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August 11, 2022

THE PUBLIC UTILITIES BOARD OF MANITOBA 400-330 Portage Avenue Winnipeg, Manitoba R3C 0C4

ATTENTION: Dr. D. Christle, Board Secretary and Executive Director

Dear Dr. Christle:

RE: CENTRA GAS MANITOBA INC. ("Centra") Cost of Service Methodology Review – Reply Submission

Please find enclosed Centra's reply to Intervener written submissions with respect to its Cost of Service Methodology Review Application.

Should you have any questions with respect to this submission, please contact the writer at 204-360-5580 or Darryl Martin at 204-360-4487.

Yours truly,

MANITOBA HYDRO LEGAL SERVICES

Per:

Jessica Carvell

Barrister & Solicitor

PUBLIC UTILITIES BOARD

CENTRA GAS MANITOBA INC.

COST OF SERVICE METHODOLOGY REVIEW REPLY SUBMISSION

August 11, 2022



CENTRA GAS MANITOBA INC. COST OF SERVICE METHODOLOGY REVIEW

REPLY SUBMISSION

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CENTRA GAS MANITOBA INC. COST OF SERVICE METHODOLOGY REVIEW REPLY SUBMISSION

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Centra Gas Manitoba Inc. ("Centra") is in receipt of the submissions of the Consumers Association of Canada, Manitoba Inc. ("CAC"), the Industrial Gas Users ("IGU") and Koch Fertilizer Canada ULC ("Koch"). Further to Order 78/22, Centra has set out below its brief Reply submissions.

2.0 LEGAL ONUS AND BURDEN OF PROOF

Consistent with section 123 of *The Public Utilities Board Act*, Centra, as the applicant, bears the evidentiary and legal burden of proof, which legal onus is on a balance of probabilities. CAC agrees.¹ However, despite such agreement, throughout its final argument, CAC also incorrectly attempts to introduce a conflicting and unsupportable "threshold" as the legal onus for Centra to meet in order for the Public Utilities Board ("PUB" or "Board") to alter or make any changes to the existing cost of service methodology:

1. The PUB should only approve proposed Centra COS changes that produce clearly superior results in terms of just and reasonable rates as compared to the currently approved policies and methodologies;

2. The PUB should only approve proposed Centra COS changes that are the result of a significant change in Centra's circumstances that necessitate a change to the COSM; and

3. In absence of meeting either of the thresholds described in #1 and #2, the PUB should reject Centra's proposed COS changes, and maintain the long-standing COS policies.²

No legal authority to support either of these alleged legal "thresholds" or tests is cited or sourced by CAC. The standard of "clearly superior results" directly conflicts with the balance

¹ Exhibit No. CAC-12 – Written Submission of CAC at page 4, and 29.

² Exhibit No. CAC-12 – Written Submission of CAC at page 7.

of probabilities standard enshrined in law for administrative tribunals such as the PUB as it would represent a much higher and onerous burden of proof on the applicant.

The acceptance of these proposed legal "thresholds" by CAC would inappropriately result in a static and inflexible cost of service regime. There is no legal basis whatsoever to apply a legal test which expressly favours and enshrines the status quo. Such a threshold would also directly conflict with the statement of the PUB in Order 164/16:

"The Board finds that, as acknowledged by Manitoba Hydro, it is not bound by prior Board decisions. As such, the Board has approached this review of Manitoba Hydro's COSS methodology through applying the principles discussed above to the evidence in the present proceeding."³

Furthermore, a review of past PUB orders of cost of service methodology do not support the thresholds advanced by CAC. It is evident from Order 164/16 that the PUB utilized the test of whether the proposed allocator better reflects cost causation.⁴ Similarly, in 1996 when selecting the peak and average methodology over modified partial plant method the PUB did not require proof that peak and average produced "clearly superior results". Rather the PUB found on a balance of probabilities that the use of modified partial plant method was "no longer appropriate".⁵

In this proceeding, Centra bears the onus of proving on a balance of probabilities that its proposed cost of service methodologies most accurately reflects cost causation regardless of whether or not that equates to maintaining the existing methodology or in adopting a change in methodology. Based upon the totality of the evidence, Centra submits that it has met and exceeded, on a balance of probabilities, that the proposed cost of service methodology accurately reflects cost causation and as such is appropriate, just, reasonable and in the overall public interest and should therefore be accepted by PUB order.

