18 -- the Winnipeg setting.

19 You see twenty-seven (27) lenders
20 roughly split between the inner city and suburbs in
21 2013. Again, in 2014, one (1) less in the inner-city,
22 but a new addition in 2015, and so some stability post
23 the 2013 order, in fact, quite significant stability
24 in Winnipeg.

25 Our clients also note that they don't

1 expect anyone would argue that the inner city is
2 under-served by the payday lending industry in
3 Manitoba. There's -- the -- it continues to be
4 heavily concentrated there. And there's also a really
5 interesting dynamic of co-location. We just put two
6 (2) examples. One's on my way home going down
7 Henderson Highway, as I pass first the Money Mart at
8 215 Henderson, then the Cash Money just a -- a little
9 bit farther down.

10 And then you can see on Portage Avenue,
11 if some of you live out west of here, within a two (2)
12 block radius, as well. And if you look at the other
13 two (2) Cash Money locations, you'll see -- whether in
14 St. Boniface or otherwise, you'll see some Money Marts
15 not that far away.

16 What about the rural communities? Our
17 client thinks it's important to underscore that
18 despite smaller population centres, there continues to
19 be a payday lending retail storefront operations in
20 Brandon, Dauphin, Swan River, The Pas, and Thompson.

21 And indeed, we had a new entrant to the
22 Thompson market in 2015. This is all on the record.
23 And that was Money Mart. So when C1 -- or C11 is
24 talking about folks going to the competitor, I don't
25 know if there's anyone else in Thompson, but Money

1 Mart's in town. Perhaps there's a -- a bit more hydro
2 money in town, or perhaps there's -- or other urban
3 stresses that are -- are leading Money Mart to enter
4 the market in Thompson.

5 We think it's also important to point
6 out -- because volume is everything. C11 says that.
7 Dr. Robinson says that. Before we get too critical of
8 the Manitoba model, that there are more payday lenders
9 in Brandon, Manitoba at seventeen dollars (\$17) per
10 hundred than there are in the Province of PEI, despite
11 its very generous cap. These are storefront
12 operations. And we've put the Brandon operations
13 there. And again, Money Mart has a presence there.

14 You heard from Mr. Keyes that Manitoba
15 has less stores per average per hundred thousand
16 population. That's actually information from Dr.
17 Robinson. Our client is not persuaded that's
18 necessarily a bad thing. We would simply want to put
19 some context on that. Here's the ratio in Canada.
20 One point four (1.4) per hundred thousand (100,000) is
21 PEI. The high is Ontario at five point eight-nine
22 (5.89). The number of stores in Manitoba are around
23 three (3) per one hundred thousand (100,000).

24 And we just want to flag that, if you
25 look at the American marketplace, and I think this is

1 Dr. Robinson in Appendix 3, there's a -- a big range.
2 You've got Hawaii at one point zero-five (1.05) stores
3 per hundred thousand to Mississippi, the -- one (1) of
4 -- part of the wild west in terms of -- or the wild
5 south in terms of permissive regulation at thirty-four
6 point six-two (34.62). Whether that's a blessing or
7 not depends on one's perspective.

8 But to provide some tighter context,
9 we've identified from Dr. Robinson's Appendix 3
10 Minnesota, one point three-five (1.35) per hundred
11 thousand (100,000); Rhode Island, a very interesting
12 model at two point seven-five (2.75); Utah, three
13 point eight-seven (3.87); Illinois, four point zero-
14 six (4.06); and California. So there's a little
15 context in terms of where Manitoba is in terms of
16 stores per hundred thousand.

17 We've talked about the importance of
18 the Manitoba model historically. Our client believes
19 that this model, this critical analysis, is even more
20 important today. Clearly, in Manitoba, there is one
21 (1) very dominant player. I don't think, given the
22 flaws in this marketplace, we were ever going to expe
23 -- expect a lot of price competition. We don't see it
24 elsewhere in Canada. Why would we see it here? But
25 given the dominant presence of Money Mart as described

1 by Mr. Keyes, I think it's pre -- pretty important.

2 Ongoing active regulatory insight is
3 also important because of what's going on in this
4 marketplace. We see the industry moving increasingly,
5 in our submission, into welfare and pension cheques.

6 And we see Manitoba as an important
7 example for other jurisdictions, including Alberta.
8 And the importance of the Manitoba example is a public
9 process that is evidence-based and reliant on
10 evidence. It's not just about lobbying. It's reliant
11 about evidence.

12 Here's the standard regulatory criteria
13 of a just and reasonable rate. A reasonable
14 opportunity for an efficiently-run company to earn
15 risk-adjusted return for comparable companies of
16 similar risk.

17 It's pretty standard in -- in the
18 regulatory dialogue, and we believe the Board has
19 correctly employed it in the past two (2) payday
20 lending reviews. And we would urge it upon you again
21 in this hearing.

22 I'm moving --

23 MR. REGIS GOSSELIN: Mr. Williams, can
24 I interrupt for a second, please? Just to go back to
25 the previous slide, the -- slide 27, please, Diana.

1 The jurisdiction says Alberta taking a harder look at
2 industry. Could -- could you -- what are you
3 referring to there?

4 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Yeah, and this --
5 I think the Board can take public notice of this. I
6 think there were references in the throne speech for
7 the Province of Alberta in terms of -- in terms of
8 interest in the payday lending industry.

9 I think one (1) of the references --
10 and I'm going off of memory -- but was to using --
11 having treasury branches explore what, if any,
12 alternatives. But I -- I think that it was clearly
13 mentioned in -- in the very recent Throne speech from
14 the Government of Alberta.

15 I -- I've talked a lot about this, and
16 who knows what will happen to -- to tomorrow. But
17 whether or not there's a new government, there will be
18 a new Minister of Consumer Affairs. Mr. Leimeux is,
19 you know, obviously not running again.

20 And we think that this Board plays a
21 really important role, not just in providing advice to
22 the government, but also in saying, This is how you
23 should look critically at the evidence that is being
24 presented to you, because the information that comes
25 to government will no doubt come not only through the

1 PUB recommendations, but through other streams of
2 communication.

3 In our province, before this tribunal,
4 we do have a gold standard in terms of receiving
5 evidence. That's not to say that that is the only way
6 that it could come in or should come in, but that is
7 the gold standard.

8 And that is a witness -- an expert
9 witness comes before this board, testifies to her or
10 his qualifications, is accepted as an expert or not,
11 and is subject to cross-examination on the same
12 evidence.

13 And that is a very important standard
14 in our -- in our Board, and it gives us, in our
15 respectful submission, the best assurance of the
16 accuracy, and reliability, and the relative
17 independence of that witness.

18 In this hearing, only one (1) party was
19 tested under that PUB gold standard, and those were
20 the witnesses of the Coalition. Thank goodness it
21 wasn't like in 2007 and '08, where I think our
22 witnesses were on the stand for eleven (11) days in a
23 row -- not in a row, but eleven (11) days. It seemed
24 like eleven (11) years.

25 Dr. -- but Dr. Buckland, Dr. Simpson,

1 Ms. St. Aubin, and Dr. Robinson came before this
2 Board, filed their evidence, testified to their
3 qualifications, had that confirmed, and were subject
4 to cross-examination.

5 And I want to note just the bottom
6 bullet on that page. It's not just their opinions
7 that were open to be tested. It was actually the
8 sources on which they relied.

9 Some of the ground-breaking work in
10 terms of the payday lending industry does come out
11 from our friends in the United States. The most
12 robust that our clients are aware of is from Pew
13 Trust, and the payday lending industry had an
14 opportunity to come here and test the bona fides of
15 that type of information. And I'll provide you some
16 citations from Dr. Buckland about that in just a
17 minute.

18 We note and -- that neither Deloitte or
19 Environics were here. Environics, its report's a bit
20 older. Maybe that's not as bit of an issue, but
21 Deloitte Alberta, our client would have dearly loved
22 to have that report here and to be tested, but our
23 clients did not have that opportunity. And it is not
24 necessary, but it is open to the Public Utilities
25 Board to draw an adverse inference from -- from not

1 presenting Deloitte in terms of its qualifications and
2 presenting it for cross-examination.

3 Our client with respect clearly
4 believes that some adverse inferences should be drawn
5 with regard to Policis. Certainly from our client's
6 perspective, Policis should have disclosed prior to
7 appearing as a presenter that its appearance was
8 financially funded, and it wasn't just travel costs as
9 we heard today. It was also an appearance fee. There
10 was no expert report, no voir dire, and no cross-
11 examination.

12 And before we go to the next page,
13 Diana, if I can pull -- ask you to pull up Exhibit 40
14 of the Coalition, pages 13 and 14?

15

16 (BRIEF PAUSE)

17

18 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Slide down.
19 Sorry, keep going, please. Keep going, please. Okay.
20 That's page 14. And we'll go over to the next page in
21 a -- in a moment.

22 The -- our -- our client suspects there
23 may have been a miscommunication between Policis and
24 the CPLA. My understanding, just from hearing Mr.
25 Keyes and I'm sure it was inadvertent, was that he was

1 advised that Policis does not appear on behalf of
2 industry in -- in those type of proceedings.

3 And from our client's perspective that
4 is -- and we -- we say nothing ill about the CPLA,
5 that's just not accurate. And you all -- all you
6 would have to do is look at the curriculum vitae of
7 Policis. You'll see numerous examples of funded
8 research for Cash Converters, as well as work for UK
9 Council of Mortgage Lenders.

10 Among its non-government funders,
11 Policis numbers the largest change of second-hand
12 shops in the world. That's Cash Converters, which is
13 a payday lender as well in -- in Australia. Scroll
14 down a little bit, Diana. And on footnote 36 -- and
15 you'll see this -- you'll actually see three (3) or
16 four (4) reports from Policis for Cash Converters in
17 Australia for that regulator.

18 But here is -- you'll see excerpts from
19 its 2008 report for Cash Converters in Australia. And
20 interestingly, they weren't talking about the Internet
21 then. They were talking about the -- the threat from
22 revolving credit or pawn, and making the point --
23 making the argument that too restrictive regulation of
24 payday lenders would drive that industry into the
25 hands of revolving credit and pawn.

1 So I simply highlight that fact to --
2 to -- there appears to be -- have been a
3 miscommunication in terms of Policis. That doesn't
4 mean they haven't done good work for the government of
5 the United Kingdom. One should always look carefully
6 at their co-authors when they're doing that work.

7 So, for example, if you see some of the
8 work with Ms. Whiteley, W-H-I-T-E-L-E-Y, there you can
9 expect some really high quality rigorous work. You
10 didn't see that name on -- on the Policis presentation
11 that was presented to you just a week ago. Thank you,
12 and we can return to the submission.

13

14 (BRIEF PAUSE)

15

16 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And I don't know
17 if you caught the tone in Dr. Buckland's work when he
18 was talk -- talking about Policis, and he's a very
19 thoughtful gentle person. Here he is telling you: If
20 you're coming with that type -- type of analysis this
21 is the stuff I'd like to see, and that wasn't there.
22 And again you -- you may not have noticed whether or
23 not the -- the emotion with which he delivered that
24 line but I thought that was a very powerful moment in
25 this proceeding.

1 In terms of the information from Cash
2 Money and Money Tree as presenters, or C11 as its
3 written reports, I want to be clear I'm not impugning
4 their truthfulness. I just -- I do want to indicate
5 though, we did not have a chance to look at their
6 financial material to cross-examine them.

7 There's always opportunities to -- to
8 get insight through -- in terms of accuracy,
9 credibility, or bias in -- in that information. And
10 also that care must be taken in extra -- extrapolating
11 to the broader industry. So that's our simply caution
12 there, not that it can't provide some useful insights,
13 but it -- great care should be taken with it.

14 What we do think is notable in this
15 hearing is from the industry as a whole, there was a
16 lot of cho -- chat -- chat about Alice -- A-L-I-C-E,
17 that kind of emergency customer. There's a lot of
18 chat about people not getting enough in terms of loans
19 when they -- they went to the payday lender.

20 To our knowledge there was not a single
21 discussion of upselling. Someone comes in for a
22 hundred or a hundred and fifty dollars (\$150), why
23 don't you take three hundred (300). Not one (1)
24 reference to that. But as -- as you've seen from our
25 focus groups, and I'll bring you references later,

1 that is clearly a significant practice in this
2 marketplace, that you as a regulator and the
3 government as the ultimate decision-maker have to be
4 ale -- alert to.

5 There was no discussion, to our
6 knowledge, of the increased reliance of this industry
7 on welfare as a source of payday loans or of the move
8 in 2011 to remove prohibition on taking -- securing
9 payday loans with welfare from the CPLA Code of Best
10 Business Practice. And from our client's take of the
11 record, there was very little discussion related to
12 the harm from repeat borrowing, although we heard some
13 thoughtful recommendations, obviously, from the CPLA.

14 So that is something when you hear from
15 the industry, and we don't doubt their very sincere
16 sense that they are helping some individuals in
17 emergency need, but you have to listen as well to what
18 you don't hear.

19 And this goes back to a point that we
20 made originally and we think it's an important
21 credibility issue. What are you being presented with?
22 Is it research? Is it lobbying? Is it somewhere in
23 between? Has there been a willingness to add the hard
24 questions?

25 You heard Mr. Keyes talk about

1 Environics today. I'll show you an excerpt, but we'll
2 -- I'd urge you to turn to CPLA -- Coalition/CPLA-1-3,
3 not now, Diana, but later. Such an important survey
4 back in 2013, no repeat loan questions. I -- we think
5 an inference can be drawn from that.

6 Are the calculations, conclusions, and
7 sources transparent? Dr. Robinson came before you
8 with a robust model that -- that he shared. What kind
9 of access did we have to Deloitte's sources? And we
10 also urge you to look at credibility of past research.

11

12 Deloitte was in Manitoba back '07/'08,
13 saying the cost -- average cost to provide loans of --
14 in excess of twenty-six dollars (\$26) per hundred.

15 Dr. Robinson clearly highlighted why he
16 thought that was an unreliable source. History has
17 proven how unreliable that analysis was, but Cash
18 Store was not part of that sample, nor was Money Mart.

19 And we note that not once in the
20 closing submissions of the CPLA this morning did they
21 mention the Deloitte Alberta study, not once.

22 From our client's perspective, a
23 positive inference can be drawn from the Coalition's
24 research approach. And again, we thank the CPLA for
25 their kind words this morning. Dr. Buckland talked

1 about the combination of quantitative and qualitative
2 matt -- measures and its strength.

