



“When You Talk - We Listen!”



MANITOBA PUBLIC UTILITIES BOARD

Re: MANITOBA PUBLIC INSURANCE CORPORATION (MPI)

2020/2021 GENERAL RATE APPLICATION

HEARING

Before Board Panel:

Irene Hamilton, QC - Board Chairperson

Robert Gabor, QC - Board Chair

Carol Hainsworth - Board Member

HELD AT:

Public Utilities Board

400, 330 Portage Avenue

Winnipeg, Manitoba

October 24, 2019

Pages 2628 to 2842

1 APPEARANCES

2

3 Kathleen McCandless ) Board Counsel

4 Robert Watchman )

5 Roger Cathcart ) Consultant

6 Brian Pelly (np) ) Advisor

7 Blair Manktelow (np) ) Advisor

8

9 Steven Scarfone ) Manitoba Public

10 Michael Triggs ) Insurance

11 Anthony Guerra )

12 Jeff Crozier )

13 Ted Meira )

14

15 Byron Williams ) CAC (Manitoba)

16 Katrine Dilay )

17 Chris Klassen (np) )

18 Christine Williams (np) )

19 (Articling student)

20 Chim Undi (np) )

21 (Articling student) )

22

23 Charlotte Meek (np) ) CMMG

24 James Wood (np) )

25

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

APPEARANCES (CONT'D)

Christian Monnin (np) )Bike Winnipeg  
Charles Feaver (np) )  
Curtis Unfried )IBAM  
Jennifer Sokal )  
(Articling student)  
Denis Guenette )Attorney General  
Tamara Edkins )of Manitoba  
(Articling Student)

1	TABLE OF CONTENTS	
2		Page No.
3	List of Exhibits	2632
4	List of Undertakings	2633
5		
6	Closing Remarks by Board Counsel	2634
7	Final Argument by Manitoba Public Insurance	2665
8	Final Argument by CAC (Manitoba)	2731
9		
10	Certificate of Transcript	2842
11		
12		
13		
14		
15		
16		
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		

1	LIST OF EXHIBITS		
2	EXHIBIT NO.	DESCRIPTION	PAGE NO.
3	MPI-95	Response to Undertaking 14	2660
4	MPI-96	Response to Undertaking 21	
5		and Appendix 1	2660
6	MPI-97	Response to Undertaking 15	
7		and Appendix 1	2661
8	MPI-98	Response to Undertaking 19	2661
9	MPI-99	Response to Undertaking 32	2661
10	MPI-100	Response to Undertaking 34	2661
11	MPI-101	MPI response to an undertaking	
12		in the commercially sensitive	
13		information module number 1	2661
14	MPI-102	MPI's closing submissions	2662
15	MPI-103	MPI's closing PowerPoint	
16		presentation	2662
17	MPI-104	Chairperson's submissions on the	
18		regulatory process	2662
19	CAC-19	Written legal brief	2730
20	CAC-20	Response to Undertaking 36	2731
21	CAC-21	Book of authorities	2731
22	CAC-22	PowerPoint on the public record	2731
23	CAC-23	CAC recommendations	2731
24			
25			

1	LIST OF UNDERTAKINGS		
2	NO.	DESCRIPTION	PAGE NO.
3	39	MPI to provide a short written	
4		submission on any jurisprudence	
5		that might exists on the	
6		interpretation that the Corporation	
7		is taking with respect to reserves	
8		regulation, as set out in the	
9		capital maintenance plan, which	
10		allows a five (5) year build,	
11		three (3) year release provision	
12		if not exactly at 100 percent MCT	2703
13			
14			
15			
16			
17			
18			
19			
20			
21			
22			
23			
24			
25			

1 --- Upon commencing at 9:00 a.m.

2

3 THE CHAIRPERSON: Good morning,  
4 everyone. Today we are starting into that portion of  
5 the hearing that deals with closing remarks. I would  
6 ask Ms. McCandless to proceed.

7 MS. KATHLEEN MCCANDLESS: Thank you.  
8 Good morning, Madam Chair, and members of the panel.

9 I note that MPI did answer some  
10 undertakings last night and this morning. So perhaps  
11 before I begin, if they could just enter those  
12 exhibits on the record.

13 MR. STEVEN SCARFONE: Yes. I don't  
14 know if we have them available quite yet to -- to  
15 speak to. We were going to mark them at the outset of  
16 our presentation.

17 MS. KATHLEEN MCCANDLESS: That's fine,  
18 yeah.

19

20 CLOSING REMARKS BY BOARD COUNSEL:

21 MS. KATHLEEN MCCANDLESS: We have now  
22 completed the evidentiary part of this public hearing  
23 with respect to the 2020 General Rate Application, or  
24 GRA, filed by Manitoba Public Insurance. The Board  
25 will soon deliberate upon the application for base

1 rates and premiums charged for compulsory vehicle and  
2 driver insurance rates to take effect on March 1,  
3 2020.

4 As counsel for the Board. I do not  
5 take a position on the merits of any part of the  
6 application or the positions taken by any of the  
7 parties. My role is to summarize the matters that are  
8 before the Board and outline issues that it may wish  
9 to consider in making its decision.

10 Now some context for the application  
11 this year. Rate indications are interest sensitive,  
12 and market interest rates are always changing. These  
13 realities give rise to a significant risk of  
14 estimation error in deriving Basic rate indications.

15 Adoption of a naive interest rate  
16 forecast reduces the complexity of making that  
17 forecast, and using rate indications derived in  
18 accordance with actual -- accepted actuarial practice  
19 in Canada rather than Basic net income projections  
20 shorten the length of the forecast, but significant  
21 uncertainty still remains.

22 To further mitigate this uncertainty,  
23 in recent prior GRAs, the PUB has routinely rec --  
24 requested the Corporation to provide an update to its  
25 rate indications to reflect market interest rates at

1 approximately the time the GRA hearing commences.  
2 When providing these updates in the past, the  
3 Corporation did not amend its application, but rather  
4 provided the update for evidentiary purposes. The PUB  
5 typically relied on this update in its Order on the  
6 application.

7                   For the 2020 GRA, the Corporation  
8 proposed a new approach, which the Board accepted.  
9 The approach called for the initial application and  
10 public notice to reflect a provisional rate request,  
11 derived in the usual manner, but with a declared  
12 intention of amending the application or updating the  
13 application to reflect an updated rate request based  
14 on market interest rates at the end of September,  
15 2019.

16                   The provisional rate request for an  
17 overall .1 percent rate level increase was based on  
18 market interest rates as at February 28, 2019. This  
19 also included continuation of the 2.0 percent net  
20 capital maintenance provision approved by the Board in  
21 Order 159/'18 for the 2018/'19 rating year only, which  
22 the Corporation felt was necessary in transition to  
23 its new proposed Capital Management Plan.

24                   The Corporation provided an update to  
25 its provisional rate request on October 4th to reflect

1 market interest rates as at -- at Sep -- September 30,  
2 2019, and requested an amendment to its application as  
3 a result of this update. Over the period from March  
4 to September, 2019. The ten (10) year Government of  
5 Canada bond yield fell fifty-eight (58) basis points,  
6 from 1.94 percent to 1.36 percent, pushing the Basic  
7 rate indication upwards to an overall 1.5 percent rate  
8 level increase.

9                   But because Basic's financial  
10 performance over the same time period significantly  
11 exceeded expectations, improving Basic's financial  
12 condi -- pos -- position, the Corporation amended its  
13 application and removed the request for continuation  
14 of the net capital maintenance provision. Combined,  
15 these changes led to the amended rate request for an  
16 overall .6 percent rate level decrease.

17                   The average rate adjustment proposed by  
18 MPI for each major vehicle class is as follows.

19                   For private passenger, an overall  
20 decrease of .9 percent.

21                   For the commercial class, an overall  
22 increase of .8 percent.

23                   For the public class, an overall  
24 increase of 10.9 percent.

25                   For motorcycles, an overall increase of

1 5.1 percent.

2 For trailers, an overall decrease of  
3 5.1 percent.

4 And for off-road vehicles, an overall  
5 decrease of 11 percent.

6 After consideration of insurance use  
7 and territory, and capping and balancing for  
8 experience rate adjustments, the results were modelled  
9 by the Corporation to assess the impact of various  
10 rate and classification changes.

11 In total, the vehicle population for  
12 the year of the application is one million one hundred  
13 and sixty-one thousand one hundred and fifty-nine  
14 (1,161,159) vehicles, to which the proposed rate would  
15 be applied as follows.

16 Four hundred and forty (440) -- forty-  
17 four (44) -- pardon me, four hundred and thirty-four  
18 thousand one hundred and sixteen (434,116) vehicles,  
19 or 37.4 percent of the overall fleet, would see a rate  
20 increase, the majority of which would be ninety-nine  
21 dollars (\$99) or less.

22 Six hundred and ten thousand four  
23 hundred and thirty (610,430) vehicles, or 52.6 percent  
24 of the overall fleet, would receive a rate decrease.

25 And one hundred and sixteen thousand

1 (116,000) -- sixteen (16) -- six hundred and thirteen  
2 (613) vehicles, or 10 percent, would receive no  
3 changes in rates.

4                   With respect to rate making in  
5 accordance with accepted actuarial practice, as  
6 always, the Corporation's estimate of its overall rate  
7 requirement is sensitive to the methods and assumption  
8 -- assumptions used in its derivation. For the 2020  
9 GRA, particular attention was given to two (2)  
10 assumption areas, rate indications by major use class,  
11 and treatment of the expected return on investment  
12 assets supporting Basic total equity.

13                   With respect to rate indications by  
14 major use class, the Corporation ack -- acknowledged  
15 potential weaknesses in its use of a common set of  
16 loss development assumptions in the analysis of  
17 serious versus other losses for accident benefits  
18 other indexed and weekly indemnity in deriving rate  
19 indications for the private passenger, commercial, and  
20 public major use classes.

21                   The potential weakness related to  
22 observed differences in loss development patterns  
23 between serious and other losses, with serious losses  
24 typically being slower to emerge, and that the  
25 Corporation's analysis approach does not fully

1 recognize those differences. The Corporation agreed  
2 to take this issue under consideration for the 2021  
3 GRA.

4                   With respect to the treatment of  
5 expected return on investment assets supporting Basic  
6 total equity, consistent with pri -- recent prior  
7 GRAs, the Corporation derives its estimate of the  
8 Basic breakeven rate requirement to exclude  
9 recognition of the expected return on investment  
10 assets supporting Basic total equity, which it  
11 acknowledges is a cash flow to Basic insurance  
12 operations.

13                   The Corporation considers this cash  
14 flow to be a capital adjustment, which it prefers to  
15 address exclusively within its new proposed Capital  
16 Management Plan. Furthermore, the Corporation  
17 believes the appropriate definition of breakeven in  
18 this context is that it should encompass only the  
19 expected cashflows relating to the policies to be  
20 issued in the coming rating year, thereby excluding  
21 the expected return on investment assets supporting  
22 Basic total equity, which relates to the results of  
23 prior rating years.

24                   The Corporation has acknowledged that  
25 rate making in accordance with accepted actuarial

1 practice in Canada permits the est -- estimation of  
2 rate indications either with or without recognition of  
3 the expected return on investment assets supporting  
4 Basic total equity.

5                   With respect to financial results, the  
6 Corporation has provided to the Board its actual  
7 financial results with respect to the 2018/'19 year,  
8 as well as for the first six (6) months of the current  
9 year, 2019/'20. For the 2018/'19 fiscal year, Basic  
10 incurred net income of \$78.8 million compared with  
11 forecasted net income of \$135.6 million at last year's  
12 GRA, a reduction of \$56.7 million.

13                   This negative variance was attributed  
14 by the Corporation to an increase of \$75.1 million in  
15 total claims incurred cost, primarily due to an  
16 actuarial adjustment of \$54.9 million, increased  
17 comprehensive claims of \$16.2 million, higher  
18 writedown DPAT (sic), premium deficiency than  
19 forecasted of \$15.5 million, and lower than forecasted  
20 interest rates of \$49.1 million.

21                   These increases in costs were offset by  
22 lower than forecast collision claims of \$40.9 million,  
23 reinsurance recoveries of \$13.5 million, and lower  
24 property damage claims of \$5.3 million. Overall,  
25 there was a negative variance of \$74.8 million and --

1 in underwriting results -- results from that presented  
2 last year. Investment income was \$208.5 million,  
3 \$16.7 million higher than the \$191.8 million forecast  
4 last year.

5                   With respect to the current year,  
6 2019/'20, the subject of last year's GRA, MPI last  
7 year forecast for Basic a net income of \$17.9 million  
8 for rating purposes, resi -- rev -- revised to a net  
9 income of \$29.7 million in this GRA.

10                   This forecast was further updated on --  
11 on October 4th to a net income of \$108.4 million,  
12 based on a September 30th interest rate update, which  
13 included actual experience based on the second quarter  
14 update, and an updated forecast for the remainder of  
15 the year. Some of this variance was attributable to  
16 an increase in the forecast of total claims incurred  
17 of \$9.8 million, a favourable interest rate impact of  
18 \$80.6 million, and forecasted investment income, being  
19 \$85.7 million higher due to interest rate changes.

20                   The change in investment income offset  
21 the increase in total claims incurred, reflecting the  
22 immunization of MPI's net income to changes in  
23 interest rates by its asset liability management  
24 strategy.

25                   With respect to the second quarter

1 update, MPI filed its second quarter report and the  
2 course of these proceedings. The Corporation reported  
3 that for the first six (6) months of 2019/'20, it had  
4 net income of \$164.2 million, an improvements of \$91.4  
5 million from last year for the same period. MPI  
6 reported net income of \$119.5 million related to  
7 Basic, compared to a net income of \$39.4 million for  
8 the same period last year, an improvement and \$80.1  
9 million over the six (6) month period.

10 MPI reported an increase in earned  
11 revenues of \$35.7 million, which was attributed to an  
12 increase in mode of -- motor vehicle premiums of 4.2  
13 percent. This increase was primarily attributed to a  
14 growth in the number of vehicles and the value of  
15 vehicles, as well as increases associated with demerit  
16 drivers on the driver safety rating scale.

17 MPI also recor -- reported an increase  
18 in investment income of \$99 million, mainly due to  
19 higher unrealized gains on bonds to related to a  
20 decline in interest rates.

21 Total claims costs increased by \$41  
22 million, or 7.5 percent, due to an increase of \$50  
23 million in bodily injury claims incurred, offset by a  
24 decrease of \$10.8 million reduction in physical damage  
25 claims incurred.

1 MPI indicated that it was currently  
2 ahead of its planned forecast for the 2019/'20 year  
3 based on the results for the first six (6) months due  
4 to higher than forecast investment income and  
5 favourable claims experience. The Corporation has now  
6 forecasted Basic net income of \$108 million for  
7 2019/'20, a net loss of \$10.1 million for 2020/'21,  
8 and a net loss of \$17.5 million, based on the .6  
9 percent applied-for rate decrease.

10 MPI has acknowledged that although it  
11 does expect a deterioration in the claims experienced  
12 during the last six (6) months of the current year,  
13 Basic's performance in the first two (2) quarters have  
14 exceeded expectations, and are not forecasted to  
15 materially diminish during the remainder of the year.

16 With respect to the rate stabilization  
17 reserve and dynamic capital adequacy testing, this  
18 Board in previous Orders has stated that the purpose  
19 of the RSR, the rate stabilization reserve, is to  
20 protect motorists that would otherwise -- from rate  
21 increases that would otherwise have been necessary due  
22 to unexpected variances from forecasted results and  
23 due to events and losses arising from nonrecurring  
24 events or factors.

25 Although not required by statute, as in

1 the competitive insurance market, the Corporation has  
2 undertaken an annual bas -- Basic dynamic capital  
3 adequacy testing investigation as a matter of good  
4 governance. The DCAT investigation entails  
5 development of a Basic financial forecast and  
6 stressing of that forecast under a number of plausible  
7 adverse scenarios covering a variety of risk  
8 categories. The report on the DCAT investigation  
9 includes an opinion from the signing actuary on the  
10 financial condist -- condition of Basic. This report  
11 has been included with the annual Basic GRA for many  
12 years.

13 Over the course of several years, the  
14 Corporation worked with the Board and Interveners  
15 towards the development of a consensus approach to  
16 adapting the Basic DCAT investigation to estimate an  
17 appropriate Basic target capital range reflecting  
18 Basic experience and risk characteristics.

19 With the passing of the reserves  
20 regulation in April, 2019, the role of the DCAT  
21 investigation in the GRA has been diminished. As this  
22 Board is aware, the validity of that regulation is  
23 subject to a challenge brought before this Board by  
24 the Consumers' Association of Canada (Manitoba)  
25 branch, referred to as CAC.

1                   While the DCAT investigation continues  
2 to provide insight into the resiliency of Basic's  
3 capital position, the single Basic target capital  
4 level, based on a 100 percent minimum capital test  
5 ratio set out in the reserves regulation, effectively  
6 severs the link between the DCAT investigation and the  
7 setting of Basic target capital levels.

8                   The recommendation of the expert  
9 witnesses Dr. Simpson and Ms. Sherry, who were called  
10 as experts by CAC, was that the Basic target capital  
11 range should continue to be set as an adaptation of  
12 the DCAT investigation, in line with the latest  
13 efforts of the collaborative review process.

14                   With respect to the proposed Capital  
15 Management Plan, as directed by the Board in Order  
16 159/'18, the 2020 GRA sets out the Corporation's  
17 proposed Capital Management Plan for approval by the  
18 Board. Features of the Corporation's proposed Capital  
19 Management Plan, or CMP, include: a

20                   A single Basic target capital level  
21 based on a 100 percent minimum capital test ratio as  
22 set by the reserves regulation;

23                   A commitment to transfer excess  
24 retained earnings from the Extension line to Basic,  
25 where excess is determined relative to the single

1 Extension target capital level, or minimum level of  
2 200 percent for minimum capital test ratio, as set by  
3 the reserves regulation;

4 A phase-in approach to move towards the  
5 Basic target capital level over a number of years  
6 through capital build or capital release provisions;

7 Determination of the need for any  
8 capital build or capital release provisions in each  
9 GRA, after consideration of the Basic rate level  
10 change indication, and the expected capital transfers  
11 from Extension;

12 Use of judgmentally selected five (5)  
13 year and three (3) year phase-in periods for capital  
14 build and release provisions, respectively;

15 Imposition of a judgmentally selected 5  
16 percent cap on the combination of the overall Basic  
17 rate indication and any capital build provision;

18 And imposition of a judgmentally  
19 selected 5 percent cap on any capital release  
20 provision.

21 The reserves regulation states as  
22 follows with respect to the Basic RSR. For the  
23 purpose of Section 18 of the Act, the minimum amount  
24 the Corporation must maintain in its rate stabilize --  
25 rate stabilization reserve is the amount determined

1 using a MCT ratio of 100 percent. The Corporation's  
2 proposed CMP reflects the Corporation's interpretation  
3 of the reserves regulation that compliance is  
4 satisfied if the Corporation establishes a plan to  
5 bring the Basic MCT ratio to at least 100 percent  
6 within a period of five (5) years or less.

7                   Because the forecasted capital  
8 transfers from Extension to Basic have now an impact  
9 on the Basic rate request, this necessarily draws  
10 elements of the Extension forecast within the  
11 oversight of the Public Utilities Board. These and  
12 other aspects of the Capital Management Plan present  
13 new issues under the regulatory process, including:

14                   The enforcement of the reserves  
15 regulation;

16                   The compliance of the CMP with the  
17 reserves regulation, and whether the CMP supports the  
18 purpose of the regulation;

19                   The appropriateness of the caps and  
20 phase-in periods;

21                   The degree to which the Board reviews  
22 Extension operations;

23                   How and when changes to the minimum  
24 capital test should be recognized in testing  
25 compliance with the reserves regulation and in

1 applying the Capital Management Plan.

2 MPI's board of directors directed that  
3 \$60 million be transferred from the Extension line of  
4 business to the Basic RSR as at February 28, 2019, to  
5 raise the RSR to \$309.8 million, and total equity of  
6 249.7 million to support rate stabilization. This  
7 transfer resulted in Basic having an MCT ratio of 51.5  
8 percent.

9 This is the fifth consecutive year in  
10 which the board of directors has directed a transfer  
11 to Basic RSR. Between 2013 and four (4) -- 2013 and  
12 '14, and 2018/'19, the Basic line of business has  
13 received transfers from competitive lines totaling  
14 \$273.3 million. The Corporation has, as of year-end  
15 2018/'19, fifty-one (51) -- \$511.8 million in retained  
16 earnings, including \$309.8 million in Basic, \$99.2  
17 million in Extension, and \$103.9 million in Special  
18 Risk Extension.

19 Overall corporate total equity, as at  
20 February 28, 2019, including accumulated other  
21 comprehensive income was \$442.1 million of which  
22 \$249.7 million relates to Basic operations,  
23 \$94.7 million to Extension, and \$97.7 million to  
24 Special Risk Extension.

25 Based on the results at the end of the

1 second quarter and based on the October 4th update,  
2 MPI is forecasting that it will transfer \$75.1 million  
3 from Extension retained earnings to Basic in 2019/'20.

4 On this basis, it is forecasting total  
5 Basic retained earnings of \$439.3 million and after  
6 accumulated other comprehensive income total Basic  
7 equity of \$390.1 million and the calculated MCT ratio  
8 of 96.4 percent.

9 Now on to investments. In the 2019  
10 GRA, the Board heard that MPI would be separating its  
11 co-mingled investment portfolio into five (5) unique  
12 portfolios that back the Corporation's liabilities and  
13 surplus.

14 The five (5) unique portfolios include  
15 Basic claims, Basic rate stabilization reserve,  
16 employee future benefit or pension, Extension, and  
17 Special Risk Extension or SRE.

18 In this application, MPI provided an  
19 update on the progress to date in the transition to  
20 the new portfolios which was substantially completed  
21 at the end of the second quarter of 2019/'20. MPI  
22 expects the process to be fully completed in the  
23 fourth quarter of 2019/'20 and first quarter of the  
24 2020/2021 year.

25 The funds available for investment are

1 primarily unearned premium reserves and unpaid claims  
2 reserves. The investment portfolio supports the  
3 payment of accident claims and the pension obligations  
4 of the Corporation.

5           The Corporation's investment assets are  
6 currently over \$2.9 billion. The size of the Basic  
7 line of business investment portfolio including the  
8 Basic claims portfolio and RSR portfolio is projected  
9 to \$2.4 billion for 2019/'20 and grow to twenty-three  
10 (23) billion for '23/'24.

11           Historically, the Corporation's  
12 investment income has been a major component of its  
13 income and have offset its annual underwriting losses.  
14 Basic net income was \$208.5 million in 2019 --  
15 2018/'19 primarily as the result of realization of  
16 gains on the transition from the consolidated  
17 investment portfolio into the five (5) unique  
18 portfolios.

19           In the original application forecast  
20 using a naive interest rate forecast at February 28,  
21 2019 of 1.94 percent, the Basic investment income was  
22 projected to be \$72.8 million for 2019/'20 and  
23 \$74.2 million for 2020/'21.

24           Based on the September 20th naive  
25 interest rate forecast update of 1.36 percent, the

1 Corporation is now projecting investment income of  
2 \$158.6 million for Basic to offset a revised  
3 underwriting loss now forecast at \$50.2 million.

4 Net income is now forecast to be  
5 \$108.4 million for 2019/'20.

6 With respect to operating expenses, the  
7 total corporate expenses were \$288.2 million in  
8 2018/'19 and are forecast to grow to \$303.6 million in  
9 the current year.

10 MPI forecast total corporate  
11 expenditures to be \$306 million in 2020/'21 and  
12 \$309 million in 2021/'22.

13 MPI's global corporate costs are to be  
14 allocated among the insurance and non-insurance  
15 categories of business and by automobile lines of --  
16 lines of business in a way that does not give rise to  
17 cross subsidization.

18 Costs are allocated to Basic through an  
19 integrated cost allocation methodology which was  
20 approved by the Board in Board order 157/12 There  
21 have been no material changes to the integrated cost  
22 allocation methodology in this application.

23 Upon the completion of the allocation  
24 process, expenses attributable to the Basic program  
25 are established for normal operations and improvement

1 initiatives.

2 Total Basic expenses were \$218.8  
3 million in 2018/'19 or 75.9 percent of corporate  
4 expenses and were forecast to be \$229.5 million in  
5 2019/'20. Thereafter, Basic expenses are forecast to  
6 increase to \$231.7 million in 2020/'21 and  
7 \$233 million in 2021/'22.

8 Salaries and benefits are a major  
9 component of the operating expenses of Basic  
10 representing over 58 percent of the total operating  
11 expenses in the year of the application.

12 Since 2015/'16, the Corporation has  
13 experienced a compound annual growth of salaries and  
14 benefits of 1.8 percent with compensation that has  
15 grown from \$116 million in 2015/'16 to \$124.2 million  
16 in 2018/'19.

17 Salaries and benefits are forecast to  
18 be \$133.7 million in the current year, \$137.2 million  
19 in 2020/'21, and \$139.6 million in 2021/'22. Forecast  
20 annual growth is 4 percent.

21 MPI is now forecasting an increase in  
22 compensation expenses net a vacancy allowance of  
23 9.95 percent in 2019/'20 and an increase of  
24 2.96 percent in 2020/'21. MPI attributed the large  
25 growth in compensation in the current year to filling

1 a large number of vacancies.

2           At the end of July 2019, actual  
3 full-time equivalents year to date was one thousand  
4 eight hundred and eight (1,808) full-time equivalents  
5 compared to a budget of one thousand nine hundred and  
6 eleven point one (1,911.1) for normal and specialty  
7 program staffing representing one hundred and two  
8 point three (102.3) vacant positions.

9           With respect to capital expenditures,  
10 MPI projected Basic capital expenditures at  
11 \$31.9 million for 2019/'20, \$45.7 million for  
12 2020/'21, and \$40.9 million for 2021/'22.

13           MPI is forecasting in the next five (5)  
14 years \$130.7 million in capital expenditures in  
15 ongoing and future information technology projects.

16           MPI also provided an update to its  
17 Legacy System Modernization Project, now referred to  
18 as Project NOVA. This relates to the replacement of  
19 dated legacy systems at a budgeted cost of  
20 \$106.8 million which includes an estimate of  
21 \$85.4 million plus a 25 percent contingency of  
22 \$21.4 million. This represents the current MPI  
23 Board-approved budget as MPI has not received final  
24 projecting from product vendors.

25           With respect to the information

1 technology strategy, MPI presented its strategy for  
2 2019/'20. In indicated that it continues to leverage  
3 enterprise architecture concepts to link business  
4 strategy to IT project investments through the use of  
5 business and technical capabilities.

6                   This year's strategy focuses  
7 extensively on Project NOVA and its transformational  
8 impact on MPI's business. This annual strategy is  
9 aligned to keep priorities, mission, vision, and  
10 values identified in the 2019/'20 annual business plan  
11 and builds upon the 2018/'19 strategy.

12                   As with prior GRAs, MPI indicated that  
13 significant changes and practices have been adopted  
14 moving forward. In particular, six (5) main streams  
15 were being followed: the move toward proven  
16 technologies; identification of all risks of a project  
17 prior to project initiation; the use of a project  
18 sponsor; alignment, when possible, to industry best  
19 practices and vendor-provided software; the value  
20 management process being ingrained in MPI culture and  
21 project lifestyle; and IT capabilities being created  
22 to support business capabilities to solve a business  
23 objective.

24                   Five (5) major influences have been  
25 identified for this year. These are legacy

1 modernization or Project NOVA which is a corporate  
2 initiative aimed to modernize the MPI core legacy  
3 systems to deliver MPI products and services to core  
4 personal and commercial customers with greater  
5 business agility and improved customer experience  
6 while reducing MPI's technology risk.

7                   Information security and IT risk  
8 management processes. MPI has formed the information  
9 security office which managed three (3) key governance  
10 functions, information security, IT risk and  
11 compliance management, and information security  
12 architecture.