CAC's error of misstating the burden of proof persists as fundamental premises throughout its entire submission thereby flawing each of its conclusions and recommendations.⁶ This

³ Order 164/16 at pages 27-28.

⁴ Order 164/16 at page 77 "The Board finds that an allocator that reflects the number of service drops, not the number of customers, better reflects cost causation."

⁵ Order 107/96 at page 26.

⁶ Exhibit No. CAC-12 – Written Submission of CAC at pages 15, 16, 20, 23-24, and 26.

fundamental error serves as the tail that inappropriately wags the dog of the opinions and conclusions reached and strenuously advocated for by CAC.

3.0 MAINLINE DEDICATED DISTRIBUTION ASSETS

IGU states "that Centra considers the Mainline class of customers to be part of the general pool of customers who use the distribution system (this is why Centra indicates the customers would continue to be allocated the noted assets even though they were reclassified to distribution)."⁷ This is a simplification of Centra's position and does not accurately describe Centra's practice. As evident by the fact that they do not receive an allocation of Distribution Mains, Centra does not consider the Mainline Class to make use of the bulk distribution system in the same way as other customer classes.

However, as noted in Attachment 1 to IGU/CENTRA I-7 a), Transmission Plant includes only those pressure reducing stations with direct interconnection to the TCPL Mainline (primary stations); all other measuring regulating stations, including those stations with transmission outlet pressure, are included in the distribution account:

TRANSMISSION PLANT: Pipelines with operating pressures above 1900 kPa and associated transmission pressure pipeline valves and fittings, and **all pressure reducing stations with <u>direct interconnection to the TCPL mainline</u>. (emphasis added)**

DISTRIBUTION PLANT: Pipelines with operating pressures less than or equal to 1900 kPa, **all pressure reducing stations downstream of transmission station plant**, all farm taps and farm tap inlet piping and all associated pipeline valves, fittings, service lines and customer meter set assemblies. (emphasis added)

Centra therefore allocates a portion of the pool of measuring and regulating equipment functionalized as Distribution (based on accounting records that reflect the above definitions) to the Mainline Class. Were it not to do so the Mainline class would not bear cost responsibility for any of the pressure reducing facilities used to serve them (with the exception of the primary stations).

⁷ Exhibit No. IGU-11 – Written Submission IGU at page 20.

The refinement requested by IGU is not as simple as identifying a few dedicated distribution outlet pressure stations for direct assignment and adds a high level of complexity for what is likely to amount to little materiality. Unlike the electric asset accounting records that were designed to discretely capture the cost of individual transmission lines and stations, Centra's records do not provide that level of granularity. As such, in order to effect the change recommended by IGU, Centra would have to:

- 1. Determine a method for sub-functionalizing Account 477 based on outlet pressure, including determining an approximate cost estimate;
- 2. Allocate the Mainline class a portion of all non-dedicated transmission outlet pressure stations;
- 3. Determine which control stations (valve stations) should or should not be included in the allocation, including determining an approximate cost estimate; and
- 4. Determine approximate costs for the dedicated stations that serve each of the Mainline customers such that it could directly assign 100% of those costs to the Mainline class.

In addition, to the complexity associated with determining the initial allocation amount, Centra would have to monitor all of the specifically identified assets to identify any new investment in these facilities. Centra notes that the refined method is expected to yield similar results to its current practice given the fact that assets used to serve the Mainline class are among the most expensive assets in the pool of costs to be allocated. Essentially rather than receiving a smaller portion of a larger pool of assets, the class would receive a very large portion of a relatively more expensive pool of assets. Proceeding in this fashion is ill-advised and would directly conflict with Mr. Bowman's perspective as outlined in CAC-IGU(Bowman) I-1 that "Cost of Service should not be made excessively complicated for immaterial benefit..."

The IGU proposed refinement is limited to allocation of Distribution assets to the Mainline customers. There is no basis to reject all cost of service allocations as it relates to Mainline customers as advanced by IGU.⁸ In the event that the PUB accepts IGU's submission to defer determination of the methodology to assign distribution assets to the Mainline class, it should accept Centra's proposals related to the allocation of all other costs to the Mainline class.