3 And at the second quote at the bottom
4 of slide 38, emphasizing that we triangulate, testing
5 whether the assertions and hypothesis are proven or
6 disproven. And that gives important insight when
7 results from different methods are consistent. And
8 that tends to lend the -- to the validity of the
9 results.

10 And so I will be talking in a few
11 moments about the work of Ms. St. Aubin, that Manitoba
12 survey. And that one's not a representative sample.
13 Our clients have said that from the start. But what
14 is really striking about Ms. St. Aubin's work is how
15 it triangulates, how it echoes, how it resonates with
16 the information of Dr. Simpson, with the information
17 of Dr. Buckland, with the information of the Pew
18 Trust.

19 We think a great deal of weight can be
20 put on her work, recognizing that it is not a random
21 sample, but that it is so consistent. it has such
22 close signif -- ties to the other research and -- that
23 has been undertaken.

24 Again, we think a positive inference
25 should be drawn from the openness of the Coalition in

1 terms of its assumptions and model, and -- and its use
2 of plain old standard statistical technique, that
3 plain old standard statistical technique that you did
4 not see in Policis.

5

6 (BRIEF PAUSE)

7

8 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And while Pew
9 Charitable Trusts were not here to defend their work,
10 Dr. Buckland was to speak to -- to its quality, that
11 it is a unique data -- dataset, and to its reputation.

12 And if we go to the next slide, there's
13 been a -- a bit of a miscommunication in this hearing.
14 And I do want to go to that. I -- I want to emphasize
15 the point that the Pew Trust employed a representative
16 sample. They started out with an original screening
17 of thirty-three thousand (33,000) some adults. To get
18 a -- a sufficiently robust sample, they went through
19 to another sixteen thousand one hundred and eight
20 (16,108).

21 And it wasn't that they just
22 interviewed four hundred and fifty-one (451) persons.
23 This is the sample that they -- they also included two
24 hundred and fifty-two (252) online borrowers.

25 And if you'll see at the bottom of

1 slide 41, there's a reference of the -- reference to
2 the description of the internet payday loan research.
3 And if you go to that document and if you go to page
4 29 or 30, you'll see a really good discussion of the
5 methodology and of the confidence that can be -- and
6 that can be derived from that methodology in terms of
7 the confidence level.

8 So we think that that research vouched
9 for by Dr. Buckland and with methodology made
10 transparent in this hearing is something that the
11 Board can put a lot of weight on.

12 Madam Chair, just so you know, I'm
13 going to talk about the consumer dynamic for probably
14 a fair number of slides, and that'll be the -- a very
15 significant part of our discussion. When I'm done
16 that, I'll let you know whether you want me to give
17 you a -- a brief break or not. I'm always at your
18 beck and call.

19 We will then be talking about the
20 industry dynamic, which will -- will take a little
21 while as well. And then we'll move more quickly
22 through the -- the following topics. At least the
23 next three (3), I can -- I'm -- and I think Ms.
24 Dilay's will probably take about fifteen (15) minutes
25 to -- to complete the recommendation.

1 So I'm always available to stand down
2 if anyone needs a break or not. But I would suggest
3 that after the consumer dynamic, we look -- and if not
4 there, we look at taking a brief break after the
5 industry dynamic, but, again, I'm at your beck and
6 call.

7 In terms of looking at the payday
8 lending industry, it's impossible to divorce it from a
9 -- a broader dialogue about social inclusion and
10 exclusion, inequality, and limitations in the market.

11 And I think Dr. Robinson was quite
12 right in saying that the breadth of the issue that
13 some of these vulnerable clients are exposed to, we
14 can't lay exclusively at the -- the feet of the payday
15 lending ind -- industry. It's part of a broader
16 dialogue. And I think that's important context.

17 I'm not going to go through slide 44
18 except for to tell you that those -- these are the
19 different points that I want to -- I -- I wish to
20 discuss, including the significance of repeat loans,
21 the debt cycle, and a desire of consumers to reconnect
22 with the mainstream industry.

23 And Mr. Keyes and the CPLA referenced
24 this this morning. There is, to some consumers, a --
25 a reason they are attracted to the payday lending

1 industry. It's accessible. The hours are flexible.
2 Here's that quote again from interview participant 8.
3 They're all over the inner city.

4 And as Ms. St. Aubin noted, many of the
5 clients that she inter -- or, excuse me, participants
6 she interviewed spoke of the payday lending industry
7 as -- as individuals who felt excluded from the
8 mainstream banking system, and feeling of being
9 marginalised by the mainstream banking industry as
10 compared to payday lenders.

11 So let's be blunt. These are the --
12 you know, we think it's fair to describe the industry
13 as open and accessible, and compared to the banking
14 industry there's a perception that they're non-
15 judgmental. And those are tremendous strengths of
16 that industry.

17 The product is very expensive. And as
18 both the focus group participants who -- who argues
19 that -- that she or he was paid in -- higher interest
20 because they were poor, or as Ms. Brandy Getty, who
21 was the third presenter, the -- the lady who had the
22 really possible experience with SEED Winnipeg, talks
23 about just that the rates are much higher -- much
24 higher than a bank loan, or a credit card. It's a
25 very expensive product.

1 And we're dealing with a population
2 which is not exclusively but which is
3 disproportionately vulnerable. There are teachers in
4 there, but that population as whole as compared to the
5 Canadian population is -- is vulnerable. What do we
6 mean by that? Well, what Dr. Buckland means is that
7 they tend to have lower income, lower asset level,
8 limited access to the mainstream banking, and in more
9 acute cases are trapped in a repeat borrowing cycle.

10 What else do we know about this
11 population? Aboriginal people are over-represented.
12 That's certainly at the national level. Again
13 recognizing that Ms. St. Aubin's survey was not
14 random, but she triangulates -- provides supporting
15 information. Of those that were -- the hundred and
16 thirty (130) that were surveyed in Manitoba, 48
17 percent self-identified as Aboriginal. And that
18 triangulates with other key observations, and -- and
19 that is why we have some confidence in sharing it with
20 you.

21 Dr. Simpson -- and I -- my eyes kind of
22 roll to the back of my head when he talks about
23 regression, and probit regression, and -- but he's a
24 very sophisticated econometrician. He and Dr. Islam
25 took the SFS and CFCS data, and looked beyond the

1 numbers to statistically significant relationships.

2 What did he point out at slide 49?

3 These are not all the observations but
4 assets and wealth reduce payday loan usage. Those
5 with post-secondary education are less likely to use
6 payday loans. The use of credit cards reduces payday
7 loan usage. And again, residents in Manitoba, all
8 other factors considered, tends to increase the
9 likelihood of usage.

10 There is a narrative put out by the
11 industry about payday loans being only for -- or,
12 sorry, primarily for emergencies. And you see it in
13 the CPLA code of best business practice advice that
14 payday loans are for only -- or for occasional use
15 only, and should not be used to cover continual
16 shortfalls.

17 And the next slide or two (2), we want
18 to highlight the inconsistency between what we see on
19 the ground in Manitoba and the code of best business
20 practice. Not to say that anyone's violating the code
21 in this regard but there's a significant inconsistency
22 between the aspiration and the reality.

23 And again here is Ms. St. Aubin, which
24 we believe is strongly reinforced by data from the
25 United States in particular: What is the main purpose

1 of your use of payday loans? And if you look at the
2 pink, 48.1 percent talk about pay -- using it to pay
3 living costs; rent, food, utilities, and clothing.
4 And words 'Manitoba Hydro' turned up in our focus
5 groups a bit too much for -- for my comfort, and I've
6 been suitably chastised by my client for -- for that.

7 And here's the observation from
8 Lawrence and Ellison (phonetic): Relying on these
9 loans for an extended period of time seems contrary to
10 the short-term financing intention and may exacerbate
11 rather than relieve financial problems. There's a
12 risk there, and we see it in repeat borrowing in
13 particular.

14 And what do we know about repeat
15 borrowing? I'm not going to mind your -- numb your
16 minds at slide 53 with the data from the States, but
17 Dr. Buckland puts that out well in slides 18 and 19.

18 But there's great data from the
19 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, state regular --
20 regulator databased, Pew Charitable Trusts, Advance
21 America and others in terms of the prevalence of
22 repeat borrowing in the American marketplace.

23 And there is significant evidence of
24 repeat borrowing in Canada. We have regulator data
25 from BC, and you see their articulation of the average

1 number of loans per borrower between 2012 and 2014.

2 And we draw your attention to the second bullet.

3 In that 2014 data, that long right --
4 or the long right tail that Dr. Simpson talked about,
5 the number of individuals with more than fifteen (15)
6 loans in one (1) year increased by 34 percent. So
7 again, that's some interesting data from British
8 Columbia.

9 Nova Scotia, on the third bullet, notes
10 that 52 percent of all payday loans were repeat loans.
11 And of those -- of that 52 percent, 30 percent
12 received eight (8) or more loans. And again, going to
13 that long right tail, there's five thousand (5,000)
14 folks in Nova Scotia with an average of thirteen (13)
15 loans each in addition to initial loans.

16 Dr. Buckland testified that he's -- he
17 -- we obviously don't have that type of data in
18 Manitoba, and our clients urge on you that this is a
19 very important data that the Board should be obtaining
20 -- not -- not the Board, but the government should be
21 obtaining.

22 But Dr. Buckland certainly noted no
23 reason why we wouldn't expect that Nova Scotia-type
24 experience to be replicated in Manitoba.

25 The national data is interesting as

1 well. This is from the CFCS with about -- a bit more
2 than 75 percent reporting two (2) or more loans. Dr.
3 Simpson was asked some questions by this -- I think by
4 Board chair -- panel chair Ms. Botting and trying to
5 get a sense of what's out in that -- in -- in that
6 data.

7 And again, he's talking about that long
8 right-hand tail consistent with what we're seeing in
9 British Columbia and Nova Scotia, and also that
10 there's probably some understatements. There are
11 limits because these studies are not focused on payday
12 loans.

13 They're StatsCan (sic). They do very
14 good work, but they're not focused on stay -- stay --
15 payday loans and information on repeat borrowers.
16 More could be teased out, which is why there's some
17 important need for more data in Canada. But it's
18 clearly significant evidence of repeat borrowing from
19 BC, Nova Scotia, and from the CFCS.

20 And what happened in Ms. St. Aubin's
21 survey? And again, it's not representative, but this
22 is where triangulation comes in. Very consistent
23 survey. This is the population of one hundred and
24 thirty (130) that Ms. St. Aubin interviewed, or her
25 research assistants interviewed.

1 And again, you see about 45 percent in
2 that group of one (1) to three (3), 24 percent in that
3 four (4) to six (6), and in excess of 30 percent
4 taking out seven (7) or more loans.

5 So again, very consistent with the type
6 of information, that long right tail that we're --
7 we're seeing in Nova Scotia and -- and British
8 Columbia, and which Dr. Simpson is speculating about
9 in the national data. Triangulation, very useful
10 information.

11 Here's just on slide 57 Ms. St. Aubin's
12 narrative which I've already gone through. So that's
13 -- repeat borrowing is clearly a phenomena that is
14 prevalent in the United States, of which there is
15 significant evidence in -- in Canada. And we believe,
16 based upon Ms. St. Aubin's work, you can reasonably
17 draw the inference that repeat borrowing is a
18 significant issue in Manitoba as well.

19 What else do we know about repeat
20 borrowing? Who is disproportionately likely to take
21 out repeat loans? It doesn't mean that that's the
22 only population. What group is disproportionately
23 likely to take out repeat loans? Not surprisingly, it
24 tends to be those who are less affluent.

25 FCAC, back in '09, over half of those

1 taking out at least twelve (12) loans per year,
2 incomes of less than thirty (30) grand. CFCS, in
3 2009, as reported on by Simpson et al in 2013,
4 evidence that repeat borrowing is more common among
5 poor and modest income and asset holding Canadians as
6 compared to the non-poor.

7 And I'll just stay on that slide for a
8 second. A really important part of what StatsCan
9 does, which you won't see in Environics, is that
10 comparison between the population of payday loan
11 borrowers and those who don't. And that is really
12 important insight that you get from StatsCan, despite
13 some of the limitations to it.

14 This is from the -- Dr. Simpson. And
15 subject to check, I believe this is from the 2014
16 CFCS. You'll recall on Exhibit 34, slide 13, he
17 actually provided a comparison of the 2009 results and
18 the 2014 results.

19 And here we have -- this is just the
20 most recent results. So just to refresh your memory,
21 in terms of the blue, that's those who identifies
22 taking out one (1) repeat loan. The red is twice and
23 the green is three (3) or more times.

24 And you'll see in terms of wages and
25 salaries, in focussing on the three (3) or more times,

1 roughly about half that population, which took out
2 loan -- wages and salar -- took out a payday loan
3 three (3) or more times did so based upon -- with the
4 primary source of income is wages and salaries.

5 Go over four (4) more headings, under
6 social assistance and you'll see that whopping 30
7 percent three (3) or more times associated with social
8 assistance. And go over two (2) more columns and
9 you'll see associated with -- with pension incomes.

10 And that was a specific research area
11 that our clients asked our experts to focus on and
12 that is a -- a matter of acute concern for our
13 clients. And -- and it goes to Dr. Buckland's point
14 that to a certain degree, perhaps the none -- the name
15 of payday lending industry, maybe that name is
16 evolving.

17 Those sources of income, especially for
18 that high percentage social assistance population is -
19 - is very concerning to our client. And our client
20 will know and -- and we -- we respect the CPLA for
21 their Code of Professional Conduct. But in 2011 that
22 decision to not lend to those on welfare was removed
23 from the Code of Professional Conduct. And we think
24 that's an important part of -- of the numbers that
25 you're seeing there.

1 Here's Dr. Simpson noting that of this
2 population migrating to social assistance of multiple
3 three (3) day -- three (3) -- three (3) or more loan
4 recipients, it's gone up 30 -- 30 percent. And I'll
5 just say that -- suggest that Ms. St. Aubin's data for
6 Manitoba, you can go to it and you'll data on Exhibit
7 35, slide 7.

8 She has about 58 percent with their
9 primary source of payday loans being their payroll
10 cheque. But you're also seeing welfare and pensions
11 showing up in the populations she identifies as -- as
12 well. Again, it's not a random sample, but there's
13 some important information.