13                   Technology risk management program.  
14 The technology risk management program provides  
15 regular investment and technology systems and  
16 processes.

17                   Enterprise architecture process.  
18 Enterprise architecture is the discipline of  
19 proactively and holistically understanding business  
20 and IT capabilities by identifying and analyzing the  
21 execution of change towards the desired business  
22 vision and outcomes.

23                   Agile delivery. MPI recognized that in  
24 replacing the core legacy systems the way these  
25 systems need to be configured and delivered also

1 needed to change. MPI has determined that adopting  
2 agile design and delivery practices are key to  
3 providing business value and to effectively work with  
4 any modern platform provider.

5                   With respect to benchmarking and  
6 information technology. Overall, the Gartner  
7 consulting benchmarking results indicate that MPI has  
8 maintained the same IT score three point one (3.1)  
9 from 2016/'17 to 2017/'18.

10                   IT spending relative to operating  
11 expenses has continued to decrease annually. MPI's IT  
12 spend as a percentage of overall operating expenses  
13 has stabilized to 5.4 percent. Compared to its peer  
14 group at 5.42 percent, MPI spend is slightly lower at  
15 5.37 percent.

16                   MPI has formed a single consolidated  
17 unit overseeing the management of its major IT vendor  
18 contracts for the purpose of standardization and  
19 identification of opportunities for improvements and  
20 cost efficiencies.

21                   The IT full-time equivalent as a  
22 percentage of company employees is 17.2 percent  
23 compared to the peer average of 13.6 percent. MPI  
24 in-house versus contractor proportion has decreased  
25 from the previous year to 27.5 percent. The peer

1 average is 30.4 percent.

2 MPI reported that it will be refreshing  
3 its IT benchmarking services with a request for  
4 proposals having been issued to source a new  
5 benchmarking service provider.

6 On the issue of road safety. In  
7 order 130/17 following the 2018 GRA, the Board  
8 directed that a technical conference take place in  
9 early 2019 on the issue of road safety. In this GRA,  
10 the Board heard from Ward Keith who contracted with  
11 the Board to facilitate the technical conference and  
12 prepare a report.

13 Mr. Keith's report on the technical  
14 conference which took place in April of 2019 was filed  
15 in this application, and it provided a summary of the  
16 issues reviewed by the participants in the conference  
17 along with specific action items undertaken by MPI  
18 arising from that conference.

19 With respect to the road safety budget,  
20 MPI is forecasting to spend \$13.9 million in Basic  
21 road safety and loss prevention programs in 2019/'20.  
22 The largest component is spent on driver education  
23 including the high school driver education program  
24 which is approximately \$4 million or 29 percent of the  
25 overall budget.

1                   Impaired driving prevention strategies  
2 are the second largest expenditure at \$2.8 million or  
3 20 percent of the overall budget.

4                   Speed management expenditures are  
5 forecast at \$0.9 million or nine hundred thousand  
6 (900,000) or 6 percent of the overall budget.

7                   The balance of the road safety programs  
8 are advertising and sponsorships, road safety  
9 programming and road watch, which is increased  
10 enforcement.

11                   MPI has discontinued the immobilizer  
12 program in 2019/'20 as a result of all new vehicles  
13 now having built-in electronic immobilizer technology.  
14 MPI attributed a reduction in auto crime strategy  
15 spending of \$900,000 to the discontinuation of this  
16 program.

17                   One last item, Madam Chair, I believe I  
18 misspoke when referring to the Basic claims portfolio.  
19 It is projected to be \$2.4 billion for 2019/'20 to  
20 grow to \$3 billion in 2023/'24.

21                   Madam Chair and members of the panel, I  
22 have attempted to comment on the main issues that  
23 arose this year. I would like to thank MPI and the  
24 Interveners for their cooperation extended throughout  
25 the hearing.

1 THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you,  
2 Ms. McCandless.

3 Mr. Scarfone, do you have exhibits to  
4 file, or do you want to proceed with your closing  
5 remarks at this point?

6 MR. STEVEN SCARFONE: I think we'll  
7 file these exhibits now. I apologize we didn't have a  
8 list before -- before Ms. McCandless began, so let's  
9 just get these on the record.

10 Exhibit number 95 -- MPI Exhibit  
11 number 95 is a response to undertaking number 14.

12

13 --- EXHIBIT NO. MPI-95: Response to Undertaking 14

14

15 MR. STEVEN SCARFONE: Exhibit  
16 number 96 is a response to undertaking number 21 and  
17 Appendix 1.

18

19 --- EXHIBIT NO. MPI-96: Response to Undertaking 21  
20 and Appendix 1

21

22 MR. STEVEN SCARFONE: MPI Exhibit  
23 number 97 is a response to undertaking number 15 and  
24 Appendix 1.

25

1 --- EXHIBIT NO. MPI-97: Response to Undertaking 15  
2 and Appendix 1

3

4 MR. STEVEN SCARFONE: MPI Exhibit  
5 number 98 is a response to undertaking number 19.

6

7 --- EXHIBIT NO. MPI-98: Response to Undertaking 19

8

9 MR. STEVEN SCARFONE: MPI Exhibit  
10 number 99 is a response to undertaking number 32.

11

12 --- EXHIBIT NO. MPI-99: Response to Undertaking 32

13

14 MR. STEVEN SCARFONE: MPI Exhibit  
15 number 100 is a response to undertaking number 34.

16

17 --- EXHIBIT NO. MPI-100: Response to Undertaking 34

18

19 MR. STEVEN SCARFONE: MPI Exhibit 101  
20 is a response to an undertaking in the commercially  
21 sensitive information module number 1.

22

23 --- EXHIBIT NO. MPI-101: MPI response to an  
24 undertaking in the  
25 commercially sensitive

1 information module  
2 number 1

3

4 MR. STEVEN SCARFONE: And the last  
5 three (3) would be 102 which is the closing submission  
6 that was circulated this morning.

7

8 --- EXHIBIT NO. MPI-102: MPI's closing submissions

9

10 MR. STEVEN SCARFONE: Exhibit  
11 number 103 will be MPIC's closing presentation in the  
12 form of a PowerPoint presentation.

13

14 --- EXHIBIT NO. MPI-103: MPI's closing PowerPoint  
15 presentation

16

17 MR. STEVEN SCARFONE: And lastly,  
18 Exhibit number 104 is Madam Chair's submission on the  
19 regulatory process. You'll recall my comments from  
20 the opening -- my opening statement. So that 104 is  
21 our last exhibit that addresses that issue.

22

23 --- EXHIBIT NO. MPI-104: Chairperson's submissions  
24 on the regulatory process

25

1 THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you,  
2 Mr. Scarfone. Please proceed.

3 MR. STEVEN SCARFONE: And before I  
4 begin with our presentation proper, Mr. Triggs has a  
5 couple things that he'd like to say, if that pleases  
6 the -- the panel?

7 THE CHAIRPERSON: Certainly.  
8 Mr. Triggs...?

9 MR. MICHAEL TRIGGS: Thank you,  
10 Madam Chair. I'll keep this very brief for a minute  
11 or two (2).

12 MPI has spoken a lot about transparency  
13 and enhanced transparency. But as I look around the  
14 room, I realize that -- now this being my eleventh GRA  
15 that I'm somewhat long in the tooth here, and there's  
16 a lot of people who haven't had the seen -- seen how  
17 things have changed over the years.

18 And with that, I just wanted to make  
19 importance to remind the people how things have in  
20 fact changed. If the -- Mr. Gabor who was here  
21 three (3) years ago, and we saw the difficulties and  
22 challenge of getting information related to the BI3  
23 project which had been implemented in 2010, challenges  
24 getting IT business cases.

25 And you contrast that to what is today.

1 I think it is a very open and robust disclosure of  
2 everything that MPI has to show.

3                   So that is the change is -- we've  
4 spoken to, but it's not -- the importance is not the  
5 fact things have changed. The importance is the  
6 transparency is out there.

7                   And Manitobans have the right to know.  
8 They -- they need to know where their money is going.  
9 They know -- they need to know how MPI operates its  
10 business. They need to know what MPI does with it --  
11 the money it is taken in.

12                   And the only real way to do that is for  
13 the Corporation to be transparent and open as a  
14 possible on that, and we think that that is our goal  
15 that we want to -- well, I don't think -- that is our  
16 goal that we want to accomplish, and we'll continue to  
17 try and improve year over year to be more transparent  
18 on that.

19                   But with transparency is also -- comes  
20 when you're disclosing. You're not hiding anything.  
21 As Mr. Graham says, you know, pulling back the covers.  
22 I guess that's an Australian terminology.

23                   But at least the point that you're  
24 showing what's out there, and there's -- mistakes have  
25 been made and mistakes will be made in the future as

1 well.

2 But our point in showing this isn't to  
3 point fingers at people, to criticize people. It is  
4 to learn from those mistakes and improve for the  
5 future, so that next year and the year after, there's  
6 improvements for how MPI delivers its service to  
7 Manitobans, and that is the spirit of intent in which  
8 we bring forth the transparency.

9 And with that, I'll just leave that for  
10 Mr. Scarfone and Mr. Guerra to conclude our  
11 presentation.

12 THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you,  
13 Mr. Triggs.

14 Mr. Scarfone...?

15

16 FINAL ARGUMENT BY MANITOBA PUBLIC INSURANCE:

17 MR. STEVEN SCARFONE: Thank you,  
18 Madam Chair. So these are the Corporation's closing  
19 remarks for the 2020 general rate application. We  
20 have a presentation to make this morning, but of  
21 course, I encourage the Board, should there be any  
22 questions concerning the slides that you're about to  
23 see, certainly interrupt me, ask those questions.

24 But the foundation of this particular  
25 slide presentation is found in the closing

1 submission -- the written argument that is more  
2 comprehensive, more robust, and will have all of  
3 the -- should have all of the information that the  
4 panel needs in response to any questions you might  
5 have this morning.

6                   So the agenda for the closing is before  
7 you. I tend to address the first four (4) items on  
8 the agenda, and Mr. Guerra will then take over and  
9 address numbers 5 through 8.

10                   So the summary of our request is set  
11 out by Ms. McCandless is the adjusted rate indication  
12 of 0.6 percent -- a negative 0.6 percent which stems  
13 from having removed the capital maintenance provision  
14 and updating the interest rate forecast as of the end  
15 of September.

16                   The rates, as you know, are in effect  
17 for thirteen (13) months with the proposed changes to  
18 the fiscal year. We are seeking approval of the  
19 capital management plan, and the last three (3)  
20 bullets set out there the discontinuance of the anti-  
21 theft discount, and no changes to driver premiums and  
22 vehicle discounts through the driver safety rating,  
23 and no changes to fleet rebates and surcharges. So  
24 that is the relief that the Corporation is seeking in  
25 this year's general rate application.

1                   So these are the areas that I want to  
2 discuss concerning the overall rate indication. You  
3 can see them there before you, and we'll proceed now  
4 with the drivers of the rate change.

5                   The required rate was 3.3 percent.  
6 That's the AAP rate. It's then adjusted, as Mr.  
7 Johnston indicated, for two (2) reasons: One (1), for  
8 vehicle upgrade. That traditionally serves to lower  
9 the rate indication, as does vehicle volume.

10                  This year, it did not. The forecast  
11 was off, and so you see there where that number is  
12 normally a negative, it's a positive. And then by  
13 removing the capital maintenance provision, you arrive  
14 at an AAP breakeven required rate change of negative  
15 point six (.6).

16                  And this is how the negative point six  
17 (.6) rate decrease affects the major classes. For the  
18 purposes of most Manitobans, you look to that top  
19 line, of course, the private passenger vehicle, and  
20 you'll see that the indicated rate change for most of  
21 us is negative .9 percent.

22                  Of the Interveners that were in  
23 attendance for this hearing, the motorcycles -- and  
24 I'll get -- I'll touch on that more -- show an  
25 increase of 5.1 percent. And there before you is the

1 -- the remainder of the major classes and the various  
2 indications based on the negative point six (.6) rate  
3 decrease, the overall rate decrease.

4                   This particular slide shows the  
5 forecasted revenues from the Basic premiums, and it's  
6 important there to note that there is forecasted some  
7 increases in total earned revenues over the next five  
8 (5) years. And you'll -- you'll note that from that  
9 that -- that the business is growing. And so that,  
10 you'll hear from me later, is important in terms of  
11 the capital requirements of the Corporation, because  
12 as we heard last year, as the business grows, as the  
13 Corporation grows, so does its capital needs based on  
14 the MCT percentage.

15                   Prudent fiscal management is a -- is a  
16 continuing goal of the Corporation, and reducing  
17 expenses is -- is something that the Corporation  
18 prides itself on. You'll see there that total Basic  
19 expenses are down by 2 percent, and there's a number  
20 of itemized lists there that show how that number is  
21 arrived at, the -- the most important of which, we  
22 say, is the claims expense, which again, is down 2  
23 percent. Operating expenses, 4.5 percent. And total  
24 Basic allocated corporate expenses are down 2.3  
25 percent, Madam Chair.

1                   This, Madam Chair, is a depiction of  
2 operating expenses as a -- oh, thanks, Anthony. Thank  
3 you. This particular slide is operating expenses that  
4 shows net premiums earned -- compared against net  
5 premiums earned.

6                   And this particular slide, as Ms.  
7 Campbell explained, you want the percentage to be  
8 lower, while recognizing the need to deliver good  
9 customer service. And so there's a balance there that  
10 has to be struck, but lower percentages essentially  
11 mean that MPI uses the money collected from the  
12 ratepayers more efficiently, more prudently, as that  
13 number decreases.

14                   Ms. McCandless touched upon the  
15 employees, which, of course, are MPI's largest  
16 expense. And the budget would say that the Basic  
17 salaries are expected to grow at an annual average of  
18 only 2.3 percent over the next few years, and that's  
19 from 2019/20 to 2021/22.

20                   The budget full-time equivalent numbers  
21 -- MPIC is not forecasting increases to the FTE  
22 numbers; that is, they don't expect it to grow. But  
23 those numbers, as you may recall, Madam Chair, the --  
24 the full-time equivalent occupancy -- or, vacancy  
25 allowance is for those positions that are being held

1 in anticipation of those positions being filled one  
2 day. And so that number is constantly moving and  
3 being adjusted as -- as people retire.

4 On the vacancy allowance number, it was  
5 an unusual year for MPIC for retirements, and turnover  
6 led to an understatement of that particular allowance  
7 in this year's rate application. But the Corporation  
8 has confidence that as the accuracy of that number  
9 improves, with the implementation of NOVA, it will be  
10 adjusted to a number that more accurately affects --  
11 aff -- reflects the needs of the Corporation in terms  
12 of its employees.

13 On the PIPP side, the weekly indemnity  
14 claims -- as we heard from Mr. Johnston, there's a  
15 long-standing problem in increasing the claims  
16 persistency. That is the number of claims that are  
17 open for longer than 24 months.

18 To address this concern, you heard last  
19 year that MPIC has now hired thirteen (13) additional  
20 claims management staff to address this, and through  
21 active case management, the Corporation is hoping to  
22 reduce the long-tail PIPP claims and return people to  
23 work. And so that, too, is a work in progress.

24 On centralized reserving, MPIC is  
25 continuing with its efforts to improve the consistency

1 and adequacy of its case reserves. And the  
2 centralized reserving system, which we heard evidence  
3 about last year and again this year, seeks to improve  
4 this forecasting.

5                   The change in the fiscal year is  
6 something that the Corporation is doing primarily as a  
7 result of the government asking MPIC to do so to align  
8 with their fiscal year. The Corporation notes that it  
9 has a very low impact on very few ratepayers.

10                   You'll recall the evidence that it  
11 really only affects those customers that are renewing  
12 in March of -- of -- on the calendar year. And the  
13 March customers used to be at the front of the queue,  
14 and as the graph shows, they will then be moved to --  
15 to the back of the queue in terms of their renewal.

16                   So the rate stabilization reserve is  
17 what I want to touch upon next, and it'll move into  
18 the capital side of this submission. As Ms.  
19 McCandless indicated, the RSR is to protect -- protect  
20 motorist from rate increases that would otherwise have  
21 been necessary due to unexpected variances from  
22 forecasted results. So that's one (1) aspect of it.  
23 Or it could be used for events and losses arising from  
24 non-recurring events or factors.

25                   So this year, there was a transfer of

1 \$60 million that occurred in February of 2019, and  
2 that served to increase the minimum capital test from  
3 37 percent to 52 percent. And you heard Mr. Johnston  
4 indicate that the two (2) biggest drivers of  
5 increasing that MCT percentage are the transfers that  
6 occur from the Extension line of business over the  
7 past four (4) or five (5) years along with the  
8 retention of the RSR income -- investment income.

9           And as Mr. Bunston indicated, and Mr.  
10 Johnston, there was also an increase to the Basic MCT  
11 that resulted from the new investment strategy ma --  
12 being implemented, so that -- that investment  
13 strategy, under the ALM study, served to lower the  
14 capital needs of the Corporation.

15           So you'll see that after the transfer,  
16 the Corporation was at 52 percent. By the end of Q1,  
17 as the strategy -- the investment strategy became  
18 implemented, that MCT number rose to 87 percent. And  
19 then end of Q2, which was September 1st, the  
20 Corporation was essentially at 100 percent MCT, as  
21 we've heard.

22           Mr. Johnston testified that the  
23 investment income on the RSR was not used in the  
24 calculation of the AAP breakeven rate, and there --  
25 I'll touch upon that later. Mr. Johnston's of the

1 view that that particular investment income, that  
2 money, should be -- should remain on the capital side  
3 of the business and not be included in AAP rate  
4 making.

5 And the last line there is important  
6 because it says:

7 "The retention of that investment  
8 income has no material impact on the  
9 overall rate indication."

10 And there is something that the -- the  
11 Board can look to to confirm what I'm about to say.  
12 It's Undertaking number 15. MPI fil -- filed it as  
13 Exhibit number 42. And if you look at pro forma line  
14 -- Pro Forma 3, line 7, you'll see that, essentially,  
15 what happens is if the RSR investment income was used  
16 in the calculation of the AAP breakeven rate -- so  
17 different than what Mr. Johnston does, and as  
18 advocated by Mr. Pelly, I believe. If it was used on  
19 that side, on the AAP rate side, it would trigger a  
20 capital build provision on the capital side.

21 And so by triggering a capital build  
22 provision, you're essentially moving money from one  
23 (1) side to the next, and the overall rate indication  
24 would be -- would have been the same this year. So we  
25 have a negative 6 percent rate indication, with a

1 retention of the RSR investment income.

2 Had that particular income been applied  
3 to rate making, the triggering of the build provision  
4 under the capital management plan would have brought  
5 the overall rate indication to a negative point six  
6 (.6). So there's no mat -- that's why the slide said  
7 there's no maperial -- no material impact, regardless  
8 of which way the -- the investment income is handled.

9 The reserves regulation, as Ms.  
10 McCandless said, was enacted back in April of 2019,  
11 and it requires MPIC to be at 100 percent on a go-  
12 forward basis. Section 3, we say, is the important  
13 part of that particular regulation, the germane  
14 portion of that regulation, which speaks to what use  
15 the Corporation should make of the surplus monies in  
16 the rate stabilization reserve. And if you look at  
17 Section 3, it makes it pretty clear that once that  
18 target is met, any excess money in the RSR, the Basic  
19 RSR, should be applied for the purpose of lowering the  
20 rate indication.

21 It's important to -- to remember when  
22 hearing submissions later on about the reserves  
23 regulation, Madam Chair, that Mr. Graham maintains  
24 that while that we're moving the needle on having more  
25 reserves than we have in the past, we are still at

1 what he calls the minimum of the minimum. It's a  
2 minimum capital test: not a dollar more, not a dollar  
3 less. And through management action, as we've heard,  
4 and the financial success of the Corporation in the  
5 past number of months, we have achieved -- we have  
6 essentially achieved that target as of now.

7           On the investment side, there ar -- are  
8 a couple of things I want to discuss with you. One  
9 (1) is the status of the asset liability management  
10 study, its implementation, MPI's risk appetite,  
11 reducing the interest rate risk for the Basic  
12 portfolio, and lastly, the ongoing benefit of the  
13 shadow portfolios that were looked at in this year's  
14 rate application.

15           So when I mention questioning MPI's  
16 risk appetite, it really is a matter of looking at how  
17 the Corporation decided to hedge its interest rate  
18 risk. You'll recall from the ALM study that it was  
19 based on a nominal lial -- liability benchmark; that  
20 is, the MPI portfolios are founded on a nominal  
21 liability benchmark.

22           The shadow portfolios, on the other  
23 hand, were founded on a real liability benchmark. And  
24 so my understanding of that is the Corporation has  
25 assumed a 2 percent inflation risk by adopting the

1 nominal liability benchmark, and they haven't hedged  
2 real interest rate risk. And that's the -- that's the  
3 difference.

4                   And it's important to remember, and  
5 this was canvassed last year at length, that the  
6 Corporation made that decision based on its forecast  
7 of inflation. And there was no evidence last year nor  
8 this year that would suggest that that inflation  
9 forecast is going to rise for an extended period of  
10 time above 2 percent.

11                   And so we say the nominal liability  
12 benchmark is still the best benchmark, and -- and tho  
13 -- those were the reasons the Corporation and its  
14 board of directors selected that. And that was an  
15 investment decision that wa -- that they made at the  
16 outset of the study.

17                   Now, the CAC -- and you heard some  
18 evidence from Mr. Makarchuk on this -- when examining  
19 the shadow portfolios, it was important to note that  
20 Mr. Williams was having him look at one (1) of the  
21 shadow portfolios and move it around and -- and try  
22 and move it in the real liability benchmark. So what  
23 we have, Madam Chair, is we have portfolios that are  
24 designed on the nominal liability benchmark, a  
25 different platform, and they're injected onto a --

1 another platform. And Mr. Williams there is asking  
2 Mr. Makarchuk, how do we deal with this and -- and  
3 move them over with the real return bonds?

4 And Mr. Makarchuk quite candidly said,  
5 well, you would have to shorten your provincials or --  
6 or do something weird because it doesn't work. And --  
7 and the comparison that they were trying to make isn't  
8 a fair one. And -- and that's why I brought to the  
9 Board's attention that all of the slides that were put  
10 forward by the Mercer group indicated that this was  
11 based on a real liability benchmark, because that is  
12 not what the MPIC portfolio is founded upon.

13 Other benefits of the -- of the ALM  
14 study are the mitigation of interest rate risk. We  
15 know that by doing that, the Corporation hopes to  
16 avoid further large-magnitude net income losses. The  
17 de-risking of the Basic claims portfolio, as I've  
18 indicated, decreases the capital that's required in  
19 the calculation of the MCT.

20 And lastly, the segregated portfolios  
21 are now what I've -- I've referred to as a fit for the  
22 purpose. They're more closely aligned to the  
23 objectives of each of the portfolios.

24 So for example, the RSR portfolio,  
25 which doesn't have any liabilities to back, has more

1 growth assets in it than the Basic claims portfolio,  
2 which is comprised entirely of fixed-income, lower-  
3 risk investments, because the primary purpose of those  
4 investments, those bonds, are to back the liabilities  
5 of the Basic program.

6           You don't have that same objective for  
7 the RSR, and again, there's different objectives for  
8 the pension portfolio. So again, they're more closely  
9 aligned to the objective and the segregated portfolio  
10 strategy MPI says is -- is a better way of doing  
11 things than the old commingled version of the -- of  
12 the investment fund.

13           So on the ongoing benefit of those  
14 shadow portfolios, Madam Chair, a couple things to  
15 remember -- that the securities in those portfolios  
16 are contrary to MPIC's inves -- investment objectives  
17 and the risk tolerance. So we heard evidence about  
18 growth assets that were in the Basic claims portfolio.  
19 The Corporation decided against purchasing growth  
20 assets for the Basic claims portfolio.

21           The Corporation also decided against  
22 leveraging. Leveraging is -- is a strategy, Madam  
23 Chair, that would have an investor borrow money to  
24 purchase securities. And we heard from Mr. Makarchuk  
25 that it's a risky proposition.

1                   But that is what the shadow portfolios  
2 have done. They've -- they've made use of a leveraged  
3 investment strategy, taken on more risk. Risk is  
4 something that the Corporation and its board of  
5 directors wanted to avoid. So remember that when  
6 we're looking at the comparisons that we saw on how  
7 each of the shadow portfolios was performing against  
8 the actual portfolios.

9                   The second thing is the -- the time  
10 frame. So the comparison was made for a six (6) month  
11 period. You heard Mr. Makarchuk say that's highly  
12 unusual. Normally, it's about five (5) years. So  
13 bear that in mind when looking at the comparisons.

14                   And lastly, the preliminary comparison  
15 does, we say, show the reasonableness of the  
16 portfolios selected by the Corporation. And here are  
17 those comparisons. So the returns are largely similar  
18 for the Basic claims portfolio, with MPI having  
19 outperformed the shadow portfolios over the first six  
20 (6) months. In our -- in our view, that means  
21 nothing, because as we heard Mr. Makarchuk say, it's  
22 not a six (6) month race, it's a five (5) year race.  
23 And so that number can move around, and nothing should  
24 really be taken from that.

25                   On the pension side, the MPIC Basic

1 portfolio -- or sorry, the MPIC pension portfolio,  
2 that should read, has underperformed, particularly the  
3 unconstrained shadow portfolio for pension. That  
4 unconstrained shadow portfolio has outperformed the  
5 actual pension portfolio by twice the amount. But  
6 again, that particular shadow portfolio contains  
7 investments that the Corporation was not prepared to  
8 purchase, strategies that the Corporation was not  
9 prepared to employ, like leveraging.

10           And so those numbers, we say, should be  
11 -- should be looked at with caution, and -- and  
12 remembering those two (2) important points, the  
13 comparison time frame and the objectives of the  
14 Corporation and its risk tolerance.

15           The last thing I might mention, Madam  
16 Chair, is -- is concerning the utility of the shadow  
17 portfolio on an ongoing basis. Bear in mind that you  
18 are looking at this through the lens of hindsight. So  
19 it's easy for people to look back and say, well, we  
20 should have done this. If you had have purchased  
21 these securities, or if you had have employed the real  
22 liability benchmark, you would have been doing better,  
23 and you would have been bringing in more investment  
24 return for the customers, lowering claims costs.

25           And the benefit of hindsight,

1 particularly where it concerns investments, is -- is  
2 something to be avoided, in our view. That -- I guess  
3 the analogy might be none of us would be here today,  
4 Madam Chair, if in 1984, we had bought Apple stock,  
5 but we didn't, and we're all still working.

6                   So remember that, and -- and we think  
7 that at this stage, the asset liability management  
8 study, which is almost fully implemented, should be  
9 left alone. Let the investments run their course, and  
10 -- and see how the fund performs over the next couple  
11 of years.

12

13   (BRIEF PAUSE)

14

15                   MR. STEVEN SCARFONE:     The Motorcycle  
16 Group intervened this -- this year, Madam Chair, and  
17 raised a couple of concerns. One is -- is the concern  
18 that they normally have, and -- and that is that their  
19 rate increase, notwithstanding what's happening to the  
20 private passenger vehicles, their particular premiums  
21 are going up.

22                                   We do note on this slide, that  
23 notwithstanding that, Manitoba motorcyclists pay the  
24 lowest rates in Canada, and that's important, because  
25 that's an inherently risky mode of transportation, as

1 we know. And we heard evidence for Mr. Johnston that  
2 the large majority of their claims costs are on the  
3 injury side. PIPP benefits being paid to  
4 motorcyclists, and most of them are long-term injury  
5 claims, which means they are particularly sensitive to  
6 interest rate changes. The -- the claims generally  
7 are longer than twenty-four (24) months, and some of  
8 them, as you might expect, are lifetime claims.

9                   So you'll see there that the rate  
10 change disproportionately affected by changes in the  
11 new money yield used for rate making, a significant  
12 proportion of the loss costs, as I've said, are for  
13 the long PIPP benefits. And the other drivers of the  
14 rate increase -- or the increase in the forecasted  
15 overall claims costs and a low upgrade factor, which  
16 results in the required rate change of 5.1 percent.