⁸ Exhibit No. IGU-11 – Written Submission IGU at page 21.

4.0 ATRIUM INDEPENDENCE

In its written submission CAC suggests for the first time that Atrium was not an independent expert: "CAC expected an independent expert to have taken a much more balanced approach in reviewing the recommendations of intervenors. Atrium's approach is certainly in conflict with the role of an expert independent of any of the parties."⁹

Centra notes that CAC was asked by the PUB to indicate whether it intended to challenge the independence of Atrium at the early stages of this proceeding. CAC indicated at that time it did not object to Atrium's independence.¹⁰

Centra reiterates that Atrium provided a comprehensive and independent review. CAC appears to conflate expressing a particular opinion as a lack of independence. It seems that the root of CAC's criticisms is its expectation that Atrium would provide a neutral listing of the pros and cons of every available cost of service methodology without applying its skill or judgment to assess the appropriateness of the methodology. An expert opinion is independent in the sense that it is the product of the expert's independent judgment, uninfluenced by who has retained him or her or the outcome of the litigation. There is absolutely no evidence to suggest that Atrium's expert opinions were influenced in any way by Centra or the possible outcome of the litigation. Centra submits that CAC's allegations that Atrium lacked independence should be given no weight.

5.0 BIPOLE COST ALLOCATION/ ICAM COMPARISONS ARE NOT RELEVANT

CAC discusses Centra's Integrated Cost Allocation Methodology ("ICAM") as well as Manitoba Hydro's cost of service methodology for its Bipoles in an attempt to support their position in opposition to Centra's proposed changes to cost allocation. Neither are relevant or significant with respect to the determination of the methodologies at hand in this application.

CAC's introduction of ICAM at this stage appears to be an attempt to demonstrate support for the continued use of the Peak and Average allocator by pointing to the use of other composite cost allocations in other areas of Centra's business.

⁹ Exhibit No. CAC-12 – Written Submission of CAC at page 5.

¹⁰ Exhibit No. CAC-2 – CAC Pre-Hearing Conference Submissions dated March 14, 2022 at page 13.

¹¹ White Burgess Langille Inman v. Abbott and Haliburton Co., 2015 SCC 23 (CanLII), [2015] 2 SCR 182 at para 32.

The ICAM used by Centra allocates the costs of common assets based on an evaluation of the cost driver for each specific type of common cost and uses a variety of allocators to ensure the allocation is appropriate to each type of cost. Centra has no objection to the use of composite or multi-faceted allocators as a matter of principle – so long as each of the foundational factors used to construct the composite allocator and the resulting allocator properly reflects and is entirely consistent with the principles of costs causation. Centra is not recommending a change from the use of a Peak and Average method simply because it is a composite allocator, but rather because one of the dimensions has no linkage to cost causation for the functions for which it was being used.

CAC attempts to portray the treatment of Manitoba Hydro's Bipoles as evidence of a "dichotomy" between Centra's proposed gas methodologies and Manitoba Hydro's electric methodologies. While there is no relevant connection between the allocation of Bipole costs and Centra's cost allocation methodology, Centra nevertheless provides the following information in order to ensure the record is clear. As noted in Rebuttal evidence, the functionalization, classification and allocation of the Bipoles is in recognition of the role they play in Manitoba Hydro's system – that is they are an extension of the Generation system and are treated consistent with other generation assets. This is not a "broad view" of cost causation – it simply and accurately reflects proper cost causation.

CAC conveniently overlooks the fact that the assets that are actually analogous to Centra's transmission and distribution assets, namely Manitoba Hydro's AC transmission and distribution assets, are allocated using Winter Coincident Peak and Non-Coincident Peak respectively and not under a purported "broad view" of cost causation that also includes consideration of annual usage. Furthermore, CAC incorrectly implies that the allocation methodology for the Bipoles was selected in order to recognize the concept of "used and useful" and that "a narrow view of cost causation would ignore the used and usefulness of bipoles throughout the year" ¹³. Used and useful is not an endorsement of including annual usage in all allocators as suggested by CAC; rather it is a concept for determining whether a cost can be recovered in rates.

¹² Exhibit No. CAC-12 – Written Submission of CAC at page 12.

¹³ Exhibit No. CAC-12 – Written Submission of CAC at page 12.