14 I want to be careful, and I do want to
15 articulate and honour C11 and 310-Loans. In our
16 client's survey of payday lenders those were two (2)
17 that expressly identified that they do not lend on
18 welfare. And here's C11. They're doing that for the
19 purposes of their customer's well being. And our --
20 our clients note that.

21 Another phenomena that our client
22 thinks is important for this Board, especially as you
23 grapple with the maximum amount of loan, and you've
24 heard from the industry how some consumers have come
25 to them and said they want to borrow more.

1 What struck us from our focus groups
2 was the exact opposite issue. Upselling is what --
3 what we call it. And I don't mind it when I go to
4 McDonald's and they offer to super size my fries. You
5 can look at my physique. You know that I often take
6 advantage of that opportunity. That's okay at
7 McDonald's. But we just want -- well, maybe it's not.

8 I -- I just want to note, this was
9 flagged by a number of our focus group participants
10 going in, I'll take a hundred, hundred and fifty
11 (150). Hey, you can get two hundred (200). I just
12 want a hundred and fifty (15). Hey, you can get three
13 eighty (380).

14 And here's the consumer interview
15 participant 8 expressing sur -- surprising; not
16 surprising to me. But that is a counterpoint to the
17 narrative. And our client doesn't want to discount
18 the narrative of the payday lenders, but just to say
19 that that goes both ways. And -- and that has
20 implications.

21 Our client is not recommending going
22 down to 25 percent. They don't see that as a good
23 result. But that up selling phenomena is in part
24 behind why our clients are not particularly interested
25 at this point in time in raising that limit. And we

1 think that's important for this Board to -- to keep --
2 keep an eye on.

3

4 (BRIEF PAUSE)

5

6 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Classical
7 economics speaks of the rational consumer. The
8 homoecconomist I think is the language. And my spouse
9 is -- is clearly one (1) of those rational consumers,
10 but she's married to someone who is not.

11 So I have sympathy for Dr. Buckland's
12 observations that -- that there are -- that assumption
13 that governs how we look at markets and about
14 competition and fairness in the marketplace has
15 limits. And the behavioural economists have won a lot
16 of Nobel Prizes focussing on that work.

17 And here's Ms. St. Aubin identifying
18 that the majority of participants did not have an
19 understanding of the annual interest rate fees,
20 highlighting the need for good, clear, comparable
21 information like what we see in Ontario and Dr.
22 Buckland talking about tunnelling. And tunnelling is
23 not a pho -- phenomena just for the poor, but it is a
24 situation that can be experienced by low-income people
25 in times of -- who are facing scarcities. And they

1 sometimes lead us to make decisions, but sometimes
2 these are decisions that hurt us in the long term.

3 Another phenomena in terms of the
4 consumer insight that we heard was about the debt
5 cycle. And one (1) of our panelists, Deena Wichert,
6 who was the third person to the Board's left, spoke
7 about this, about how -- once you get into payday
8 loans, how hard it was to get out, even when she was
9 back in the labour market.

10 And then you see interview participant
11 6, again, how hard it is to get out of the cycle. You
12 have no money. You need to get another one. The
13 cycle continues. And that's something that's very
14 important. It's part of the reason why our client is
15 interested in the option and the choice for consumers
16 of installment loans, whether on the Washington model
17 or other models.

18 A final concern, and this comes out
19 very strongly in our client's survey of practices of
20 payday lenders -- and remember that was an open
21 survey. Our -- our research assistants disclosed that
22 they were phoning on behalf of the public interest law
23 centre. And frequently individuals are being asked to
24 disclose important information, including their social
25 insurance number.

1 And Dr. Buckland talks about in his
2 exhibit, but in our survey of the industry there's
3 some really good information. We didn't find it in
4 all service providers, in all payday lenders in
5 Manitoba, but more often than not that re -- request
6 and/or requirement for a social insurance number was
7 prevalent.

8 And -- and as -- it -- it's very
9 important at the -- at the mainline stores, but it's -
10 - it's at least as important or more important when
11 you're going onto the internet and there's not a face
12 that you can -- you can look at to -- to -- when
13 you're being asked to provide this information.

14 Do payday loans benefit consumers? I
15 thought the Pew Charitable Trust really caught the
16 tensions in -- in this issue really well, describing
17 the experience of borrowers. They have an
18 appreciation for friendly service, dismay with the
19 high cost, and frustration with lengthy in --
20 indebtedness.

21 In our expert's analysis of the record,
22 particularly through the focus group conversations,
23 the issue of harm becomes nuanced. Certainly, two (2)
24 types of payday lenders became apparent in Dr.
25 Buckland's views, those able to use small loans from

1 time to time in a strategic fashion, and also able to
2 relatively repay them in a timely fashion, and the
3 more vulnerable repeat borrowers who tended to
4 eventually become dependent on this loan.

5 And he points out the challenges of
6 this marketplace. Ease of accessibility and the
7 convenience of current payday loans can help some
8 borrowers, at least within the limits of bounded
9 rationality, and harm others, and that the credit-
10 challenged payday loan users appear to be the most
11 vulnerable.

12

13 (BRIEF PAUSE)

14

15 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: You've heard some
16 mixed views about financial literacy in this hearing,
17 and we clearly understand that people have to be
18 willing to adopt it, But Brandy Getty, to me, perhaps
19 the most powerful moment of this hearing, when she
20 shared her story and how working with SEED, she had
21 come to a -- a different choice.

22 And this highlights the -- the great
23 importance our clients place on financial literacy,
24 providing good information to consumers in the
25 marketplace, and so that from time to time, you get a

1 Brandy Getty or -- and there's many others like her,
2 who, with given the proper tools, can make good
3 choices. And we think this was a very powerful
4 statement about the value of financial literacy in
5 this hearing.

6 So going back, Do payday loans benefit
7 consumers? Dr. Buckland concern -- says it's clear
8 that some consumers relying on repetitive borrowing,
9 accessing their loans online, tunnelling as a result
10 of personal and professional stresses, may be harmed
11 by payday loans. And that's one (1) of the major
12 reasons, of course, we're here.

13 One (1) of the last couple points we
14 wanted to make from our focus groups and our dialogue
15 and our interviews with Manitoba consumers, and this
16 came out really interesting as -- in Ms. St. Aubin's
17 work about a desire to reconnect with mainstream
18 banking. And you -- here you have focus group
19 participant 6, and wanting to -- to deal with -- with
20 the BMO rather than the payday lending company, but
21 with a bad credit rating.

22 And on the next slide, you have -- this
23 is the one (1) consumer in Ms. St. Aubin's focus
24 groups who expressed a fair bit of interest in the
25 installment loan product. Now, in that case, that was

1 Colorado. With -- with hindsight, we might have
2 preferred to have shared Washington's, but here's that
3 consumer talking about how that installment loan for
4 her might help to get some light at the end of the
5 tunnel.

6 It gives you a path to get away from
7 the payday -- payday loan, trying to improve their
8 credit rating, and making a really powerful point, I
9 think, in that last paragraph: My credit rating
10 wasn't very good the last -- seven (7) years ago, but
11 I've been really good with my payday lenders. But
12 that's not reflected in my payday lending rating, and
13 could you imagine the -- what my score could have
14 been? I've been using this service for seven (7)
15 years.

16 And I think that's a really powerful
17 indictment of how we haven't collectively linked these
18 services. And that's not aimed at the payday lending
19 industry, but at -- at a missed opportunity. Here's a
20 consumer moving from insolvency, but still facing some
21 liquidity -- liquidity challenges, and unable to take
22 advantage of that good -- good reputation with the
23 payday lending industry to improve her access to
24 certain products.

25 And we think that's a very important

1 lesson. What we do with it, I wish everyone good
2 luck.

3 Again, this just goes to Environics and
4 -- and sometimes our client's concern with the
5 industry not asking the questions we would advise.
6 Here we are in our Information Request asking is -- is
7 Environics providing evidence on -- on those who use
8 payday loans more than once, no. How many times they
9 use payday loans, there's no such evidence.

10 Can the CPLA, going to Question E,
11 identify any study of the repeat loan issue it has
12 undertaken in Canada since 2013? No. And given the
13 importance of that issue and the risk of harm, we
14 think this says something powerful to you about how
15 evidence is treated and about the need for processes
16 like this which provide the opportunity to share more
17 complete surveys of the marketplace and of consumers.

18 Just before leaving the consumer
19 dynamic, one (1) author who's prom -- prominently
20 cited by Dr. Buckland is B-A-R-A-D-A-R-A-N. I'm going
21 to say Baradaran, not very well. An important
22 contribution to the literature who takes issue with
23 payday lenders not checking the creditworthiness of
24 borrowers and not distinguishing between insolvent --
25 insolvent and illiquid people.

1 Our clients just want to point -- our
2 clients think that that is a little too simplistic,
3 not nuanced enough, that -- that approach. Because in
4 our client's perspective, it's not just about the
5 illiquid and the insolvency -- solvent, but it's also
6 about the illiquid trying to emerge from insolvency.

7 And you think of that individual, focus
8 group participant 5 at slide 71, seven (7) years
9 paying -- paying her payday loans regularly, not
10 affecting her credit rating. And so there is an issue
11 of access as well for -- for persons like her.

12 Our clients do want to note that in
13 terms of access, certainly their knowledge is that
14 Money Mart provides relatively accessible access to
15 the marketplace to consumers. They also have a very
16 low bad debt rate. So increased accessibility does
17 not necessarily lead to relatively high bad debt
18 rates.

19 Madam Chair, I'm moving to the industry
20 dynamics. I wonder -- I'm totally at the Board's
21 direction. I wouldn't mind at least getting some
22 water for myself, but I'm -- I don't know if you'd
23 like me to take a -- a five (5) -- a five (5) minute
24 break, or how would -- how would you like me to
25 proceed?

1 THE PANEL CHAIRPERSON: I'll just --
2 I'll just pass -- check with the panel, because it is
3 getting close to lunchtime.

4

5 (BRIEF PAUSE)

6

7 THE PANEL CHAIRPERSON: Well, we're
8 just checking. How long would the industry piece be,
9 because we could break for lunch for half an hour and
10 then -- would that be...

11 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: I think that
12 would probably be well. The industry piece is going
13 to be probably twenty (20) minutes, at least, so. I
14 have to talk about Dr. Robinson a bit and any
15 conversation about him is not that short, so.

16 THE PANEL CHAIRPERSON: Okay. Thank
17 you. Then I think we'll take a half hour. Is that --
18 a half hour for a lunch break. Thank you.

19

20 --- Upon recessing at 11:45 a.m.

21 --- Upon resuming at 12:24 p.m.

22

23 THE PANEL CHAIRPERSON: Welcome back.
24 I hope you enjoyed your lunch. I'm going to turn the
25 mic over to Mr. Byron Williams, for the Coalition, to

1 continue with his final -- or closing evi -- sorry,
2 submission. Thank you.

3 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Yes. And -- and
4 thank you, Madam Chair and members of the panel. I'll
5 just note that court reporter reminds me that on
6 Friday we presented a response to an undertaking about
7 Policis, and apparently I was so excited to present it
8 to you that I forgot to have it marked as an exhibit.
9 So that should have been marked as Exhibit 40.

10

11 --- EXHIBIT NO. CAC-40: Response to Undertaking 1

12

13 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: I believe the --
14 the Board secretary has marked it as such, but I don't
15 think it was reflected on the record, so I apologize
16 for that.

17 And then this PowerPoint which was hal
18 -- handed this morning, as I indicated, should be
19 Coalition 41.

20

21 --- EXHIBIT NO. CAC-41: A Regulatory Success
22 Story: Protection, Access,
23 and Sustainability;
24 closing submission on
25 behalf of the Consumer

1 Coalition

2

3 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And urging you
4 note to read it yet, we've also handed out our list of
5 our recommendations which Ms. Dilay will go through.
6 You can read it if you want, it's a free country. But
7 we would mark that as Coalition 42.

8

9 --- EXHIBIT NO. CAC-42: Payday Loan Review,
10 Consumer Coalition
11 recommendations, April 18,
12 2016

13

14 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: We -- we left off
15 on industry dynamics. And just on pages 75, 76, and
16 77 I just go through some of the issues we're going to
17 talk about. So I'll -- it was more to -- to orientate
18 myself. So we could actually moved to 70 -- 78, if we
19 might.

20 I've labelled this slide because we're
21 talking about Dr. Robinson, "Insightful flamboyance."
22 There might other terms other might choose to use to
23 describe him; that's the one I -- I had, and I think
24 it's important. He is a colourful personality and
25 sometimes inadvertently his words give offence. And -

1 - and sometimes that might even distract from his
2 penetrating insight. So I just want to acknowledge
3 that.

4 Our client is very proud to have
5 brought Dr. Robinson. We think he's been of
6 incredible assistance to these deliberations in
7 '07/'08, 2013, and again this year. He brings a high
8 level penetrating insight. But I do acknowledge that
9 from time to time his choice of words does cause
10 discomfort, which may distract from the quality of his
11 work.

12 And I want to highlight the quality of
13 his work because in our client's view the strength of
14 the Manitoba model comes from decisions this Board
15 made in '07/'08, and in 2013. But much of the insight
16 this Board received did come from Dr. -- Dr. Robinson,
17 and -- and his insight into the financial activities
18 in the marketplace, into price, into the reality.

19 And he gave the Board his cold, hard
20 opinion in '07/'08, and again in 2013 by moving to an
21 efficient model. There was going to be consolidation
22 in the industry that would increase volume for the
23 efficient producers. It would provide opportunities
24 for the rural providers to take advantage of the
25 economies of scope.

1 But there would be challenges in terms
2 of some of the industry storefront operations but the
3 tradeoff was significantly enhanced consumer
4 protection, and a maintenance of strong access to the
5 marketplace. That was Dr. Robinson's insight. We
6 believe it has served the Board well in the -- the
7 past, and we believe it -- it will continue to serve
8 you well in the future.

9 Going to the second bullet, Dr.
10 Robinson talks a lot about scale, scope, and market
11 dominance. His evidence, in our client's view, is
12 strongly supported by admissions by the industry. His
13 insights are corroborated by industry ad --
14 admissions. And his insights and advice are strongly
15 corroborated by a practical living example in the
16 American marketplace.