17

18   (BRIEF PAUSE)

19

20                   MR. STEVEN SCARFONE:     And there you  
21 see the 5.1 percent. So their bill goes up by forty-  
22 one dollars (\$41) this year, as opposed to some of the  
23 other indicated rate changes.

24                   On the Extension side, which is before  
25 this tribunal because of the Capital Management Plan,

1 I would suggest, Mr. Graham indicated there that. He  
2 inherited an organization that was in some respects  
3 secretive, and he made reference to a black hole of  
4 money that sat with Extension. It was difficult for  
5 MPIC, in his view, to defend itself because of our  
6 reluctance to be transparent on the Extension side.

7           So this year, the Public Utilities  
8 Board had look-see into Extension. So as a result of  
9 having proposed a Capital Management Plan, it became  
10 necessary for the -- the Board to understand how much  
11 money the Corporation makes on the Extension side,  
12 what its forecast was for its capital targets, because  
13 as you'll hear later, transfers only occur once  
14 Extension line of business reaches 200 percent MCT,  
15 and that the extra money will be backing Basic,  
16 essentially. So prior to the \$60 million transfer  
17 that occurred earlier this year, the Extension MCT, as  
18 the application says, was at 527 percent.

19           And so I've -- as I've indicated, that  
20 makes Extension revenues important to discuss before  
21 this Board, but we do have to be careful about the  
22 depth that the PUB examines revenues and expenses,  
23 because it is a competitive line of business. And so  
24 we would disagree with Ms. McCandless when she  
25 mentioned oversight. We would characterize it better

1 as insight into Extension, not oversight.

2

3

(BRIEF PAUSE)

4

5 MR. STEVEN SCARFONE: So that leads me  
6 into the proposed Capital Management Plan, why we need  
7 one, largely as a result of the reserves regulation,  
8 which serves as the anchor point to the Capital  
9 Management Plan. Secondly, you'll recall from  
10 application in the overview section, there's an  
11 attachment there that has the mandate letter -- the  
12 mandate letter sent to MPIC from the government that  
13 asks for MPIC to engage this Board to implement a  
14 Capital Management Plan with MCT targets. And so  
15 that's another reason that we say we need one.

16 And lastly, it's the method by which  
17 this Board will ensure compliance with the regulation,  
18 should this Board find that the regulation is valid.  
19 And when we say compliance -- and I'll get into this  
20 in a bit -- the Capital Management Plan sets out the  
21 mechanism to achieve and -- and be at that 100 percent  
22 MCT target under the regulation.

23 We say that the Capital Management Plan  
24 makes good sense, and -- and should be approved by  
25 this Board. And -- and I don't want to simplify

1 things, but more capital equals more stability and  
2 less volatility. That the Corporation's view.

3 We understand that there's opposing  
4 views, particularly from Ms. Sherry, who would say 100  
5 percent MCT means the Corporation is holding too much  
6 ratepayer money. We disagree.

7 The transfers have moved from being  
8 discretionary to nondiscretionary. And they're  
9 automatic, so to the extent that the threshold in the  
10 Extension line of business exceeds 200 percent, there  
11 will be an automatic transfer every year, and I'll  
12 show you a slide to that effect later. But there is a  
13 pace to the rebuilds. Should a -- a build provision  
14 be required, it will be spread over five (5) years to  
15 help mitigate any build associated volatility.

16 On the -- the point that I raised about  
17 more capital, it's important to -- to remember -- and  
18 -- and Mr. Todd took issue with this -- the upper  
19 range of the -- of the target last year was \$315  
20 million, as ordered by the PUB. You heard Mr.  
21 Johnston indicate that the current dollar amount for  
22 100 percent MCT is about 375 million.

23 So we are now holding \$60 million more  
24 in capital than the upper target from last year. So  
25 when you hear Dr. Simpson say that the range is more

1 volatile than -- than a point source, and -- and I  
2 think Mr. Todd said the same thing, that, in our view,  
3 doesn't make sense, because how can there be more  
4 volatility at three seventy-five (375) than there is  
5 three fifty (350)?

6                   And so we disagree with that, but they  
7 would say, well, yes, but there are other factors,  
8 including that -- that represents too much capital.  
9 Well, that's an academic debate, but the -- the --  
10 there's no doubt that holding more capital has to mean  
11 less volatility, more money to draw from the RSR in  
12 the event those unforeseen events happen to occur.

13                   And -- and lastly, we would note that  
14 the Corporation has achieved its 100 percent MCT --  
15 MCT target without any build provision, without any  
16 ask of ratepayers in this year's rate application.

17

18                   (BRIEF PAUSE)

19

20                   MR. STEVEN SCARFONE:    So Mr. Todd  
21 provided some expert evidence. He -- he did what I  
22 would call an objective evaluation of the Capital  
23 Management Plan. And we say that MPIC's Capital  
24 Management Plan addresses two (2) common regulator  
25 concerns. He said, Regulators are commonly concerned

1 with avoiding cross subsidization and limiting anti-  
2 competitive activity.

3                   The benefits derived by Extension, and  
4 -- and there's no question that Extension does derive  
5 benefits from the Basic program, need to be offset  
6 with capital transfers from Extension to Basic, and  
7 that's exactly what the Capital Management Plan does.  
8 It contemplates transfers to offset any anti-  
9 competitive activity, and certainly, there's no cross  
10 subsidization of Extension by Basic. Mr. Todd  
11 indicated it's the exact opposite. The subsidization  
12 is flowing the other way, the money is going from  
13 Extension to Basic.

14                   And lastly, he said, Transferred --  
15 transfers should be used to ensure the capital target  
16 is met. And -- and there was the exchange with Mr.  
17 Todd. During his testimony, he's talking about the  
18 210 percent there. So he's talking about the  
19 Extension. He said, That 10 percent would be  
20 available for transfer, and then it's used to lower  
21 the rate indication. Well, he said, It could be used  
22 in a number of ways. It could be used to reduce  
23 rates. It could be used to provide a rebate.

24                   And I asked him, It might also be used  
25 to achieve the capital target of Basic?

1                   And he said, Yes, if the monopoly is  
2 lower than 100 percent, yes. Mr. Todd said, That  
3 would be the first recourse.

4                   So if you're prioritizing use, in Mr.  
5 Todd's view, again consistent with what's in the  
6 Capital Management Plan, you first top up 200 percent.  
7 That's what the money's for, top up the capital. Once  
8 you're topped up in Basic, then you can think about  
9 reducing rates, or perhaps even a rebate, but it's not  
10 before you've met your 100 percent MCT target.

11                   So this is the slide that we -- we've  
12 produced that shows the anticipated transfers from the  
13 Extension line of business. You'll see there the \$60  
14 million that was already transferred in February. You  
15 heard Mr. Johnston say that this coming year, another  
16 75 million will be transferred. The reason for that  
17 being higher than the following years is because the  
18 60 million that was transferred in February did not  
19 represent the full amount to bring it down to 200  
20 percent MCT. So there's still extra money in there.  
21 That extra money is going to be coming over this year  
22 and in the form of \$75 million.

23                   Thereafter, it's fairly consistent.  
24 The projections are about 40 to \$45 million every year  
25 transferred into Basic under the Capital Management

1 Plan. And there you see how it will affect the Basic  
2 MCT, and the projections that are made on how that  
3 number will -- will rise, I would suggest, with one  
4 (1) exception in 2023. And the projections right now  
5 are that in 2024, there would be excess capital in  
6 Basic, resulting in a triggering of the capital  
7 release provisions under the Capital Management Plan.

8                   So this is -- this -- these next few  
9 slides depict, in our view, to assist the Board in  
10 understanding how the Capital Management Plan works.  
11 And it -- and it will show you both the rate-making  
12 side and the capital side, and how the two (2) work  
13 together in coming up with the overall rate  
14 indication.

15                   So on this first slide, you see the  
16 claims forecast less the Basic claims investment  
17 income. And so when you remove the investment income,  
18 you get what's called the actual -- the actuarial  
19 claims cost, so that's the AAP rate that the  
20 Corporation needs. And we'll label that box A.

21                   On the capital side, Madam Chair, is  
22 the 100 percent MCT target under the reserves  
23 regulation. And so every year under the Capital  
24 Management Plan, the Corporation will look to see  
25 where it's at as compared against its target. So the

1 actual Basic MC -- MCT, whatever that number might be.  
2 In this case, as depicted here, it's lower than the  
3 target, which would of course mean we need to find a  
4 way to get up to 100 percent MCT.

5                   And as the Capital Management Plan  
6 indicates, it does so not in year 1 or year 2. It's  
7 spread out over five (5) years. So if the  
8 Corporation's is -- is not at its target, it comes up  
9 with a number that it needs to meet, and spreads that  
10 out over five (5) years. The first two (2) years,  
11 you'll see there, move together, because that's the  
12 forecast period, and that gets you to step 3, which is  
13 your MCT ratio.

14                   And so we don't know what's happening  
15 after years 1 and 2, because those are outside the  
16 forecast period, but we know that this is what we need  
17 to start moving up on that five (5) step depiction  
18 that you saw earlier. So that is B, and there's C,  
19 your 100 percent MCT target. So that's how the -- the  
20 build provision operates under the Plan.

21                   And there's the future state. So we  
22 know that B is moving us closer to the target, but  
23 we're not there yet, and the future state, as  
24 indicated there, excess Extension, plus RSR investment  
25 income, plus actual Basic MCT. Those would -- those

1 would be the factors that go into moving us toward the  
2 goal of 100 percent MCT.

3                   So on this particular side -- slide,  
4 sorry, you have the financial source on one (1) side,  
5 which is the premium that we collect from our  
6 customers as against the AAP claims cost. That's a  
7 level scale. That's the breakeven rate-making model.

8                   However, when you include capital and  
9 in there, there's the targeted MCT ratio that I spoke  
10 of earlier that the Corporation would need to achieve  
11 its 100 percent MCT target. You'll see, Madam Chair,  
12 that -- that targeted MCT ratio is lower than the  
13 Extension that was transferred from -- the capital  
14 that was transferred from Extension, and the RSR  
15 investment income that Mr. Johnston wants to retain.

16                   So those two (2) factors are balanced  
17 against the ratio. And you'll see that it tips the  
18 scale. There's not enough money. There's not enough  
19 capital to keep the -- to keep the scale balanced, and  
20 so that's when the capital build comes in. And the  
21 capital build rights the scale and puts -- puts the  
22 Corporation back in balance.

23                   That's scenario 1, that's the -- that's  
24 the build provision. And it's the capital build and  
25 the premium that makes up the overall rate indication.

1 And as I've said earlier, no matter what you do on  
2 that side of the scale with that RSR investment  
3 income, it's going to ultimately end up with the same  
4 overall rate indication.

5                   You just -- you either cli -- you  
6 either give it to the ratepayers on this side, which  
7 would trigger a build provision, or you collect it  
8 from the ratepayers on the capital side, where you  
9 keep it on the capital side and you don't collect  
10 anything on the rate-making side.

11                   And then in Scenario 2, Madam Chair,  
12 this is that the other side of the Capital Management  
13 Plan and the release provisions.

14                   So here you'll see that the scale is  
15 tipped in favour of too much money. So when you saw  
16 that the MCT in 2024 was at a hundred and three  
17 percent, that's this scenario where you have excess  
18 capital and the financial need isn't as great as the  
19 money that the Corporation is holding.

20                   And so that then triggers the capital  
21 release in the form of lower rates for MPIC customers  
22 and the scale gets balanced and the premium is -- or  
23 the overall rate indication would be the premiums less  
24 the capital release.

25                   And so that particular presentation or

1 that depiction we hope helps the panel in  
2 understanding the capital management plan. That was  
3 put together not by -- they don't teach those skills  
4 at Robson Hall. That was put together by the  
5 regulatory team, Mr. Meira and Mr. Crozier and his --  
6 his team. So we hope that was of some assistance to  
7 the -- to the Board.

8 I think we've frozen. Oh, here we go.  
9 I'll just back up. It's frozen.

10

11 (BRIEF PAUSE)

12

13 MR. STEVEN SCARFONE: Here we go. So  
14 next topic is the transparency issue that Mr. Triggs  
15 touched upon and fiscal prudence. Of course, number 1  
16 on that list is Project NOVA representing the largest  
17 capital project undertaken by the Corporation just  
18 under a hundred million dollars.

19 And that's -- it's a business project  
20 that's designed to upgrade the -- the systems that  
21 MPIC has in place including the claims administration  
22 reporting system. The insurance workstation that you  
23 heard is made use of by both the brokers and MPIC.  
24 Other topics for discussion are the service agreements  
25 and the service delivery.

1                   On Project NOVA, this particular slide  
2 was taken from the application. Why is MPIC  
3 modernizing its legacy systems? That is the result of  
4 having two (2) independent consulting firms look into  
5 MPIC systems to address those five (5) key issues,  
6 none of which are more or less important than the  
7 other.

8                   But our mandate -- MPIC's mandate is  
9 providing customer service good rates, and so we say  
10 NOVA primarily is for the customer, and it will  
11 enhance and facilitate MPI's vision of moving online,  
12 and we can't do it without implementing the upgrade as  
13 contemplated by Project NOVA.

14                   There you see the three (3) factors for  
15 Project NOVA: discipline meaning external  
16 consultation to assess the candidacy and guidance for  
17 the business case which is before this panel in the  
18 confidential module.

19                   You heard evidence from Mr. Bunko and  
20 his team about the use of the new agile methodology  
21 and the advantages that that particular methodology  
22 will provide in ensuring that NOVA is implemented with  
23 success, again the business case fully transparent in  
24 the confidential module.

25                   There was a panel that spoke about the

1 net present value and the benefit or the return of the  
2 investment dollars on that particular project. That,  
3 again, I won't touch upon in this public forum, but  
4 it's all in the confidential module, and the panel  
5 heard evidence on that.

6                   And you'll also recall, Madam Chair,  
7 that there the governance structure that was out --  
8 that was set out for the panel that shows the  
9 particular personnel that are involved in the  
10 implementation of -- of NOVA along with an independent  
11 program governance advisor.

12                   And there is the governance model  
13 before you, Madam Chair.

14

15                   (BRIEF PAUSE)

16

17                   MR. STEVEN SCARFONE:    So the key point  
18 there is -- and Project NOVA, again a very large  
19 capital project that is being undertaken by the  
20 Corporation. The payback period estimated to be  
21 fourteen (14) years, and the net present value using a  
22 7.5 percent discount rate at \$12.7 million in the  
23 positive.

24

25                   (BRIEF PAUSE)

1 THE CHAIRPERSON: Mr. Scarfone --

2 MR. STEVEN SCARFONE: Yes.

3 THE CHAIRPERSON: -- is this an  
4 opportune time to take a break for a few minutes --  
5 give you a chance to rest your voice -- or do you want  
6 to keep going?

7 MR. STEVEN SCARFONE: Well, I think --  
8 I've got a couple more slides left, Madam Chair, and  
9 then Mr. Guerra's going to take over. So maybe before  
10 Mr. Guerra does that, we could take a break, and then  
11 we can return and listen to his soothing voice for a  
12 little while.

13 THE CHAIRPERSON: Sure. That's fine.  
14 Thank you.

15 MR. STEVEN SCARFONE: So service  
16 agreements -- the Corporation had a service delivery  
17 panel that presented on a number of issues, one of  
18 which was the existing agreements that are currently  
19 in place with all of MPIC's service providers.

20 So that would not only include the  
21 Intervener Insurance Brokers Association of Manitoba  
22 but also all the other service providers that the  
23 Corporation engages to run its business. It's the  
24 chiropractors, the repair industry -- all of that is  
25 included under the -- the large topic of service

1 agreements.

2                   And the -- the issue that Mr. Triggs  
3 touched upon, the Corporation wants to be as  
4 transparent as possible in providing to this Board the  
5 details of those particular service agreements so that  
6 the Board is satisfied that they're fair and  
7 reasonable and provide good value for Manitobans that  
8 the -- that they promote competition and that they  
9 don't infringe upon anti-competitive negotiation  
10 between service provider and Manitoba Public  
11 Insurance.

12                   And -- and as recognized by the IBAM  
13 panel, MPIC and its service providers depend on one  
14 another. They're business partners. And so it's  
15 important that there be a good working relationship on  
16 a go-forward basis with all of its service providers.

17                   The Corporation would say some of these  
18 agreements do not benefit MPI's core business  
19 interests. And so -- and some subagreements do not --  
20 are no longer fit into MPIC's mandate.

21                   So we heard some evidence about a  
22 funding agreement or a sponsorship agreement with  
23 the -- with the brokers. That particular agreement  
24 was put in an end by the new executive for those very  
25 reasons.

1                   And so when we speak to -- when we  
2 speak to promoting competition, Madam Chair, it is, as  
3 I've indicated -- the goal of that is to restrict  
4 anti-competitive behaviour in arriving at the  
5 negotiated terms of those service agreements. It is  
6 in the best interests of ratepayers that agreements be  
7 negotiated fairly.

8                   So, Madam Chair, what -- what can this  
9 Board do in terms of MPIC's agreements with the  
10 service providers?

11                   One recommendation that we think this  
12 Board can make is that all future arrangements  
13 affecting the compensation of service provider  
14 association members comply with the terms of the  
15 Competition Act. That's number 1.

16                   Secondly, in the spirit of  
17 transparency -- MPIC's ongoing commitment to  
18 transparency, order that MPIC file all such  
19 arrangements with this Board at the first general rate  
20 application subsequent to them having been entered  
21 into.

22                   So once the contract is signed, once  
23 the negotiations are done, the -- the Corporation  
24 would propose that the agreements are no longer held  
25 secret but rather put before this Board for

1 examination to ensure that they are meeting with the  
2 requirements of not only the Competition Act but that  
3 generally, they're fair and reasonable for Manitobans.

4 And lastly, order MPIC to file evidence  
5 demonstrating that the compensation arrangements  
6 reflect prudent costs are just and reasonable and  
7 again comply with the Competition Act.

8

9 (BRIEF PAUSE)

10

11 MR. STEVEN SCARFONE: On service  
12 delivery, management has discretion to make service  
13 delivery decisions. And MPIC, as we've heard with the  
14 evidence that was provided by the Brokers Association,  
15 views the presentation of its future online service  
16 delivery model as another example of its increased  
17 transparency with the PUB.

18 MPIC knows that its customers expect  
19 and deserve the right to complete transactions online  
20 by themselves if they so choose and that it supports  
21 and it's committed to a shared distribution channel  
22 with its brokers to deliver these services online.

23 As Mr. Triggs indicated, the  
24 Corporation has sought to be open and transparent with  
25 the PUB about this particular issue. This is not, we

1 would say, about airing dirty laundry. This is about  
2 ensuring that MPI get online services delivery right.  
3 This will affect not only the quality of customer  
4 service but also, of course, revenues and costs.

5

6 (BRIEF PAUSE)

7

8 MR. STEVEN SCARFONE: MPIC will expect  
9 to provide updates to this Board in future GRAs but  
10 does not seek or expect direction on how to go about  
11 entering into these service delivery contracts.

12 And so this, Madam Chair, I would  
13 suggest is the appropriate time to break. And -- and  
14 if the -- if the panel has questions now or if they  
15 want to wait till the end of the presentation, I'm  
16 happy to oblige them in either respect.

17

18 (BRIEF PAUSE)

19

20 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: I'm just --  
21 sorry, I'm just wondering during the break, the  
22 PowerPoint presentation and the copy of the PowerPoint  
23 presentation are now off. And I just want to make  
24 sure that we don't -- that we haven't missed a page in  
25 the written one we have.

1 Mr. Crozier's -- sorry -- Mr. Crozier  
2 is shaking his head. Is -- I don't know if it's a  
3 title page that was missed when it was printed, but  
4 the -- the numbering is now off.

5 MR. JEFF CROZIER: Yes. Slide --  
6 slide 17 was the rate stabilization reserve title  
7 page, and I think in the PDFing process, the content  
8 of slide 18 -- the following slide which just is the  
9 definition of the rate stabilization reserve -- ended  
10 up underneath -- or on that title page.

11 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: Okay.

12 MR. JEFF CROZIER: So there's no  
13 content, but they are off, and it's -- if you go to  
14 slide 17, you'll see that's where it misaligns.

15 That being said, the exhibit that was  
16 filed is an exact -- an exact copy of this.

17 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: That's fine. I  
18 just want to make sure there is -- there wasn't an  
19 important page that we've -- that we missed.

20

21 (BRIEF PAUSE)

22

23 THE CHAIRPERSON: Okay. Thank you  
24 very much, Mr. Scarfone. At this point, I think we  
25 will proceed to break, and we may have some questions

1 following the break, but once we're back, we will  
2 know.

3 MR. STEVEN SCARFONE: Thank you.

4 THE CHAIRPERSON: I'd like to adjourn  
5 to 10:50, please. So that's -- ten (10) to 11:00,  
6 we'll come back then. Thank you.

7

8 --- Upon recessing at 10:34 a.m.

9 --- Upon resuming at 10:55 a.m.

10

11 THE CHAIRPERSON: Okay. Thank you  
12 very much.

13 Yes, Mr. Scarfone, we have a couple of  
14 questions for you. The first is, I wondered if you  
15 could point us to any case law or principle of  
16 statutory interpretation that would support MPI's  
17 interpretation of the reserves regulation as set out  
18 in the capital maintenance plan, which allows a five  
19 (5) year build, three (3) year release provision if  
20 you're not exactly at 100 percent MCT.

21 MR. STEVEN SCARFONE: So I -- I do  
22 believe that we may have provided a response to that  
23 particular question during the Information Request  
24 process, Madam Chair. But what the Corporation can do  
25 to specifically address your question is undertake to

1 provide a written submission -- a short wri -- written  
2 submission on any jurisprudence that might exists on  
3 the interpretation that the Corporation is taking with  
4 respect to that.

5 THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. That  
6 would be helpful.

7 MR. STEVEN SCARFONE: Yes.

8

9 --- UNDERTAKING NO. 39: MPI to provide a short  
10 written submission on any  
11 jurisprudence that might  
12 exists on the  
13 interpretation that the  
14 Corporation is taking with  
15 respect to reserves  
16 regulation, as set out in  
17 the capital maintenance  
18 plan, which allows a five  
19 (5) year build, three (3)  
20 year release provision if  
21 not exactly at 100 percent  
22 MCT

23

24 THE CHAIRPERSON: Mr. Gabor...?

25 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: Mr. Scarfone, if

1 we could go to page -- now, this is where we run into  
2 the interesting... The one behind, sorry. I have it  
3 as sixty-one (61). I guess it's prob -- it may be  
4 sixty-two (62), yeah, on the screen.

5 I'm a little confused on what you're  
6 proposing for the Board oversight over the  
7 relationships with -- with service providers. Are you  
8 suggesting that the Board would approve contracts?

9 MR. STEVEN SCARFONE: No.

10 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: Are you  
11 suggesting that the Board -- so are you suggesting  
12 that the Board could undo the contracts?

13 MR. STEVEN SCARFONE: No.

14 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: So if the Board,  
15 in your last bullet, looked at whether there are  
16 prudent costs that are just and reasonable, and the  
17 Board finds that they aren't, what are you suggesting  
18 the Board's jurisdiction is?

19 MR. STEVEN SCARFONE: Well, concerning  
20 contracts entered into -- so for example, we -- you  
21 might equate some of these service delivery contracts  
22 to the collective agreement that -- that the  
23 Corporation enters into with its unionized employees.  
24 Certainly, you know, you've heard evidence that thar -  
25 - there are increases that occur to the union

1 employees under that agreement that, we would suggest,  
2 are of really no moment for this particular Board.

3 MPIC's bound by them. We have to pay  
4 them. Those are expenses that we're -- we're  
5 contractually bound by.

6 Similarly, for these service delivery  
7 agreements, we're not asking that the -- that the --  
8 that the Board approve them in any way, but we're  
9 recommending, as we say here, that once they're  
10 entered into, they would be examined to ensure that  
11 they're fair and reasonable and just, and that they  
12 provide benefit to Manitobans, and that they're --  
13 they were fairly negotiated and in compliance with the  
14 provisions of the Competition Act.

15 If the Board was to find that they  
16 weren't, we would expect that there would be some  
17 direction by the Board on how the Corporation might go  
18 about ensuring that the next agreements are entered  
19 into in what the Board de -- thinks is a fair and  
20 reasonable manner.

21 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: Okay. I don't  
22 know if there's going to be any further comment in  
23 relation to the issue about online. We asked  
24 specifically that the parties address what the parties  
25 thought our jurisdiction were on that issue and

1 further, what the parties sought in terms of either a  
2 recommendation or a directi -- sorry, a directive or a  
3 recommendation.

4 Unless your co-counsel is going to  
5 raise it, I think I've heard all that you were  
6 presenting on online. On those two (2) points,  
7 though, does the -- does MPI have a position on what  
8 our jurisdiction is and what you would seek in terms  
9 of a -- a directive or recommendation?

10 MR. STEVEN SCARFONE: So I'm told that  
11 -- oh, sure. Yeah, Mr. Triggs will answer it because  
12 he -- he touched upon this in the -- in the written  
13 submission.

14 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: Okay. I haven't  
15 had an opportunity to read --

16 MR. STEVEN SCARFONE: No, of course.

17 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: -- the written  
18 submission --

19 MR. STEVEN SCARFONE: Yes.

20 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: -- so.

21 MR. MICHAEL TRIGGS: Mr. Gabor, it is  
22 dealt with in -- in detail in the written submission.  
23 At the end of the day, this information is provided to  
24 the Board as -- for transparency purpose, for  
25 information purposes. We're on the brink of a major

1 transformational change in the way we do business, and  
2 it's prudent upon MPI to bring this to the PUB's  
3 attention. Do we want anything on the PUB on this  
4 matter? No.

5 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: Okay.

6 MR. MICHAEL TRIGGS: And we -- we  
7 don't believe that you have jurisdiction to give  
8 orders on the nature of the service provided, how it's  
9 delivered, and -- and any sort of agreements that may  
10 come regarding the compensation associated with the  
11 delivery of that.

12 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: Okay. Thank you,  
13 sir.

14 THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much.  
15 Mr. Guerra...?

16 MR. STEVEN SCARFONE: Just one (1)  
17 last comment, madam Chair. So we do note Mr. Gabor is  
18 correct in that when we adjourned before closing, the  
19 Board asked for certain things be included in MPIC's  
20 closing submissions, one (1) of which was the reserves  
21 regulation, its validity, the various sub-issues under  
22 Issue 18.

23 And so I don't want to leave the Board  
24 thinking that MPIC is done on that front, but what we  
25 proposed to do, because the onus would be on the

1 consumers' group, is to have them make their argument.  
2 The presumption is in the favour of the validity. So  
3 when they make their argument, MPIC will then address  
4 that argument in its reply.

5 THE CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Thank you, Mr.  
6 Scarfone.

7 Mr. Guerra...?

8 MR. ANTHONY GUERRA: Thank you, Madam  
9 Chair. I'm going to go to the -- the next portion of  
10 the presentation, which is the last four (4) bullet  
11 points, five (5) to eight (8): road safety, driver  
12 safety rating, improving the GRA process, and our  
13 conclusion.

14 One might be tempted to think that I  
15 will be speaking as long as My Learned Friend and --  
16 and colleague, Mr. Scarfone, and I think Mr. Scarfone  
17 also thought that would be the case as well when we  
18 div -- divided up the -- the labour on -- on this  
19 presentation, but the next few slides, we'll actually  
20 -- we'll go through pretty quickly.

21 So in terms of the first issue of road  
22 safety, there was a lot of discussion this year in --  
23 in the process before and after -- or, sorry, the --  
24 before and during the hearing process about road  
25 safety. We had a two (2) day technical conference.