17 There is ample evidence, and we'll come
18 to it, in the American marketplace at a sustainable
19 industry at that range, between fifteen dollars (\$15)
20 per hundred and seventeen dollars (\$17) per hundred.
21 We believe his analysis has strong support from the
22 operating marg -- margins of Dollar Financial Group.

23 And we also believe that it's buttress
24 because when he goes at the expenses of Money Mart,
25 he's bringing real live American examples such as Cash

1 Advance. And finally, recognizing that it was a
2 presentation and not evidence but Dr. Robinson's
3 assumptions for his model in terms of volume and
4 operating cost, in our client's view, were strongly
5 supported by the presentation of Cash Money.

6 Another hallmark of Dr. Robinson's work
7 is his transparency and accountability. He shared his
8 model to the Board, and to the CPLA, and to C11 well
9 in advance of his testimony. He expressly articulated
10 his assumptions.

11 And if the Board gets a chance, Dr.
12 Robinson in his pre-filed written evidence goes
13 through fairly carefully some of the conservatism in
14 his assessments. Issues where he gave the nod to
15 evidence that might be more favourable to the
16 industry. I don't have time and it would be too
17 burdensome to take you through that, but I urge you to
18 go back to that section and -- and see that
19 conservatism.

20 One of the most helpful activities Dr.
21 Robinson took was to -- in his evidence he stress
22 tested multiple scenarios. Now, one of the challenges
23 in this -- this isn't like Manitoba Public Insurance
24 where we have many -- hundreds or perhaps thousands of
25 observations. We can do really cool Monte Carlo

1 simulations, and Dr. Simpson and I can get very
2 excited about that.

3 We don't have that type of data point
4 here so what Dr. Robinson did, and we think it speaks
5 well to his evidence, is he stress tested his
6 scenarios. And those stress tests told us a few
7 things. One is that cost of capital is not that
8 critical of a variable in the sense that a range
9 between cost of capital assumptions is not likely to
10 make that much of a difference in the overall cost.

11 What are the big ticket items? Volume,
12 and the relationship between operating costs and
13 volume, and bad debt. Those are the big three (3).
14 And his multiple scenarios, we think, showed some
15 robustness in his scenarios. It allows the Board, by
16 sharing his model, to put in your own assumptions.

17 I noted the observation of Mr. Keyes
18 from CPLA about suggesting that there were numerous
19 corrections to Dr. Robinson's evidence. I just bring
20 you back to his dialogue in terms of rabbit and horse
21 stew.

22 In terms of corrections, I believe one
23 related to the Manitoba tax rate, and he, in
24 Undertaking 38 or 39 (sic), responded to that.
25 Another correction I believe brought to his attention

1 by Board counsel actually overstated the costs of the
2 industry.

3 The CPLA does not detail these
4 corrections. There ain't no horses amongst them.
5 There might be a little -- couple of rabbits
6 skittering around. Some go in the favour of the
7 industry, some go in the favour Dr. Robin --
8 Robinson's observation.

9 And his openness to acknowledge those
10 corrections I think is very important. In our
11 clients' view, his essential elements of his analysis
12 are unchallenged. Here's Dr. Robinson on scale and
13 scope:

14 "The key challenge for a small
15 business is the volume to cover its
16 fixed costs. Economies of scale,
17 most costs are fixed, but costs rise
18 much more slowly than loan volume,
19 especially in a consolidating market
20 like Winnipeg."

21 That's his...

22 "Large chains can generate more
23 volume with advertising and share
24 some costs like infotech."

25 So that's his economies of scale which

1 are an opportunity for urban providers.

2 Then we go to economy of scope:

3 "Add more products: gold, pawn
4 shop, tax preparation."

5 And very important for small products
6 (sic). But I want to go back to economies of scope
7 again in terms of the urban setting for a moment.

8 CPLA and Mr. Keyes on behalf of the
9 CPLA chose their words very carefully this morning.
10 They said that Cash Money and Money Mart enjoy the
11 same economies of scale. Well, we may or may not
12 agree on that.

13 He never commented on economies of
14 scope, and we think that failure to comment is
15 telling. One (1) of Money Mart's huge advantages in
16 this marketplace is economies of scope, the cheque
17 cashing business which is declining, but Money Mart
18 has been very agile in expanding its lines of
19 business.

20 So we think the absence of that
21 analysis in terms of scope was quite -- quite
22 interesting. So that's Robinson. If we can go back
23 one (1) slide, that's Robinson on economies of scale.

24 Now, if we go to the next slide, being
25 slide 82, what about these wise words:

1 "Profitability is driven by volume.
2 Large chains have brand recognition
3 and can maximize efficiency of staff
4 between multiple locations."

5 That's not Dr. Robinson. That's C11
6 really endorsing his analysis of the economies of
7 scale and making a very important point. And we
8 comment them on their candour.

9 Slide 83, here's Robinson confirmed by
10 the industry in terms of economies of scope. Going
11 back to the Dauphin payday lender, having to
12 reconsider its pay -- business model to seek advantage
13 of economies of scope through furniture and
14 appliances, scrap gold purchases, jewellery sales,
15 along with its cheque-cashing and payday loans
16 service.

17 And it's hard to tell what C11 is
18 doing, but they -- we do note from the response to C11
19 1-8 AMB responding to the PUB that they speak of many
20 assets, investments, and other interests, and that
21 their office in terms of the payday loan operation is
22 just one (1) asset of many. So there may be economies
23 of scope there that we haven't had an opportunity to
24 examine.

25 Robinson's conclusions are that repeat

1 loans drive the business. Most loans are to repeat
2 borrowers, and lenders depend on the business. And if
3 we go to slide 85, we'll see support for that from
4 Ernst & Young. Clearly, going to the second bullet:

5 "The long-run survival of payday
6 loan operator will depend on
7 achieving a steady repeat customer
8 business."

9 Economies of scale, economies of scope,
10 repeat business observations, Robinson endorsed
11 implicitly by industry analysis. Dr. Robinson
12 observed that Money Mart dominated the marketplace.
13 He perhaps did not use that language. He talked about
14 the industry concentrated and consolidating.

15 And if we turn to the next slide we see
16 his insight endorsed by Dollar Financial Group. Our
17 network of retail locations in Canada are the largest
18 of their kind by revenue. And Mr. Keyes, on behalf of
19 the CPLA, the first day of the hearing, described one
20 (1) of his members is, in fact, the dominant operator
21 here in Manitoba.

22 And stay here, if we might, for a
23 second. That's not just the number of stores. This
24 business is driven by volume. And it is reasonable to
25 assume that the volume pouring through the Money Mop -

1 - Mart operations in downtown Winnipeg is -- is
2 significantly higher than otherwise.

3 So when we think of Money Mart owning
4 half the stores in Manitoba, I -- it is fair to
5 conclude, and reasonable to conclude that they own way
6 more of the share of the volume. And again, we've
7 gone through this slide again, but the operating
8 margins across Dollar Financial Group's lines of
9 business, again, confirm and reflect its dominant
10 market position.

11 We've talked about this before, but Dr.
12 Robinson's observation that there are -- is not
13 meaningful price competition and that the rates rise
14 to the regulated rate gives us a salutary warning from
15 the Ontario experience and -- experience otherwise.
16 And it's also confirmed, as you can see at the bottom
17 of the page by the Pew Trust, made those same
18 observations in Manitoba -- excuse me, with -- with
19 regard to the American experience.

20 What does the American experience tell
21 us? This is the untest -- unchallenged evidence of
22 Dr. Robinson. He did it originally in his evidence in
23 Appendix 3, but he provided an update in Coalition 37,
24 a common rate cap is fifteen dollars (\$15) per
25 hundred.

1 Some are lower. You'll see Michigan is
2 -- is amongst the lowest. Some are around the
3 Manitoba rate, and some with no limits. And just to
4 stay on this for a minute, if you think back to
5 Policis and our client clearly takes issue with some
6 of Policis, but in the American context, who is the
7 great ideal for Policis? California at seventeen
8 twenty-five (17.25) per hundred.

9 There's -- Dr. Robinson's advice
10 historically about price caps we think has been well
11 supported by the experience in Manitoba and the
12 experience and record in other jurisdictions. And Dr.
13 Robinson goes through a very interesting analysis in
14 his evidence, and again, I believe it's Appendix 3.

15 He looks at the numbers of stores per
16 capita for jurisdictions at seventeen (17) per
17 hundred, fifteen (15) per hundred, et cetera, and
18 derives a lot of support for his conclusion that a
19 range -- a rate in that range between seven (7) --
20 excuse me, fifteen (15) and seventeen (17) is just and
21 reasonable.

22 And just to distinguish, there are many
23 ways that we can distinguish the American and Canadian
24 experience. But two (2) examples given here by Dr.
25 Robinson, one (1) is that there's not as much

1 corporate concentration in the states than in Canada
2 and so that the volume churning through the Money Mart
3 stores we could expect to be higher than we might see
4 in the United States, and also that the loan volume in
5 the US is lower than in Canada on average.

6 And that's where that industry is
7 sustainable in that fifteen (15) to seventeen dollar
8 (\$17) range. So there's good evidence from the United
9 States and -- and with -- with respect, on these
10 points Dr. Robinson was not touched in cross-
11 examination.

12 So in talking about his considerations
13 in -- in looking at the cost model and -- and the --
14 the rate model, Dr. Robinson spoke in terms of the --
15 both from an economics justification as well as an
16 ethical one. Remember, he says this was a business
17 story. It wasn't a story about predatory owls.

18 He did observe that there is a
19 disadvantaged borrower population and empirical
20 evidence showing no price competition. That is a
21 clear invitation for a rate cap and a rate cap that
22 tends to be more restrictive rather than less
23 restrictive, recognizing that the market that rates
24 prices flow towards the cap.

25 The economic justification, and it's a

1 justification that underlines all rate regulation, is
2 if the market is not fair, if the industry is not
3 competitive, regulate so that the industry does not
4 earn more than a fair rate on what it invests. And
5 he's got good PUB precedent to rely upon both from
6 orders in the '08 as well as in 2013.

7 So Dr. Robinson's analysis focusses on
8 opportunities for efficiency and scale, scope and risk
9 management. He highlights what are the three (3) big
10 ticket items as well as one (1) that is quite
11 interesting, and I find very interesting, but tends to
12 be less important in effecting the ultimate cost,
13 which is the cost of capital.

14 It doesn't mean that industry is not
15 entitled to a fair return, it just means that, in
16 terms of what triggers an appropriate rate, its
17 volume, operating costs, and bad debt.

18 And you heard Dr. Robinson speaking in
19 terms of the -- the Cash Money presentation and how
20 the volumes that he backed out of that presentation
21 seem to be quite supportive of his own. There was an
22 attempt to challenge him in cross-examination,
23 although I note it wasn't referred to in the closing
24 arguments of CPLA.

25 Because what Dr. Robinson did, he

1 looked at the average volume per store of Money Mart
2 in 2013 as his base volume, and then he trued it up to
3 -- to recognize the consolidation in the marketplace,
4 the disappearance of Cash Store.

5 And in cross-examination, the CPLA said
6 to him: Well, Cash Store gave up there licence in
7 2012. Why would you take their numbers from 2013?

8 But the reality that we all know was
9 that Cash Store kept operating in Manitoba. And there
10 is the observations from the Board's own order
11 confirming that. And I note that it is telling that
12 the CPLA did not go back to that point in their
13 closing submissions.

14 Operating costs. Again, Cash Money's
15 operating costs came in uncannily close to the
16 estimate of Dr. Robinson. He did start with the value
17 of twelve dollars (\$12) roughly from Money Mart. And
18 then he explains two (2) key factors why he backed
19 down from twelve dollars (\$12) to eleven dollars
20 (\$11).

21 One (1) was, again, remember that this
22 is an industry with high fixed costs, with the influx
23 of volume from Cash Store stores, that should bring
24 the operating costs per hundred dollars (\$100) down.
25 And -- and, as you can see, he is -- the second bullet

1 describes that Money Mart volumes, he is suggesting,
2 are lower than they are now. And that leads to
3 spreading the costs over a much larger base and
4 lowering the overall costs, and that's an important
5 observation.

6 And, secondly, that he took issue with
7 the -- the Dollar Financial Group's categorization of
8 other costs. And I won't go into detail. I think
9 it's captured really well in his evidence at page 21.
10 But he used a very useful comparable.

11 He went to Cash America and looked what
12 their operating costs were as a percentage of revenue,
13 their other operating costs were, and he note they
14 were 6.1 percent. And then he looked to that big,
15 opaque cloud in the Dollar Financial Group's 10-K
16 filing of other expenditures, and found it at 29.5
17 percent, giving validation to his conclusion that that
18 number was excessive.

19 And to be clear, he didn't eliminate
20 those other costs. He made a judgmental call to split
21 the difference and go down from twelve (12) to eleven
22 (11). And again, that number was largely validated by
23 the presentation of Cash Money.

24

25

(BRIEF PAUSE)

1 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Mr. Keyes and the
2 CPLA have been quite right to note that the licensing
3 fee in Manitoba is higher. There's no denying that.
4 They never flagged the admission from the CPLA or from
5 Deloitte that certain operating costs such as rent and
6 labour may be lower in Manitoba, which is one (1)
7 factor, although not the most important, that raises
8 some issues with the Deloitte estimate of operating
9 costs in excess of twelve dollars (\$12) based on
10 Alberta data. And again, we see the Cash Money
11 estimates coming in quite close to Dr. Robinson's.

12 Bad debt is an important issue, and
13 we've seen the -- the strikingly high figure in the
14 Deloitte/Alberta figures in excess of 6 percent for
15 bad debt. And I note again that Deloitte/Alberta was
16 not cited once in CPLA's submissions this morning.

17 But what do our friends at C11 say --
18 say about bad debt cost since regulation? That they
19 have not changed significantly, and we think that's an
20 important observation from a -- a party that doesn't
21 have any horses in -- in the race in that particular
22 question.

23 So that Deloitte/Alberta bad debt fee
24 of -- estimate in excess of 6 percent, our clients
25 think is clearly out of sync. We see Money Mart's

1 loan loss provision at 2.2 percent. And even Cash
2 Store, just before it and its -- I'll reserve any
3 comment here in Cash Store -- even before Cash Store
4 closed its doors, you see its loan loss provisions 4
5 percent, 3 percent.

6 Higher than Money Mart's, but
7 substantially lower than the loan loss provisions
8 alleged in Deloitte 2015, casting substantial doubt on
9 the credibility of that information.

10 I want to stay on bad debt for just one
11 (1) second.

12

13 (BRIEF PAUSE)

14

15 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Dr. Robinson has,
16 in terms of his model and his determination of an
17 appropriate estimate of bad debt expense, has relied
18 heavily on the Money Mart experience. And I -- excuse
19 me -- I think that's important. I think that's
20 reflective of what an efficient player in the industry
21 is -- is capable of achieving, and that's certainly
22 why the client is prepared to pay significant reliance
23 upon that information.

24

25 (BRIEF PAUSE)

1 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: I want to talk
2 just for a minute about the Deloitte information. I
3 probably had a longer presentation planned, but just -
4 - CPLA is -- appears not to be citing it heavily, so
5 I'll -- I'll be a little briefer.

6 But back in '07/'08, there was
7 Manitoba-specific data provided by Deloitte. Now, we
8 argued strongly and persuasively that it was skewed
9 and had a sampling bias in that it did not contain
10 Cash Money or Money Mart.

11 But look at that figure that they were
12 estimating back in '07/'08, around twenty-six (26),
13 twenty-seven dollars (\$27). Clearly Manitoba
14 experience casts a substantial shadow of credibility
15 on that information.

16 The 2015 report, Deloitte tells us they
17 spent ninety-five (95) hours, that the bad debt we
18 think is clearly way off. And the Public Utilities
19 Board did ask Deloitte for supporting calculations,
20 and that analysis was denied. And that there all --
21 also was issues in terms of the sample itself.

22 From our client's perspective, there's
23 not much weight, if any, that can be pointed -- put to
24 the Deloitte material. Clearly, the -- the bad debt
25 estimate raises a big red flag. And the -- the

1 failure to present itself or its material for further
2 testing is also of concern.

3 MR. REGIS GOSSELIN: Mr. Williams,
4 that second bullet under Deloitte/Alberta, I'm not
5 sure I get that one.

6 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Sorry. My simple
7 point with that is rememb -- just going back to the
8 gold standard point that if you're pre -- presenting
9 written evidence in a hearing, the general practice
10 would be to present yourself. And -- and that is, I
11 think, in terms of weighing that material, that is an
12 important factor for the Board to consider. I'm sorry
13 that it was less -- not well expressed.

14

15 (BRIEF PAUSE)

16

17 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: So here you have
18 Dr. Robinson and Mr. Keyes caught part of his quote
19 today. I think this is the -- an appropriate
20 characterization of page 476 of the -- the evidence.
21 Going to the high end, Dr. Robinson, at the fourth
22 bullet, is saying that a rate higher than seventeen
23 (17) is clearly excessive.

24 Going to the first bullet, he thinks a
25 15 percent rate is the right one, looking at an

1 efficient lender and the American data, but
2 recognizing that Cash Money information, which of
3 course was untested, he can see the argument for
4 somewhere between fifteen (15) and seventeen (17).

5 Now, just from our -- our client's
6 perspective, again, our client's inclination is
7 towards the lower end of that range in the range of 15
8 percent. They think that's reflective of what
9 efficient American lenders in a marketplace with lower
10 volume, lower corporation concentra -- tra -- tration
11 can achieve, what dominant lenders like Money Mart can
12 achieve, what lenders in rural Manitoba who achieve
13 efficiencies of scale and scope can achieve.

14 In terms of Cash Money, that's an -- an
15 interesting question. Our client did not get to
16 challenge the 12 percent overhead going to the head
17 office. And we would simply note with -- in terms of
18 Cash Money, that that debt range, that bad debt range
19 in excess of 4 percent raises some concerns.

20 And so our client acknowledges that Dr.
21 Robinson articulated what we think is a fair opinion,
22 that somewhere between fifteen (15) and seventeen (17)
23 is the right result. His judgment was closer towards
24 fifteen (15), was the better result, and our client
25 concurs very strongly with that.

1 Our client found the insight from a
2 couple of the smaller firms really interesting. And
3 Money -- Money Tree and C11, we just want to observe
4 that their biggest concerns, and at least that's our
5 observation, they may interpret them differently, you
6 can go back to their presentations and their evidence
7 as well.

8 From our client's perspective, their
9 biggest concern wasn't the cap. It was the amount --
10 percentage of income available for loaning and the
11 seven (7) day waiting period, and the cooling off
12 period. And we -- that seemed to us consistent with
13 C11.

14 So we found that really interesting
15 from the perspective of -- of smaller lenders and
16 offering some insight. And going to page 102, it was
17 Ms. Davis, I believe, for Money Tree. Not necessarily
18 agreeing with the fairness of the 17 percent, but
19 again, that did not seem to be her primary concern.

20 And then making a really good point at
21 page 149 of the transcript, talking about how the
22 regulations and changes to the regulation are so hard
23 to understand, and I would say not just from a
24 layman's perspective, or a laywoman's perspective, but
25 from certainly someone who's tried to wade through

1 them myself.

2 And I think that's a very important
3 insight from an industry insider who is struggling to
4 make sense of this. And it -- and if -- if Money Tree
5 is struggling with the language, our clients and the
6 consumers that they represent, some of them will get
7 the language great, but others will struggle, and we
8 think that's an important insight from the industry,
9 which goes to a recommendation in which I think we
10 enrich upon some of the CPLA advice in terms of the
11 language.

12 And it speaks to the need for plain
13 language. And it speaks to the need to provide
14 assistance to the good people at the CPO in terms of
15 consumer-friendly plain lang -- plain language writing.

16

17 (BRIEF PAUSE)

18

19 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Our clients just
20 want to go back to this point. We hope these -- some
21 truths are self-evident and that this is one (1), that
22 this is a -- a challenge marketplace with participants
23 of payday loan borrowers disproportionately
24 experiencing lower wealth, having fewer mainstream
25 choices, and as Ms. St. Aubin eloquently pointed out,

1 in certain cases, insufficient income to meet their
2 basic needs. Consumers and apparently industry
3 insiders having challenges, in -- in a certain degree,
4 with the language and consumers certainly challenge
5 and understand the product and how to compare
6 different products in the marketplace, the stresses,
7 especially those associated with financial stress,
8 yielding, in some cases, bounded rationality.

9 The absence of real competition
10 highlighted by the fact that rates follow the
11 regulation and the reality that the industry is
12 dominated by few players. And in Manitoba, frankly,
13 it's dominated by one (1) with economies of scale and,
14 in the case of Money Mart, scope.

15

16 (BRIEF PAUSE)

17

18 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Our client notes
19 with interest a lot of dialogue in terms of online
20 payday lending. And just to remind you that it was
21 CAC that did important work for the office of the pri
22 -- privacy commissioner on internet payday lending.
23 And Dr. Buckland was actually the methodologist who
24 assisted the Consumer Council.

25 Our clients and our experts have been

1 highly engaged in trying to get a feel for what is
2 going on in this online marketplace. And we
3 sympathize with the observations of the CPLA in terms
4 of the dearth of Canadian data.

5 In terms of online payday lending, we
6 do note that it clearly has -- is -- is, like many
7 other online services, growing, and in the US, that
8 the storefront operations have been in decline since
9 2007.

10 In terms of who's taking advantage of
11 these opportunities in the marketplace, we think the
12 strong evidence on this record is that it's -- those
13 persons on the online market are disproportionately
14 younger and more affluent.

15 And the CPLA made reference to the --
16 Denise Barrett Consulting and their work in terms of
17 for the Consumer Council of Canada. And you can see
18 this interview with an industry representative who was
19 interviewed by Denise Barrett Consulting about the
20 online trending younger and slightly higher in --
21 income and suggesting that it was a service-focused
22 marketplace.

23 And Dr. Buckland, he's not saying that
24 there's -- that it's not happening, that vulnerable
25 people are more likely to use the internet. He has

1 just seen no evidence of that. And that I think is an
2 important cautionary note. That doesn't mean that we
3 shouldn't be alive to it. Our clients have been alive
4 to it and are continuing to research this area.

5 But it is very important not -- in our
6 client's submission, to yield to calls to raise rates
7 if those are coming or not to lower rates out of --
8 out of fear of -- of the interlet market -- internet
9 market.

10 Our client flags and shares concerns in
11 terms of risks associated with online lending,
12 asymmetry of information, lead generators, people out
13 there, not to provide the service, but charging a fee
14 to provide referrals less likely to follow the
15 regulations, and quite troubling consumer practices
16 certainly found in the American data.

17 Just to back up for one (1) second.
18 The CPLA this morning seemed to take issue with the
19 currency of the Pew data. And you can go to our
20 PowerPoint here. And we -- we refer you to the two --
21 2014 methodological survey of Pew, and it explains
22 what it does.

23 But just in terms of time frame,
24 Clarity, the primary service relied upon by the
25 Policis, is using 2012 data. The CPLA is using --

1 sorry, Pew -- Pew is using work from this -- that
2 exact same time period. So I think the currency --
3 the -- you know, how current the information is, is a
4 bit of a red herring.

5 That doesn't mean that there might have
6 been develop -- might not have been developments in
7 the marketplace. But in terms of the data that's been
8 presented to you, whether by the very robust
9 methodological work of Pew or the work of Policis,
10 it's from about the same time period.

11 CPLA is -- is trying to tell you, in
12 our clients' submission, that if you -- a regulator
13 that is -- is too progressive in terms of protecting
14 consumers through main -- online -- or storefront
15 lending caps is -- there's a risk that it will drive
16 people to the internet.

17 This is an important discussion. We
18 think it is not supported by the evidence, and it's
19 certainly not supported by the evidence of Pew. And
20 we believe strongly that, however challenged the
21 Policis information is, it actually in slide 21
22 supports our contention.

23 Generally, we can look at three (3)
24 types of regulatory regimes: permissive, hybrid --
25 Manitoba and most Canadian provinces would fit into

1 that -- and restrictive. Quebec would fit into that,
2 as would jurisdictions like North Carolina, Oregon.

3 What we knew -- know about the impacts
4 of regulation -- I've talked about this ad nauseam --
5 prices move to the cap. That's just one (1) thing to
6 -- to keep in mind.

7 This is important, and this is from Dr.
8 Buckland who is a careful observer. In terms of
9 outcomes for consumers, he observes that there's
10 limits on the -- limits on the amounts borrowed, that
11 these limitations have limited effect.

12 And so without more, they're not that
13 effective in protecting consumers I think is -- is Dr.
14 Buckland's observations. Doesn't mean -- that doesn't
15 mean that it -- they're not important.

16 I think Dr. Buckland believes that they
17 are, but in terms of helping to prevent the debt
18 cycle, Dr. Buckland is -- is cautious in overstating
19 their value. That's the simple point I'm just trying
20 to -- to make here.

21 What do we know about rate caps and
22 internet use?

23 MR. REGIS GOSSELIN: Mr. Williams, I -
24 - I guess I -- I'm having trouble with that one.
25 Could you -- could you perhaps -- I wonder how

1 difficult it would be for Diana to pull up that slide
2 so we can take a look at it.

3

4 (BRIEF PAUSE)

5

6 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: This is Dr.
7 Buckland's slide, slide 31. And is it the middle
8 bullet you're directing my attention to? Mr. Chair,
9 is that --

10 MR. REGIS GOSSELIN: No, it doesn't
11 answer my question. I'll have to go back to the --
12 through the transcript to get perhaps a little bit
13 more information.

14 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Could -- can I --
15 Mr. Chair, I don't know if this would help you or not,
16 but if you wanted, like we could either at the break
17 or I could by written -- if -- if it's that middle
18 bullet that is -- is causing you concern, I can -- I
19 can try and do my best right now.

20 But I think if -- going back into Dr.
21 Buckland's work, we could provide you something in --
22 in fairly short order that might assist with that.
23 I'm at your beck and call. I just --

24 MR. REGIS GOSSELIN: That would be
25 useful. I think the last bullet is fine. The last

1 two (2) bullets are fine. It's the middle one that's
2 causing me brief. I'm not sure --

3 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Okay.

4 MR. REGIS GOSSELIN: -- I understand
5 what it's saying.

6 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Yeah. And so
7 just -- we'll -- I'll -- we'll try and do this two (2)
8 ways, Mr. -- Mr. Chair and Chairperson of the panel.
9 As I understand it, the issue is you're having
10 challenges in understanding the reasoning behind
11 bullet 2 on this page in terms of the caution Dr.
12 Buckland expresses with limits.

13 And what I'm suggesting is that, if
14 there is a chance for a -- a break over coffee, I'll
15 see if we can pull something from Dr. Buckland's
16 evidence. And if I'm not confident that I can give
17 you a robust answer, we would undertake to provide you
18 with a -- a quick written response by tomorrow.

19 Is -- would that be satisfactory?

20 MR. REGIS GOSSELIN: That would be
21 useful, but, you know, this is suggesting that, for
22 some -- this seems to be suggesting that the -- that
23 the limits that are there now are not binding. And we
24 have heard absolutely no evidence that they -- people
25 are not following the limits. And so I -- I'm a bit

1 confused --

2 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Okay.

3 MR. REGIS GOSSELIN: -- by that
4 statement.

5 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Okay. And I'll
6 do my best to try and answer this. But again, I'd
7 like to go back to his evidence because that's not
8 something I focused on as much as perhaps I should
9 have.

10 While there's no doubt that the stores
11 in Manitoba are respecting the limits -- I don't think
12 we've seen any evidence of that, but it may be that
13 he's referring to the fact that they can -- even if
14 you res -- have a limit at one (1) store with one (1)
15 particular retailer, if you're on Henderson Highway on
16 the two hundred (200) block, you get your 30 percent
17 from -- from Money Mart, you can walk a half a block
18 north to Cash Money and a get another loan. That's
19 how I interpret that.

20 But what I'd like to -- because I -- I
21 think it's a really useful question, and -- and our
22 client has had some really robust discussions with Dr.
23 Buckland on that very point, so I think it's deserving
24 of a bit more information, if that is satisfactory?

25 MR. REGIS GOSSELIN: I think that

1 would be useful, as well.

2 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Okay. And so
3 what I'm going to do is I'm going to do an undertaking
4 to provide a -- a more thorough response to slide 31
5 of Dr. Buckland's PowerPoint, which I believe is
6 Exhibit 32 in terms of the second bone -- bullet in
7 terms of limits on amounts borrowed, and -- unless I
8 can find a magic answer over -- over the coffee break.