1 We had multiple days of the hearing process here  
2 devoted towards the topic of road safety. We had over  
3 thirty (3) Information Requests that -- that dealt  
4 with directly or indirectly the issue of road safety.  
5 And I -- I would note that that was among the top  
6 three (3) most canvassed issues in the discovery  
7 portion of -- of this GRA.

8                   And -- and -- and the -- the topic you  
9 see here obviously involves, from a budgetary  
10 perspective, a -- a very modest budget compared to  
11 other budgets that MPI was discussing this year,  
12 namely, things like Project NOVA. And one would be  
13 tempted to take a look at the current graph and seeing  
14 the -- the minute changes from year to year and see  
15 that as, perhaps, an area of concern. But we would  
16 submit that the issue here is not the exponential  
17 growth of the road safety budget but more importantly  
18 the optimization of the budget.

19                   And so the evidence that was present by  
20 -- by MPI through the course of this proceeding were -  
21 - were based upon the efforts that were being made by  
22 MPI, in fact, to optimize its spending on road safety.  
23 And MPI recognizes that road safety is an issue that -  
24 - that should be dealt with to some extent in the --  
25 the course of this hearing. The -- the issue really

1 becomes to what degree and how often and -- and  
2 whether or not we engage in such a large endeavour  
3 every other year with respect to this issue.

4 MPI would say that the issue of road  
5 safety is very important and -- and -- and need not be  
6 forgotten; however, there -- there was -- there was a  
7 -- a lot of information covered this -- this past  
8 application, an -- and we have to put that into the  
9 context of -- of MPI's overall spend on -- on all of  
10 its projects, including road safety.

11 MPI does have its priorities in order  
12 with respect to its spending on road safety. We've  
13 heard evidence from the road safety panel that it now  
14 calculates its priorities on -- on costing other than  
15 just the claims costs for -- for certain collisions,  
16 but also the sl -- the social cost. And that allows  
17 it to really understand what are the -- what are the  
18 impacts of collisions on -- on Manitobans and -- and -  
19 - and what -- what are the root causes of the -- of  
20 the major accidents and how MPI can -- can use its  
21 road safety budget to effectively try to mitigate some  
22 of those risks.

23 So what I would submit for your  
24 consideration is that, as I mention again, although  
25 this graph is not suggesting any -- any major

1 increases in the road safety budget, the parties are  
2 there.

3                   We've seen a number of initiatives over  
4 the last number of days of the Hearing that MPI's  
5 undertaken to -- to meet some of these top priorities.

6                   The next slide talks about all the  
7 progress we've achieved to date through things like  
8 the Driver's Ed high school education program, the  
9 MELT program, the Save the 100 program, the distracted  
10 driving offences notices, and then all the initiatives  
11 that are either underway or will be underway soon.

12                   And then, as Mr. Wennberg had mentioned  
13 in his -- in his testimony, some of the future  
14 possibilities, some of which look very attractive and  
15 very enticing, and some that may not come to pass, but  
16 it will be one (1) of those situations where research  
17 and certainly gathering data and metrics will be very  
18 important, and aligning those with established parties  
19 and -- and the -- and measuring the costs of  
20 collisions to decide what is the best use of the  
21 existing road safety budget.

22                   Mr. Wennberg also did not discount the  
23 fact or the possibility of -- of there being further  
24 spends on projects, but it has to be a case-by-case  
25 situation.

1                   With respect to how far or how often  
2 the road safety issue should be canvassed at the --  
3 before the Public Utilities Board, I would note that  
4 there is a provincial road safety committee.

5                   MPI would submit that that is really  
6 the more proper forum for the collaborative discussion  
7 about road safety initiatives and the future of road  
8 safety projects in this province.

9                   Although there certainly is that aspect  
10 of MPI's spin towards road safety, it is often one (1)  
11 component of the entire picture. The prime example,  
12 as Mr. Wennberg talked about, the -- the use of the  
13 cameras at intersections to -- to measure, to document  
14 near collisions, to -- to get some more data on that  
15 issue.

16                   MPI can't do those types of initiatives  
17 by them -- by itself, it needs the assistance of  
18 sometimes the city or municipality in question, or  
19 even the province.

20                   And so, when it comes to analysing  
21 MPI's spin on road safety, we should be mindful of the  
22 other avenues available for that type of discussion  
23 and -- and be mindful there are -- there -- there are  
24 more dedicated lines for communicating on -- on those  
25 issues.

1                   That said, Mr. Wennberg did have some  
2 comments about when he felt it would be most  
3 appropriate to come to the Board with some insight  
4 into road safety.

5                   And -- and, quite frankly and I think  
6 appropriately, he commented that it would be an ad hoc  
7 situation. We have to realize that some of these --  
8 these programs do take some time to ferment and that  
9 we will -- we will need to be able to come back and to  
10 be able to share with the Board some real data on  
11 progress, and -- and it's not something that can  
12 easily be done on an annual basis.

13                   Sometimes there may be more to talk  
14 about than others, and it really will come down to  
15 what's -- what's currently available and what's being  
16 worked on in terms of the -- the importance of -- of  
17 this issue.

18                   Now to the issue of driver safety  
19 rating. This topic was canvassed briefly only because  
20 it's still a work in progress. But there are some  
21 things that MPI does know currently about the  
22 situation.

23                   We do know that Manitobans generally  
24 like the current system, which is the registered owner  
25 model system. It is seen as a fair way to establish

1 rates and to -- to deal with the issue of risk. It's  
2 not perfect, but none of the models that were  
3 canvassed that are -- are known were also deemed to be  
4 perfect, as well.

5                   It's about paying the right price in a  
6 way that seems to be fair. And MPI thinks that most  
7 Manitobans appreciate that the current system achieves  
8 those objectives.

9                   However, that's not the end of the  
10 story. It's not just about what a majority of  
11 Manitobans in a particular -- a particular survey have  
12 -- have said about the system. It needs to be costed.  
13 Alternatives needs to be considered. And, ultimately,  
14 there needs to be a recent decision about what's best  
15 for ratepayers going forward.

16                   Therefore, MPI is continually examining  
17 the issue and will be providing a pricing examination  
18 on not only the current registered owner model, but  
19 also the primary driver model and the driver premium  
20 model which were discussed at some length in the DSR,  
21 or driver safety rating panel.

22                   More information would be provided  
23 about the costs of each of these models in next year's  
24 rate application.

25                   And MPI does expect at that point it

1 will be coming back to the Utility Board with its  
2 recommendations on -- on the -- the selection of -- of  
3 one (1) of these models, whether it be continuing with  
4 the -- the existing model or -- or moving to one (1)  
5 of the -- the two (2) alternatives that Manitobans  
6 have also indicated that they would be okay with, and  
7 also meet the definitions of -- of being fair and --  
8 and pricing risk at the -- at a fair price.

9

10 (BRIEF PAUSE)

11

12 MR. ANTHONY GUERRA: The final topic  
13 I'd like to speak about is improving the GRA process.  
14 And it was something that we had discussed about  
15 commenting on.

16 I would not for the panel's  
17 consideration that we did submit a separate written  
18 response on the issue of improving the GRA process. I  
19 would invite the panel members to -- to consider that.

20 I'm not going to go into as much depth  
21 about the issue here because I do think it's canvassed  
22 fairly in-depth in our written submission. And that  
23 written submission is where you'll find some of the  
24 concrete suggestions that MPI has to how to improve  
25 thi -- this process.

1                   So, we can certainly have a discussion,  
2 and -- and I can answer some questions about it, but I  
3 do suggest that -- that that -- that written document  
4 be given a read prior to because I do think it will  
5 answer a lot of the -- the questions the panel members  
6 may have.

7                   So, what -- what do we know at -- at  
8 this point? Well, this year's rate application  
9 involved the submission of over ten thousand (10,000)  
10 pages of evidence. There were over two (2) rounds of  
11 discovery that involved MPI which resulted in over  
12 eight hundred and one (801) specific questions  
13 answered.

14                   That's not eight hundred and one (801)  
15 individual Information Requests that were made. As we  
16 know, Information Requests can contain many sub-  
17 questions. These are all the questions that were  
18 posed individual to MPI through those two (2) rounds  
19 of -- of discovery.

20                   Notwithstanding this robust discovery  
21 system that we -- we currently have, as we've seen,  
22 the hearing process is also an extension of the  
23 discovery process; rightly or wrongly, that's just the  
24 way it is.

25                   in the context of that hearing, or this

1 hearing that we've engaged in, MPI undertook an -- to  
2 provide another ninety (90) -- or sorry, thirty-nine  
3 (39) documents through undertakings or -- or responses  
4 to questions for undertakings, filed over a hundred  
5 and four (104) exhibits.

6                   And, as we know, we've -- now we're  
7 into the third week of -- of the oral hearing.

8                   The question that remains for -- for  
9 MPI is -- is, what -- what information does the Board  
10 ultimately need to make its decision. We would submit  
11 that, in this case, we probably have too much  
12 information that's being provided.

13                   And, again, part of that is MPI trying  
14 to be transparent and open with that. And -- and that  
15 comes with some acknowledgment that there will be  
16 increased production of -- of documents and  
17 information.

18                   But that doesn't necessarily mean that  
19 it's all going to be read or -- or relevant. And so,  
20 what we need is we need to have -- we need to have  
21 someone take the reins in this process and decide  
22 what issues are really going to be that important to  
23 canvass.

24                   We would submit that, for example, the  
25 issue of road safety was canvassed very thoroughly and

1 probably could have been canvassed less thoroughly  
2 with a very similar result that we would expect in  
3 this case.

4                   That's not to say it's not an important  
5 issue, but we have to be mindful of -- of how  
6 expansive this process has become and -- and ways in  
7 which we can improve the process going forward.

8                   So, at the end of the day, MPI is -- is  
9 really asking, what is the best way to get information  
10 that the -- that the Board deems to be important and  
11 required to the Board.

12                   And -- and MPI is prepared to make  
13 certain -- to -- to follow along and -- and abide by  
14 certain directions from the Board on this, but we  
15 really do need to, I think, see the forest from the  
16 trees on this.

17                   And certainly, I would invite the --  
18 the members of the Board to consider our written  
19 submission with some helpful, practical suggestions on  
20 -- on ways we can -- we can improve the process.

21                   Before I leave the topic though, I do  
22 want to kind of highlight what I think is a success  
23 stor -- story here, and that is the -- the piloted  
24 confidential process that we had this year.

25                   It was proposed by MPI as a way to try

1 to make that the process of delivering confidential  
2 information more efficiently to the Board and to the  
3 Interveners, and also to provide a process that was  
4 more fair to Interveners because, as you know, prior  
5 to the implementation of this pilot project, and I  
6 appreciate it is a pilot project for this year at this  
7 point, and we would encourage the Board to consider  
8 its use in future years, what was happening was  
9 information would be presented to the panel without  
10 Intervener scrutiny.

11                   And -- and this year, we've -- we've  
12 changed that. We've had confidential information  
13 being provided to the Interveners before decisions  
14 were made as to whether or not the information was  
15 confidential that allowed Interveners, as you know, to  
16 -- to comment and to -- to test the claims that were  
17 being by or on behalf of MPI.

18                   And so, we think that that process is -  
19 - is only -- not only more fair to the Interveners,  
20 but, also it -- it alleviates the need for multiple  
21 motions, which can clog up the system, and I think  
22 what we've seen here in this case is although it's  
23 still a large undertaking, it -- it is certainly a lot  
24 more efficient than -- than we've seen in the past.  
25 And again, I would recommend that the -- the Board

1 consider using this process again in the future.

2           So finally, in conclusion, I just want  
3 to highlight again the -- the topics that we raised.  
4 Again, this is a positive story as -- as we like to  
5 say at MPI, the fact that we are asking for a negative  
6 rate indication overall.

7           This is more money in the pockets of  
8 ratepayers and this is, in no uncertain terms, a -- a  
9 success due to the -- the new commitment from our  
10 executive and also the dedication of every employee of  
11 this company to -- to working in the best interests of  
12 its ratepayers.

13           We are asking for rates to be in effect  
14 for the thirteen (13) month period, and we are asking  
15 for approval of the proposed capital management plan,  
16 and as you know, we are asking for this continuance of  
17 the anti-theft discount for newly insured vehicles, no  
18 changes to the DSR for the vehicle or driver premiums,  
19 and no changes to fleet rebates or surcharges.

20           Before I -- I conclude, I do note that  
21 I -- I forgot in my submission with respect to road  
22 safety, to extend our appreciation to Mr. Keith, who  
23 did provide his assistance with respect to the  
24 technical conference and -- and did a fine job in  
25 presenting his findings to the -- the Board through

1 the oral hearing.

2 So he is certainly missed around the  
3 office, but obviously he -- he continues to benefit  
4 the system after his -- after his leaving. So we do  
5 want to extend that thanks to him as well.

6 And with that, subject to any  
7 questions, those are my comments.

8 THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr.  
9 Guerra. Mr. Gabor...?

10 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: Yeah, I'd just  
11 like to put on the record, Madam Chair, that I -- I  
12 look forward with interest to read the written  
13 submission, and quite frankly would like to reserve  
14 the right to ask questions on the written submission  
15 at the time of reply, if -- if there are any  
16 questions.

17 I appreciate Mr. Triggs' comment to the  
18 question I asked, I'd just like to read it in the  
19 written submission too and not just have my -- any  
20 questions relate only to the reply.

21 Mr. Guerra, certainly we're always  
22 looking at improving the process. I guess the  
23 question I have is: is there a suggestion that the  
24 kind of process we run or the scope of the process  
25 relates to the rate requested by MPI?

1 MR. ANTHONY GUERRA: Sorry, can -- can  
2 we rephrase that question. I'm not sure exactly what  
3 you're asking for.

4 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: The -- the number  
5 of issues and the scope of the process, is it a  
6 different process if you're asking for a -- a negative  
7 rate increase, versus a small rate increase, versus a  
8 large rate increase?

9 MR. ANTHONY GUERRA: It's tempting to  
10 look at the process like that, right? We are asking  
11 for less money and therefore maybe there shouldn't be  
12 as much scrutiny there.

13 And while I think there is some merit  
14 to considering that, I think overall what we have to  
15 do is we have to take a look at what are the issues  
16 that are most pressing for ratepayers at the current  
17 time, right?

18 And we will have some discussion about  
19 that through the discovery process, and we have a --  
20 we have a very robust discovery process.

21 The -- the problem is that sometimes  
22 even though we have such a robust discovery process,  
23 we -- we still -- we still don't understand the issues  
24 well enough when it comes to the time of the hearing  
25 and -- and often the hearing is -- is used to get to

1 that a-ha moment, that's really what we're all about  
2 here.

3                   And perhaps that is a -- a -- you know,  
4 a fault of MPI in -- in not explaining the process  
5 properly or where we're at properly, but I don't think  
6 that's the case. I think we have a very robust  
7 application, we have a very robust discovery process  
8 and -- and I think it is incumbent upon the parties at  
9 some point in time prior to the hearing to really take  
10 a look at the evidence that's being put before them  
11 and -- and decide for themselves what are the -- what  
12 are the real issues in -- in dispute here, or that  
13 need to be tested here.

14                   And if there is any way in which the  
15 issues, as they may have been originally assessed, to  
16 be of importance, if there's any maybe common ground  
17 there, that some of those issues can be decided to  
18 either be not dealt with in the hearing, or dealt with  
19 at a -- at an appropriate level.

20                   And so that discussion is something  
21 we've proposed last year. We would suggest that be  
22 part of the solution, there's other recommendations  
23 that we would make, but we would really strongly  
24 suggest that -- that we have that -- that tough  
25 discussion prior to the hearing, but what are the real

1 issues that -- that need, absolutely need to be  
2 addressed with by way of an oral hearing here and --  
3 and we would really focus the parties on making sure  
4 that that discovery process is used to its fullest  
5 extent.

6 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: Wouldn't that be  
7 part of the scoping process before the hearing and  
8 before the application is filed?

9 MR. ANTHONY GUERRA: Well, I mean, yes  
10 and -- and no. I do think that we will come out of  
11 this hearing having some sense as to what is going to  
12 be important going forward, and there are only so many  
13 days of the year that we can devote to this process  
14 and -- and certain things we know are not going to be  
15 as -- as important next year.

16 And so with that, the decision needs to  
17 be made, and we would submit be made by all the  
18 parties involved that some issues just don't deserve  
19 as much attention in the -- in the hearing process in  
20 -- in one year versus another, and road safety might  
21 be an example of that, going forward.

22 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: I understand the  
23 road safety argument, certainly.

24 Is there evidence -- I mean, you talked  
25 about the need for transparency. Is there evidence

1 that's just filed where there is no issue where MPI  
2 wants the Board to take a position?

3 And I'll -- I'll be specific.

4 MR. ANTHONY GUERRA: Sure.

5 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: You filed an  
6 application that had hundreds of pages about the  
7 relationship with the Insurance Broker Association of  
8 Manitoba, that was in the application, which I  
9 understand completely.

10 The position is -- which was put today,  
11 as I understand it in your written submission is, the  
12 Board has no jurisdiction over the issue.

13 Doesn't that contradict this idea that  
14 there is certain issues that should be before the  
15 Board and there are other issues that shouldn't be so  
16 we can reduce it? We have a major issue that was  
17 before the Board this time, we specifically asked if  
18 we have jurisdiction over it and for the parties  
19 position Mr. Triggs indicated you -- your position.

20 MR. ANTHONY GUERRA: Right.

21 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: You spent a lot  
22 of days --

23 MR. ANTHONY GUERRA: Absolutely, and -  
24 -

25 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: -- and I read

1 every page, so I'm just trying to figure out how that  
2 relates to an argument that, you know, how an argument  
3 that we looked at this issue in a very serious manner,  
4 all the parties, with the position, and it may have  
5 been from the outset, it may have been later, that we  
6 have no jurisdiction over it.

7 To your position that, you know, this  
8 hearing is too long, we're looking at too many issues,  
9 isn't the first issue to take off the issues where the  
10 Board has no jurisdiction?

11 MR. ANTHONY GUERRA: Right. And --  
12 and Mr. Triggs will -- will make one comment.

13 What I would say to that though is our  
14 position is not that -- that the Board has absolutely  
15 no jurisdiction to look at the arrangements that --  
16 that are being made with respect to service providers.  
17 The -- the issue is with respect to the choice on a  
18 service delivery model. That's a different situation,  
19 right?

20 It's what customers want and it's --  
21 it's how that is going to be provided to them.

22 The Board cannot tell MPI it -- it has  
23 to deliver online services a certain way, right.  
24 That's -- that's the issue that we take concern with.

25 What's going to happen, however, is

1 that that decision is going to be made by MPI in  
2 association with the brokers, and then a certain model  
3 will go forward, right?

4                   And so there will be some over -- there  
5 will be some review of how we are currently serving  
6 our customers in future applications, and so it's  
7 important to know, from the Board's perspective, how  
8 we got to that point.

9                   With respect to service agreements  
10 though and how we get into service agreements, there  
11 is some benefit in having the Board take a look at our  
12 current agreements and future agreements and saying  
13 how were those agreements negotiated.

14                   If they're negotiated as a result of --  
15 of one, you know, one monopoly-style party abusing its  
16 power with respect to MPIs monopoly, then that's a  
17 concern.

18                   And now going forward, as -- as Mr.  
19 Graham has mentioned, the covers have been pulled  
20 away. Everyone knows what's going on.

21                   Now -- now next year, if MPI were to  
22 negotiate an agreement in -- in the same type of way,  
23 we would expect this Board to come to us and say what  
24 are you doing? Why are you doing this? Where is the  
25 proof that you have done this in the way that is in

1 the best interests of ratepayers? And if you don't  
2 stop doing what you're doing, you -- we're going to  
3 have some concerns here because we have to approve  
4 your just and reasonable rates. And -- and maybe  
5 these aren't rates that are just and reasonable.

6 So there is something for the -- for  
7 the Board to say in terms of the way in which we  
8 negotiate our agreements and that's why we are  
9 presenting that. But I -- I want us to -- to separate  
10 the issues of service agreements with service delivery  
11 and how the -- how we choose those models.

12 There may be some critiques going  
13 forward, but -- what we've done. But ultimately a  
14 decision with respect to how we get the service  
15 delivery is something that management has to make by  
16 itself.

17 So subject to any questions -- or any  
18 further comments by Mr. Triggs, that would be my  
19 response to that.

20 MR. MICHAEL TRIGGS: I have nothing  
21 further to add to what he said.

22 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: Thank you.

23 THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. We're  
24 almost at 11:30. Ms. McCandless, is the Consumer's  
25 Association expecting to proceed at one o'clock or is

1 it something that can be done sooner than that?

2 MS. KATHLEEN MCCANDLESS: I see Ms.  
3 Dilay here, I assume we're waiting for Mr. Williams to  
4 come probably at one o'clock?

5 MS. KATRINE DILAY: Sorry about that.  
6 Yes, exactly, we're -- we're just finalizing our  
7 presentation, copies are being made, so if we could  
8 adjourn until -- or if we could start our presentation  
9 at one o'clock that would be appreciated.

10 THE CHAIRPERSON: Certainly, we can do  
11 that. So we will adjourn now until one o'clock this  
12 afternoon. Thank you.

13

14 --- Upon recessing at 11:28 a.m.

15 --- Upon resuming at 1:01 p.m.

16

17 THE CHAIRPERSON: Good afternoon  
18 everyone. Good afternoon, Mr. Williams. Please  
19 proceed.

20

21 (BRIEF PAUSE)

22

23 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Good afternoon,  
24 members of the panel. I'll be appearing with Ms.  
25 Dilay, who is back by popular demand, and she will be

1 doing the thoughtful legal submissions. I'll be  
2 covering the -- the -- generally, the issues relating  
3 to the -- to the -- the rate approval exercise. And  
4 we will switch off, and Ms. Dilay will also share the  
5 recommendations of our client with the panel.

6 I would note that there is some -- some  
7 CSI slides. What I would propose is let's just play  
8 it -- we've designed them so that they can just be  
9 read. If time permits, and we're okay schedule-wise,  
10 then they're -- they -- we -- we've -- I'd aim them  
11 for the back of our submissions, and we'll -- we'll be  
12 at -- we'll check the clock and see where we are.

13 THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr.  
14 Williams. And good afternoon, Ms. Dilay.

15 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Ms. Dilay reminds  
16 me that there are a -- a number of exhibits to be  
17 entered on the record, including the written legal  
18 brief, which was filed on Tuesday, which we would ask  
19 be marked as CAC Exhibit 19.

20

21 --- EXHIBIT NO. CAC-19: Written legal brief

22

23 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: The response to  
24 undertaking, which is CAC-20.

25

1 --- EXHIBIT NO. CAC-20: Response to Undertaking 36

2

3 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: A book of  
4 authorities, which has been entered on Dropbox and  
5 physical copies will be made available to the Board  
6 tomorrow morning. We would ask that -- that be CAC-  
7 21.

8

9 --- EXHIBIT NO. CAC-21: Book of authorities

10

11 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And then our  
12 PowerPoint on the public record, CAC-22.

13

14 --- EXHIBIT NO. CAC-22: PowerPoint on the public  
15 record

16

17 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And our  
18 recommendations we would ask be CAC-23.

19

20 --- EXHIBIT NO. CAC-23: CAC recommendations

21

22 FINAL ARGUMENT BY CAC (MANITOBA):

23 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And some may  
24 wonder in the context of an average rate -- a rate  
25 reduction of, on average, of 0.6 percent, why this is

1 a -- a hearing of considerable intensity, public  
2 interest, some media controversy.

3                   And certainly from our clients'  
4 perspective, this is a hearing that is worthy of  
5 making a fuss about because of six (6) or seven (7)  
6 fundamentally important issues. And one (1) of those,  
7 in our clients' view, is a challenge by the provincial  
8 cabinet to the legislatively granted independent rate  
9 setting role of the Public Utilities Board, an  
10 authority which it has exercised with distinction,  
11 since 1989.

12                   Another of the challenges in this  
13 hearing has been by Manitoba Public Insurance, to the  
14 traditional way that we have looked at how service  
15 agreements are negotiated with the industry, with the  
16 automotra -- automobile trades and others.

17                   Another challenge is a challenge of the  
18 marketplace, and of technology and consumer demand.  
19 And that is a challenge to the traditional bricks and  
20 mortar service delivery model, whether by brokers or  
21 the MPI service centres, and how did they respond, and  
22 how do we collectively respond to deliver rates for  
23 service that are just and reasonable in the context of  
24 Manitoba Public Insurance.

25                   And obviously there's challenges to the

1 legacy systems of -- of the insurance business and  
2 Manitoba Public Insurance, as well as of driver and  
3 vehicle administration, Autopac online, AOL, cars and  
4 the DVA. These challenges presage -- anticipate the  
5 largest information technology investment in Manitoba  
6 public insurance history. Some of the witnesses for  
7 Manitoba public insurance describe it as a once-in-a-  
8 lifetime opportunity.

9                   There's also -- apart from the  
10 economics, and the finance, and the emerging service  
11 needs, there's a challenge of on -- the ongoing toll  
12 of fatalities and serious injuries suffered by all  
13 Manitobans, but disproportionately by rural  
14 Manitobans. And in this hearing, uniquely among the  
15 hearings our client has participated in, driven to  
16 significant degree by the issues related to the  
17 Capital Management Plan, there are challenges to the  
18 myth that there is true competition in the Extension  
19 market.

20                   And this panel heard from a number of  
21 distinguished witnesses. One (1) of the most  
22 compelling and thoughtful, of course, was Mr. John  
23 Todd, who shared his experience with the appropriate  
24 regulatory treatment of nonutility services. And in  
25 this hearing, there is a fundamental challenge to the

1 historic view of MPI that the benefits offered to  
2 Extension or nonutility services, by virtue of its  
3 relationship with the statutory monopoly, are not  
4 relevant to setting of Basic rates. In this hearing,  
5 they're central to a lot of the Board's deliberations.

6 Our client is a kind client, a  
7 thoughtful client, but our -- the legal team knows not  
8 to use the words average rate reduction with our  
9 client, because there is no such thing as an average  
10 rate reduction to a consumer. Each consumer  
11 experiences an individual impact. Rates may be going  
12 down. They may be going up. They may be going up  
13 significantly, or going down significantly.

14 So amidst the immediate headlines of a  
15 rate reduction, there are significant impacts both up  
16 and down in this hearing for many individuals. Over  
17 ninety thousand (90,000) private passenger vehicles  
18 will receive rate increases between 4 and 5 percent.  
19 An additional sixty thousand (60,000) will be facing  
20 increases of between 3 and 4 percent. Over one  
21 hundred and fifty thousand (150,000) consumers  
22 experiencing volatility on the way up. So while rate  
23 stability is a convenient myth in the corporate  
24 boardroom or the legislative briefing note, it is not  
25 -- it is never the lived experience for many Manitoba

1 consumers.

2                   This hearing, like all hearings, but  
3 this hearing in particular matters a great deal to our  
4 clients. There's a choice for the regulatory process  
5 to honour the legislative commitment to an independent  
6 rate approval process, or to walk down the ICBC path,  
7 the path of cabinet interference in the rate-setting  
8 process.

9                   This hearing matters for our clients  
10 because there are significant grounds for concerns  
11 that the traditional industrywide agreements are not  
12 delivering value for customers, and risk running afoul  
13 of the Competition Act. And I'll address this in more  
14 detail when we get to issues related to brokers, but  
15 the Board has asked generally what is its jurisdiction  
16 with regard to these issues.

17                   And our gen -- our client's general  
18 comment is your jurisdiction is what it has always  
19 been, to assess rates for service of Manitoba Public  
20 Insurance. And in assessing rates for service for  
21 Manitoba Public Insurance, part of that involves  
22 looking at the arrangements with service providers and  
23 whether Manitoba Public Insurance is giving value to  
24 ratepayers, whether it's operating prudently and  
25 reasonably.