9

10 --- UNDERTAKING NO. 4: The Coalition to provide a
11 more thorough response to
12 slide 31 of Dr. Buckland's
13 PowerPoint, in terms of
14 limits on amounts borrowed

15

16 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: That was a joke
17 anyways. This is the evidence from Pew, and what it
18 was considering here was the impacts of regulation on
19 internet use.

20 And in the -- in the first column, you
21 see that -- that it's addressing the national average,
22 permissive states, hybrid states, and restrictive
23 states. And then it's looking at the percentage of
24 payday loan borrower -- or -- of the population who
25 take out payday loans in those areas, how many borrow

1 from storefront only, how many borrow from online, or
2 other.

3 So you see at the national level, Pew
4 estimates that in the range of 4 percent borrow with
5 1.8 percent of that -- of the population borrowing
6 from online. In permissive states, the kind of the
7 Mississippi of the world, borrowing from storefront
8 only is higher at 5.2 percent, and if you think of
9 Mississippi with thirty-four (34) stores per hundred,
10 that makes some sense. Borrowing from online or other
11 is 1.37 percent.

12 In hybrid states, interestingly, Pew
13 classifies California as hybrid while Policis calls it
14 permissive, but hybrid states borrowing from
15 storefronts only is above the national average but
16 lower than in permissive states, and borrowing from
17 online or other is also lower.

18 In restrictive states, you see the
19 conclusion from Pew that the borrowing from the
20 storefronts is much lower, perhaps taking Mr. -- going
21 across the border or otherwise, and -- but that
22 borrowing from online or other is somewhat higher than
23 the national average.

24 And from Exhibit 40 of Dr. Buckland,
25 Dr. Robinson, and Dr. Simpson, based on the Pew Trust

1 analysis and focussing on hybrid and permissive
2 states, there is little difference in the percentage
3 of adults reporting online payday loan usage in the
4 past five (5) years between hybrid states and
5 permissive states. So that's their conclusion, and --
6 and that's useful information.

7 Before we come to Policis, there was
8 some submission in the initial CPLA presentation that
9 the relative dearth of regulated online lenders in
10 Manitoba was -- at least we interpret it to suggest
11 that it's primarily because of the price cap. And we
12 simply point you to the Coalition/ CPLA-1-14 to
13 suggest that when you look at the percentage of online
14 -- or the presence of online and -- and unregulated
15 lenders, there are other factors in play apart from
16 price.

17 And so you'll see in the response to
18 Coalition/CPLA-1-14, we had asked the consumer -- CPLA
19 to confirm that in Nova Scotia, there were three (3)
20 licensed online payday lenders and eight (8)
21 unlicensed online payday lend -- lenders, and the CPLA
22 confirmed that. And we note that the maximum rate in
23 Nova Scotia is twenty-two dollars (\$22) per hundred.

24 We also asked them to confirm that in
25 PEI, there were zero licensed online payday lenders

1 and nine (9) unlicensed, and noting that the maximum
2 was twenty-five (25) per hundred.

3 So again, this isn't to say that this
4 is the -- that there's no price issue in terms of the
5 presence of regulated or unreg -- regulated. It's
6 just to say that care should be taken in terms of the
7 CPLA submissions. And we make this same point on
8 slide 113.

9 Also in the original submissions of the
10 CPLA was some sort of suggestion -- or a quote from
11 the Consumer Council suggested that consumers in Can -
12 - Manitoba were not more safe.

13 So the PUB quite properly asked the
14 CPLA, Are you saying that consumers are somehow less
15 safe? And here's the CPLA response -- oh, go back,
16 please:

17 "It doesn't necessarily follow that
18 regulation of cause conditions which
19 are less safe."

20 And we think that, upon reflection,
21 that is a -- a good response by the CPLA.

22 Dr. Buckland makes this point:

23 "There's limited data about pay --
24 online lenders. There are higher
25 risks clearly associated with that.

1 However, this should not be used as
2 a rationale to not regulate physical
3 payday lenders."

4 And we would add "or to loosen the
5 price cap." Both sectors, in his view, must be
6 effectively regulated, although clearly, one (1) of
7 those is -- is going to be very challenging.

8 Our client believes strongly that
9 Undertaking 40 (sic) highlights a number of the
10 concerns with Policis. But I do want to spend a
11 little time with that information, noting the caveat
12 that we did not have a chance to discover that -- that
13 presentation or to cross-examine.

14 But our concerns are five (5) with
15 Policis, that it ignores the UK experience. And the
16 UK experience, we would submit, is inconsistent with -
17 - with Policis's analysis that somehow more
18 progressive regulation throws people to the internet,
19 because there was a rapid development of internet
20 payday lending in the UK despite minimally restrictive
21 policies.

22 The second bullet on this page -- and
23 we'll come to this in more detail in a second, but
24 probably the most current internet data we have on the
25 record is actually from Dollar Financial Group, from

1 its 10-K filing.

2 And we'll come to that in a second, but
3 it shows a very different experience from a lender
4 that has a presence in the United Kingdom and Europe,
5 Canada, and the United States. And we think it's
6 significant and surprising that Policis ignored this
7 very important insight right in its own backyard.

8 Policis, as Dr. Buckland politely
9 pointed out, doesn't identify the data challenges or
10 limitations in its source data. Clarity does.
11 Clarity, to its credit, did in -- does in its blogs,
12 but Policy doesn't -- Policis doesn't, and we think
13 that is important.

14 A fundamental concern with Policis is
15 that our client is unable to verify, replicate, or
16 test the significance of their assertions given the
17 lack of explanation of their methodology, the absence
18 of data, the absence of calculations, and the absence
19 of statistical tests of significance.

20 And finally, and Dr. Buckland warned
21 you of this, great care must be read -- taken in
22 reading the headlines on the Policis PowerPoint.

23 And the one that caught my client's eye
24 in particular is slides 26 and 27 where there's one
25 (1) headline purporting to compare permissive and

1 restrictive states, but it's actually conflating the
2 data between banned and restricted states.

3 So great care, in our client's view,
4 should be taken with that Polis (sic) PowerPoint.
5 Doesn't mean that there's not important work there,
6 but that PowerPoint, in our client's view, is
7 inherently unreliable as presented.

8 I talked to you previously about the
9 Pew research that made the point that, from their
10 perspective, there wasn't evidence to indicate that
11 internet online usage was higher in hybrid states.

12 Here's the slide 21 from Policis, our
13 interpretation of it, which I note the CPLA did not
14 take issue with this morning. So what slide 21 does -
15 - disregard the headline. Focus on the information
16 presented. And what it does is compare in permissive
17 states their share of the national sub 701 FICO
18 population with their share of online payday loan
19 volume. And it does that for restrictive states, and
20 banned states, as well.

21 So the notorious slide 21 is notorious
22 only for its headline, not for what's in it.
23 Permissive states, as defined by Policis, account for
24 roughly 35 percent of sub 701 FICO, so relatively
25 disadvantaged borrowers.

1 So if there was a proportionate use of
2 online usage, you would suspect 35 percent, but they
3 account for over 50 percent of online payday lending
4 volume. Restrictive states, as defined by Policis,
5 account for roughly 29 percent of that disadvantaged
6 population sub 701 FICO but less than 25 percent of
7 online payday loan volume. And the banned states,
8 again there's the information.

9 And when you get to unlicensed online
10 lending what you see is that permissive states, hybrid
11 states, and banned states each have about roughly 20
12 percent of that share of unlicensed -- of the total
13 online payday loan value volume that is unlicensed.

14 And Dr. Simpson simply says -- observes
15 that the percentage is -- that's unlicensed is roughly
16 the same across these three (3) types of jurisdictions
17 and that there appears to be no correlation.

18 That's slide 21. And that's why Dr.
19 Buckland told you both on the Thursday and the Friday,
20 if you'll ignore the headline, that information is
21 very consistent with the Pew observation.

22 I've talked about the omission of -- of
23 the Pew information and -- and simply -- or excuse me,
24 the UK information and the fact that the great
25 majority of lending in the UK was online, on the

1 internet before regulation became to take effect in
2 the UK in 2015.

3 And here's the Dollar Financial group
4 that's so interesting. This is its lending revenue by
5 region in 2013. And you can see the -- the total
6 revenue for the UK and Europe, and then total revenue
7 minus the internet. So you see a very significant
8 online lending presence for Dollar Financial Group in
9 the UK and Europe on line 3, almost 280 -- well,
10 roughly 288 million.

11 Then you see the relatively modest
12 online internet loans reported in the onli -- or the
13 DF -- DFG data in 2013 for Canada and the United
14 States and, also, internet loans as a percentage of
15 total loans, 63 percent in the UK and Europe, 5
16 percent in Canada, and 10 percent in the United
17 States.

18 It doesn't mean that there's not an
19 issue with internet lending, but this, to our
20 knowledge, is the most recent data on the record.
21 It's -- it's data that wasn't even referred to by --
22 by Policis. And by, "on the record," I mean on the
23 record of this proceeding.

24 We've already talked a little bit about
25 Clarity di -- data li -- limitations. Here is the CEO

1 of Clarity talking about being unable to analyze any
2 sampling bias.

3 Slide 123 you see the Consumer
4 Financial Protection Bureau. That headline should say
5 CFPB, taking issue with the quality of information
6 that Clar -- in -- in Clarity's possession and a
7 failure to promptly delete inaccurate, incomplete, or
8 unverifiable information.

9 So these are clear data limitations
10 which may go to -- not to say that the data is not --
11 is of no value because that's clearly not the case,
12 but which should have been disclosed by Policis and --
13 and raised some concerns about that information.

14 I started at the -- at the start I
15 talked about giving voice to consumers. We thought we
16 might finish with a voice from consumers as well.
17 This is from our focus groups, what should be done.
18 This is focus group participant 6:

19 "The only thing I'd stress is maybe
20 to get them to lower the interest
21 rates on these payday loans,
22 practical, I mean. It's always the
23 poor people that get the shaft it
24 seems like. We're paying higher
25 interest because we're poor."

1 And that's advice our client has -- has
2 taken to heart in -- in this proceeding. Mr. Chair --
3 Madam Chair, excuse me, and -- and members of the
4 panel, I did say and recommend that in this hearing in
5 particular that I -- our advice to the Board is to
6 make some factual findings that will be of use to the
7 new government going forward.

8 At slides 125 to 135, we present our
9 recommended factual findings. I've gone through many
10 of them as we've gone through the course of our -- our
11 argument. I'm happy, and I would be pleased to go
12 through them again. Alternatively, I can turn it over
13 to My -- My Friend Ms. Dilay to -- to continue with
14 our recommendations.

15 Does the panel have a preference?

16 THE PANEL CHAIRPERSON: I'll just
17 check with the panel briefly.

18

19 (BRIEF PAUSE)

20

21 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Perhaps I could
22 just -- oh, sorry, go ahead.

23 THE PANEL CHAIRPERSON: Just a moment,
24 Mr. --

25 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Oh, sorry, I

1 apologize.

2 THE PANEL CHAIRPERSON: They were just
3 checking through to see if there was anything we
4 wanted to comment on rather than maybe go through the
5 whole --

6 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Well, maybe what
7 I'll just do is on the first slide, slide 25, just
8 we're recommending that the third finding be identify
9 the particular vulnerability of repeat borrowers.

10 At the top of slide 126, this increase
11 reliance on non-payday sources of income is something
12 that our clients feel is particularly important to
13 note.

14 On slide 127, the -- the middle slide
15 and the absence of meaningful price competition, our
16 client believes it is very important for a -- for the
17 Board to make a factual finding on, but also for any
18 new regulator or government setting the rates to have
19 insight that this is a marketplace that is not working
20 very well.

21 The dominance of Money Mart in the --
22 in the payday lending marketplace is -- is well est --
23 established. On slide 129 the continued heavy
24 concentration in the inner city of Winnipeg is
25 notable, and there's clearly not an access issue

1 there.

2 Slide 130, this is important from our
3 client's perspective, because they do worry about
4 access in rural areas and they do note a significant
5 presence in a number of jurisdictions, a new entrant
6 in the Thompson market, and that in -- in Brandon
7 there are actually more payday lenders than in the
8 province of PEI based on the evidence of this record.

9 Slide 131 puts context in terms of the
10 number of stores in Manitoba, noting the range in
11 Canada based upon what we understand. And clearly the
12 market dynamic and the emerging use of internet is
13 something that is important to this regulator today
14 and as the CPLA says, will be of growing interest over
15 time.

16 Slide 134, I think I will spend a
17 moment on. We think that there is very strong
18 evidence in this record that a sustainable North
19 American industry can exist in that range between
20 fifteen (15) per hundred and seventeen twenty-five
21 (17.25) per hundred.

22 And we note the seventeen twenty-five
23 (17.25) comes from Policis. We note Dr. Robinson's
24 evidence that eighteen (18) per one hundred (100) is
25 too high. That seventeen (17) per one hundred (100)

1 has delivered significant savings for Manitoba
2 consumers and that seventeen (17) per one hundred
3 (100) is sustainable.

4 In terms of the fifteen dollars (\$15)
5 per hundred where our client leans strongly, they
6 believe it is sustainable for efficient payday lenders
7 employing economies of scale, scope, and appropriate
8 risk management.

9 They wish to con -- highlight on slide
10 135 that there is no evidence that Internet payday
11 loan use is higher in hybrid, and they refer to Pew
12 Trust, the -- it says "MM 10-K" that should be Dollar
13 Financial Group 10-K, and Policis. And --

14 MR. REGIS GOSSELIN: Mr. Williams, you
15 focused on hybrid here because of -- closest to the
16 Canadian -- Manitoba system?

17 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: I -- I think
18 that's -- that was Dr. Buckland's conclusion. And I -
19 - that's based upon that there is a cap. It's -- it's
20 not kind of in the Quebec range, or even the Michigan
21 kind of nine (9) or ten (10) cents. It's -- so it's
22 clearly not restrictive, and it's -- but it's -- but
23 there is -- the regulatory regime is -- is more
24 restrictive than you might see in -- in some of the
25 American jurisdictions, Mississippi or -- or others.

1 Again from our client's perspective, I
2 -- I've talked about slide 135. Slide 136. Our
3 client believes that there is strong evidence that a
4 rate range somewhere between fifteen (15) and
5 seventeen (17) is the best balance between protection,
6 access, and sustainability, and leaning towards the --
7 the bottom end, being the fifteen (15).

8 Our client notes the insufficient data
9 regarding payday lending, and -- and Ms. -- Ms. Dilay
10 will have extensive recommendations about this, a need
11 to improve mandatory reporting, a need to give -- give
12 consumers more information regarding Internet payday
13 lending, and also an important concern regarding low-
14 cost universal identification.

15 Our client is concerned about the fact
16 that consumers are asked in person for their Social
17 Insurance number. Our client is even more concerned
18 that online you can't move through the progression of
19 a payday loan processing on many sites without
20 revealing your Internet -- your Social Insurance
21 number. You can't ask how your information will be
22 protected online in many cases, so our client is
23 particularly concerned online. And My friend, Ms.
24 Dilay, can speak to that more eloquently than I.
25

1 (BRIEF PAUSE)

2

3 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Did --

4 THE PANEL CHAIRPERSON: I'll turn it
5 over to Ms. Dilay now?

6 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Yes, and I don't
7 know if we made -- did we make it an exhibit? This is
8 Exhibit 42 (sic). Then I'll shut up.

9 THE PANEL CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr.
10 Williams. That was very informative.

11 Ms. Dilay...?

12 MS. KATRINE DILAY: Good afternoon,
13 Madam Chair, and members of the Board. So to
14 compliment Mr. Williams's presentation, I'd like to
15 present the recommendations from our client. So as
16 Mr. Williams made reference to, we -- this is going to
17 be Exhibit 42 (sic) for the Coalition, and thank you,
18 Diana, for pulling it up. And a copy has also been
19 distributed in paper form.

20 So what I would like to do is kind of
21 walk through the recommendations from the Coalition.
22 There are fifteen (15) recommendations that we are
23 making in total. Some of them I'll have a bit more
24 explanation, some of them will be relatively brief.

25 So the Coalition's first recommendation

1 is that the cap on payday loan fees be decreased from
2 seventeen dollars (\$17) per hundred dollar loan to
3 fifteen dollars (\$15) per hundred dollar loan.

4 Secondly, the Coalition recommends that
5 the payday loan regulations in Manitoba should require
6 lenders to offer borrowers the option to convert a
7 payday loan into an installment loan on the first due
8 date. So just a bit of commentary on that to provide
9 some context.

10 So in our client's view, in order for
11 this recommendation to be implemented the Coalition
12 recommends that an examination of best practices
13 regarding installment loans from other jurisdictions
14 should be undertaken to determine the best
15 installment option for Manitoba.

16 The criteria that should be used in
17 making this determination should include consumer
18 protection, consumer choice, and industry
19 sustainability. There should also be con --
20 consultation done with the industry, as well as with
21 consumers, to determine the best option.

22 However, we do -- we have seen in this
23 review a number of examples that relate to this
24 particular recommendation. So, for example, Dr.
25 Robinson noted in his evidence that the installment

1 period could be the borrower's option, and would not
2 exceed six (6) months. Sections 13.1(2) and 13.1(3)
3 of the regulations currently specify that a
4 replacement or extended loan may be charged no more
5 than an additional 5 percent of a principled amount.

6 Dr. Robinson suggested that the fee for
7 the payday loan due at the first due date would be
8 calculated under the rate cap regulation. And the
9 total to be repaid on the instalment loan would be the
10 principal, plus the original fee, plus 5 percent of
11 the original principal.

12 It's important to note that since this
13 loan would not be covered under the exemption to
14 payday lending from the Criminal Code, all combined
15 fees would have to be annualized and be limited to 60
16 percent APR.

17 Another example of a tight of -- of a
18 type of instalment loan we have seen in this review is
19 the CPLA recommendation in Exhibit 12. So that's the
20 first one, the optional extended payment plan.

21 So Mr. Keyes has already spoken about
22 this recommendation this morning, so I won't go into
23 detail. But essentially, it's where a borrower takes
24 out three (3) or more successive loans within a sixty
25 (60) -- sixty-two (62) day period.

1 And for that loan and subsequent loans,
2 the lender has to offer and the borrower has the
3 option to accept repayment terms for that loan spread
4 over at least three (3) payment periods where no
5 payment exceeds 35 percent of the sum of the principal
6 and cost of borrowing.

7 Another example that we have seen is
8 the -- the current BC regulations on instalment loans
9 which is very similar to the recommendation by the
10 CPLA. But that one does not appear to incorporate the
11 same kind of option for the borrower to choose whether
12 they -- they would like to make it into separate pay
13 periods.

14 So we can find that in Section 23 of
15 the British Columbia Payday Loans Regulation. And
16 that provides that:

17 "Where a lender enters into a third
18 or subsequent payday loan agreement
19 with a borrower in a sixty-two (62)
20 day period, then the lender must
21 provide in the loan agreement that
22 repayment is to be spread over at
23 least three (3) pay periods if paid
24 bi-weekly or semi-monthly, and over
25 two (2) pay periods if paid less

1 often."

2 Another example that was referred to by
3 Dr. Robinson is the example of the instalment loan in
4 Washington. So in Washington, borrowers are entitled
5 to an instalment loan at any time prior to default.

6 Borrowers do not have to pay a fee for
7 the instalment plan, and they have from ninety (90) to
8 a hundred days, depending on the original loan amount,
9 to repay the loan in a -- in a series of instalments.

10 The third recommendation from the
11 Coalition is that Manitoba should not change the
12 maximum percentage of pay that may be borrowed, which
13 it currently set at -- at 30 percent of the borrower's
14 net pay. And this is from Section 15.2 of the
15 Manitoba Payday Loans Regulation.

16 It is the Coalition's view on this
17 point that a change which would decrease the
18 proportion of income that borrowers can take out as a
19 payday loan would have little effect on the debt trap
20 problem that we've seen in some of the evidence.

21 Instead, we would refer you to
22 recommendation number 2, the option to convert to an
23 instalment loan, which is seen as a more effective
24 method to deal with that problem.

25 Fourth, the Coalition recommends that

1 data on payday lenders in Manitoba should be improved.
2 As is already being done in other provinces in Canada,
3 in Manitoba all licensed payday lenders should be
4 required to report annually aggregated loan data.

5 So we have listed the information that
6 we would recommend be reported. This would include
7 the number of loans granted, the average size of loan
8 granted -- granted, sorry, the number of transactions,
9 loan duration, the number of defaults on loans
10 granted, the average size of loans defaulted, the
11 number of borrowers who have been granted more than
12 one (1) loan, the number of repeat loans granted, the
13 total number of borrowers who have been granted repeat
14 loans, the number of borrowers who have been granted
15 repeat loans, one (1), two (2), three (3), et cetera.

16 So we would recommend that there be no
17 category so that we do know how many borrowers are
18 borrowing exactly which number of loans, and finally,
19 the number of default loans that are to repeat
20 borrowers.

21 The -- this information -- we have
22 looked at the -- the regulation that is currently in
23 place in Nova Scotia and in British Columbia, as well
24 as in Ontario, to determine which information should
25 be collected in Manitoba. And this information should

1 be collected from payday lenders and should be made
2 publically available on the Consumer Protection office
3 website in aggregate form.

4 Although the Coalition did have
5 discussions as to whether data relating to payday loan
6 borrowers should be collected, so that would be, for
7 example, average income or the source of income used
8 for payday loans. Concerns were raised regarding
9 that, with regards to the privacy of consumers as well
10 as the extensive pressure that could be put on the
11 industry. So at this -- at this time, the Coalition
12 is not recommending that this information be
13 collected.

14 So, as mentioned, it's of note that
15 reporting of data by payday lenders is already being
16 done in British Columbia, Nova Scotia, and Ontario.
17 And we saw some detail of this information filed by
18 the CPLA in their Exhibit 13, which is very useful.
19 We've also included some information in this document,
20 Exhibit 42, of the Coalition.

21 So the Coalition's fifth recommendation
22 is that the licensing fee for payday lenders should be
23 changed so -- to a percentage of total loan value.
24 This percentage should -- should be set so that it
25 would maintain the current volume for the financial

1 literacy fund and also would adjust for inflation so
2 there is no decrease in the amount of the fund, which
3 our client believes is -- is important.

4 The Coalition would see this as a way
5 to be more fair to lenders of various sizes while
6 maintaining the level of funds collected that go
7 towards financial literacy. On this point as well,
8 the Coalition would recommend that reporting on the
9 financial literacy fund should be more transparent by
10 including details on the application process for
11 grants, research obje -- objectives as well as
12 criteria for a selection of grant recipients.

13 As a sixth recommendation, the
14 Coalition recommends that disclosure of information by
15 payday lenders to borrowers should be improved. So on
16 this point we have attached at the back of this
17 document the Coalition's recommendations from the
18 2007/2008 hearing regarding disclosure to borrowers
19 when they take out a payday loan.

20 So on this point, the Coalition
21 recommends that the requirements for printed materials
22 provided to payday loan borrowers by lenders should be
23 revisited. And we have provided those recommendations
24 from 2007/2008 because we believe that some of those
25 are still very applicable to -- to today and to

1 changes that could be made to disclosure.

2 The process of reviewing current
3 disclosure to borrowers could include the
4 establishment of a standard form contract, such as the
5 one suggested by he CPLA in their Exhibit 12.

6 In revisiting these printed materials
7 the Coalition would recommend that there be the use of
8 a plain language consultant to ensure accessibility of
9 those documents, user testing, as well as a
10 stakeholder working group.

11 In addition and as seen as the -- in
12 the '08 -- '07/'08 recommendations, payday lenders
13 should be required to provider verbal or oral
14 explanation of information to consumers where the
15 consumer may have limited literacy skills.

16 Further in terms of disclosure of
17 information, Manitoba regulations should be changed to
18 reflect the Ontario regulations where payday lenders
19 preve -- present fees for payday loans next to
20 equivalent fees for credit cards. And we saw an
21 example of this in Exhibit 38 of Coalition.

22 As the seventh recommendation, the
23 Coalition recommends that payday lenders should not be
24 allowed to pass on the charge for debit or ca -- or
25 cash cards to their consumers. So, in our client's

1 view, the regulations were implemented to limit these
2 types of charges in order to protect consumers from
3 any extra charges being added to their loans.

4 For number 8, the Coalition recommends
5 that research should be undertaken to inform future
6 payday loan reviews in Manitoba. And there we've got
7 three (3) points specifically to recommend on
8 research.

9 First, there should be increased
10 research to carefully assess the economic and social
11 consequences of payday loans to individuals and
12 communities. As we have seen in this hearing,
13 particular attention should be assigned to issue such
14 as repeat and internet borrowing.

15 Secondly, research should focus on the
16 use and potential for new communication technologies
17 to be used by mainstream financial institutions in
18 providing alternative to payday loans.

19 And third, a review of best practices
20 relating to payday loans in other jurisdictions should
21 be undertaken.

22 The next recommendation is that -- that
23 there should be ways to engage mainstream financial
24 institutions in the small loan market and more
25 generally, in the area of financial inclusion and

1 these should be identified.

2 We do note that Dr. Buckland and his
3 team made a number of additional specific
4 recommendations within the Small Loan's Workshop
5 Report, which was filed as tab 9 to the Coalition's
6 pre-filed evidence. The Coalition does intend to use
7 these very important recommendations as well as the
8 findings from that workshop in working with mainstream
9 financial institutions towards the development of
10 alternatives to payday loans.

11 Number 10, which Mr. Williams spoke to
12 at the end of his presentation is that the Coalition
13 recommends that a low cost or no cost universal
14 identification option be established that we -- that
15 would eliminate the requirement for a social insurance
16 number as identification, which we -- we saw in the
17 evidence in this hearing that some payday lending
18 outlets do ask or require for - that information.

19 It would be important that this option
20 not require photo identification for access. And the
21 Coalition recommends that consideration should be
22 given to the work of various community organizations
23 who do work in this area and who work directly with
24 consumers, which could include SEED Winnipeg, or
25 Citizens Bridge.

1 Number 11 is that the Coalition
2 recommends that continued effort be made to
3 investigate and regulate the internet payday loan
4 industry, including the issues of licensing and lead
5 generators.

6 Number 12 is -- is related to number 11
7 and the Coalition does wish to make some specific
8 recommendations regarding online lending. These
9 recommendations would be directed toward government as
10 well as the industry.

11 So there are nine (9) under there and
12 we'll go through them relatively quickly. So the
13 first one would be to inform the public about privacy
14 safeguards and requirements when using an online
15 payday lender.

16 Informing the public about their online
17 privacy rights. This would include the kind of
18 information that they do not have to provide to online
19 payday lenders. Informing the public about the risks
20 of providing personal information to lead generators
21 as well as unlicensed lenders.

22 Requiring online lenders to implement
23 discernible measures to ensure that their privacy
24 policies are read and understood by consumers when
25 they visit their websites.

1 Encouraging licensed lenders to report
2 unlicensed lenders and lead generators.

3 Encouraging cooperation between
4 jurisdictions to enable prosecution of lead generators
5 and non-compliant online lenders.

6 Recommending to the federal government
7 that regulations under the Personal Information
8 Protection and Electronic Documents Act should
9 prohibit online lenders from requiring borrowers to
10 provide their social insurance number for
11 identification purposes.

12 And on that point, Mr. Williams alluded
13 to this as well, but I just want to emphasize, that
14 consumers who lend online and who are required to
15 provide their social insurance number will not have
16 the opportunity to ask questions about why they are
17 required and they will, in some cases, not be able to
18 move onto the next step in their application without
19 providing this number.

20 Restricting online lenders from
21 obtaining consent to disclose the borrower's personal
22 information to unidentified third parties, except as
23 keeping with the personal information protection, and
24 Electronic Documents Act.

25 And finally, requiring online lenders

1 to inform borrowers of their right to access their
2 personal information, to challenge its accuracy, and
3 to have inaccurate information amended.

4 In terms of number 13 the Coalition
5 recommends that consideration should be given to a one
6 (1) year notice for payday loan review hearings to
7 allow sufficient time for research to be conducted.
8 On that point the Coalition would simply like to note
9 that payday loan reviews are different from other
10 types of Public Utilities Board hearings in that there
11 is no applicant.

12 Number 14 is that the Coalition
13 recommends that consumers should be protected from
14 other high-cost credit products that are not currently
15 being regulated in Manitoba. The Coalition does note
16 that there is new legislation regarding licensing of
17 high-cost credit products, disclosure of information,
18 as well as loan cancelling -- cancellation rules.