1                   Part -- the other part of the statutory  
2 definition is rates for service, and so in looking at  
3 the rates and whether they're just and reasonable,  
4 there are also issues of consideration of are  
5 consumers receiving that service fairly, are they  
6 receiving it equally, or in the case of, let's say the  
7 bricks and mortar service delivery model, are there  
8 vulnerable consumers who are left out of reasonable  
9 access to those services. That's part of the equation  
10 in approving just and reasonable rates.

11                   In approving just and reasonable rates,  
12 this Board also, when you look at the broker issue,  
13 but also the agreements with other elements of the  
14 industry, always has to be alive to risk. That risk  
15 could be a hail storm, a snowstorm, interest rates,  
16 not that we've ever had any interest rate challenges  
17 in -- in this jurisdiction, but it also could be a  
18 legal risk, and so issues relating to possibly running  
19 afoul of the Competition Act are risk that the Board  
20 in its rate-setting exercise should be alive to.

21                   Analytically what does that mean? It  
22 does not mean that it is up to the Board to supervise,  
23 conciliate, or dictate an agreement between MPI and  
24 the -- and the brokers, or MPI and the chiropractors,  
25 or any of the trades, but the Board has jurisdiction

1 to critically analyse those agreements, to make a  
2 determination if the expenditures associated with them  
3 are just and reasonable, to make a determination in  
4 terms of whether the risks incorporated in those  
5 relationships are undue, and the Board always has its  
6 recommendation power, a general recommendation power  
7 to offer advice.

8                   One (1) of the issues our client will  
9 struggle with, and we'll offer some suggestions, but  
10 obviously in this hearing you'll -- we -- we've heard  
11 a lot about whether the competitive market is -- is  
12 competitive or not. We'll come back to that in a  
13 little bit, but that's a place where advice might be  
14 given by this Board, but not an actual decision be  
15 made.

16                   This hearing matters for rate payer --  
17 payers, because there are real live issues related to  
18 bricks and mortar services. One (1) of the most  
19 important is maintaining services for rural -- and  
20 maintaining or enhancing services for northern and  
21 remote communities, both access to important bricks  
22 and mortar services, as well as enhanced online  
23 service opportunities for all Manitobans, especially  
24 those who are currently under served.

25                   And we've seen those maps with an --

1 MPI Appendix 14, where they looked at the -- the hot  
2 map of where brokers were and where they weren't, and  
3 we've certainly seen that -- that great big vacant  
4 space in northern Manitoba where there's thirty-nine  
5 (39) brokers -- thirty-nine (39) employees.

6           So clearly there are significant bricks  
7 and mortar gaps already, and that is why, from a  
8 consumer perspective, the opportunity for online  
9 services is seen as a -- a critical opportunity to  
10 provide value for rates for service. And that's not  
11 for just rural and remote issues. It's also important  
12 for all Manitobans who wish to access important online  
13 services.

14           And again, our clients are supportive  
15 of ensuring that not just urban consumers, but cost-  
16 effective bricks and mortar services, are available to  
17 all Manitobans in a manner that does not deny them the  
18 choice of being served by MPI or by brokers.

19           This hearing also matters for  
20 ratepayers because there are significant risks related  
21 to the modernization of legacy systems, particularly  
22 given the relationship between the insurance and  
23 driver vehicle sides of the business.

24           Final two (2) points and why this  
25 hearing is particularly important for our clients. In

1 other proceedings, this Board, the Public Utilities  
2 Board, has made important statements about  
3 reconciliation, especially in the Hydro context.

4 Our client is concerned that, unlike  
5 Alberta, unlike British Columbia, there is no  
6 Indigenous road safety strategy, notwithstanding  
7 evidence of a disproportionate number of fatalities  
8 and serious injuries in rural Manitoba, as well as the  
9 MPI observations candidly offered of unlicensed  
10 drivers and vehicles and unmet service needs in First  
11 Nation communities. To our clients, that is a  
12 pressing reconciliation concern.

13 And finally, this hearing matters to  
14 our clients, our truly captive clients, because in the  
15 face of overwhelming evidence of excess profits and  
16 significant evidence of market failure in Extension,  
17 it is critical to ensure that monopoly ratepayers  
18 receive an appropriate transfer of all excess profits  
19 consistent with an evidence-based risk analysis of  
20 MPI's monopoly in non-utility lines of business.

21 In many hearings, it's -- it's -- it's  
22 relatively easy to characterize the monopoly, whether  
23 positively or adversely. This is a hearing with a lot  
24 of nuance. Our client sees two (2) sides to Manitoba  
25 Public Insurance in this hearing.

1                   On the one side, there is evidence of  
2 good intentions and transparency. Part of that comes  
3 from the MPI concession of the appropriate --  
4 appropriateness of transfers from Extension reserves  
5 to Basic. Part of it comes from what was truly good  
6 practice consumer engagement with regard to the driver  
7 safety rating review. Part -- part of it was the  
8 active efforts of Mr. Johnston and Mr. Wennberg and  
9 their team to improve reserving and case management  
10 with regard to the Personal Injury Protection Plan.  
11 Those efforts should be noted and -- and  
12 congratulated.

13                   Our clients also see evidence of good  
14 intention and transparency in the efforts to begin to  
15 implement value management practices with regard to  
16 information technology projects, in the benchmarking  
17 exercises undertaken with regard to vehicle repair and  
18 other service industry benchmarks, of the efforts to  
19 address the failure to achieve value for money in  
20 certain industry agreements, and the risk of non-  
21 compliance with the Competition Act, and the efforts  
22 to maintain and enhance consumer choice and ensure  
23 value for money in the face of the inevitable,  
24 disruption of the bricks and mortar service delivery  
25 model.

1                   So that's one side, but there's the  
2 other side of MPI that our client does not and cannot  
3 dorse -- endorse.

4                   There is the sidestepping of the  
5 inherent balancing the independent rate approval  
6 process and the efforts to impose the risk tolerances  
7 of the MPI Board of Directors on captive monopoly  
8 subscribers through the reserves regulation.

9                   There is a substantive failure to  
10 comply with the intent of the shadow investment  
11 portfolio, which was supposed to be a way to examine  
12 the foregone opportunities in terms of higher return,  
13 by taking on different risks in a prudent fashion, and  
14 did not achieve that objective.

15                   Our client also cannot endorse the  
16 significant risk associated with the current approach  
17 to the implementation of legacy systems modernization.

18                   And finally, our client definitely does  
19 not endorse the revi -- the revision to the collision  
20 forecast for the last six (6) months of the 2019/20  
21 year, achieved by taking into account the unusually  
22 low collision experience over five (5) of the first  
23 six (6) months of this year.

24                   When the Board is looking at this rate  
25 application, determining whether to grant the

1 reduction or a different reduction, keep rates the  
2 same on average or an increase, our clients would ask  
3 this Board to make a finding that, despite the efforts  
4 of current MPI leadership, built into today's rates  
5 and into the forecast rates is the cost of imprudence  
6 that is embedded in the current rate application.

7           Captive monopoly customers continue to  
8 bear significant current and future costs associated,  
9 first, with the failure to reasonably manage complex  
10 personal injury protection plan, or PIPP, cases,  
11 especially between 2010 and September of 2018; the  
12 failure to properly manage the physical damage re-  
13 engineering project, resulting in a negative net  
14 present value of \$50 million; an adventurous approach  
15 to information technology projects, resulting in over  
16 \$20 million in writeoffs in '17/'18 and '18/'19,  
17 writeoffs that wrefec -- affect the retained earnings  
18 related to the insurance lines of business to this  
19 day.

20           Our clients notice well that there are  
21 higher than peer techno -- information technology  
22 full-time equivalent positions at MPI and that there  
23 is evidence of imprudent industry-wide agreements,  
24 leading in some cases to higher than Canadian average  
25 labour rates. And as just one (1) example of the

1 ongoing cost of questionable value management  
2 projects, there's the Driver Z program, a budget  
3 revised from 5 million to 7.1 million, no initial net  
4 present value analysis, and a current negative net  
5 present value of \$1.6 million.

6           Before we leave this slide, these are  
7 financial issues, but if we think of the PIPP, the  
8 public -- personal injury protection plan issue,  
9 they're very much human issues as well. The complex  
10 disabilities -- the failure to manage that has a  
11 financial cost, but it also brings a significant human  
12 cost to the families and indi -- individuals directly  
13 affected.

14           In terms of the thrust of our  
15 submission, I'm going to have a couple of overview  
16 comments, one (1) about the state of competition or  
17 lack thereof, and just a -- a very brief overview of  
18 the legal arguments. Ms. Dilay, I assure you, will be  
19 the brains behind that operation, but I just want to  
20 have a couple comments about that.

21           In the course of our clients'  
22 submissions, if you think of the five (5) elements of  
23 the Board's ordinary approach to -- to looking at just  
24 and reasonable rates, our clients will have a few  
25 comments about forecast reasonableness, they will have

1 a lot of comments about the prudence and  
2 reasonableness of expenditures and investments, and  
3 they will have a lot of comments as well about the  
4 overall health of the Corporation, including prudent  
5 reserves and the capital management plan. The  
6 importance of consumer engagement will be highlighted  
7 throughout the submissions as well.

8           A number of the questions of the Board,  
9 Ms. Dilay will address in Part 2 of our submissions,  
10 focussing on the reserve regulation analysis, and she  
11 will also be making the recommendations. And there  
12 are about eight (8) slides of confidential submissions  
13 which will come at the end of our submissions.

14           The headline on slide 14 is 'We Are All  
15 Captive'. Traditionally, it is Basic cus -- customers  
16 who are described as captive, and the Extension market  
17 is competitive. But in our clients' submission,  
18 calling the Extension market 'competitive' does a  
19 fundamental, profound injustice to that word.

20           The evidence of this hearing suggests  
21 that Manitoba Public Insurance has held a 95 percent  
22 share of the Extension market since at least 2008;  
23 that it is earning excessive profit margins on that  
24 line of business; that Extension receives an  
25 inordinate benefit from its relationship with Basic,

1 including through seamless renewal and reassessment  
2 transactions; that there is no structural separation  
3 between the two (2) lines of business, leaving MPI  
4 with the same access to com -- consumer information as  
5 Basic insurance, unlike its "competitors" in the  
6 private market; and that there was some evidence in  
7 written MPI statements in 2014s (sic) of efforts to  
8 inoculate the competitive lines of business from  
9 competition.

10           The de facto Extension monopoly raises  
11 questions of profound importance for the independent  
12 rate approval process and is the reason why Mr. Todd  
13 was brought as a generally accepted regulatory  
14 practice expert.

15           This Board has been blessed with a  
16 lengthy legal argument and authorities from the  
17 consumers' association in terms of the reserve  
18 regulation, it will be gifted with a very thoughtful  
19 argument by Ms. Dilay, and there'll be a lot of  
20 legislative history, a lot of cases, a lot of  
21 statutory interpretation. But in our clients'  
22 submission, at the big picture, there's a pe -- a -- a  
23 clear path to a finding that the reserve regulation is  
24 not valid and cannot be applied by the Public  
25 Utilities Board in its independent rate setting

1 process.

2                   And again, Ms. Dilay will go through  
3 it, but here are the simple points that our client  
4 would ask this Board to keep in mind: First, that it  
5 has been granted independent rate approval authority  
6 over the rates and services of Basic insurance by the  
7 Legislature; secondly, that since 1989, the rate  
8 stabilization reserve has been an integral element of  
9 its rate approval function. It has been so by the  
10 Board considering and determining the appropriate  
11 level of the reserve for rate setting purposes, by the  
12 Board considering and determining the appropriate  
13 methodology for determining the RSR level, RSR being  
14 rate stabilization reserve.

15                   It has been an integral element of the  
16 Board's independent rate approval process by the Board  
17 considering and determining whether additional  
18 premiums should be charged to rebuild the RSR, as it  
19 did in the 1990s, or whether a rebate should be given  
20 to consumers due to excessive reserves in the RSR.  
21 That's evident in the Board's order, it's consistent  
22 with our clients' opinion, and it was frankly and  
23 candidly admitted properly by Mr. Johnston on the  
24 October 14th transcript.

25                   So there's the legislative authority,

1 the RSR functions exercised by the Board, and then on  
2 slide se -- 16, you see a direct interference in that  
3 legislative-granted authority, using even the words  
4 'rate stabilization reserve', and usurping or  
5 purporting to usurp the legislative granted --  
6 legislatively granted authority of the Public  
7 Utilities Board to determine an appropriate Basic  
8 insurance rate stabilization reserve for rate setting  
9 and to approve an appropriate methodology for the  
10 determination of their rate stabilization reserve  
11 levels.

12 Most ironically about that regulation -  
13 - is it came in 2019, two (2) years after amendments  
14 to the Crown Corporations Governance and  
15 Accountability Act and to the MPI Act that expressly  
16 took away the authority of Cabinet to impact vehicle  
17 is -- insurance rates, an authority that had existed  
18 prior in Section 33 of the MPI Act. Again, Ms. Dilay  
19 will give more eloquent expression to those  
20 submissions, thoughtful nuance, but in two (2) slides,  
21 that is the thrust of our clients' submissions.

22 So our clients say the path is clear  
23 but it's hard, and our client doesn't like to be in  
24 this position, and I suspect the Board does not  
25 either. But our job is simple. It is to honour the

1 legislative will as it comes to independent rate  
2 approval, and that legislative will cannot be  
3 overturned, sidestepped, or undermined by the Cabinet.

4                   This Board is well familiar with the  
5 concept of just and reasonable rates. In its opening  
6 comments to this hearing, it talked about the  
7 balancing act between the interests of ratepayers and  
8 the financial health of the utility.

9                   We will come back to that balancing act  
10 when we come back to the reserve regulation because  
11 historically, the Board has determined risk tolerances  
12 for the reserve regulation balancing corporate -- the  
13 monopoly's interest versus ratepayer's. That  
14 balancing act, in our client's submission, has been  
15 undermined, overtaken, and the -- the will of the MPI  
16 Board of Directors has been substituted for balance.

17                   The five (5) of the just and reasonable  
18 rate analysis are set out at slide 19, and we just put  
19 them there for the Board's reference. We're going to  
20 the first one -- I think we are anyways -- ensuring  
21 forecasts are reasonably reliable.

22                   And our client is not going to be very  
23 adversarial on forecast reasonableness. On the  
24 expenditure to side, our client generally accepts the  
25 reasonableness of the 2021 general rate application

1 forecast of Manitoba Public Insurance.

2                   It does wish to flag three (3) areas of  
3 uncertainty. One is interest rate direction during  
4 the test year. A second is the recent history of  
5 unfavourable experience relating to personal injury  
6 protection plan variances -- unfavourable variances.  
7 And the third is the possibility that unusually high  
8 vacancy rates will extend into the 2020/2021 test year  
9 potentially dampening or reducing test year  
10 expenditures.

11                   I will come back to the -- the PIPP  
12 unfavourable variances as well as the vacancies in a  
13 couple moments.

14                   So that was expenditures for the  
15 2020/'21 year. In terms of expenditure forecasts for  
16 the 2019/'20 year, our client is uncomfortable with  
17 the revision to the collision claims forecast for the  
18 second half of the 2019/'20 year.

19                   To take into account unusually  
20 favourable experience in, what our client has termed,  
21 the non-winter months, our client considers that  
22 atypical for Manitoba Public Insurance practices, and,  
23 in our client's view, that should not be relied upon  
24 in any determination of the projected level of the  
25 Basic rate stabilization reserve for the 2019/'20 year

1 end. In our client's view, those revisions are  
2 atypically optimistic for Manitoba Public Insurance.

3           On the revenue side and going back to  
4 the test year -- the 2020/'21 year -- our client  
5 generally accepts the reasonableness of the  
6 Corporation's forecasts. There is one exception, and  
7 this is the matter of competing professional opinions  
8 by Mr. Johnston and Ms. Sherry and that relates to  
9 whether or not investment income from the rate  
10 stabilization reserve should be taken into account in  
11 the determination of the actuarially accepted rate.

12           And our client is not saying  
13 Mr. Johnston is doing anything improper. He and  
14 Ms. Sherry have a legitimate disagreement in terms of  
15 admittedly somewhat opaque actuarial standards.

16           But from our client's perspective, they  
17 do prefer the opinion of Ms. Sherry that the  
18 investment income should be taken into account from  
19 the rate stabilization reserve especially because such  
20 a determination would appear to be more generally  
21 consistent with industry practices. But they do  
22 recognize ambiguity, and this is an issue that does  
23 give them some analytic challenges as well.

24           I said I would come back to the  
25 unfavourable experience related to the runoff related

1 to the personal injury protection lines of coverages.

2           Again, our client is generally -- is  
3 not contesting the expenditure forecasts, but they do  
4 feel it's incumbent to identify significant  
5 uncertainty, and this is one.

6           And the -- the panel will recall that  
7 once we take out the interest rate impacts, once we  
8 cancel the methodological changes, the external  
9 actuary in February of 2019 identified unfavourable  
10 experience related runoff of about \$40 million between  
11 the three (3) personal injury protection plan  
12 coverages with most of those unfavourable developments  
13 being in the -- the '16/'17 and '17/'18 year.

14           And this has been an endemic challenge  
15 for Manitoba Public Insurance. This unfavourable  
16 experience is primarily attributable to claims  
17 persistency, claims extending -- complex claims  
18 extending beyond -- considerably on into the future as  
19 well as case reserving that MPI itself has described  
20 as being inadequate and inconsistent.

21

22   (BRIEF PAUSE)

23

24           DR. BYRON WILLIAMS:   And in terms of  
25 the case reserving, there have been ongoing challenges

1 with its accuracy and consistency, particularly for  
2 the 2010 to 2016 years.

3 To its credit, Manitoba Public  
4 Insurance has introduced new centralized case  
5 reserving methodology which is expected to lead to  
6 greater consistency and reliability. But that doesn't  
7 address the other longstanding issue which is the  
8 persistence of these complex claims.

9 And MPI's evidence from last year in  
10 CAC-1-36 which was confirmed in discussion with  
11 Mr. Wennberg this year is that that claims  
12 persistency -- some of the challenges have been  
13 impacted by a longstanding failure to reasonably  
14 manage complex claims.

15 And if you get a chance to go back to  
16 CAC-1-36, Appendix A, Attachment A, there's a very  
17 thoughtful explanation of the challenges of the  
18 Corporation, particularly at page 8. Its challenges  
19 were both staff reductions and actual technical  
20 challenges in the case management of complex claims.  
21 MPI has taken some efforts to standardize metrics and  
22 case management. They hired new staff in September of  
23 2018.

24 But as we've learned with these  
25 personal injury protection plan claims, there's --

1 their so-called long tail claims, we won't know if the  
2 case management is having its intended effect for  
3 quite a while, not to the twenty-nine -- 2019  
4 develops beyond the twenty four -- twenty-four (24)  
5 to sixty (60) month period. Again, that is a source  
6 of negative uncertainty around the expenditure  
7 forecast.

8                   On the upside, at least in terms of  
9 expenditures for the test year, is the ongoing effects  
10 of the very large vacancy rate driven by higher than  
11 normal retirements and higher than normal turnover,  
12 and we had this discussion both with Ms. Campbell and  
13 Mr. Giesbrecht on October the 8th.

14                   And in -- in our conversation at  
15 page 480 and 481 of the transcript, Mr. Giesbrecht  
16 noted that the disconnect between budgeted full-time  
17 equivalents and unfilled positions may spill over into  
18 the 2021 year. He was asked, would the extended level  
19 of vacancies carry over into 2021? And he thought it  
20 was fair to say that it would have some effect.

21                   So that is an element that would tend,  
22 all of other things being equal, to -- to drive --  
23 push down claims costs. That is with regard to the  
24 2021 year.

25                   I do want to come back on behalf of our

1 clients to the 2019/'20 year. And as you know just  
2 before the hearing started, there was a significant  
3 amendment to the application, and one of the elements  
4 to that amendment was a different treatment for  
5 frequency -- collision frequency based upon the --  
6 five (5) of the first six (6) months of 2019/'20.

7 So, Mr. Johnston is talking at page  
8 1,089 of the transcript:

9 "They've had some low months, so  
10 we've recognized favourable  
11 collision frequency in the second  
12 half of the year. We've assumed it  
13 will continue."

14 Fortuitously or not, that conversation  
15 was just after the -- the storm events of October 11th  
16 and 12 and, as Mr. Johnston also candidly noted, not  
17 liking our chances so much for this month, but  
18 hopefully for the rest of the year.

19 And this Board will recall and can take  
20 judicial notice of our typical experience in rate  
21 hearings where the Corporation cautions about giving  
22 undue weight to experience of the first half of the  
23 test year.

24 And so, for our client -- sorry, not  
25 the test year, excuse me, of the current year. For

1 our client, this approach -- and they have the highest  
2 regard for Ms. Johnston, but this left them  
3 uncomfortable.

4                   And we canvassed this a little bit with  
5 Mr. Johnston on the -- and Mr. -- and Mr. Graham on  
6 the next slide, being slide 27, because winter is  
7 coming, and the most volatile ti -- part of the  
8 Manitoba Public Insurance year in terms of frequency  
9 of collisions is winter.

10                   And at the bottom of this slide, being  
11 slide 27, we've put from the corporate risk scenario  
12 analysis the events of a one (1) in forty (40) adverse  
13 winter collision. We're not predicting it. We're  
14 just noting that it would be \$66 million.

15                   So, from our client's perspective, farm  
16 boy that I am, there's a saying, don't cou -- count  
17 your chickens before they're hatched. In this case,  
18 our client would advise don't count your collision  
19 frequency before it's defrosted. Let's -- that, to  
20 our clients, is a bit imprudent.

21

22                   (BRIEF PAUSE)

23

24                   DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: On slide 29, our  
25 client -- this is the general section, excuse me,

1 where we're talking about the prudence and  
2 reasonableness of both expenditures and investments.

3 Our client wants to start with  
4 everyone's favourite topic, shadow portfolios, and  
5 just to remind the Board of its words from last year.  
6 Last year, the Board was presented with what it  
7 considered to be two (2) reasonable options.

8 One (1) was the MPI selected investment  
9 portfolio, a highly concentrated in fixed incomes,  
10 extremely conservative approach, at least from a  
11 nominal risk perspective, and the other was Mr.  
12 Viola's approach based on the real world and on real  
13 risk.

14 And the Board concluded ultimately that  
15 the MPI proposal was reasonable and prudent but did  
16 recognize that there was the potential, the risk, that  
17 Manitoba Public Insurance had foregone an opportunity,  
18 those words are emphasized, to hedge against long-term  
19 risks by rejecting real return bo -- bonds.

20 And the Board directed the Corporation  
21 to run shadow portfolios. And we've underlined the  
22 words to be evaluated against the portfolio selected  
23 by the Corporation.

24 And the Board wanted to do this as a  
25 text of whether the Corporation's asset liability

1 strategy is reasonable. And our clients, while di --  
2 disappointed in the Board's determinations,  
3 appreciates the -- the care with which the Board made  
4 that determination last year.

5                   So, how would one reasonably test that  
6 hypothesis of whether the Corporation had foregone an  
7 opportunity? The Board to -- in our client's view,  
8 that would appropriately be done consistent with the  
9 Board direction by two (2) shadow portfolios, 1) to  
10 test the hypothesis that in the real world, not the  
11 nominal work, the MPI selected portfolio had foregone  
12 an opportunity to hedge against long-term risks by  
13 rejecting real return bonds.

14                   And the very least, our client would  
15 have expected Mercers (sic) and MPI to compare an  
16 optimized shadow portfolio against the MPI selected  
17 portfolio at a comparable level of real risk.

18                   How can one test the foregone  
19 opportunity unless it's at a comparable level of real  
20 risk? The Board also wanted to see what an  
21 unconstrained shadow portfolio would look like.

22                   And from our client's perspective, to  
23 test that hypothesis that, in the real world, rather  
24 than the nominal world, the MPI selected portfolio had  
25 undergone an opportunity to hedge against long-term

1 risks by unduly constraining the portfolio by not  
2 being diversified.

3 To achieve and to reasonably test that  
4 hypothesis, our client would have expected that  
5 Mercers (sic) and MPI would have compared an  
6 optimized, unconstrained shadow portfolio against the  
7 MPI selected portfolio at a comparable level of real  
8 risk.

9 Again, how can one test if an  
10 opportunity has been foregone unless it's at a  
11 comparable level of risk?

12 So, what are the issues with the -- the  
13 Basic shadow portfolios? Our client does not intend  
14 to focus on the pensions ones, but on the two (2)  
15 Basic shadow portfolios.

16 There are five (5) profound concerns.  
17 First, shadow portfolio was not investment 101  
18 optimized while the MPI selected portfolio was.

19 Second, shadow portfolio 1 was  
20 established with a significantly lower level of real  
21 risk than the MPI selected portfolio rather than a  
22 comparable level of risk.

23 Mysteriously, shadow portfolio 2, the  
24 unconstrained portfolio, was con -- so-called  
25 unconstrained portfolio, was compared against the

1 rejected 2017 MPI port -- portfolio rather than the  
2 MPI selected portfolio.

3                   And, again, shadow portfolio 2 was  
4 established with a significantly lower level of real  
5 risk than the MPI selected portfolio rather than a  
6 comparable level of risk.

7                   And finally, shadow portfolio 2  
8 "unconstrained" was constrained by limits imposed by  
9 the MPI Board of Directors.

10                   Egotist that I am, I like to think that  
11 I have a good sense of humour. Mr. Scarfone gets the  
12 prize for best line of the Hearing when he tried to  
13 mess -- rescue the Mercer's witness from what Mr.  
14 Scarfone described as the abyss.

15                   The result of the Mercer's analysis  
16 thought in our client's submission, all joking aside,  
17 was an analytical abyss. And here is the Mercer  
18 witness candidly admitted -- admitting that shadow  
19 portfolio 1 was not optimized. It wasn't on an  
20 efficient frontier.

21                   It was just another asset mix  
22 constrained to move money from one (1) bucket to  
23 another with no other buckets in play. Would that be  
24 fair? "Right," says the Mercer's witness.

25

1 (BRIEF PAUSE)

2

3 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Significantly,  
4 shadow portfolio 1 had significantly less real risk as  
5 measured in standard volatility than the MPI  
6 preference.

7 Again, the Board's instructions, or the  
8 hypothesis to be tested, is whether an opportunity was  
9 foregone. And here on slide 34, you see our -- our  
10 legal team asking the Mercer's witness that they  
11 should -- suggesting to them that they selected a  
12 shadow por -- polio -- shadow portfolio for comparison  
13 purposes that have less risk.

14 And that fact was conceded by the  
15 Mercer's witness, and not just a little risk. Our  
16 client suggested to the Mercer's witness that it was a  
17 significant reduction in risk as measured in real  
18 terms.

19 And as the Mercer's witness candidly  
20 conceded, a move from four point five (4.5), which was  
21 the MPI selected risk of that portfolio, to three  
22 point two (3.2) is significant.

23 The same challenge spilled over into  
24 shadow portfolio two (2). And here you see on slide  
25 thirty-five (35) our conversation with the Mercer's

1 witness.

2 In neither shadow one (1) or shadow  
3 portfolio two (2), did you start from the same level  
4 of risk, real risk, as measured in the MPI selected  
5 portfolio. Correct.

6 So if one were wanting to conduct an  
7 apples to apples comparison, the same risk is the MPI  
8 selected portfolio, that was not done by any of the  
9 shadow portfolios on Basic use selected. That's  
10 right.

11 Those are the most fundamental problems  
12 with shadow portfolio one (1) and two (2) the  
13 analysis. But if you'll recall the Board's words, it  
14 was trying to test the shadow portfolios against the  
15 MPI selected portfolios.

16 But if you remember that no doubt  
17 stimulating investment portfolio discussion, there was  
18 a -- the purple dot of -- called "current", which was  
19 current 2017. That was the rejected MPI portfolio  
20 before asset liability management was engaged in.

21 So here we are talking about shadow  
22 portfolio two (2), and the question is put to the  
23 Mercer's witness. When you're using the term "same  
24 risk", you're comparing it to the rejected 2017  
25 portfolio. Right, agreeing. Just to confirm, you're

1 not comparing it to the same risk as the MPI selected  
2 portfolio.

3                   Again, the witness confirms. And when  
4 one looked to the same return, again the shadow  
5 portfolio is being compared to the rejected 2017  
6 portfolio. That was conceded. Again, not comparing  
7 it to the selected MPI portfolio, again, that was  
8 conceded.

9                   Slide 37 is titled "unconstrained does  
10 not mean unconstrained", and this was a nimble piece  
11 of cross-examination by our learned PUB counsel asking  
12 with regard to shadow portfolio two (2), when we're  
13 talking about unconstrained really we're speaking  
14 about unconstrained within what the MPI investment  
15 committee provided, and that was again conceded by the  
16 Mercer's witness.

17                   Our clients with regard to the shadow  
18 portfolios are in one area of agreement with both Mr.  
19 Bunston and Mercers, and that is if this exercise is  
20 to be undertaken, it is an exercise that requires some  
21 time. And Mr. -- the Mercer's witness suggests it  
22 should be over a full market cycle. Mr. Bunston gave  
23 words to similar effect at pages 499 to 500 of the  
24 transcript and our client cannot disagree with that.

25                   I'm going to move away from the shadow

1 portfolios just to go back for a moment to our  
2 client's underlying concerns with the asset liability  
3 management strategy at Manitoba Public Insurance.

4           You often hear in this hearing the  
5 suggestion that MPI has "de-risked" the portfolio. It  
6 may have done so significantly in nominal terms, but  
7 as PUB counsel put to the MPI witnesses, or the Mercer  
8 witness, sorry, at slide 39, would it be overly  
9 simplistic of me to suggest that the nominal liability  
10 benchmark is not taken into inflation volatility, and  
11 the witnesses conceded that would not be overly-  
12 simplistic. That would be fair.

13           And again, that's one of our client's  
14 concerns. It's not that it's de-risk, it's just  
15 different risks and our client does not accept the  
16 submission that it's low risk over time.

17           On that theme of MPI selecting a  
18 portfolio of different risk not de-risked, is the  
19 reality that the Basic portfolio is highly  
20 concentrated. Provincial, Federal, and corporate  
21 bonds with relatively high correlations. And frankly,  
22 that's working out splendidly in the first six (6)  
23 months of this year.

24           But that's from an asset perspective,  
25 risky, because high correlations tend to impair the

1 benefits of diversification for assets.

2                   And this was confirmed in our client's  
3 conversation with the Mercer witness.

4

5                                   (BRIEF PAUSE)

6

7                   DR. BYRON WILLIAMS:    Just a couple of  
8 last slides on the investment portfolio.  Our client  
9 is concerned not just with the interests of ratepayers  
10 today but the interests of ratepayers five (5) years  
11 from now and ten (10) years from now.  And this is --  
12 this description of the MPI investment portfolio  
13 wasn't concocted by our clients.  It's a good  
14 discussion of the cost of capital of the Corporation  
15 in the value management business case of the  
16 Corporation.

17                                   And this analysis on slide 41 just  
18 talks about the conservatism of the portfolio and --  
19 and -- and the consequences of that in terms of the  
20 expected total retu -- return over time.  And our  
21 clients think that that is an important point, not  
22 just focussed on the income statement of this year or  
23 next year, but on the entire family of Manitoba Public  
24 Insurance consumers, including those consumers who  
25 will be collecting PIPP benefits, personal injury

1 protection plan benefits, twenty (20) years from now.

2 Next slide, please.

3                   And again, the Board has made its  
4 determination in the short term, but our client  
5 continues to question the reasonableness of the MPI  
6 approach. They point to the superior returns over the  
7 last five (5) years -- again, that's a relatively  
8 short period -- of Saskatchewan SGI, which -- which  
9 has on its hybri -- it bucket -- its bucket approach  
10 does include for the longer-term claims an investment  
11 pool of purely growth aflet -- assets.

12                   So our clients' recommended finding  
13 with regard to the investment portfolio is, first,  
14 that the purpose of the shadow portfolio was to assess  
15 whether MPI was foregoing opportunity for a comparable  
16 level of risk; second, that that purpose has not been  
17 achieved; and that third, MPI has not complied with  
18 the PUB directions with respect to the shadow  
19 portfolio. Our client will have additional  
20 recommendations, which will be shared by Ms. Dilay  
21 later.

22

23   (BRIEF PAUSE)

24

25                   DR. BYRON WILLIAMS:    Our client -- in

1 terms of slide 44, we're going to have a couple of  
2 short snappers but on really important issues. One  
3 (1) is on the personal injury protection plan, and  
4 again, this is pointing out that there are -- are  
5 excessive, imprudent, and unreasonable costs built  
6 into PIPP, which are impacted by a couple of factors.

7           One (1) is unreasonable agreements with  
8 certain service providers, which our client intends to  
9 address in this -- the commercially sensitive  
10 information portion of the submissions. We will note  
11 that MPI, in our clients' view, has shown candor in  
12 identifying these challenges and exploring alternative  
13 models to retain service providers.

14           There are also excessive, imprudent,  
15 unreasonable costs built into forecast PIPP  
16 expenditures by the ongoing struggles of Manitoba  
17 Public Insurance to manage complex claims, which were  
18 exacerbated by imprudent staff reductions between two-  
19 o-nine and 2017 and challenges in addressing and  
20 developing appropriate case management skills,  
21 practices, and metrics. And the financial and human  
22 cost of those challenges endures.

23           To the Corporation's credit, it has  
24 acknowledged the -- these cha -- challenges and is  
25 attempting to address them. The outcome remains

1 uncertain.

2                   The Board has heard a lot in terms of  
3 physical damage re-engineering over the years. In  
4 this hearing, we had the final assessment of the  
5 program, and our clients do recommend to the Board  
6 that it -- that it find that historic, current, and  
7 future rates of Manitoba consumers have been adversely  
8 affected by the imprudent rollout of the PDR project  
9 physical damage re-engineering.

10                   They would note that while the project  
11 appears to be -- have been relatively favourably  
12 received from consumers, it has failed to deliver  
13 value for money resulting in a negative net present  
14 value in the range of 49 million to 50 million with  
15 the Gartners doing the calculations for MPI, including  
16 obviously a significant write-off relating to the  
17 customer claims reporting system.

18                   Our client does acknowledge that MPI  
19 has shown candour in admitting the challenges with  
20 program delivery and prudence in writing off those  
21 expenditures. But those write-offs from prior years  
22 are reflected in today's reduced retaining earnings.

23                   From our client's perspective -- and  
24 some of this will be addressed in CSI -- but one of  
25 the most important aspects of this hearing relates to

1 collision repair costs. The benchmarking exercise  
2 that Manitoba Public Insurance has undertaken and the  
3 lessons in the -- on the public record that -- that we  
4 can take from that exercise.

5 Our client will address some of this in  
6 commercially sensitive information, but on the public  
7 record, they recommend the following findings. First,  
8 that there appears to be excessive and unreasonable  
9 costs built into certain industry agreements that  
10 cannot be explained by the market realities of a  
11 smaller province such as Manitoba or differences in  
12 service quality, i.e., ICAR Gold. Again, we'll  
13 elaborate on those in CSI.

14 Secondly, that there are grounds for  
15 concern that the practice of industry wide agreements  
16 historically undertaken by MPI may raise issues under  
17 the Federal Competition Act and practical barriers to  
18 competition.

19 Third, giving credit to Manitoba Public  
20 Insurance, that the Corporation has shown prudence in  
21 undertaking benchmarking exercises with regard to  
22 vehicle repair and other service industry benchmarks.

23 Also that the Corporation has shown  
24 reasonableness in removing the five (5) repair a week  
25 minimum for the Direct Repair program -- I hope I have

1 that right -- which flowed from an industry agreement  
2 and which posed an unfair barrier to smaller shops  
3 including those in rural Manitoba.

4                   A key recommendation from our client's  
5 perspective which goes to whether the labour rates and  
6 in collision repair are just and reasonable and goes  
7 as well to the risks faced by the Corporation, if any  
8 in terms of compliance with the Competition Act, is  
9 that Manitoba Public Insurance should report back  
10 during the next general rate application on industry  
11 best practice in and ensuring compliance with the  
12 Competition Act, value for money, and quality service  
13 availability.

14                   Included in that analysis should be an  
15 assessment of viable alternatives to industry wide  
16 agreements which may include, as ICBC appears to do,  
17 the Irish (Phonetic) messenger model, the rate cards,  
18 which there was some discussion in this hearing, and  
19 RFPs or requests for proposals.

20                   From our client's perspective looking  
21 not just at next year's rates but rates over time,  
22 this is one of the most prudent and reasonable and  
23 important exercises that are -- that could be  
24 undertaken, both in terms of rates levels but also the  
25 risks faced by the Corporation.

1                   At slide 47, I asked perhaps the  
2 weirdest question in my legal career. I asked the  
3 president of MPI -- and I've asked a few weird ones,  
4 I'll concede that -- but I asked the president of MPI  
5 to put on the consumer cap -- cloth cap, no doubt --  
6 and discuss why consumers perhaps should be concerned  
7 about the current status quo with many service  
8 providers of the industry-wide agreements.

9                   And at the top of this slide, here you  
10 see the risk from a consumer perspective that  
11 consumers and all -- MPI and ultimately consumers are  
12 paid too much under a negotiated contract.

13                   And Mr. Wennberg chipped in in the same  
14 discussion and also spoke of the challenges from  
15 the -- the Corporation's perspective with one of the  
16 most notable -- and this is on the public record at  
17 slides -- or pages 1797 to 1802 -- being the  
18 commercial repair rates: 10 percent, 10 percent,  
19 10 percent, moving from the high nineties to a  
20 commercial repair -- he says a hundred and  
21 thirty-three. It might be slightly different.

22                   The rate that we pay on commercial  
23 vehicles is the highest rate in North America. And  
24 from our client's perspective, this is the consumer  
25 interest, the public interest, and the regulatory

1 interest, and again, leads to our client's concern  
2 that embedded in current and future rates may be  
3 excessive labour costs, as represented in -- in this  
4 transcript excerpt.

5

6 (BRIEF PAUSE)

7

8 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Madam Chair,  
9 we're going well for time. I wonder -- what I'm going  
10 to suggest is we're over a third of the way through.  
11 I wonder if we could step down for five (5) --  
12 five (5) minutes. I've got an important section here  
13 and just -- I'd like to be a little fresher, if I  
14 could, for that with your indulgence if that's  
15 appropriate.

16 THE CHAIRPERSON: Certainly,  
17 Mr. Williams. That's fine. It's 2:07. How about if  
18 we reconvene at 2:15.

19

20 --- Upon recessing at 2:07 p.m.

21 --- Upon resuming at 2:17 p.m.

22

23 THE CHAIRPERSON: Mr. Williams...?

24 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Yes, thank you,  
25 and the Public Utilities Board counsel has helpfully

1 reminded ourselves -- we will be coming to the -- Ms.  
2 Dilay's argument in a few min -- well, in about an  
3 hour -- to the legal submissions.

4                   Obviously the Attorney General of  
5 Manitoba is here. The Attorney General of Canada was  
6 served and indicated the they -- they were not  
7 appearing, but we have not filed that with the Public  
8 Utilities Board, which is my oversight, for which I  
9 apologize, and we will make sure that that is done  
10 forthwith, with our apologies.

11                   THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

12                   DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: For -- the next  
13 few slides are going to address issues related to the  
14 bricks and mortar delivery model. And before we go  
15 through the slides, I think it's important again to  
16 just back up for a second and -- and share our  
17 clients' interest in this issue, which is not to pick  
18 on brokers or to pick on MPI, but to start with the  
19 reality that these are living, breathing costs that --  
20 that will -- will -- associated with broker  
21 commissions that will affect consumers, but also  
22 because our client saw the industry-wide agreement  
23 with brokers as offering a window on the broader issue  
24 of industry-wide agreements and insight into some of  
25 the potential concerns that could flow from that, both

1 in terms of barriers to entry, in terms of barriers to  
2 innovation, and in terms of alleged risks with the  
3 Competition Act.

4 Our clients' keen interest in this  
5 issue as well is because the relationship of brokers  
6 and the intertwining in their commission structure --  
7 but in how they deal with consumers between Basic and  
8 Extension, offers important insight into that  
9 relationship, which is central to the Board's  
10 deliberations related to the Capital Management Plan.

11 And again going back to the Board's  
12 jurisdiction to approve rates for service, the last  
13 two (2) words in that equation, or in that  
14 terminology, are "for service," and our client saw the  
15 issues relating to bricks and mortar service delivery  
16 models as offering insight into areas of the province  
17 that are arguably under served, and that is an  
18 important consumer issue which is germane to the  
19 Board's approval to set rates -- to approve rates for  
20 service.

21 Can we go back to slide 48 for a  
22 minute?

23 Just some introductory comments on the  
24 general theme that you've heard a lot of discussion in  
25 this hearing about as exclusivity in British Columbia

1 versus primary models.

2                   From our clients' respectful  
3 submission, consumer choice is not achieved  
4 exclusively through broker delivery models, and they  
5 pointed out and we dealt with this with our cross-  
6 examination of the insurance broker witnesses, in many  
7 areas of insurance, Manitobans have the choice of  
8 whether to purchase their insurance directly from a  
9 broker, which is obviously their right in a free and  
10 democratic society, or from other institutions, and  
11 that could be online travel health insurance, that  
12 could be mortgage income replacement insurance where  
13 you could go to a broker or you could get it from your  
14 bank, or car loan income replacement insurance.

15                   That choice is present in many aspects  
16 of the marketplace, and from our client's perspective,  
17 consumers come in all shapes and sizes, all degrees of  
18 sophisticated -- sophistication, and their autonomy is  
19 best served by having those different choices.

20                   Our clients do not doubt that captive  
21 customers of Basic and Extension services have been  
22 generally well served by a mixed bricks and mortar  
23 delivery model, which relies primarily on brokers but  
24 which provides consumers with the choice of receiving  
25 services directly from Manitoba Public Insurance in

1 locations where that is available, and in our clients'  
2 view, the model is prudent and superior to bro -- the  
3 broker exclusivity model employed by ICBC, which both  
4 denies consumer choice and leaves the Corporation  
5 inordinately vulnerable to economic and other  
6 pressures.

7                   And by analogy, this Board could take  
8 judicial notice of our legal aid system in Manitoba,  
9 which has both a staff delivery service model and  
10 contracted private sector services as well, delivering  
11 the best of both worlds, more choice for legal aid  
12 consumers, but also tools to maintain cost control for  
13 -- for legal aid itself. And so from our clients'  
14 perspective, that is a -- a fit analogy.

15                   So while the bricks and mortar's model  
16 has generally served many captive consumers well,  
17 there are significant bricks and mortar service gaps  
18 in rural Manitoba, in northern Manitoba, and in First  
19 Nation communities, and those gaps, in our clients'  
20 respectful view, might be ameliorated, at least in  
21 part, by online services or enhanced telephone  
22 options, which our client was interested to hear from  
23 the brokers in the conversation on -- on Tuesday.

24                   An important issue from our clients'  
25 perspective for this Board, which is entrusted with

1 approving rates for service to keep its eye on, is  
2 opportunities in a cost-effective way to support more  
3 vulnerable rural bricks and mortar services.

4           Some of the interesting concepts that  
5 came up in this hearing was potentially increased  
6 compensation for towns where there may be a single  
7 broker location and no alternatives within 50  
8 kilometres, and conceptually, from our clients'  
9 perspective, that might be a reasonable and prudent  
10 opportunity, while keeping the level of commissions  
11 the same, to invest more where services are less and  
12 where volumes may be less, but having that bricks and  
13 mortar service is important.

14           There were examples of innovative  
15 efforts by Manitoba Public Insurance. The Island Lake  
16 example of -- of going into remote communities with no  
17 broker services and employing innovative payment  
18 options, the Northern Store, because of the financial  
19 inclusion challenges in those communities.

20           There is also examples of interest in  
21 collaboration between brokers and MPI in terms of -- I  
22 think was the Pimicikamak First Nation, but -- or  
23 maybe it was Snow Lake - it might have been Snow Lake  
24 -- I might have -- Snow Lake in terms of assisting  
25 brokers to make periodic visits to communities that

1 have no bricks and mortar services, and also  
2 potentially opportunities to use the telephone option  
3 more creatively. And again, those are shared in  
4 particular by the broker panel at -- at page 2472.

5                   At the bottom of this slide, being  
6 slide forty -- 49, you see an important statement by  
7 Manitoba Public Insurance. Our clients are -- are  
8 highly committed to prudence and reasonableness, but  
9 our clients do concur both with -- with Manitoba  
10 Public Insurance that it is important to support  
11 communities where there are limited options in terms  
12 of service.

13                   In the course of this hearing, this  
14 Board has received a significant amount of evidence in  
15 terms of the comparisons with private sector broker  
16 commissions. Our client cautions that that analysis  
17 should be viewed with significant care, and there's a  
18 number of reasons for that.

19                   First of all, there are on the record  
20 of this hearing substantial differences in the types  
21 of services delivered by brokers in Manitoba to  
22 captive Basic and Extension customers. It doesn't  
23 mean the services are not important, but those  
24 services are not easily comparable to private sector  
25 services.

1                   First of all, these distinctions relate  
2 to the absence of the need to seek and filter  
3 competitive quotes with regard to the Basic program.  
4 They relate to the absence of the time-consuming  
5 traditional "front-line underwriting function  
6 exercise," and that's in contrast to the competitive  
7 market, or as the broker panel conceded, for products  
8 like special risk Extension.

9                   These distinctions also relate to the  
10 ease and convenience of the Extension form itself,  
11 which leads -- assists in leading MPI to Extension  
12 market dominance and reduces the demand for  
13 competitive quotes from Extension, and these  
14 distinctions from the private marker (sic) broker  
15 commissions also relate to the simplicity and  
16 standardization of the Basic and compulsory insurance  
17 package.

18                   In our clients' view, these fundamental  
19 differences in the complexity of Basic and Extension  
20 services make comparisons with broker commissions in  
21 the competitive market largely unreliable.

22                   Our clients also caution on slide 51,  
23 that care should be exercising -- exercised -- I guess  
24 I should be exercising -- care should be exercised in  
25 reviewing standalone Basic commissions with any

1 jurisdiction.

2                   One (1) of the reasons care should be  
3 exercised is because of Manitoba's unique five (5)  
4 year insurance renewal model with annual  
5 reassessments. It is structurally distinct from any  
6 other Canadian jurisdiction. So brokers and MPI are  
7 engaged in a -- a live dispute before us in terms of  
8 the actual volume of reassessments done in broker  
9 offices. Our clients cannot offer an opinion on those  
10 numbers. What they can say with certainty is that  
11 structure is fundamentally different, admitted by the  
12 brokers, admitted by MPI, from any other Canadian  
13 jurisdiction. So that's one (1) point of caution in  
14 terms of looking at standalone Basic commissions.

15                   It is also analytically inappropriate  
16 to review Basic commissions in isolation because  
17 historically, and to this day, Basic and Extension  
18 commissions are negotiated as part of the same  
19 agreement. There are puts and takes in those  
20 agreements. If you want to talk about the  
21 reasonableness and prudence of the agreement and the  
22 package, fair enough, but you can't cherry pick out of  
23 that agreement, because it's a holistic agreement.

24                   And that point is made in the -- the  
25 2008 broker agreement. This is language from it. The

1 new service delivery model -- this is the language  
2 from it -- was designed to maximize compensation based  
3 on professionally managing the customer's overall  
4 business portfolio. So can't cherry pick the Basic  
5 commission out of there.

6           Just a final note in terms of -- from  
7 our clients' perspective, it is not analytically sound  
8 to compare Basic commissions to the overall corporate  
9 expenditures. If you want to add in Extension, you  
10 want to add in SRE, that is valid analytically,  
11 otherwise, that type of analysis is deserving of no  
12 weight.

13           In introducing this section, our client  
14 said that -- suggested I -- I suggested on their  
15 behalf that our client saw the brokering agreement is  
16 offering a window on potential issues with broader  
17 agreements.

18           And on slide 52, and I think 53, our  
19 client indicates that there is some evidence on this  
20 record to suggest that MPI and broker agreements,  
21 operating procedures, and practices have sometimes  
22 stifled innovation in service delivery to consumers  
23 and created barriers to entry in the broker industry.

24           One (1) example of that is the 2008  
25 agreement, which included a commitment agreed to by

1 MPI and brokers that MPI would not endeavour to  
2 provide customers with the option of renewing vehicle  
3 registration, insurance, or driver's licence online.  
4 Our client questions whether that agreement was in the  
5 consumer best interest.

6                   On slide 52, pulling from Appendix 11  
7 of CAC-1-1M, is the infamous -- infamous Section 19.  
8 As of December 2013, both IBAM, representing the  
9 brokers, and the Corporation believe that the Province  
10 of Manitoba is well served by the existing size and  
11 scope of our brec -- our broker force. No new  
12 agencies need apply. I'm being sarcastic there.

13                   As such, the Corporation will no longer  
14 be accepting applications for new licences or  
15 appointments. Of course, there is dispute about  
16 whether applications can be made, whether they will be  
17 accepted. But that is concerning to our client in  
18 terms of the marketplace.

19                   And here on slide 53, you see Mr.  
20 Wennberg and Ms. Hora suggesting that there was a  
21 strong message sent to people that Manitoba Public  
22 Insurance, in terms of accepting new agency  
23 applications, was not open for -- for business.

24                   The first arrow or bullet on slide 53  
25 is an important but disturbing quote from Appendix 3

1 of CAC-1-1. And a central issue in this hearing has  
2 been the relationship between Basic and Extension,  
3 given the significance of the Capital Management Plan  
4 transfers, but also the live question: is the  
5 Extension marketplace truly competitive?

6 And our client recognizes that the  
7 authors of the statement may not be with the  
8 Corporation anymore. But here is a 2014 briefing to  
9 the MPI Board of directors.

10 Speaking of a relationship with  
11 brokers, and on the second line, demonstrates  
12 commitment to the broker distribution channel as well  
13 as inoculation against competitive threats by  
14 aggressive insurers that do not depend on the broker  
15 distribution channel.

16 Again, on the next bullet or arrow, you  
17 see reference to a suggestion in a 2016 board of  
18 directors recommendation that the relationship between  
19 brokers and MPI has been a critical factor in the  
20 Corporation's ability to retain majority market share  
21 in the competitive Extension and SRE environments.

22 Finally, at the bottom of page 53, on  
23 this theme that the existing MPI broker relationship  
24 may exacerbate certain market concerns, our clients  
25 raise, as others have in this hearing, the concern of

1 whether consumers are being consistently advised of  
2 their opportunity to choose non-MPI Extension service  
3 offerings.

4                   There were questions of one (1) of the  
5 panel members of MPI. Do you survey that? Our client  
6 asked the brokers, Is there mystery shopping to see if  
7 Manitobans are even being advised of their right to  
8 choose when it comes to the Extension service?

9                   And there's -- apart from anecdote, and  
10 we all have our anecdotes -- that issue is unresolved.  
11 There is at least one (1) piece of survey evidence  
12 suggesting that it is not clear that consumers are  
13 being consistently advised even of their Extension  
14 offerings from MPI. And again from a consumer, a  
15 rates for service, a value of service perspective, and  
16 consumer security perspective, that is concerning.  
17 And that data related both to MPI service centres as  
18 well as to brokers.

19

20   (BRIEF PAUSE)

21

22                   DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Our client would  
23 never wish to diminish the value that many Manitobans  
24 play on their broker -- place on their brokers, and --  
25 and -- but there has been some suggestion in this

1 hearing by the insurance brokers that the broker model  
2 is the cornerstone of the relatively low rates of  
3 Manitoba.

4                   Our client suggests that a more  
5 reasonable hypothesis is the no-fault plan. And  
6 certainly, British Columbia, where there is an  
7 exclusive broker model, is no bastion of financial  
8 rectitude. It is insignificant trouble right now, and  
9 the exclusive broker model has not proven to be a  
10 bulwark against its challenges.

11                   An argument has been made in this  
12 hearing, why look at the brokers? There's other fish  
13 to fry. Our client agrees with Manitoba Public  
14 Insurance that this is important. Brokers, Basic, and  
15 Extension commissions holistically nego -- negotiated  
16 are -- it's suggested here on slide 55, amount to \$85  
17 million.

18                   That doesn't necessarily mean the  
19 number should be lower, but it doesn't need -- mean it  
20 needs to be higher. Maybe it needs to be  
21 redistributed. Our client has no position on that in  
22 this hearing, but it does mean that magnitude of that  
23 investment is definitely worry -- worthy of scrutiny.  
24 And you see the compare -- comparison made to the cost  
25 of the entire operation team of folks at MPI.

1 (BRIEF PAUSE)

2

3 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: This is one (1)  
4 of those areas of the Board asked for positions on the  
5 Board's jurisdiction. This is one (1) of the areas  
6 where the evidence in this hearing, from our client's  
7 perspective, being with regard to what is -- are the  
8 current service offerings in terms of Basic and  
9 Extension, and whether those need to be rev --  
10 reviewed and reviewed more frequently.

11 Our client is very sympathetic to the  
12 brokers on that point. We do not think it's within  
13 the Board's jurisdiction, though, to order that  
14 review. That would be a review initiated by Manitoba  
15 Public Insurance or perhaps by its -- its board or  
16 perhaps by the -- the Province. But from our clients'  
17 perspective, that would be a valuable recommendation  
18 that this Board, apart from its rate-approval  
19 authority, could do.

20 Are Manitobans appropriately insured in  
21 the Basic and Extension package for today's risk,  
22 tomorrow's risk, five (5) years from now risk? That,  
23 from our clients' perspective -- it's not the Board's  
24 jurisdiction, we would submit, but it would be a  
25 useful recommendation.

1 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: I -- I'm sorry,  
2 Mr. Williams. Can you go through this again, the  
3 recommendation? What I got is it's not the  
4 jurisdiction --

5 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Sorry --

6 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: -- which I  
7 understood to review the relationship. Then I heard  
8 that --

9 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Sorry, sorry --

10 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: -- for --

11 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Yeah.

12 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: -- for MPI, so to  
13 suggest --

14 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: So just -- so I'm  
15 -- I'm speaking to the simple issue here, sir --

16 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: Yes.

17 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: -- of whether the  
18 Basic service offering -- you know, the five hundred  
19 (500) deductible, the two hundred thousand (200,000)  
20 third-party liability -- the Extension service  
21 offering, the lower deductible -- our client is  
22 suggesting that is worthy of review and periodic  
23 review. What we are saying is that the Board -- this  
24 Board, the Public Utilities Board, could make that  
25 recommendation to MPI and to the government, and I

1 apologiz -- gize for being imprecise, but it can't  
2 order it.

3 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: Yeah. No, thank  
4 you.

5

6 (BRIEF PAUSE)

7

8 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Our client has  
9 some recommended findings. One (1) of them is that in  
10 light of five year -- the five (5) year renewal  
11 process and the issue of 90 percent clean  
12 reassessments, there is fundamental dissatisfaction  
13 with the existing broker commission structure both on  
14 the part of Manitoba Public Insurance, in terms of  
15 whether it's trailing fees or the 71 million guarantee  
16 -- or on the part of brokers, in terms of are all  
17 their services being compensated. That is a factual  
18 finding we think is open to this Board to make.

19 And underlying that tension is a more  
20 existential one relating to disruption in the broader  
21 marketplace. That disruption is driven by consumer  
22 demand, by technology, including online services. And  
23 as the McKinsey (phonetic) report and the Conference  
24 Board of Canada report appended to one (1) of the I --  
25 IBAM Information Requests of the MPI, I think perhaps

1 one dash -- well, number 4, but I could be wrong --  
2 there is a rapidly changing insurance operational  
3 dynamic outside of Manitoba, and one (1) of the  
4 primary targets is -- is auto insurance.

5                   So we've got the historic challenges  
6 related to the five (5) year renewals, and then we've  
7 got the -- the -- the -- the issue of -- of a market  
8 that is on the verge of disruption. And what are the  
9 consequences?