19 However, the Coalition would recommend
20 that permission should be requested from the federal
21 government to regulate fees and charges associated
22 with these products, as well. Two (2) examples of
23 these types of products would be rent to own and pawn
24 loans, for example.

25 And finally number 15 would be to refer

1 to the recommendations made by the CPLA this morning.
2 The Coalition does support the CPLA recommendations
3 contained within CPLA Exhibit 12 with a few caveats
4 that I'd just like to address.

5 So for the recommendation regarding the
6 optional extended payment plan, the Coalition would
7 refer the Board to its recommendation number two (2)
8 where -- where we provide a further explanation -- or a
9 further discussion, sorry, of the installment loan
10 option from the Coalition's point of view.

11 Regarding the standard form contract,
12 we would refer the Board to our recommendation number
13 six (6), which speaks to disclosure of information to
14 borrowers.

15 Regarding the restriction on default
16 fees and interest charged on loans in default, and as
17 was mentioned by Mr. Keyes, this -- this point is
18 already addressed in the Manitoba regulation in
19 Section 15.4(1), where the maximum penalty that may be
20 charged, required, or accepted in relation to any
21 default by a borrower under a payday loan is a penalty
22 of 2.5 percent of the amount in default.

23 And finally regarding the discounting
24 or promotions for first time loans, and this was a
25 question that was posed to Mr. Keyes this morning that

1 we had a bit of a discussion on because this point is
2 already addressed in the Manitoba regulations. It is
3 in Section 15.6(1)(f), and it pro -- prohibits
4 providing incentives for payday loans. And so in the
5 joint opinion of Mr. Keyes and myself, this -- this
6 point is already addressed in the Manitoba
7 regulations.

8 In terms of just the last point that is
9 in the document on recommendations, it's a
10 recommendation presented and considered, and we just
11 wanted to touch on a point that was made by the CPLA
12 in its opening submissions. That in Ontario there is
13 a seven (7) day cooling off period where a borrower
14 can take a loan without waiting the entire cooling off
15 period if the borrower has paid in full the
16 outstanding balance under the first agreement.

17 So the -- the Coalition did have some
18 discussion on -- there was some evidence presented
19 during this hearing that demonstrates that there may
20 be -- there might be some issues with the current
21 Manitoba seven (7) day cooling off period. However,
22 the Coalition does believe that there is value in
23 maintaining this -- this regulation. Although it may
24 not benefit all consumers, it -- it is still
25 benefiting a segment of -- of consumers.

1 And so that would be my presentation of
2 -- of the Coalition's recommendations. I don't know
3 if Mr. Williams has anything to add at this point.

4 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: No. We -- we do
5 appreciate the opportunity to appear before the banel
6 -- the panel, and also the Manitoba process which we
7 think does well in -- in providing diverse
8 perspectives, and we're -- we're happy to close up
9 unless there's any questions from the panel. Thank
10 you.

11 MR. REGIS GOSSELIN: I have a
12 question in relation to recommendation number 5.
13 Total loan value, by loan value you mean -- by percent
14 -- I'm looking at recommendation number 5, the -- the
15 percentage of total loan value. So you -- that's the
16 total amount of loans that would have been issued by
17 the lender during the year? Is that the...

18 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Yes, that's my
19 understanding. And -- and I think the objective was
20 to recognize the -- that the across the board fees
21 have a disproportionate effect upon smaller volume
22 lenders. So this was an attempt to try and shift a
23 bit more the weight to the -- to the larger volume --
24 volume lenders.

25 MR. REGIS GOSSELIN: Now,

1 recommendation number 14 talks about:

2 "Consumers should be protected from
3 other high-cost products that are
4 not currently regulated."

5 We didn't hear too much evidence on
6 this hearing about that issue. And I -- you know, I'm
7 sort of queasy about making a recommendation that we
8 can't -- that -- that is unsupported by material that
9 we've seen. And I -- I -- you know, could you explain
10 your thinking on that particular topic?

11 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Well, I'm not
12 going to -- I understand the Board's caution. And I'm
13 not going to question your conclusion that there
14 wasn't much evidence put on it in the record, although
15 I -- I believe our Learned -- or CPLA had some
16 comments, as well.

17 So I'll just -- so let's start from the
18 premise that it's probably fair to say that there
19 hasn't been a significant amount of evidence on the
20 record. It is an ongoing concern of our client's
21 informed in part by Dr. Buckland and Dr. Robinson's
22 work in examining other services in the -- in the
23 marketplace, including pawn shops and, in particular,
24 rent-to-own.

25 But the Board's caution is duly noted

1 and -- and the fact that there's not a lot of evidence
2 on the record, but this is a longstanding concern of
3 our client's.

4 MR. REGIS GOSSELIN: Now, the
5 recommendation number 15B, restrictions on discounts
6 and promotions of first-time loans, that would have
7 the effect of -- discounts, though, on first-time
8 loans would have the effect of lowering the cost of
9 that loan.

10 Why would you be opposed to that?

11 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: So, first of all,
12 I believe that is already prohibited in Manitoba
13 legislation. So it's Section 15.6, so we should
14 probably amend that to say, Already addressed in
15 Manitoba legislation.

16 From a philosophical perspective, and -
17 - and you might wish to put the same question to the
18 CPLA, I believe that the concern of some organizations
19 was that consumers were being enticed into the -- into
20 the -- into the marketplace without truly
21 comprehending the costs. I think that's where that
22 comes from. I think that's where our client's concern
23 comes from.

24

25

(BRIEF PAUSE)

1 THE PANEL CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr.
2 Gosselin has a couple more questions.

3 MR. REGIS GOSSELIN: Now, I guess the
4 -- you've called your -- your recommendations call for
5 an increased amount of research and investigation of
6 the pay -- the internet payday loan industry and so
7 on. And I guess the -- the question I have is: Who
8 would you expect that -- that -- who would undertake
9 that research?

10 I mean, it -- it's kind of silent about
11 who should be funding this research, who should be
12 conducting this research, and I -- so I -- I guess I'm
13 trying to extend a little bit more into specifics of -
14 - around that particular issue.

15 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And could we just
16 have a moment, please?

17

18 (BRIEF PAUSE)

19

20 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Thank you. And -
21 - and just one (1) more second.

22

23 (BRIEF PAUSE)

24

25 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: I hope -- there's

1 been -- these hearings are actually good to get folks
2 together. And so I think there is two (2) or three
3 (3) sources that -- in terms of this information.
4 There certainly have been some discussions, just very
5 informal, about getting back together with the CPLA
6 and our clients, after their busy season, and perhaps
7 in -- in July, and articulating some joint research
8 objectives.

9 Now, there are going to be some issues
10 where these organizations very strongly disagree.
11 There might be other issues where both organizations
12 have an -- an acute research interest.

13 So -- so some of that, we hope will
14 come out of a better dialogue between consumers and
15 industry in Manitoba. Some of this information,
16 certainly, we would see being done in partnership with
17 academic institutions. Certainly, our clients and our
18 centre partners closely with them.

19 We certainly wouldn't mind having some
20 discussions with the -- the province itself, and the -
21 - and the literacy fund, and -- and others about what
22 their research objectives are.

23 And it's been very difficult to -- for
24 anyone to pierce the -- the veil of that literacy fund
25 and -- and understand what it's being used for. And

1 there may be some opportunities for that.

2 So I would say that there's been some
3 really interesting research from a variety of sources.
4 That I would say that often it has been either an
5 academic silo, or a consumer silo, or an industry
6 silo, or a government silo. So we see some
7 opportunities in -- in all those areas.

8 And I believe there's probably
9 information that's already in the possession of the
10 industry that -- that might assist us as well. I
11 guess we'll -- so that's kind of where our clients
12 were -- were going. And, frankly, our -- our thinking
13 has evolved with every coffee break during the course
14 of this hearing.

15 MR. REGIS GOSSELIN: But -- but to the
16 point that you just made regarding the literacy fund,
17 you didn't address that as part of your
18 recommendations but you -- you've certainly made it --
19 you certainly made a case now that you would need to
20 have information about the Literacy Fund.

21 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: I think in
22 recommendation 5 and then underneath it (a), 5(a) --
23 and -- and I believe that I could probably convince my
24 friends from the CPLA to strongly endorse this one,
25 about the need for more transparent reporting,

1 including the details on the process to apply for a
2 grant, research objectives, and criteria.

3 And I think there's some -- who knows,
4 they may be doing great work there. So there's some
5 shared frustration with the -- the relatively opaque
6 communications.

7 MR. REGIS GOSSELIN: Okay. Thank you
8 for that. I missed that one. I was probably looking
9 at the fifteen (15) -- fifteen (\$15) per hundred
10 recommendation. But -- but that's a critical point,
11 though, that -- that particular issue.

12 And, you know, the -- you've made a
13 recommend -- you've made a choice to go to fifteen
14 (15), and -- and your witness quavered somewhat on
15 that recommendation. And I, you know, I'm pretty
16 clear from the industry that they feel strongly that
17 that -- that cap should be maintained.

18 Could you outline your position more
19 clearly for me in terms of why it should be fifteen
20 (15) and not seventeen (17), based on the discussions
21 we've heard from your -- from your witness?

22 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Certainly. And -
23 - and I want to back up a -- a bit. Like, we always
24 take the concerns of industry very seriously. These
25 are significant concerns. You might recall back in

1 2013, there were concerns expressed by two (2) of the
2 Intervenors there and arguing that they needed a rate
3 at least of 19 percent.

4 So while we take those concerns very
5 seriously, we also are aware that -- that there's a
6 bit of -- that that -- it -- it may -- may turn out
7 that even though the industry is unhappy, they
8 continue to function in the marketplace.

9 A big driver of our client's approach
10 to this was there's really very persuasive evidence
11 from the American experience that these are
12 sustainable with lower volumes, lower con -- corporate
13 concentration.

14 And even the -- in terms of the
15 evidence that our client heard in terms of Cash Money
16 evidence -- I've used the wrong word, but the
17 presentation -- there was a very relatively high bad
18 debt rate. And for -- to our client, that was outside
19 the efficiency expectation our client would have had.

20 Our client sees a -- a firm like Money
21 Mart in the marketplace, and at least as accessible as
22 others, but with significantly lower bad debt rates.
23 So that -- that is a lot of the driver from our
24 client's perspective, and that's where they're --
25 they're coming from.

1 The importance of consumer protection,
2 that two dollars (\$2) per hundred for any of the
3 panellists that you heard is a pretty critical two
4 dollars (\$2) per hundred when -- when you're dealing
5 with -- when you're dealing with -- with your --
6 meeting your basic needs.

7 And for the client, one (1) of the
8 strongest points was the very high operating margins
9 that were seen out of the Dollar Financial Group
10 operations. And -- and I think that was a triggering
11 point.

12 And -- and our client has -- has made
13 our evidence -- we know that the right number is
14 probably in the fifteen (15) to seventeen (17) range.
15 Our clients are pretty strong evidence that there was
16 a -- there was a fair bit of room for an efficient
17 lender to do just fine at fifteen (15).

18 And the last point I'll note is we
19 didn't hear -- the concerns that our client heard from
20 C11, or Money Tree, for example, weren't really
21 focused on the cap, in our view. They were focussed
22 on other issues. So that's where our client's is
23 coming from, Mr. Chair.

24 MR. REGIS GOSSELIN: The -- the
25 Manitoba has a number of single stores operating in

1 rural Manitoba -- ope -- operating in rural Manitoba.
2 And I guess in -- in those cases, as far as we know,
3 there isn't the opportunity for economies of -- of
4 scale. There isn't -- probably isn't the centralized
5 computer system, centralized accounting system and so
6 on.

7 So notwithstanding that, you're still -
8 - you're still of the view that the rate should be
9 going down to fifteen (15)?

10 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Yeah, and in our
11 -- that goes right back to '07/'08. And remember that
12 the opportunities for a sing -- a -- single store
13 scale opportunities do not exist. Those are scope.
14 And -- and it's the example of the Parkland operation
15 that had to change its -- its business model and
16 probably will be better positioned to -- to sustain
17 itself going forward.

18 So those -- right from the start small
19 -- small rural operations, like you look at Prince
20 Edward Island, there's two (2) payday lenders, right.
21 They're -- unless payday lenders are going to be in
22 smaller communities taking advantages, you know,
23 whether it's title loans, or whatever else is going
24 through the store, tho -- those -- while scale
25 opportunities are not there, scope opportunities are.

1 And the fact that we still have
2 lenders, we have three (3) in Brandon, in Dauphin,
3 Swan River. We actually have one (1) more in Thompson
4 than 2013. That's evidence to us that there's
5 opportunities of scope out in rural Manitoba to our
6 clients.

7

8 (BRIEF PAUSE)

9

10 THE PANEL CHAIRPERSON: Okay. Thank
11 you very much. This concludes the 2016 Tri-Annual
12 Payday Loans Review Hearing. And on behalf of the
13 Board Panel I would like to thank everyone for their
14 cooperation throughout this hearing.

15 And this includes the Intervenors; and
16 the respective counsel for the Coalition, counsel Mr.
17 Williams and Ms. Dilay; for CPLA the Honourables Stan
18 Keyes; President and CPLA counsel, Mr. Bishop and Ms.
19 Ko; as well as C11 A1 Financial and Loans; the
20 presenters who made submissions this year; the
21 secretary of the Board, Mr. Darren Christle, and our
22 document manager Ms. Diana Villegas; our court
23 reporter Digi-Tran including Mr. Bob Keelaghan; our
24 advisors, Mr. Cathcart and Ms. Wed -- Wedlake; and our
25 counsel, Ms. McCandless.

1 The Board also appreciates the members
2 of the public who took time to sit in on the hearing
3 during the course of the hearings, so thank you for
4 coming. And the panel will be meeting in the very
5 near future to deliberate and make our final
6 determinations on the matter before us.

7 Thus this concludes our hearing. So
8 thank you very much. Enjoy the rest of your day.

9 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And, Madam Chair,
10 I'll just confirm that we have a -- one (1)
11 undertaking outstanding regarding slide 31, I believe,
12 from Exhibit 32.

13 THE PANEL CHAIRPERSON: Yes, that's
14 correct. Thank you.

15
16 --- Upon adjourning at 2:05 p.m.

17
18 Certified correct,

19

20

21 _____

22 Robert Keelaghan, Mr.

23

24

25