10                   And from a consumer perspective, our  
11 clients' concern is making sure that they have cost-  
12 effective service that is reasonably available that  
13 preserves consumer choice. And that will lead to some  
14 of our recommendations to come.

15                   The final point on this slide, and I  
16 apologize for this -- there is no one (1) size fits  
17 all in terms of consumer, as we've said before. There  
18 are some who want to be ear -- ad -- online conducting  
19 those transactions with autonomy. There are others  
20 who want to go down the street to the broker in their  
21 neighbourhood and -- and have confidence in that  
22 relationship. Our -- our clients' interest is value  
23 for money and preserving consumer choice and options,  
24 both in terms of service delivery model and the option  
25 of MPI or -- or brokers for bricks and mortar.

1

2

(BRIEF PAUSE)

3

4

DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: We'll talk more about market dominance in Extension under the capital management plan discussion, but our clients believe that the broker panel offered significant insight on this issue.

9

First of all, and I can't remember what the IWS acronym stands for, but the -- the fact that it makes sale of MPI Extension products considerably easier than those of other providers was factually uncontested in this hearing.

14

Secondly, that it may be more convenient for customer and brokers to have both Basic and Extension coverage from the same provider. In the case of claims, you only have to deal with one (1) insurance company.

19

Third, as noted by Mr. McGregor on Tuesday, that sometimes it's a challenge getting other competitive service offerings in the Manitoba marketplace. In his words, the challenge has been getting other insurers to offer the product.

24

And finally, the -- the -- the fact, I think, admitted both by Ms. Chammartin and Mr.

25

1 McGregor that Extension commissions set by other  
2 insurers are typically less than the commissions  
3 offered by MPI -- again, factors collectively that may  
4 help to explain Manitoba Public Insurance endemic  
5 dominance in the Extension marketplace.

6 Our clients' recommended findings in  
7 terms of the bricks-and-mortar service delivery model  
8 are first of all, that Manitoba ratepayers will not be  
9 well served by a service de -- delivery model that  
10 seeks to inflexibly lock in the status quo or ignore  
11 the realities of rapidly changing consumer market and  
12 technological demands. They think there are three (3)  
13 important principles in terms of accessibility and ch  
14 -- choice and which would deliver value to ratepayers.

15 First of all, that Manitobans would be  
16 well served by a service delivery model that commits,  
17 in a cost-effective ma -- manner, to maintaining and  
18 enhancing options from cons -- for consumers in  
19 northern, rural, and remote communities; a model that  
20 enables all ma -- Manitobans who choose to access  
21 online MPI services; and ensuring that all customers  
22 who wish to access MPI services through a bricks-and-  
23 mortar option, where available, have the choice  
24 between MPI and brokers.

25 Those, from our clients' perspective,

1 are important principles that they would recommend.

2

3

(BRIEF PAUSE)

4

5

DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Our clients would  
6 be remiss if they did not note that there -- again,  
7 these are high level estimates -- but that there are  
8 certain delivery models which preserve consumer choice  
9 for bricks-and-mortar services that have potential  
10 significant cost savings on the commission side.

11 They're not speaking to whether or not there would be  
12 corresponding cost increase on the MPI side.

13

One (1) is a shared delivery model,  
14 which would preserve choice in person at the broker or  
15 MPI and online, might offer potential savings over  
16 five (5) years of 91 million. And another one (1) of  
17 interest to our clients in terms of prudence and  
18 reasonableness was choice for bricks-and-mortar  
19 services both through brokers and MPI, and online  
20 through MPI. Those savings were significantly larger,  
21 estimated in the range of two hundred and thirty-seven  
22 (237) over five (5) years.

23

Again, high level estimates -- we don't  
24 know the puts and takes, but those are models that,  
25 from our clients' perspective, offered access to that

1 important bricks-and-mortar services where available.

2           Just some final findings, and this is  
3 consistent with our earlier commentary. First, that  
4 the recommended finding that the package of broker  
5 commissions offered in Manitoba are not easibly (sic)  
6 comparable to other jurisdictions, given five (5) year  
7 renewals, the absence of competition in Basic and  
8 large -- dominantly in Extension, and the absence of  
9 frontline underwriting for Basic and Extension.

10           Second, that there are grounds for  
11 concern that the practice of industry-wide agreements  
12 historically undertaken by MPI may raise issues under  
13 the federal Competition Act.

14           Third, there are grounds for concern  
15 that the practice of industry-wide agreements  
16 historically undertaken by MPI may raise practical  
17 barriers to competition.

18           And fourth, that consumers, whether  
19 appearing at a broker's office or at MPI, should be  
20 entitled to notice of the existence of competitive  
21 options to MPI Extension.

22           Our clients don't have a lot of  
23 optimism that the Extension market can prosper in  
24 Manitoba, but our clients do believe that it's  
25 important to take efforts to at least make sure that

1 Manitobans are aware of their choices.

2                   Flowing from those recommended  
3 findings, our client would recommend that MPI should  
4 be directed to report back on the prudence and  
5 reasonableness of existing compensation packages,  
6 especially in light of evolving consumer needs and the  
7 need to preserve and enhance service in rural northern  
8 and remote communities.

9                   Secondly, that MPI should be directed  
10 to report back an alternative agreement models which  
11 might deliver better value for captive ratepayers,  
12 ensure compliance with the Com -- Competition Act and  
13 reduce barriers to entry for competitive services.

14                   And third, and, again, this would only  
15 be a recommendation, but a review of existing Basic  
16 and Extension service offerings would be consistent  
17 with the recognition of evolving consumer needs and  
18 ongoing market dynamics.

19

20   (BRIEF PAUSE)

21

22                   DR. BYRON WILLIAMS:   Turning from  
23 brokers and bricks and mortar service delivery model  
24 to information technology. Our client's observations  
25 of the record of this Hearing are that they are mixed.

1                   To the -- to the credit of MPI, and  
2 certainly Mr. Remillard was helpful on this issue, MPI  
3 continues to de -- demonstrate candour and learnings  
4 from the physical damage re-engineering project.

5                   And some of the lessons are not to be  
6 industry leaders and create new and improved  
7 technologies and, secondly and critically, making  
8 software customization an exception, not the norm.

9                   A second observation is that Manitoba  
10 according -- Manitoba Public Insurance's in --  
11 information technology service delivery processes,  
12 according to Gartner, are somewhat more mature  
13 generally than peer organizations, and every domain,  
14 with the exception of Enterprise Architecture.

15                   But despite its overall maturity,  
16 Manitoba Public Insurance continues to have more  
17 information technology full-time equivalence is a  
18 percentage of total company employees than peers.

19                   Also flagged in the Gartner report was  
20 that our -- outsourced spending at \$10.2 million was  
21 94 percent higher than the peer group average. And we  
22 would note that there is a review of the IB -- IBM --  
23 that should not be IBAM, it should be IBM on slide 64  
24 -- agreement has been undertaken.

25                   And third, as flagged by Gartner Group,

1 maintenance costs at 5.8 percent are significantly  
2 higher than the peer group average as well.

3                   Again, we discussed this with MPI, and  
4 there were some reasons offered, but these are sources  
5 of concern with the overall information technology  
6 assessment, and also an indication of why those  
7 Gartner benchmark reports have been so important and  
8 insightful to the Board and of the importance of  
9 ensuring that good benchmarking continues into the  
10 future whether delivered by Gartner or otherwise.

11

12   (BRIEF PAUSE)

13

14                   DR. BYRON WILLIAMS:   We've titled this  
15 -- the discussion of Project Nova calculated risk or  
16 leap of faith. There's no factual denying the  
17 challenges by the MPI legacy programs, including  
18 Autopac online cars, the claim adjuster reporting  
19 system, whatever that acronym stands for, and, in  
20 particular, the -- as well as the driver and vehicle  
21 administration challenges.

22   On the calculated risk side of the  
23 equation, our clients would note that Nova, or the  
24 Legacy System management, is highly ambitious,  
25 constituting the li -- largest IT project in MPI

1 history.

2                   We would also note that its high-level  
3 business case, very preliminary, has un -- undergone a  
4 thoughtful review by two (2) very well regarded firms.  
5 And we note our -- on our client's behalf with  
6 interest significant, a internal and external prov --  
7 project oversight is contemplated with interesting  
8 user and consumer engagement anticipated.

9                   Our clients will have some comments of  
10 -- on Project Nova in the commercially sensitive  
11 discussion. But for the purposes of the public  
12 record, they would flag the following major risks  
13 associated with the project.

14                   One (1) is the complexity of addressing  
15 a number of major Legacy Systems at generally the same  
16 time and as part of the same project. And we've set  
17 out four (4) there, including driver and vehicle  
18 administration, the special risk Extension project,  
19 AOL, and cars.

20                   A second risk is the relative  
21 inexperience of Manitoba Public Insurance with the  
22 Agile methodology. As Mr. Bunkle (phonetic) notes,  
23 it's an emerging skill set within the Corporation, but  
24 they haven't built a lot of business cases around that  
25 methodology.

1                   Third, our client notes substantial  
2 budget uncertainties given the stage of the pro --  
3 project with Mr. Dessler noting there's a risk that  
4 numbers may deviate from the \$106.8 million.

5                   Fourth is the reliance of the business  
6 case on broker's commissions.

7                   And fifth, maybe not a risk, but a lack  
8 of clarity, at least to our client, about whether MPI  
9 would be held -- and that word should be whole on the  
10 last arrow by the Provincial Government for the risks  
11 and costs associated with the project.

12                   In terms of information technology on  
13 the public record, our client would not that MPI  
14 continues to demonstrate some challenges with IT  
15 expenditures related to full-time equivalence and  
16 operational and maintenance expenditures.

17                   That Project Nova is an important but  
18 extremely high-risk project, in our client's view,  
19 with significant uncertainties related to  
20 implementation and budget.

21                   And given the magnitude of the project  
22 and potential impacts on service deliver of MPI and  
23 government services, our client would recommend that  
24 regular updates on the risk status budget and business  
25 case should be delivered to the PUB which is

1 consistent with the Board's rate approval and function  
2 and its authority to examine the prudence and  
3 reasonableness of expenditures.

4

5 (BRIEF PAUSE)

6

7 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: I'm most nervous  
8 about this part of our submissions because my learned  
9 friend, Ms. Dilay, did a fantastic job, but I have to  
10 deliver her findings so -- on road safety.

11 But the client and Ms. Dilay have asked  
12 me to highlight the importance of road safety to all  
13 Manitobans, but the grounds for concern, first with  
14 the increase in serious injury over the period from  
15 2014 to 2017, as well as ongoing higher than Canada  
16 average -- averages in terms of fatalities and,  
17 finally, the number of pedestrian deaths in 2019.

18 Our client wishes to highlight as well  
19 the ongoing reality that rural Manitobans experience a  
20 disproportionate share of fatalities with se --  
21 seatbelt use being an ongoing concern, and that the  
22 social costs of collisions in Manitoba is estimated to  
23 be about \$2 billion annually, or about 3 percent of  
24 Manitoba's gross domestic product.

25 From our client's perspective, it's

1 important to Manitobans, but it's also important to  
2 the rate approval process. Successful road safety  
3 efforts and investments impact claims, claims costs,  
4 and the premiums required to fund the Basic program.

5 And our client notes the longstanding  
6 priority placed by this Board on whether the value of  
7 road safety programming is being maximized.

8

9 (BRIEF PAUSE)

10

11 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Of concern to our  
12 client is the fact that the Provincial road safety  
13 budget has not yet been developed and it's not clear  
14 if we're concerned about efficiency, if we're  
15 concerned about values for dollars, if we're concerned  
16 about optimization, it's not clear that it's a  
17 priority.

18 There is no evidence on this record to  
19 conclude that Manitoba Public Insurance is able to  
20 assess whether it is optimizing its investment as part  
21 of the broader provincial road safety system. And no  
22 provincial road safety budget has been issued as part  
23 of the overall road safety strategy.

24 Ms. Dilay had an interesting discussion  
25 with Mr. Eden (phonetic) at slide 71 of this Power

1 Point, from which our client concludes that the road  
2 safety priority setting pro -- priority setting  
3 process is conducted in a vacuum without the full  
4 picture of road safety programs in Manitoba.

5                   And Ms. Dilay suggests to the MPI  
6 witness, pages 769 to 70 of the transcript, that the  
7 priority setting process of Manitoba Public Insurance,  
8 with regard to road safety, is currently been -- being  
9 applied without reference to a spreadsheet of  
10 Manitoba's road safety programs, and associated  
11 budgets and the respected funding.

12                   And it -- and that's confirmed and  
13 that's of course because the document does not yet  
14 exist.

15                   Also mentioned in our introductory  
16 comments, but of particular concern to our client is  
17 the absence of a First Nation and/or Indigenous road  
18 safety strategy, which our client believes is not only  
19 troubling, but inconsistent with our duty,  
20 collectively, of reconciliation.

21                   Our clients notes that no First Nations  
22 or Indigenous political organizations were invited to  
23 participate in the road safety technical conference,  
24 and that there is currently no First Nation or  
25 Indigenous representation on the provincial road

1 safety committee level.

2 Our client was greatly concerned with  
3 the sharing of Mr. Wennberg, not that he shared it,  
4 but his observations of his visit to the four (4)  
5 island lake -- well, the Island Lake region and the  
6 communities there.

7 Anecdotally, presumably, Mr. Wennberg  
8 made observations that there is maybe even up to 80  
9 percent of the people are unlicensed, a number of the  
10 cars over half of them don't have insurance, and don't  
11 have plates, even in terms of driving around, and  
12 obviously rough roads and signage concerns.

13 Obviously concerned himself, this is,  
14 from our client's perspective, in a province where we  
15 assume that we're all insured, that we're all  
16 licensed, this is a concern to all ratepayers and all  
17 citizens.

18 In terms of road safety, our client  
19 recommends that this Board recognize and confirm the  
20 importance of road safety to all Manitobans, including  
21 rate payers, and that road safety issues should remain  
22 a regular, periodic feature at PUB hearings.

23 And Ms. Dilay has some guidance in  
24 terms of the frequency of that in the final  
25 recommendations.

1                   Second, that a road safety budget, a  
2 provincial road safety budget, would assist this Board  
3 in determining whether MPI's portfolio is truly  
4 optimized and assist MPI in that important endeavour,  
5 not only within its own budget, but within the broader  
6 context of managing scarce resources and optimizing  
7 investments in road safety.

8                   And third, that following good practice  
9 engagement, and this is from our client's perspective,  
10 is -- is urgent.

11                   MPI should report back to the PUB at  
12 its next general rate application regarding its  
13 progress in developing a Canadian best practice, First  
14 Nations and Indigenous road safety strategy.

15                   Our client has a couple of slides  
16 regarding the elimination of the monthly credit card  
17 option. And the starting point is that that  
18 elimination of the pre-authorized payment option was  
19 done without consultation with consumers.

20                   That option was an important option to  
21 many Manitobans, affecting roughly 10 percent of the  
22 customers of MPI.

23                   And notably, MPI, prior to making its  
24 decision, engaged in discussions with the Insurance  
25 Broker's Association and with the government.

1                   And you'll see from pages -- the  
2 reference from the October 16th transcript to the  
3 conversation with Mr. Remillard, referring to  
4 engagement with brokers then the province, but asking  
5 what type of engagement was undertaken with consumers,  
6 directly, if at all.

7                   With consumers, replace MPI? Yes. So  
8 meaning Manitobans? Good question. We will  
9 acknowledge that we did not directly go to customers  
10 to seek their input as to how they would feel about  
11 eliminating this option.

12                   This comes back to the rates for  
13 service dialogue and our client likes to think of  
14 themselves as fiercely fiscal, but it's rates for  
15 service and for certain Manitobans, 10 percent of  
16 Manitobans, this was an important option.

17                   And from our client's perspective, this  
18 is an unfair burden on vulnerable consumers who may be  
19 challenged to afford to make a larger payment all at  
20 once or change now and pay their bills later.

21                   They are losing a viable payment option  
22 that helps make -- make ends meet while those who can  
23 afford a three (3) or four (4) payment cost are still  
24 able to use credit as their form of payment. And for  
25 our client, that is deeply troubling.

1                   Our client notes rather lengthy  
2 commentary by Manitoba Public Insurance about the  
3 regulatory process. With the Board's permission,  
4 we're not able to digest that commentary today or  
5 reply to it.

6                   Our client, in due course, perhaps  
7 after the efficiency Manitoba hearing is done, would  
8 appreciate the opportunity to -- to respond to those  
9 comments.

10                  And our client never wants to diminish  
11 the cost of any expenditure by Manitoba Public  
12 Insurance and agrees totally that every cent, every  
13 penny, should be scrutinized.

14                  But our client did wish to notice in  
15 what they think is an apples to apples comparison,  
16 that regulatory appeal costs, including both the  
17 Public Utility Board and Automobile and Injury  
18 Compensation Commission constitute about one half  
19 (1/2) of 1 percent of total claims cost percentage  
20 wise.

21                  In effect, the price of a monopoly, the  
22 price of accountability is about half of 1 percent of  
23 claims costs mathematically. And from our client's  
24 perspective, we always have to scrutinize those costs.  
25 We always want to be efficient, but we also want to be

1 effective.

2                   And this process has delivered  
3 tremendous value to ratepayers in terms of  
4 accountability, transparency, and ensuring that  
5 Manitobans have confidence that decisions are being  
6 made based upon evidence in public, not in back -- not  
7 in back rooms and non-tra -- transparent fashions.

8

9   (BRIEF PAUSE)

10

11                   DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: We use the credit  
12 card example on behalf of our client to highlight what  
13 bad consumer engagement looks like, or nonexistent  
14 consumer engagement.

15                   Best practice consumer engagement  
16 suggests that customers, consumers should be engaged  
17 often and should be informed about options. There are  
18 tremendous learning opportunities for MPI and for this  
19 Board in consumer engagement.

20                   Stakeholder engagement is important,  
21 but direct engagement with consumers is, as well. One  
22 (1) of those examples is service delivery and  
23 engagement with Manitoba consumers about future  
24 operating models, including the provision of online  
25 services, the important role of brokers.

1                   The important role of MPI and different  
2 challenges and options in urban versus rural and  
3 remote areas may assist this Corporation in forging a  
4 path forward that will benefit ratepayers and be more  
5 likely to be successful.

6                   In terms of road safety, while MPI  
7 consults with consumers in evaluating its programs,  
8 there is room for improvement in pro -- program  
9 selection and development by engaging consumers early  
10 in the pro -- process.

11                   Given experience in other jurisdictions  
12 and the fact that the majority of serious collisions  
13 happen in rural areas and on gravel roads, there would  
14 be substantial merit for MPI to engage with rural  
15 Manitobans and with Manitoba First Nations and  
16 specifically towards developing a First Nation road  
17 safety strategy.

18                   In terms of driver safety rating, CAC  
19 (Manitoba) was very pleased with the MPI's engagement  
20 with customers to date and looks forward to receiving  
21 results of further engagement that will serve to  
22 inform the decision-making process.

23

24

(BRIEF PAUSE)

25

1 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Madam Chair, just  
2 if I could just -- maybe four (4) minutes, five (5)  
3 minutes, just -- and then we'll finish her -- finish  
4 her off, if that's okay with the panel?

5 THE CHAIRPERSON: That's -- that's  
6 certainly fine, Mr. Williams. I just have one (1)  
7 question, and that is when do you expect that you will  
8 be concluded for today?

9 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: I'm expecting  
10 around 4:30.

11 THE CHAIRPERSON: Okay.

12 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Just one (1)  
13 second. I want to...

14 THE CHAIRPERSON: Yeah, that's sort of  
15 the outside-end as far as --

16 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Okay.

17 THE CHAIRPERSON: -- the panel's  
18 concerned, if that's all right with you.

19 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: That should be  
20 fine.

21

22 --- Upon recessing at 3:11 p.m.

23 --- Upon resuming at 3:14 p.m.

24

25 THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

1 Mr. Williams...?

2 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Thank you. We're  
3 on the overall health of the Corporation and taking  
4 into account reasonable reserves.

5 And our client has identified six (6)  
6 critical questions for the setting of the rate  
7 stabilization reserve and the consideration of the  
8 capital management plan.

9 First, what do we know generally about  
10 the overall health of the insurance lines of business  
11 and the relationship between Basic, Extension, and  
12 SRE?

13 Second -- this relates to Mr. Todd's  
14 evidence -- what did generally accepted regulatory  
15 practices suggest?

16 Third, how does the proposed capital  
17 management plan and underlying reserve regulation  
18 compare to generally accepted regulatory practice?

19 Fourth -- Ms. Dilay's area -- to the  
20 extent that the capital management plan does not  
21 appear to be consistent with good practice, what are  
22 the options of the Public Utility Board? Is the  
23 regulation lawful and binding?

24 Five, if it's not lawful or binding,  
25 what weight, if any, should be given to that document?

1                   And sixth, if the reserve regulation is  
2 lawful and binding, is the capital management plan  
3 consistent with it?

4                   I'll just note that in terms of our  
5 timing, I'll try to finish Questions 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6  
6 in the next thirty (30) minutes or so, giving  
7 Ms. Dilay the opportunity for about half an hour to go  
8 through the -- the legal submissions for which we've  
9 already filed substantial briefs.

10                   THE CHAIRPERSON:   And just one  
11 question, Mr. Williams, if that doesn't afford you  
12 enough time, is Ms. Dilay available for tomorrow  
13 morning?

14                   DR. BYRON WILLIAMS:   She is.   And  
15 the -- the issues that follow, including the  
16 recommendation she would have -- she would be  
17 available for.

18                   THE CHAIRPERSON:   Okay.   Thank you.

19                   DR. BYRON WILLIAMS:   And the CSI,  
20 Ms. Dilay, is versed in the material and could present  
21 it as -- as well.

22                   THE CHAIRPERSON:   Okay.   Thank you.

23                   DR. BYRON WILLIAMS:   When we know  
24 generally about the overall health of the insurance --  
25 of the insurance lines of business and the

1 relationship between Basic, Extension, and SRE,  
2 generally our clients conclude that the overall health  
3 of the Corporation is strong underpinned by its  
4 statutory monopoly in Basic and market dominance in  
5 the allegedly competitive Extension and SRE Special  
6 Risk Extension lines of business.

7           The characteristics of the Extension  
8 line of business which is directly relevant to the  
9 capital management plan include longstanding dominance  
10 at over 95 percent -- at or over 95 percent of the  
11 market for over a decade and with over 85 percent of  
12 all Basic Autopac policyholders purchasing Extension  
13 coverage.

14           Another characteristic is stable  
15 expenditures buttressed by the certainty, as  
16 Mr. Wennberg shared, that roughly 60 percent of its  
17 claims costs associate -- are associated with  
18 deductibles which it has that certainty that they're  
19 limited to a certain amount per claim.

20           We also know that the current state of  
21 the MPI Extension line of business includes unusually  
22 high profit range, not in the 15 to 20 percent range  
23 noted by Mr. Graham on the opening day on the hearing  
24 as standard in marketplaces, but in the range of  
25 32 percent in its most recent year with profit targets

1 in the range of 27 to 28 percent in the current and  
2 test years.

3 We also know that the strength of the  
4 Extension line of business is its relationship with  
5 Basic -- the benefit it draws from Basic. For the  
6 most part, Basic and Extension customers, as noted by  
7 Mr. Johnston, are the same people.

8 Core elements of that market dominance  
9 include shared customer information, seamless shared  
10 screens and service delivery platforms, ease of claim,  
11 and price, and it is unclear whether all or many  
12 Extension customers are aware they have a competitive  
13 choice.

14

15 (BRIEF PAUSE)

16

17 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: On slide 82,  
18 you'll see Mr. Watchman pushing Mr. Todd in terms of  
19 whether there's indicia in -- in the current  
20 marketplace of Extension of anti-competitive  
21 behaviour. Mr. Todd is cautious, noting he hasn't  
22 conducted any detailed analysis, but that would be a  
23 reasonable starting assumption for any analysis.

24 What do generally accepted regulatory  
25 practice -- what do those principles suggest in terms

1 of process, and how have they been applied in Manitoba  
2 regarding the rate stabilization reserve? Our client  
3 finds particularly helpful Mr. Todd's evidence  
4 generally and in particular pages 21 to -- 2,124 to  
5 2,137. We're trying to highlight some of those key  
6 elements for the -- for the Board.

7                   The starting point is: Why are we  
8 doing this? Mr. Todd notes that it's a legislative  
9 monopoly. Basic fits the mode of a regulated utility,  
10 and the purpose of rate approval of rate regulation is  
11 to protect customers and to service a proxy, a  
12 substitute for competition in areas whether there's  
13 either a natural monopoly or, in the case of MPI, a  
14 statutory one.

15                   We've already spoken that the essential  
16 starting point of independent rate setting is balance.  
17 Here's the well known words of the Court of Appeal  
18 about the Public Utilities Board balancing act of  
19 ratepayer's interests and the financial health of the  
20 utility in the public interest.

21                   Mr. Todd notes the prudence and  
22 balance -- excuse me -- the balance requires a  
23 prudence consideration including for necessary  
24 reserves. The purpose is to set rates that recover  
25 prudently incurred costs, fully recovered but not over

1 recovered. That implies in the MPI context that rates  
2 should be sufficient to achieve the required reserves  
3 but no more than sufficient.

4                   What happens in circumstances like with  
5 Extension in particular but also SRE when there are  
6 new non-utility services offered by a monopoly? In  
7 those circumstances, issues arise a fairness to  
8 monopoly customers and the importance of avoiding  
9 anti-competitive behaviour.

10                   As Mr. Todd notes in slide 87, the  
11 concern for regulators is that the fair treatment and  
12 pricing of the utility services -- that's the concern,  
13 the fair treatment of pricing of the utility service  
14 as it interplays with the revenues that are generated  
15 by the competitive services to ensure the customers of  
16 the monopoly are fairly treated.

17                   What does subsidy mean? Mr. Todd notes  
18 that it is open to regulators to adopt a broad  
19 interpretation of subsidy meaning anything that  
20 affects the competitive position of the competitive  
21 services could be viewed as a subsidy.

22                   He also notes that excess benefits are  
23 generally returned to the monopoly consumer. Most  
24 regulators say, he advises, that those benefits  
25 flow -- flow from the monopoly consumer and that the

1 value of the benefits to the other line of business  
2 should flow back to them. This statement assumes that  
3 the goal is to benefit monopoly customers.

4 Mr. Todd's conclusion is that  
5 100 percent of excess profits in excess of prudent  
6 cost recovery -- it is appropriate to -- including  
7 prudent reserves for the non-utility service can be  
8 flowed back to monopoly consumers.

9

10 (BRIEF PAUSE)

11

12 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Applying these  
13 principles to Manitoba Public Insurance requires, in  
14 Mr. Todd's view, consideration of appropriate reserve  
15 levels for the non-utility service.

16 As he puts it, whatever the Board  
17 decides is the -- the regulatory Board is the  
18 appropriate reserve structure in generally accepted  
19 principles. If you're generating reserves in excess  
20 of what's needed for that, the concept says the only  
21 reason they can get excess reserve is because they're  
22 being -- benefitting from being associated with Basic.

23 And that excess revenue in excess of  
24 prudent reserves becomes the way you define the  
25 benefit of the joined operation of competitive and

1 Basic services. And again without the benefit,  
2 competitive pricing would not result in excess  
3 benefits. Therefore, the excess earnings should  
4 accrue back to Basic.

5                   What are the implications for the  
6 capital management plan? First, recognize as a fact  
7 that the benefit that Extension and SRE derive from  
8 Basic has legitimate value for Basic to recover.

9                   Second, Mr. Todd concludes that would  
10 you -- you would limit, consistent with good  
11 regulatory practice, the capital target for Extension  
12 and SRE to a level that reflects sound actuarial  
13 practices.

14                   And that's so that the competitive  
15 services won't retain the benefit of the joint  
16 operations as the subsidy from Basic but rather would  
17 flow back to the benefit of Basic and that whatever  
18 success should be flowed back to Basic systematically.

19                   Mr. Todd is an economist, indicated a  
20 preference for lump sum rebates as opposed to rate  
21 reductions because it enables you to keep the price  
22 signal on the premiums for insurance at a cost base  
23 level.

24                   In this slide, we're moving from  
25 Mr. Todd to what this Board has historically done in

1 terms of the relationship between Extension and Basic  
2 and the rate stabilization reserve target.

3           First of all in our client's  
4 conclusion, this Board has endorsed the concept of the  
5 rate stabilization reserve as a vehicle for protecting  
6 customers from rate instability from one time only  
7 events or significant variances.

8           Second, it has considered the adequacy  
9 of Basic reserves within a broader conversation of the  
10 overall health of the Corporation. It's looked at  
11 Basic reserves, but it's also looked at reserves for  
12 the other lines of business.

13           Third, it has adopted an  
14 evidenced-based approach to the approval of RSR levels  
15 grounded in a one (1) in forty (40) risk tolerance,  
16 and the recognition that excess conservatism and risk  
17 tolerances is inconsistent with fairness and social  
18 utility.

19           Fourth, it has expressly rejected the  
20 hundred percent MCT as an upper RSR target. And  
21 fifth -- and we'll come to this in a couple seconds --  
22 it has asked whether the benefit provided to Extension  
23 from Basic is fully reflected in cost allocation  
24 principles.

25           Sixth, it has established cost

1 allocation rules to prevent more narrowly defined  
2 subsidies, and seventh, it has sought express  
3 statutory authority to regulate Extension and again,  
4 as recently as last year's hearing, question the  
5 utility of excess reserves in the Extension and SRE  
6 lines of business. That's the historic practice.

7           To date, what the Board has not done  
8 which is the logical step from Mr. Todd's analysis, it  
9 has not imputed excess profits from non-utility lines  
10 of business into its Basic rate calculation or its --  
11 its reserve calculation.

12           And to date, the Board has not  
13 recommended mechanisms, to our client's knowledge, to  
14 improve competitive outcomes for the Extension line of  
15 business.

16           The point of these two (2) slides is  
17 that the Board has actively been following some  
18 aspects of the analysis set forward by Mr. Todd in  
19 terms of good practice. An evidence-based approach to  
20 risk on the Basic line of business, considering the  
21 relationship between Extension and Basic, but it  
22 hasn't gone those two (2) final steps that are set out  
23 in his analysis: imputing excess profits into the --  
24 into the Basic rate calculation or recommending  
25 mechanisms to improve competitive outcomes for the

1 Extension line of business.

2

3 (BRIEF PAUSE)

4

5 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Just a couple  
6 quotes from prior decisions of the Board. The first  
7 one expresses discomfort with the Basic Extension  
8 relationship and questions arise in both the language  
9 at the top of page 94 as to the wisdom of allocating  
10 costs on a basis that ignores the centrality of Basic  
11 and the value that Basic brings to Extension, SRE, and  
12 DVR -- DVA operations.

13 And then you see later in this -- in  
14 this lengthy paragraph reference to prior practices of  
15 transferring Extension premiums back to Basic.

16 At the bottom of the page, we've also  
17 put in the Board's express rejection of the MCT and  
18 the threshold MCT ratio of a hundred percent as the  
19 upper limit of the RSR target.

20 The Board, at that point in time,  
21 expressing a concern with the degree of conservatism  
22 implied by that target, potentially giving risk to  
23 utilitarian concerns and concerns of moral hazard.

24

25 (BRIEF PAUSE)

1 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Our client does  
2 note a bit of a discussion from our learned friend,  
3 Mr. Guerra, with Ms. Sherry and Dr. Simpson in terms  
4 of the Board's comments last year about the purpose of  
5 the rate stabilization reserve, including the question  
6 of insolvency.

7 And from our client's perspective,  
8 there are many sources saying -- suggesting that, in  
9 the context of rate stability, the concept of  
10 insolvency is of questionable relevance for a Crown-  
11 owned monopoly with annual access to an independent  
12 rate approval process.

13 Those sources include Kopstein, Dr.  
14 Simpson, Ms. Sherry, and Ernst & Young, and the report  
15 done for ICBC. And we're going to go to that Ernst &  
16 Young commentary on the next slide.

17 This is Ernst & Young in 2016, noting  
18 that whereas -- noting why insolvency is such a  
19 concern for the office of the superintendent of  
20 financial insurance and why it's such a concern in  
21 competitive marketplaces and in the MC -- for the MCT,  
22 but how it's of questionable relevance for Crown  
23 Corporations.

24 Whereas a sole private insurer would  
25 face bankruptcy in the event of insufficient capital,

1 leaving policyholders and claimants at risk of not  
2 being fully indemnified for their losses, a government  
3 insurer is implicitly backed by the Government,  
4 meaning the risk is minimal in comparison.

5                   And if we think of the whole OSFI  
6 intent of the MC intent -- MCT intent, those  
7 significant levels of reserves are there because, if a  
8 Corporation is facing having a bad year, if it raises  
9 rates, it loses more market share and gets in a  
10 vicious death circle.

11                   Ernst & Young is arguing here that  
12 that's not the issue when you're looking at a more  
13 narrow question of stability of rates with regard to a  
14 Crown monopoly.

15                   And you'll see there, they're raising  
16 the concern or making the recommendation that  
17 consideration should also be given to whether the  
18 OSFI, O-S-F-I, MCT ratio is the appropriate framework  
19 for setting capital for the Basic product.

20                   How does the proposed capital  
21 management plan of MPI and underlying reserve  
22 regulation compare to generally accepted regulatory  
23 practice?

24

25

(BRIEF PAUSE)

1 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: It may be  
2 implicit, but our client would argue that one (1)  
3 positive aspect of the capital management plan  
4 proposed by MPI is recognition of the concept of  
5 excess profits.

6 Our client is concerned that MPI does  
7 not demonstrate rigour in its assessment of the risks  
8 faced by Extension, but that the actual proposed  
9 transfer of the access in excess of the RSR target is  
10 consistent with the concept of Mr. Todd of excess  
11 profit.

12 Our client's concerns, and some of  
13 these were expressed by Mr. Todd, as well, our -- I --  
14 we don't think MPI has acknowledged it -- acknowledged  
15 that the Extension profits are excessive.

16 And our clients believe that MPI has  
17 not yet accepted that the transfer of excess profit is  
18 not simply a matter of its discretion, but it  
19 consistent with good regulatory practice and the ambit  
20 of the Crown Corporation's Governments Act.

21 I just want to be clear on this point,  
22 Madam Chair, as it gets late in the day. As our  
23 client understands Mr. Todd's authority -- or Mr.  
24 Todd's advise, and also the legislation itself, the  
25 point he's making is that the benefit flowing to

1 Extension that enables its market dominance and excess  
2 profits, it is appropriate for the Public Utilities  
3 Board in its rate setting analysis to impute tho --  
4 those excess profits into the Basic rate calculation.

5           The Public Utilities Board cannot force  
6 the Extension line of business to transfer those  
7 profits. But given its authority under the  
8 legislation, given a finding that the benefit and the  
9 excess profit on the Extension side is attributable to  
10 the relationship with Basic, it is consistent with  
11 good regulatory practice to impute those dollars in  
12 the rate setting process for Basic.

13           So, I hope that makes his point clear  
14 and that what he said in evidence on Tuesday morning  
15 which is inconsistent with MPI, they seem to think it  
16 an act of charity, Mr. Todd would say that imput --  
17 imputation (phonetic) of excess profits into the rate  
18 calculation is consistent with good regulatory  
19 practice.

20           And our client would argue that it is  
21 contemplated under the Crown Corporation Governance  
22 Act.

23           So, that's the generally positive side  
24 of the capital management plan. Where our client  
25 takes fundamental disagreement with the capital

1 management plan is if we think of the central role of  
2 this Board, which is balancing interest, balancing the  
3 interest of ratepayers and balance versus the  
4 interests of the Corporation.

5                   In the exercise of that balancing act,  
6 this Board has for a number of years come up with that  
7 risk tolerance level of one (1) in forty (40). Our  
8 clients don't like it. They would like it lower.  
9 Manitoba Public Insurance definitely doesn't like it.  
10 They would like it higher, a one (1) in one hundred  
11 (100) year risk tolerance.

12                   But that's the Board's job, not to make  
13 us happy, but to create that balance in the public  
14 interest. And our client's fundamental concern with  
15 the reserve regulation and the capital management plan  
16 is that that concept of balance has been undermined  
17 because the risk tolerance of the Manitoba Public  
18 Insurance has been substituted for the risk tolerance  
19 envisioned in prior Public Utility Board orders.

20                   That is one (1) of the fundamental  
21 disputes. That authority that has long resided in the  
22 Public Utilities Board to approve the RSR level, to  
23 approve the methodology, including risk tolerances,  
24 had been undermined, usurped by the regulation.

25                   And here you see a discussion with Mr.

1 Johnston. He's asked whether the one (1) in one  
2 hundred (100) year risk tolerance captured in the  
3 Corporation's analysis more closely align with the  
4 risk appetite of the MPI Board of Directors.

5                   And he says, yes, we have been  
6 targeting a hundred percent MCT as our capital, not  
7 just in this application, but in previous  
8 applications. But the hundred percent MCT aligns with  
9 this risk tolerance, that's the comfort level of our  
10 Board.

11                   And it's fine for their Board to have  
12 that risk tolerance, but in independent rate approval  
13 processes, that judgment call, as it has for the last  
14 thirty (30) years, resides with the independent  
15 regulator.

16                   And our client notes numerically that  
17 Mr. Johnston confirmed that from the lower bound of  
18 the RSR target, based upon a one (1) in forty (40)  
19 risk tolerance to a one (1) and one hundred (100) risk  
20 tolerance, there is an increase up in the range of  
21 about \$200 million.

22                   I think his language at page 1,218 of  
23 the transcript was something, like, about 200, maybe a  
24 little less, 200 million.

25                   So, there is a substitution of the

1 Board of Director of Manitoba Public Insurance's risk  
2 tolerance for the balance determination of the Public  
3 Utilities Board, but where is the evidence of  
4 increased risk?

5                   In this Hearing, Manitoba Public  
6 Insurance has not adduced evidence suggesting a  
7 material increase in risk as compared to 2019/'20.  
8 And if the Board reflects upon the record in its  
9 entirety, the Board will remember comments by Manitoba  
10 Ins -- Public Insurance, saying that, with the  
11 completion of asset liability management, it has  
12 derisked that Basic portfolio.

13                   Our client may take issue with that  
14 factual assertion in terms of derisking, but MPI, if  
15 anything, is suggesting that risk is rel -- reduced as  
16 compared to 2019/'20.

17

18                   (BRIEF PAUSE)

19

20                   DR. BYRON WILLIAMS:    Another  
21 fundamental error -- sorry, area where the capital  
22 management plan approach as envisioned in the reserve  
23 re -- regulation is inconsistent with good regulatory  
24 practice, is in the setting of the reserve targets for  
25 Extension and special risk Extension.

1                   Go back to the logic of Mr. Todd.  
2 Recognize that there's a benefit flowing to the non-  
3 utility business. Recognize the right of the Board to  
4 impute the excess profits back into the Basic or  
5 monopoly calculation.

6                   How does one determine excess profits?  
7 Look at a prudent -- go back to prudence. What is a  
8 prudent risk target for the Corporation? And in this  
9 discussion at transcript pages 1,234 to 1,237, our  
10 client raises with Mr. Johnston the suggestion that  
11 the 200 percent MCT target for Extension is built upon  
12 the myth of competition.

13                   And you'll remember our learned friend,  
14 Mr. Guerra's, cross-examination of Mr. Todd. And he  
15 suggested, on average, the MCT target in the private  
16 sector is a little north of 200 percent MC -- MCT.

17                   And at the top of this page being slide  
18 101, you see Mr. Johnson (sic) be -- it being  
19 suggested to him that the Board of Directors'  
20 deliberations as represented in the 200 percent MCT  
21 target would be analogous to a target adopted by a  
22 number of firms in the private sector and in  
23 competitive markets. Agreed.

24                   And then the suggestion being put to  
25 Mr. Johnson (sic) that, given the 95 percent share in

1 Extension extending back over a decade, a 2018 profit  
2 target in excess of 30 percent and flat expenses,  
3 would it not be fair to describe the assertion that  
4 Extension is a competitive market is a myth.

5                   While Mr. Johnston rejected that  
6 premise in the question, he added more evidence,  
7 noting that it's not only Extension that has that  
8 market dominance, it's -- it's well on the  
9 commercials, the SRE side, where that market dom --  
10 dominance exists, as well.

11                   From our client's perspective, this is  
12 a fundamental weakness in the reserve regulation  
13 analytically and in the capital management plan  
14 because the capital risk targets, the MCT targets for  
15 the MCT -- for the Extension line of business based on  
16 200 percent is based upon the analytical and  
17 mathematical fallacy that the Extension market is  
18 competitive.

19                   Where is that evidence? Excess profits  
20 -- 95 percent market share enduring over a decade.  
21 This record is replete with foundational, fundamental  
22 evidence that that allegation of competition in that  
23 marketplace is empirically mythological.

24                   And Board counsel had an interesting  
25 discussion with Mr. Todd at transcript pages 2,322 and

1 2,323, and put to them elements of, if memory serves  
2 me right, the Manitoba Public Insurance investment  
3 strategy for Extension and SRE, and our client would  
4 urge this Board to go back to that analysis, and if --  
5 if it does so, we think you will accept the conclusion  
6 of Mr. Todd based upon that discussion and consistent  
7 with the information put to him that the kind of risk  
8 that you see with the Basic policy -- policies, those  
9 long-tailed personal injury protection plan policies,  
10 are not being observed in the Extension or special  
11 risk lines of business, further undermining the -- any  
12 suggestion that the SRE or Extension targets are based  
13 upon evidence and based upon market realities and  
14 based upon prudent risk principles.

15           And our client asks a final question on  
16 this subject matter on slide 102, again from the  
17 principle of good regulatory practice. If you think  
18 of Mr. Todd's analysis, the objective was to prevent  
19 subsidy broadly defined to the competitive lines of  
20 business and also prevent anti-competitive behaviour.

21           Recognizing the myth of the competitive  
22 and ex -- or the Extension and SRE lines of business  
23 as competitive, what does excessive reserves --  
24 imprudent reserves in those lines of business do for  
25 the competitive marketplace that is already so

1 fundamentally compromised? More room to lower rates  
2 to preserve market share, more room to, as MPI said in  
3 their Board of Directors' minutes, in -- or  
4 recommendation 2014, to inoculate the market from  
5 competition.

6                   What public interest purpose is served  
7 by ext -- excessive reserves in Extension and special  
8 risk except to further compete the already compromised  
9 competitive balances in these lines of business, and  
10 not to the benefit of the Basic customers from whom  
11 these benefits enure.

12                   There's been a lot of target in this --  
13 a lot of target -- a lot of talk in this hearing about  
14 targets versus ranges. Mr. Johnston has an opinion,  
15 Ms. Sherry has an opinion, Dr. Simpson has an opinion.  
16 Mr. Todd put the subject and the issue, I think, in --  
17 in good light, drawing analogies is with the revenue  
18 cost coverage ratio in Hydro, 95 percent to 105  
19 percent, one (1) of the objectives being more rate  
20 stability, the point being that a range is more  
21 consistent with the objective rate stability than a  
22 target.

23                   And our client -- before we leave that  
24 slide, with my apologies, Ms. Dilay -- will note that  
25 there are circumscribed rules around the MPI Capital

1 Management Plan, the five (5) years to -- to build it  
2 up, the three (3) years to bring it down, but still  
3 will suggest strongly that if rate stability is the  
4 objective, that whatever the determined target number,  
5 it's better achieved with the range around that number  
6 rather than a target.

7                   We're going to come back to item number  
8 4 in just a minute, and I will shut up, no doubt to  
9 your pleasure. But I wonder if we can go to -- to the  
10 next one.

11                   One (1) of the que -- the last  
12 questions that I'll be challenged with addressing is  
13 if the reserve regulation is neither lawful or binding  
14 what weight, if any, should be given to that document?  
15 And I'll confess -- I'll confess to this Board that I  
16 didn't come across that -- that question till about  
17 four o'clock in the morning, so I started to look at  
18 the -- at the Crown Governance Act and the -- and  
19 other legislation, and from our clients' perspective,  
20 this is how we would approach this issue.

21                   Just one second.

22

23   (BRIEF PAUSE)

24

25                   DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: I've made this

1 mistake once before, but I also made it on this slide.  
2 When we're speaking of the legislative amendments,  
3 those are 2018 amendments, with my apologies to the  
4 Panel, and I -- I've made that mistake on the record.

5           But the starting point for our answer  
6 to this question is, let's go back to those changes to  
7 the Crown Corporations -- the introduction of the  
8 Crown Corporations Governance Act replacing the Crown  
9 Corporations Review and Accountability Act, as well as  
10 changes to the MPI Act.

11           What was the legislative purpose of  
12 those amendments? And Ms. Dilay will speak to this,  
13 and you'll see it in our written brief, but Minister  
14 Schuler, in introducing those amendments, spoke of  
15 clarifying the rules of government, the Corporation,  
16 and the PUB, clarifying the roles. Minister Schuler  
17 also spoke of the desire to reduce political  
18 interference. So what was actually done in those  
19 legislative amendments?

20           First of all, the express power of the  
21 Cabinet with regard to vehicle insurance in terms of  
22 the rate approval process was removed. That power  
23 that had been in the legislation for decades, under  
24 what is now known as Section 33 of the MPI Act, was  
25 taken out with regard to vehicle intersher --

1 insurance.

2                   So that's one (1) of the acts of  
3 clarity from the legislature, in its wisdom, get  
4 government, get politicians out of the business of  
5 vehicle insurance rates.

6

7                   (BRIEF PAUSE)

8

9                   DR. BYRON WILLIAMS:    So that's the  
10 first step of our analysis.

11                   The second step in the analysis was  
12 recognizing that the Crown Corporations Governance Act  
13 is about clarifying the respective rules of  
14 government, the Corporation, and the PUB, what tools  
15 are in that Crown government -- governance -- lead --  
16 lang -- legislation for government to communicate with  
17 the Corporation or -- or the Public Utilities Board?

18                   Well, there are two (2) tools in the  
19 legislation. One (1) is a mandate letter under  
20 Section 6, and one (1) is a directive to the  
21 Corporation under Section 13(1). From our client's  
22 perspective, the directive to the Corporation, the  
23 language of that provision, Section 13, does not  
24 contemplate the type of activities such as the reserve  
25 regulation. And in terms of the mandate letter, that

1 is directed to the Corporation, not to the Public  
2 Utilities Board.

3                   So from our clients' perspective, if  
4 you think of the long-standing independence of the  
5 Board is in trying -- in trying first, and the Crown  
6 Corporations Public Review and Accountability Act and  
7 the Crown Governance Act, the express removal of the  
8 power of cabinet in any regard with regard to vehicle  
9 insurance rate setting, and the absence of a tool in  
10 the legislation -- legislation defined to clarify the  
11 respective rules of government, the Corporation, and  
12 the PUB, from our clients' perspective, the reserve  
13 regulation, if it is neither lawful or binding, is  
14 interesting information.

15                   But if one thinks to the intent of this  
16 legislation in 2018, to put government in its proper  
17 role, to put the Corporation in its proper role, and  
18 the PUB in its proper role, what more can it be?

19

20                   (BRIEF PAUSE)

21

22                   DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Our client did  
23 not create the dilemma imposed by the cabinet action,  
24 and neither did Manitoba ratepayers. If the cabinet  
25 wishes to remove the thirty (30) year old independent

1 authority of the Public Utilities Board in terms of  
2 rate stabilization reserves, in terms of their  
3 methodology and their level surcharges and rebates,  
4 the answer to cabinet is not to propose a regulation  
5 that is not within its authority as an interference in  
6 rate setting, but to propose a legislative bill which,  
7 if passed by the legislature, could turn back the  
8 clock on independent rate app -- approval.

9 But from our clients' perspective, in  
10 light of the legislative changes established in 2018,  
11 that regulation by itself is deserving of no weight.

12 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: Sorry, Mr.  
13 Williams, can I just interrupt you for a second?

14 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: I was hoping I  
15 could sneak through that comment, sir.

16 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: Go back to the  
17 last chart. No, it's just --

18 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Yeah.

19 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: -- I want to  
20 clarify for the record. Your comment was, Our client  
21 did not create the dilemma imposed by cabinet action.

22 And the wording is, The PUB did not  
23 create the dilemma imposed.

24 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: So --

25 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: Which -- which

1 one is it?

2 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: I would say both,  
3 Mr. Chair (sic). So -- so the point I was simply  
4 trying to make --

5 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: No, I understand  
6 the point.

7 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Yeah.

8 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: I just want to  
9 make sure that --

10 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Yeah. Yeah. So  
11 --

12 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: -- that the --  
13 the record is accurate.

14 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Yeah. And what I  
15 -- what I erred in, sir, the intent of that arrow was  
16 to say that ratepayers did not create the dilemma, nor  
17 did the Public Utilities Board. And my apologies for  
18 misspeaking.

19 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: You're fine.  
20 That's fine.

21

22 (BRIEF PAUSE)

23

24 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Finally, from my  
25 perspective, if the reserve reg -- regulation is

1 lawful and binding, the question was posed by the  
2 Board: is the Capital Management Plan consistent with  
3 it?

4

5 (BRIEF PAUSE)

6

7 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: From our clients'  
8 perspective, if the reserve regulation was validly  
9 enacted and binding on the PUB for rate approval  
10 processes, Manitoba Public Insurance's current capital  
11 position and its proposed Management Plan are not in  
12 compliance with the reserve regulation.

13 That reserve regulation doesn't say,  
14 create a range around MCT of 100 percent. It does not  
15 say, build up to MCT of 100 percent over five (5)  
16 years.

17 That rate reserve regulation, if valid  
18 and binding, which our clients deny, imposes mandatory  
19 language. The minimum amount the Corporation must  
20 maintain in its Basic insurance RSR is the amount  
21 determined using an MCT ratio of 100 percent, the  
22 minimum amount the Corporation must maintain.

23 MPI embarks upon a novel and creative  
24 effort to sidestep the mandatory language of the  
25 reserve regulation, both in PUB-MPI Information

1 Request 1-100 and Undertaking 18. But that dancing  
2 around the regulatory language, the mandatory  
3 regulatory language, cannot be reconciled with the  
4 reserve regulation itself.

5                   And our client adds that there has been  
6 no legislative fact evidence adduced to undermine or  
7 challenge the unambiguous regulatory language. And  
8 just on that point, and Ms. Dilay will talk about it  
9 more, in our client's analysis of the evolution of the  
10 statutory regi -- regime, we do rely upon statements  
11 made, whether in Hansard, in the legislature, or in  
12 the Kopstein report prior to the development of the  
13 legislation to give insight into the legislative  
14 intent.

15                   That is what is known as legislative  
16 fact evidence. There is no such legislative fact  
17 evidence on the record that would in any way undermine  
18 the unambiguous regulatory language.

19

20                   (BRIEF PAUSE)

21

22                   DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: So -- so Madam  
23 Chair, just in terms of timing, I did go fifty (50)  
24 minutes longer.

25                   Ms. Dilay's available today. Would it

1 -- we're at the Board's -- you sh -- we will do as you  
2 -- we can keep going, or we can stop and then resume  
3 in the morning -- or she can, anyways. We're at your  
4 -- we'll -- we'll wait for your guidance.

5

6 (BRIEF PAUSE)

7

8 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And Madam Chair,  
9 I apologize. Ms. Dilay reminds me that if you do have  
10 presentations on the non-law -- or, presentations --  
11 questions on the non-law side -- or, the not -- I -- I  
12 can make myself available to answer those as well.  
13 It's obviously where -- whatever you decide.

14 THE CHAIRPERSON: Well, perhaps what  
15 we could do is this. I would think that if Ms. Dilay  
16 were able to start and continue uninterrupted, that  
17 would be preferable, which would be tomorrow morning.  
18 But if there are questions with regard to your portion  
19 of the presentation, perhaps we could deal with those  
20 now. Is that acceptable to you?

21 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Yes, and thank  
22 you for your guidance.

23 THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

24

25 (BRIEF PAUSE)

1                   BOARD MEMBER GABOR:    Mr. Williams, the  
2 only -- the only question I have -- you made a  
3 reference to ICBC and the interference there, and I'm  
4 -- I'm trying to understand what the interference  
5 there is. I -- I know of situations, quite frankly,  
6 where the government has issued an Order in Council  
7 saying here's what the rate is, contrary to -- to the  
8 Board. I -- I don't know if that's what you're  
9 talking about or if you're talking about something  
10 else.

11                   DR. BYRON WILLIAMS:    Yes, and thank  
12 you, and I apologize for being imprecise. What our  
13 client was referring to -- as everyone knows, the  
14 Insurance Corporation of British Columbia is in  
15 significant financial distress. I think that's on the  
16 record of this -- this proceeding.

17                   Our clients' understanding of some of  
18 those events, both based upon the record in documents  
19 they've reviewed as well as from media commentary, is  
20 that on -- on more than one (1) occasion, the  
21 indicated rate, the rate necessary to -- was -- was  
22 politically interfered with by the Cabinet at the  
23 time.

24                   So that was what I was trying to refer  
25 to, sir. And -- and the -- the point that I was

1 inelegantly trying to make is that from our clients'  
2 perspective, the independence of the Board as set on  
3 the statute is -- is sacred, and it's sacred because  
4 one doesn't know whether it will be a government  
5 making a well-meaning intention or a politically --  
6 well-meaning recommendation or exp -- expedient ones.  
7 Once there starts to be that interference in the  
8 independent rate setting process, then our client  
9 believe (sic) that undermines the integrity of the  
10 process but also undermines and -- and puts at risk  
11 ratepayers.

12                   And I'll just finish to say that those  
13 are the specific examples, but even the kind of  
14 Cabinet directive setting out risk targets, which was  
15 allowed under the BC legislation, different than our  
16 legislation -- from our clients' perspective, it begs  
17 the question, who's better placed and situated to --  
18 to do that. And certainly, the Manitoba practice has  
19 been the independent regulator.

20                   BOARD MEMBER GABOR: Right. But I  
21 just want to clarify, this was by way of Order in  
22 Council as a directive to the utilities commission in  
23 BC --

24                   DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Yes, as  
25 authorized under the legislation, sir.

1 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: Right. Okay,  
2 thank you.

3 THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much  
4 for you presentation, Mr. Williams. And just subject  
5 to comments from PUB counsel, I understand we have the  
6 other Interveners who will be presenting tomorrow,  
7 together with our continuation with Ms. Dilay first  
8 thing in the morning. From a timing perspective, is  
9 that going to be acceptable?

10 MS. KATHLEEN MCCANDLESS: I -- I  
11 believe so, yes. So I have been in touch with counsel  
12 for all of the Interveners who have not yet presented.  
13 Counsel for CMMG gave a time estimate of fifteen (15)  
14 minutes. I believe Mr. Unfried's estimate was ap --  
15 approximately an hour, but he can correct me if I'm  
16 wrong. A little more? Maybe...

17 MR. CURTIS UNFRIED: I expect that  
18 we'll be closer to an hour and a half.

19 MS. KATHLEEN MCCANDLESS: And Mr.  
20 Monnin is -- he said about thirty (30) minutes to  
21 maybe an hour at the outset -- outside, so.

22 THE CHAIRPERSON: Okay, thank you.  
23 And we have the day reserved tomorrow, so I think we  
24 should be capable of finishing that then, well within  
25 that time frame.

1                   So thank you very much to everyone.  
2 We'll adjourn for the day and start tomorrow morning  
3 with Ms. Dilay. Thank you.

4

5 --- Upon adjourning at 4:05 p.m.

6

7 Certified correct,

8

9

10 \_\_\_\_\_

11 Wendy Woodworth, Ms.

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25